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
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THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAR

**The American Armies
Abroad and At Home**



Drawn by Joseph Cummings Chase

General John J. Pershing
Commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

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VOLUME V

The United States in the War

The American Armies Abroad and At Home

INTRODUCTION BY MAJOR GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Part I—The American Army in the Field in France

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER B. WOLF
42nd Division, U. S. A.

Part II—The Story of the A. E. F.

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INTRODUCTION

BY MAJOR-GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

THE adjustment of human life, scattered over the earth, passed successively through group and tribal forms into that ethnic shape, which, being a composite of groups and a polyglot of tribes, was termed a nation. On this progression into national units is founded the state of things now confronting us. The unification of lesser elements into national form became necessary as the sparse settlement of territory was superseded by nuclei—knots—of population assembled and living so as to take advantage of the natural facilities of a particular desirable region, and at the same time to assure mutual security against disturbance by a self-defense which was only possible where one cluster of individuals was able to keep in personal contact with at least one other similar cluster. Unification was the tendency. An easier and better livelihood was the object. Communication, in its most rudimentary form, between islets of population was one of the means and one which, as population increased and forms of life became more diverse and interests more complex, took on an ever-growing significance.

The unification was not always accomplished by reason and in amity. Compulsory unification, through terror, by fire and the sword, and through the coldly calculated agency of War, was very frequently present, as the illuminated and bloody pages of history will suggest. Even as late as the era of Christ, literature was so stressed by the combats and conflicts out of which national boundaries and national units grew, that when Tacitus, in his *Germania*, wrote a cool and catalogic study of the economic life and the arts of peace of a Germanic tribe, his splendid contribution was, and has ever since been, viewed as exceptional.

As nations began to show themselves, there arose in each a sort of committee on measures and standards, whose duty it was to estimate and appraise results of past policies and from the facts thus obtained and in the light of the needs of the nation, to fix those future policies which were best designed to serve its ethnic interests.

The deliberations of this body, according to the general impression that has arisen, and as in the case of recent peace deliberations, were behind closed doors. The conclusions were, it seems, recorded in the minds of those who took part. What they were the future action of the nation, or, perhaps, the unguarded memorabilia that one or the other of these deliberators left to his posterity, revealed. The person or persons entrusted with the making of momentous decisions of this sort



Major-General Douglas MacArthur

necessarily stood at the apex of the organization of the state. Sometimes it was the monarch himself, other times it was the prince or monarch as the mouth-piece of the conclusions of his especial adviser. In later days, and recently in Germany, it was neither of the two, but a whole class, who had made such subjects of life study and work. Whoever was charged with this task in the organization of any particular state,—whether monarch, counsellor or class,—has gone through history under the name of statesman.

The completed century that concerns us, one terminus of which was the close of the Napoleonic war period and the other the conclusion of the World War, was characterized by a unification, intranational and international, such as history had not heretofore presented. This great movement of regroupment and closer alignment, which is one of the surest indicia of the advance of civilization, was furthered by an unparalleled fecundity in science and invention. The example of the newly launched republic of the United States, with the principles of union that it stood for and that its Constitution made crystal clear, was consistent with this movement and, in fact, the augury and forerunner thereof. Indeed, it must have been often the inspiration, as well as the guide.

Thus, in the century now passing through its last days, the British Empire arose, a united Germany came forth, Japan was linked with Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and Italy changed from an amorphous group into compact and definite form. With these movements will be identified the names of Cavour in Italy, von Stein and Bismarck in Germany, Prince Ito and Okuma in Japan, Gambetta in France, Disraeli and Gladstone in England. Immeasurably in advance of all those, as has been suggested, was the United States, with Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and Monroe of that enlightened group of inspired and advanced thinkers who set down the Constitution. This particular century, applying to its movement of unification inventions that brought all parts of the world closely together and raised communication (on which, as we have seen, the first beginnings of a closer form of life were largely dependent) to its pinnacle, could not fail to be marked by the greatest activity and growing complexity. Units transcended their urban or material bounds and became molecular in character. Parts previously in obscurity so far as intercourse with the outside was concerned, were brought into the bright light of world trade. The smaller and less advanced or enlightened countries, those in the Balkans and those that went to make up Turkey, became fields for the forces of unification of one or the other of the great nations and the corresponding object of concern to the rest of the world. In retrospect, it seems incredible that at the beginning of the century about to close one of the greatest minds of his time said that our birth was "but a sleep and a forgetting."

At the beginning of this same century, and throughout it, a detail of the events comprised in it indicates that those statesmen whom we

have defined above,—who deliberated behind closed doors, momentarily, inasmuch as their decisions necessarily involved the entire civilized world,—came to the conclusion that War was valuable at certain turns in the life of a nation. War, it seemed to them, solved questions economic, religious and moral, otherwise without solution. It gained advantages of a material sort and territory otherwise unobtainable. It was a valuable instrument that should be, of course, sparingly used, but it had its place and its use in the state. Looking towards India, which he then knew was destined to remain clear of his conquests, Napoleon is said to have remarked that the last war for religion or an idea had been fought and that those in the future would be for trade. This accredited animadversion was prophetic of the century that was to be ushered in with his fall. He realized the vast change that was to take place and the economic clashes between great bodies of population that would ensue. He realized that the consolidating, unifying process was under full way, and perhaps he foresaw the great strides that would be taken in the improvement of communications on land and water, under both and over both. Certainly the new century bore out the correctness of his conclusion.

The war which has just closed, however, has made it clear that, irrespective of what statesmen formerly felt as to the advisability of a war fought by great nations, such a conflict under present conditions carries consequences incommensurate with any conceivable material returns; also, that the only war the future would justify between great nations and powers would be one for the perpetuation of an ideal or the preservation of a principle standing at the base of the structure of those nations. This result, and it is thought to be a result which statesmen will recognize, is directly traceable to the application of those features of the closing century which have been suggested.

In the military parlance of the French, the general subject of communications, by road or rail, by light or sound, to the front, to the rear, to the right and the left, between nation and nation, comes under the name of "liaison"—the bringing together of elements. For convenience this term will be employed to describe those communications. The liaison shown to be possible within huge bodies of troops of a nation and between those bodies and similar bodies of its allies, directly contributed to the present day estimate of the value of war as a tool in the cabinet of the statesman. Those forms of individual combat by selected champions, such as the Horatii and Curatii, or between groups or tribes, which were common to the world when it was in its nomad, group and tribal stages, and when its population was small, necessarily gave way to organized, armed bodies as states and nations grew up and as population grew more dense, and liaison, as applied to life in times of peace, grew greater. Finally, as liaison, in times of peace, was brought to an efficiency that had never been had before, and as national units became more considerable and more organized, largely through the medium of such liaison, it was possible to put in the field

in the World War bodies of troops so numerous that the world was shocked when it saw the actual figures, which still remain so great as to be almost incomprehensible. On both sides forces of this magnitude were arrayed. On each side they were so knit and intertwined that the arena of their combat was hardly large enough to contain them and they stretched off, on the Western Front, from the water on one flank, to the spines of the steep mountains that separated France from the Rhine on the other, and were numerous enough to form, on both sides, a line that was sufficiently dense to prevent either side from penetrating without a Homeric effort. Liaison as modernly organized, made it possible to control this vast military alignment and its far-flung battle line.

Under these circumstances elements came into play that had never had an opportunity to operate before: the element of time; economic elements that were involved thereby and in the supply of the line and the support of the civilian population, at a time when existing stocks were being run through, arterial lines of supply were being worn out or impeded and the number of individuals available for the labor of production brought constantly lower.

It soon became apparent that there was a law of diminishing returns applicable when bodies of this size opposed each other on the field of war, and that this law of diminishing returns operated inexorably to show that all the treasure and material advantages that could possibly be gained by such a war would not be commensurate with the losses in men, in property, and in organization, which would have to be suffered in so doing. War could no longer be made good business.

Thus, the past century, as a logical development of its tendency to unification, gave war an entirely different aspect so far as statesmen must view it. This conclusion has been corroborated in the war now closed. It is not meant that in this war the losses that were incurred brought no commensurate returns; only, that these losses brought no commensurate return in treasure and material advantages and in those things which nations in their present form have grown to covet. They did, however, bring idealistic returns, for the idea actuating the Teutonic statesmen in this conflict—and by statesmen is meant the military class of Germany as and when they coöperated with the civil heads of the government—was not imprinted on the world; and the Germanic world policy was shown to be disastrous to a great nation at the time of its marked prosperity. Rather, the results of the World War induce the conclusion that a repetition of war on this scale is only possible for a nation when there is at stake either a basic policy of its existence, or of its theory of the rights of the individuals comprising it.

In that part which the United States played in the struggle, there uprises not an abstract conception, but a clear-cut and commanding

figure—the American Infantryman. In peace times suffering by comparison with the appearance of the lighter-equipped and swifter-moving troops of other arms, and not drawing to his service that glamour of exalted mental attainment in which the more technical services basked, in war he came into his own as the backbone of the American forces in the field and the builder of that credit which his country has received for its part in the struggle. His modesty and his good nature will take him back into the workshops, offices and agencies of normal existence, into garrison life and the special tasks of peace with that same insensibility to the generous estimate of the troops who supported him and whose duty it was to aid him, as he showed to the punishing hazard and the poignant tragedy which he so indomitably overcame. But those of us who saw will not forget. Blue-lipped, smudged with sludge, chilled by the mud and the rain of his fox-hole, forming grimly and without emotion in the murk which the ground was throwing up, as heavy as that which the skies were letting down, he drove through to his objective with a dash, a ferocity and a power that his normal placidity and good nature had belied. During these moments he was transformed. Alertness, initiative and dash overcame weariness and all the tests to which his endurance had been subjected. He would not be stopped; and if the moment offered any advantage which he could gain, he would seize it, under his officers if they were present, by his own ends if they were not. He has written his history in letters of red on his enemy's breast and no man can add to it. But when I think of his patience under adversity, his fortitude under suffering, his resolution under danger, and his modesty under victory, I am filled with an emotion that I cannot trust myself to express. Crusader that he was, he kept the faith unto death that a nation might live to fulfill its destiny.

The United States in the War

PART I. THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD IN FRANCE

By LIEUT. COL. WALTER B. WOLF

42nd DIVISION, U. S. A.

I

THE INITIAL INFLUX

First American Troops Find Outlook for Allies Far From Bright—French Appraisal of Fighting Qualities of Our Troops Cautious and Fair

THE panorama of the activities of the Army of the United States in the field upon which the light of emphasis here is shown is, patently, but a fraction of a series of sections from the larger and self-contained panorama that the closing thirteen months of the war on the Western front revealed. So interleaved in the book of the military activities of the Allied powers, and so interwoven with the fabric of the operations of those powers was the military employment of the United States Army, that it is necessary to consider and keep uppermost, during all phases of the periods to be covered, those general conditions which controlled on the military front from the coast on the west to Belfort and Mulhouse (Mülhausen) on the east.

In reference to the Army of the United States, a most vital factor in its employment was the ascertainment of how and where those combat elements which were from time to time arriving overseas in France, and also in England, might be most profitably engaged, in order to force an early and victorious conclusion of hostilities.

Scarcely a month after the first divisional elements of the United States had commenced their initial and tuitionary tour upon the

front, in that portion of it between Lunéville and Dombasle, a serious check had been administered to the Allied forces when the German had swung back, with a portentous power and a disillusioning success, near Cambrai and the Bourlon woods, and had converted a potential local British victory of great importance into a reverse of even greater importance.

It was administered in November, when active operations for the year of 1917 would necessarily soon come to a close, and the Allies were about to face a winter which, because of the excessive submarine activity and the persistent pinch of reduced food stocks, promised to be, as in fact it was, of unprecedented bitterness. Furthermore, on the Italian front the vigorous and swift invasion by Germany and Austria, down from the bulwark of the Alps into the lowlands perilously close to Venice, at the expense to Italy of a huge haul in prisoners and *matériel*, had made the autumn of 1917 a most disquieting one. In fact, the success of the Central Powers obtained against Italy was so menacing that French and British reinforcements were detached from a front where they could be little spared, and for nearly ten days were being

speeded southward. Owing to this movement, a newly arrived American division, the 42nd, was held at St. Nazaire, its port of entry in France, pending the release of the French arterial railroads from the pressure of this unusual, though not entirely unexpected, development.

MILITARY FRAME OF MIND ON ALLIED SIDE—
WINTER OF 1917-1918

In outlining the most striking of the initial difficulties the then small and then slowly augmented American Expeditionary Forces encountered, it will be readily seen that the military frame of mind was unhappy on the Allied side, and correspondingly hopeful, despite the vicissitudes which the Allied blockade had unmistakably imposed, on the German side. It is not meant that either the French or the British Army despaired of victory. That was not the case. Both of these great armies, and the Belgian as well, as armies, believed at the beginning of the winter of 1917-18, that the Allies would be ultimately victorious. But all were heavily disappointed and deeply concerned by the postponement of victory, which the events of the closing months of the year had augured.

The civilian in France, although not despondent, and although a fine example of stoicism, nevertheless was more restive under the disappointment that the recent events had caused than was the soldier. It is reasonable to assume that following their well-defined custom of periodic leaves of absence, the *permissionnaires* would return to the front reduced somewhat in spirit and in their confidence of victory by the conditions which they had found in their own homes, as well as the hardships of a rigorous and brutal winter that was breaking over them. If it is unescapable that these somber colors dominated the advent of 1918 in France, it is unescapable also that the same reasons aroused an excited anticipation of early victory and elated expectation of it in Germany, both among the field forces and in the civilian population.

The terrors of winter to a large army in the field, even during the flood tide and full flush of victory, or, what is somewhat stronger psychologically, of the anticipation of victory, cannot be overestimated. In that troglodytic

and burrowed mass of organization which the length and breadth of the lines on the Western front still presented in the winter of 1918, the cold, the wet, and the soginess, the havoc caused by occasional thaws, and the immense effort necessary under cramped conditions to manhandle the required supplies of food and ammunition from rear to front, were bound to weigh upon the minds of troops who had previously encountered similar if perhaps somewhat worse conditions. Thus it is that, approaching a period of the severity and duration that winter in northern Europe usually is, it is most valuable to a large command to enter it with the fillip of high hopefulness and confidence in the future.

GERMAN HOPES HIGH

It has been seen that the German passed into it with perhaps more of this feeling than the French or British. Indeed, upon the entry of our Army of Occupation into Germany, frequent reference was made by the Germans, both discharged soldiers and civilians, to the grim difference between the winter of 1917-18 and that of 1918-19. These informants, without exception, would volunteer that perhaps things were a bit snug and supplies high in price and short in quantity during the previous winter, but that to counteract this there had then prevailed the conviction that it would be the last before the German was victorious; that in the one following a conquering Germany would indulge in a plentitude of those things edible and things wearable which the nation was sure victory would bring.

This German feeling, so unmistakably shown after the collapse of her cause to have been existent scarcely ten months before that collapse, was fanned to a glow and to a heat by the multifarious agencies of the well-knit German State. It served to gloss over the rising antagonism to the Imperial Food Administration among the civilian population, and to convey what was invaluable to combat troops at that stage of the operations, a decided, offensive morale.

In the elaboration of the characteristics of the American soldier that is to follow, it will be seen what an important, if not in fact decisively important contribution the posses-


sion of offensive morale was to the results gained. The same is equally applicable to the German command.

With the army of Germany in this frame of mind and its civilian population possessed of this invaluable attitude, with the submarine policy of Germany apparently working to its maximum, and the state a well-oiled machine, it is not surprising that the two great military leaders of Germany on the Western front,

ority in numbers of men, under the then prevailing conditions of stabilized warfare, were indissociable.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OPEN TO GERMAN MILITARY LEADERS

Two courses lay open to the German military leaders. The first was to preserve the military *status quo*. The alternative was to drive a victorious peace.



Newly Arrived Soldiers Debarking at Brest

As many as 30,000 men landed at this port in one day.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff, should shortly appear as the ringmasters in the circus of military operations. The understanding of what the American Army had to do as part of the greater Allied command depends entirely on an appreciation of what Hindenburg and Ludendorff were called upon to accomplish. The initiative lay with the German at this stage. This being so, the Allied operations must necessarily define the German purpose and check it. The initiative, and the superi-

By following the first course, the growing feeling of disappointment in the deferment of victory on the Allied side might be exploited to a point where peace could be gained with little expenditure of either life or ammunition, and without risk of loss either of territory or fortune to the German Government. However, in reasoning to this conclusion it was necessary to presuppose that the civilian population of the Allies would convince their governments that an immediate, if inconclu-

sive peace, was preferable to a continuation of hostilities coupled with hopes of positive returns, and with the rehabilitation of the national fortunes depleted by war, all at some distressingly remote date. It was also necessary to assume that the civilian population of the Allies would force this viewpoint before the combat troops the United States would be able to set down in France were sufficiently numerous to cause the initiative to pass to the Allies. Besides, for the German to adopt this course would be to discount at its full value the recrudescence of hopefulness in a future victory then participated in by his military and civilians.

By following the alternative course of driving a victorious peace, an expenditure with open eyes of additional lives and additional property would be necessitated, with the end in view that this victorious peace once obtained, a vindication by victory of Germany's military policy would be had and the military ascendancy in the state would be indefinitely perpetuated.

It might be, and was, it appears, seriously doubted among the German leaders whether German military leadership and control of the government, both during war and peace periods, would be tolerated if a peace, inconclusive and without indemnity, and without, in fact, any apparent improvement in Germany's condition, and with, in fact, an onerous burden of debt incurred, were concluded. Accordingly, it seemed clear to these leaders that by adopting a policy that any conclusion of hostilities would be a victory because it was not a defeat, instead of a more vigorous policy designed to force a decisive and conclusive victory, those who were compelled to make this choice would likewise be compelled to eliminate themselves from their power in the state. This element—the reluctance of the German military leaders to lose their grip on the state—was doubtless one of the determining factors in the matter.

Until the German General Staff accounting is had and the autobiographical records of Hindenburg and Ludendorff are studied, the cause of the German decision must remain speculative. Perhaps the popular anticipation, both among German line troops and in the German back areas, was such that, irre-

spective of the effect upon the individuals concerned in shaping the policy, those charged with its determination did not dare to blanket these hopes.

It is certain that the German elected the more daring course,—to drive a conclusive and decisive victory. As is characteristic of him, he reckoned the costs, and, though they were very high in life, concluded that, in the old Jesuitical way, the end justified them. As a further characteristic, he set about to prepare a plan for the reduction of the Western front (for at this stage of the war, the entire front had become like a great garrison or fortress which had to be besieged and reduced), that was as grand in its conception as it became, in the face of the opposition opposed to it, grandiose in its application.


We have seen Hindenburg and Ludendorff as the ringmasters. We have seen that, due to his superiority in numbers of men in the field, which promised to be furthered by the impending collapse of the Russian front, and the relatively less mental attrition at home, the balance of optimism as to the future had inclined towards the German. It was on this troubled landscape that the initial influx of the United States Army occurred, and against this murky, and, for the Allied powers, ominous horizon that the stature of the American soldier was silhouetted. From the first the forerunners of the combat troops of the American Expeditionary Forces found the German setting the pace on land, on the sea and in the air.

THE COMBAT VALUE OF OUR TROOPS

The press publicity given the first elements of the American troops to arrive in France left unsaid the actual change in attitude which the presence of these pledges from a great nation of its final commitment to the Allied cause worked in the nations who were to be benefited thereby. The hospitality and the pageantry of their reception is known. Their presence was earnestly and genuinely appreciated. But they found themselves in a country that had been gouged for over thirty-four months by a fatiguing and very bloody war in which their potential value as line troops, although sincerely hoped to be great, was never-

theless undetermined. The pleasure and relief of the French in their arrival was sincere; but back of it was, as may be understood in that most conservative nation, a deep reserve as to the actual value they would be. Not that the French thought that they would be of little value; the contrary was the case. The hopes of all France were undisguisedly that they would prove the peer of any. How-

properties of the weapon handed it before it used the weapon. It gave prompt and every assistance for the demonstration of the fighting qualities of the United States Army, so that when this was concluded the French command had a most clear and competent conception of the limits of the American soldiers' usefulness and was, therefore, when the opportunity arose, able to employ them



Where the Service of Supply Operated in France

ever, the situation in which France found herself by the depletion of her manhood and her resources was so acute, and the peril which she clearly saw to be confronting her was understood by her to be so imminent and great, that all she desired was to know the combat value of the American soldier, and that having been established, to have as many as possible sent to stem the tide. This is the true feeling evinced by the French High Command, and it is to its credit that it was, in a time of great stress, careful and conservative to such an extent as to be desirous of knowing the real

advantageously and without delay. There are times, indeed, when it is of little importance what the antecedents of a considerable body of soldiers are, as long as they are available at the time and the place desired. However, the operations in which the United States Army was engaged were not of this nature. In fairness it must be said that the honest and thorough appraisal of the American troops that was early made by the French was of great value in their employment at the time when Marshal Foch was chosen the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces.

II

IN TUITION AND ON PROBATION

First Combat Divisions in Training for the Front Line—The Hard Winter of 1917-18—American Good Nature Reassuring to the French


AT the beginning of the winter of 1917-18, there were in France four combat divisions of the American Army. The 1st Division was in the area of Gondrecourt, in the valley of the River Ornain, and slightly south of the Commercy-Void-Toul highroad. The 26th Division was centered about the important old town of Neufchâteau in the valley of the Meuse, southeastward from the area of the 1st Division. North, in the valley of the Meuse, east of the area of the 1st Division, the 42nd Division was first concentrated around the town of Vaucouleurs; was later passed southward through Neufchâteau to an area around Grand and St. Blin in the valleys immediately west from that of the Meuse, and was then shifted for a second time further southward below Chaumont, to a large, irregular area extending on both sides of the Chaumont-Dijon highroad from Rolampont on the north to Longeau on the south. Lastly, the 2nd Division, a few elements of which had arrived in advance of the 26th and 42nd Divisions, was located at and radially from Bourmont in the valley of the Meuse south of Neufchâteau, and on both sides of the highroad from that town to Langres.

The artillery brigades of the 26th and 42nd Divisions were not with their divisions, but were simultaneously in training in Brittany at the artillery camp of Coetquidan and rejoined their divisional commands upon the line.

So assembled, the forerunning divisions of the army of the United States, at the approach of winter, presented in a small way the identical difficulties in preparation for battle which were manifested on a large scale when the trans-Atlantic flow of divisions in the spring of 1918 was under way. The 1st Division had about completed its battle training, had

upon the front in the locality of Bures, about emerged from its initial and training tour 12 kilometers (7.4 miles) northeast of Lunéville, and was engaging in such maneuvers on a regimental and brigade scale as the rear area in which it was located permitted. The two recently arrived divisions, the 26th and 42nd, had scratched the surface of battle training, and, since their departure from the United States, had never been assembled or maneuvered as a division excepting in the case of the 42nd Division, in whose case two long changes of station under most adverse weather conditions carried, in spite of all drawbacks, the benefits of a most rigorous practice march. The 2nd Division was present only as a shell, with the units which were to make it up either on the water or broken up and scattered broadcast along the lines of communication that were being built up. These units, necessarily, were relieved from their duty in the rear and regrouped when the training of the 2nd Division was seriously undertaken.

The general conditions upon the front prevailing at this time, made it imperative that irrespective of inequalities in development which have just been emphasized, the separate divisional integers should be prepared for combat service as rapidly as possible, first, in order that they might be available in case the German attempted to drive his initiative to a decision, and secondly, in order that, if they took the front, they might be united under a corps command and function together, a condition which was entirely precluded if there were a great disparity between the responsibilities with which the different divisions might, owing to the state of their training, ability and development for combat, be entrusted.



From Official Government Statistics

Diagram Showing Time Elapsed From Organization of Divisions
to Entering the Line

INITIAL PLAN OF TRAINING

At this stage, and to assure a uniformity among the divisions, the plan was adopted of training the troops in the elements of formations in extended order, in the *matériel* and use of their respective weapons, and in anti-gas defense, and then to send to each of the divi-

sions a regiment or portion of a regiment of experienced French troops, who were to be interleaved with the American troops, and by example would illustrate the application of these fundamentals that had been previously acquired, as well as that more particular use of the special weapons which French experience had taught.

Due to the severity of this winter, the limitations of field exercises were great and were not entirely offset by the interest and enthusiasm with which the American soldier underwent his tuition, and by the sincerity with which his leaders applied themselves throughout this very considerable task.

Among all alike, an unmistakable restlessness was noted, and the gravity of the military situation on the front percolating to the very bottom of the structure of the American Army, created a powerful and undisguised desire to be employed as soon as possible, and to learn the refinements and master the specialties of stabilized warfare in the presence of the enemy.


LEARNING HOW TO LIVE IN FRANCE

It is instructive to consider the living conditions of the body of troops which were receiving instruction. Each of the divisional areas generally comprised ten to twenty small towns strongly built, and, even at this stage

Barracks, a favored form of housing specialized in by the French Army engineers.

In these homes fuel was supplied by the French Government and was rarely plentiful either for the civilian occupants, or for the billeted Americans. The particular section in which the American troops found themselves was not being deforested to any large extent. Wood-cutting was possible only at a very few places, and from these the haul of the cut timber was usually long and difficult.

The barracks were all of a wood construction, of a single thickness, or rather thinness,



From Official Government Statistics

Tons of Army Cargo Shipped to France Each Month

of the war, populous. The troops were either quartered with the civilian population, in which case they were known as billeted, or more closely grouped, if possible, in flat, long, low and narrow buildings containing from eighty to one hundred bunks, according to the type and mode of installation, known as Adrian

usually lined or covered with paper against the moisture. Owing to their want of flooring they were generally cold and very damp, despite the yeoman effort of the wood-fed stoves at either end. Fuel for lighting and electric lights were the exceptions. And thus, with the natural darkness of French type of

village construction and the inescapable gloominess of the Adrian, work by and instruction of the troops could be rarely carried on indoors, while the rainy or snowy darkness of winter in the north of France cut the possible hours of application in the open to a minimum. The cramped and in many cases


BUOYANCY OF AMERICAN CHARACTER

The stamina and cheerfulness of the American troops, who, under the living conditions which were entirely different from any to which they had been accustomed, were undergoing an uninterrupted period of military furbishing, cannot be overstated.

The same good nature, the willingness to make every physical and mental exertion to obtain the desired end, the stubbornness of spirit which was exhibited in the endurance of the intense cold of the winter, while pursuing a course of instruction with unflagging interest, and the general kindliness and chivalry to the civilian old and civilian young—who alone comprised the communities in which the troops found themselves—which were later shown in detail and caused so much favorable comment, were present from the start.

The tall, angular American, youthful in face and with a similar youthfulness of figure, wearing in many instances the light cotton in which he had left the United States, and humorously philosophizing about the last bath that he had enjoyed in a dim and somewhat distant past, was an inspiring figure of encouragement which, it can be definitely stated, contributed in a positive and powerful way to the heartening of the French civilian population. The returned French soldier, seeing this, must have had a similar stimulus, and when he later rejoined his command at the front, it is fair to assume that this confidence in the American character would run through the entire command. And it is believed it did.

The American soldier, in his hours of leisure, did all those things which the press of the country featured. He talked for hours, with the young and the old, starting in the sign language and progressing to a remarkable fluency in an equally remarkably short time. He assisted the old in their duties and the young in their games and pleasures. He occupied the front door steps with his swinging broad shoulders and delighted the infants of the house by tirelessly improvising new and strange amusements. He was the spirit of consideration, the soul of kindness.



Official Government Statistics

The Number of Soldiers Furnished by Each State

uncomfortable surroundings in which the American troops found themselves, served the invaluable purpose of advising them how to "shake down," as the absorption of a large body of troops in an incredibly small space was termed, and how to live in France, experiences which, during the intense activities in the field and rapid shifts and changes of station in which these particular divisions participated in 1918, proved to be particularly useful.

There have filtered through statements of extreme cases of an entirely different sort, of theft and peculation and physical violence by American troops. That there were isolated examples of this even in the earliest days is unfortunately true, but the fact is that they were entirely isolated and represented that very small fraction of bad actors which is

FRONT LINE DUTY AT LAST

Early in January, 1918, the 1st Division took the front with one brigade, commanded by Major General Duncan, then a brigadier, in the line in the locality of Flirey and Beaumont on the southern face of the St. Mihiel salient. Shortly thereafter the 26th Division,



Copyright By Joseph Cummings Chase

Major General George B. Duncan

He was in command of the 77th Division in the Picardy sector, and on the Vesle, and of the 82nd Division in the Argonne.

found in all communities, whether civilian or military, and which infallibly gains a prominence out of all proportion to their numbers. It is also believed that the French population understood this thoroughly and recognized, indeed, the few exceptions there were to the general knightliness of the American soldier.

and then the 42nd Division, entered upon their separate training tours at the front, the former in the locality of Soissons and along the western part of the Chemin des Dames, and the latter on the right flank of the Eighth French Army, which was then holding that part of the line from the east bank of the

Meuse, east of Verdun, on the west to Allarmont, from which point the foothills of the Vosges commence to rise, on the south and east. The 2nd Division, in the meantime, was being hurried to a state where it could follow the two divisions last named, and received its battle training on the line slightly east of Verdun on the left flank of the Eighth



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Marines Trying Out a New Model Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun

French Army near Dieue-sur-Meuse and Sommedieue.

At this juncture it was the plan and intention that the American Army, as and when it was able, should take over a definite portion of the line which corresponded, in a general way, to the limits of the Eighth French Army just described, with portions of the

front in the foothills of the Vosges and upper Alsace added. On all of the published maps the eye notes a sharp break in the front to the south in the neighborhood of Baccarat, where the lines incline sharply to the south and east. The American Army was to take both faces of the angle here formed and to hold a frontage of, roughly, 130 kilometers. With this in view, the lines of communication of the American Expeditionary Forces converged on a point accessible to the front to be taken over, with Is-sur-Tille a needle's eye toward which the lines of supply for the Army from ports assigned to the United States on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean converged. This town had been an important railroad junction lying west of the highroad from Langres to Dijon. In furtherance of the same project, Is-sur-Tille grew into a vast expanse of warehouses, storehouses and plants, and remained throughout the war the great American regulating station, by which is meant the point from which the distribution of supplies by rail is controlled so as to enable the maximum balanced use of the rail lines and to prevent inequalities and delays in the movement of these day-to-day necessities at a time when troops were being simultaneously transported. Convenient as this point was for the front that it was anticipated the American command would take over, it had the manifest disadvantage of remoteness during those operations in which, due to the development of the German plan of forcing the initiative, the American divisions were participants during July and August, and which could not have been anticipated by anyone prior to the early summer of 1918.

As has been seen, the 1st Division was released from training at the outset of 1918, at a time when the three other combat divisions in France were receiving their instruction on the line under French tutelage. On these same grounds many of the following divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces received their instruction and first took the line. However, at the time in question the situation had been changed only by the arrival in the first weeks of the new year of the 32nd Division. The 41st Division, a splendid body of men from the far western sea-

board, had been selected in November, 1917 as a replacement unit, and was functioning to fill the interstices in organization which existed in the combat divisions, and, although

performing excellent service in this regard and supplying to the first arriving divisions excellent men, the 41st Division was never relieved from its replacement duty.

III

STABILIZED WARFARE

The French Organization for the Defense—A System of Three Prepared Positions Linked Up by a Long, Strongly Built Trench

AS the six months we are about to consider was a period of stabilized warfare, it is desirable to outline briefly the conditions of that type of military life.

Stabilized warfare, sometimes known as "sector warfare," had reached the summit of its development by 1918. As the line stretched across the map of France the French organization of the terrain, defined in an authoritative handbook published by the French High Command for distribution to those who might be charged with this organization, answered the identical principles excepting as variations in topography necessarily introduced special modifications. These modifications were always introduced in execution of the spirit of the prescribed principles. Therefore, one saw upon the entire French front wherever there was a trench system, the physical expression of these principles.

The French lines consisted of three main positions: The First, or Forward Position, included the terrain on which battle would be offered in the first instance in case of hostile attack. It usually comprised, where the ground permitted, a Line of Surveillance or Observation situated beyond a crest or rise on its forward slope towards the enemy, back of which and in the rear of the same crest was the Line of Resistance, and still further back, usually a kilometer, but sometimes as far as two kilometers, the Line of Support. Along the Line of Surveillance were disposed outpost and watching elements, small squads of sentinels who served the purpose of observing the No Man's Land, which at this juncture of the war was constantly growing wider,

often to a distance of a kilometer, and of apprising the elements garrisoning the Line of Resistance of anything untoward, or of covering them and giving them an opportunity to make their most effective disposition in case of a surprising incursion. Along the Line of Resistance, which usually consisted of a continuous trench whose axis was parallel to the front and was technically known as the Parallel of Resistance, were disposed the main forward elements for the defense and garrison of the position, called *Groupes de Combat*, conveniently abbreviated as G. C.s, small garrisons of the size of a French platoon (which is usually about half the size of the American unit of the same name, or thirty men) studded along the entire Parallel of Resistance, taking advantage of the principal salient points of the terrain for the defense of the group itself, as well as for the adjoining and flanking groups, and giving an appearance of self-sufficiency and isolation.

THE FORWARD POSITIONS

These groups of combat held a labyrinth of trenches upon which the entrances of their dugouts opened, in which their stores of ammunition, pyrotechnics, anti-gas defense and reserve rations were kept, and in which were housed the entire garrison and such attached elements as were located in small detached posts between two groups of combat to insure the safety of both of them, such as machine-gun squads, and in which were also housed the small detachments detailed to duty in the Line of Surveillance, as well as signal men, artillery, *liaison* personnel and the personnel of

the Intelligence sections, whose tour of duty took them to the front-line trenches. These small mazes of organization, as different in form as were the peculiarities of the terrain, irregular, and ingeniously designed, were, as a general thing, wired in by an independent girdle of barbed wire entirely separate from the cincture of it running across the entire front, stretched usually somewhat in advance of the Line of Surveillance. They were each built on the principle of being self-sufficient strong points, capable of holding out against

fense irrespective of the success of the enemy on the right and left of their particular strongholds. By so doing the *Groupes de Combat* would drive a series of wedges into the continuity of the enemy attack and fragmentate the assault into a series of local engagements in which both the rush and the mutual support of an unbroken wave of assault would be lacking.

THE SUPPORT GARRISONS OF THE FIRST POSITION

In the rear of the *Groupes de Combat* were the Supports, so located in principle as to be able to interpose a desperate opposition to an enemy who had broken through the Parallel of Resistance, and at the same time be so situated as to be able to detach upon request, or when necessary in the judgment of the commanding officer, a number of groups to assist in the engagement in which the *Groupes de Combat* were involved and holding out, with the purpose of relieving and freeing the embattled strong points. The essential thing in the location of the garrisons in the Parallel of Support was, therefore, that it be strong enough to aid the *Groupes de Combat* and likewise to hold the First Position in case the forward parts of the latter were overrun. They were often situated in woods, or what remained thereof, were entrenched and separately wired in, were self-sufficient in supplies, ammunition, pyrotechnics and rifles, had dugouts against bombardment, and were formally organized for the defense with fire steps, light machine-gun positions and riflemen's posts. The particular trick in their location was to find a place in which the garrisons, necessarily much larger than those of the combat groups and varying from a half to two companies, could be conveniently and comfortably housed at such distance from the rear that they would not be caught in the brutal bombardment by the enemy of the combat group, and still be close enough to send supporting detachments to the assistance of those groups over the terrain to be traversed. These garrisons of the Parallel of Support were termed by the French *Points d'Appui*.

The entire organization of the First Position across a certain section of the front was taken over by a battalion, and the battalion



Ulk, Berlin

German View of Art as a Defense

"You shoot behind me—you lie behind me,
"You are assaulting the apex of civilization."

bombardment by the strength of their shelters and against direct assault by the strength of their fire and their wire, and capable of assisting neighboring or flanking strong points by the careful and scientific plotting of the field of fire, so that in case of an assault on a flanking combat group, the enemy would find himself exposed to a heavy volume of fire on his flank. Of necessity these garrisons were equipped with those things which would enable them to carry on their independent de-

section so taken over was known as a "Center of Resistance," which, as has been indicated, consisted of the observation squads, the combat groups in their rear, and in rear of the latter, the remainder of the battalion, which made up the supports.

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES

To connect these three parts of the Center of Resistance were trenches running from rear to front, known as "Communication Trenches," or *Boyaux*, which afforded cover, during the less troubled period of trench warfare, to detachments moving from rear to front, to carrying parties bringing forward supplies of all sorts and cooked rations from the kitchen, and finally, during the moment of attack, to the supporting troops in their advance to the assistance of the embattled *Groupe de Combat*. These communication trenches were often wired on either side and, along their course and convenient to them in small emplacements of their own, were usually located those special arms entering into the defense of the sector, such as Stokes mortars or heavy machine guns and searchlight projectors, observation posts and cotes for the carrier pigeons. The location of these special arms answered the principle that in case they were detected and drew fire, that fire would not be brought down upon the body of the garrisons in the Center of Resistance, and similarly, in case the Center of Resistance or parts of its organization were subjected to fire, the specialties would not be by that fact involved in it.

THE ARTILLERY COVER OR INTERMEDIATE POSITION


Along the entire front the various battalions garrisoned the First Position, and in so doing were supported by the artillery of their command and also by a certain amount of artillery known as the "sector pieces," which did not pertain to their division or larger tactical element, but remained in the sector irrespective of the identity of the troops, occupying it for the general defense and security of the sector. In many cases this artillery was of an unusual caliber, or represented a type which could not be profitably employed for divisional equipment for one reason or another. The

entire artillery of the sector,—and at this point it is well to remark that the word "sector" was a phrase of precision used by the French to indicate that part of the front taken over by a division,—was disposed according to its range and its mode of employment in different zones of remoteness from the enemy front line. This arrangement had the advantage that in a large sector it was nearly impossible to include all of the defending artillery in the enemy plan for offensive preparation, practically impossible by firing into a fixed zone to do a damage commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition and the life of the gun. To increase the mobility, and the difficulty of the enemy in stopping the artillery in the sector, duplicate, and in many cases triplicate, emplacements were prepared for the batteries (both sector pieces and divisional) and often for the various sections of the batteries. From these emplacements data was figured in advance against the different parts of the enemy line upon which fire might become desirable, and the data for the defensive missions of the particular guns was laid out and everything prepared for a periodic rotation of the guns from one position to another with a view of baffling the enemy. In case of gas bombardment, these emplacements prevented entire batteries, or the larger part of their guns, from being silenced by affording a large number of points from which fire could be delivered, some of which, it was conceivable, might not be covered by the enemy gas. However, experience had shown that this concentration of artillery, usually in the rear of the Center of Resistance, despite the fact that the guns were laddered from front to rear in what was known as *echelons*, left a considerable bulk of the defending guns at the mercy of the enemy who might penetrate the First Position at an isolated point, and who, by their superiority in small arms fire, would succeed without much delay in overrunning the artillery position and gaining, at a very small cost, an advance of considerable depth and such *matériel* as they were able to remove to their own line, and thus create an opening which, by being widened and extended on its flanks could menace the entire line by putting an enemy, who had penetrated locally in force, in back of the main

resistance. The reinforcement of the enemy troops at this rift and their employment in swinging wide to the rear might present a critical condition which it was almost impossible to localize without a great loss and entire readjustment of the lines.

As has been indicated, to institute a scheme of organization as complete as the French in principle was, required an incessant and incalculable amount of physical effort. Thus, to prevent this contingency, a position known as the "Artillery Cover Position," or as the "Intermediate Position," or "1 Bis Position" was laid out along the entire French line, to which sufficient of the reserves of the sector were advanced to cover the artillery in case of a break through, and still be in a position to maneuver against the enemy masses that were seeking to penetrate. At many points of the line the Artillery Cover Position was traced on the terrain and the preliminary trenches dug to a depth of a foot, while the wiring and the communication trenches between the Intermediate Position and the First Position, as well as with the Second Position, were planned on paper, but often otherwise incomplete.

known as the "Second Position," organized similarly in principle to the First Position, with its observation posts on the forward slope towards the enemy, a Parallel of Resistance on the reverse slope and a Parallel of Support to the rear. This position was frequently at a further state of completion than the Intermediate Position so far as observation posts and the Parallel of Resistance were concerned. It was generally wired and the posts of a



From Official Government Statistics

Complete Units of Artillery Made in America

Many American divisions turned the spade to dig and swung the mallet to wire the rudimentary Artillery Cover Position.

WHERE THE DIVISION MADE ITS FINAL STAND—THE SECOND POSITION

Finally, in the rear of the three military crests within the French sector was what was

future garrison were indicated upon it and frequent practice in the taking of positions upon it had. On the Second Position the French planned to make their ultimate local resistance; that is, in case the troops garrisoning the sector were unsuccessful in their stand, the corps with which the garrison division was functioning, after estimating the menace of the attack would, in case it re-

solved to defend at a threatened point, throw in the reserve that was available to the corps upon the Second Position and fight it out to a conclusion at that point. If the enemy were successful here he would oppose the resistance that the Army could bring to bear upon other positions usually traced out and studded with artillery emplacements and reconnoitered upon the terrain in the rear.


TRENCH COMMUNICATION LINKING POSITIONS

To tie the entire organization from front to rear and the respective positions involved in it together, the French High Command devised what was known as a *Bretelle* or switch,

tage inherent in the terrain, to place themselves in a strong natural position on the flank of the enemy who was penetrating. Accordingly, as the enemy penetrated deeper the opposition would toughen and increase in point of numbers. The arm of attack, which had been forced through the expanse of the front, would find itself forcing its way into a sort of funnel of organization from which the defenders would be able to pour in a most vigorous fire and resistance.

THE FRONT OF THE EIGHTH FRENCH ARMY

This method of organization of the ground just described had, as the very description



Artillery Available Each Month

which was a long, strongly built trench connecting one position with another that ran, owing to some advantage upon the ground, at an angle to the axes along which the positions it connected were extended. Thus the Switch Position, besides linking the main positions together, enabled the defending troops, when driven back, to give up only part of the intervening terrain, and due to some advan-

indicates, for its main purpose the assurance of the defense of a considerable portion of the line. Within the front of the Eighth French Army at this time the divisional sectors varied in width from eight to twelve kilometers, or four and three-quarters to seven miles. On this frontage the main idea was defense. It had been long since any offensive operations on a large scale had been launched here. The

terrain was an alternation, from west to east, of woods and plains, rolling gently at first, and then, after the frontage of the Woivre was traversed and the Moselle crossed, the woods became more dense and the valleys more deep, especially on that part of the line in front of the Nancy-Dombasle-Lunéville highroad, where there was considerable dense forest along the front. From Lunéville to the eastern boundary of the Eighth French Army there was a regular alternation of clumps of woods, both saplings and great trees, verdant meadows, and the most picturesque, sharply rolling valleys, at the foot of each of which, at this season, was a swollen brooklet that usually figured in the defense of the front.

For a considerable time this frontage of the Eighth French Army had been used as the resting place for tired French divisions, where they could be usefully employed while regaining their vitality and replenishing their numbers. During the winter months it usually showed a very imposing battle order

of first-class divisions which the French High Command planned to employ early in the spring, and whose winter tour of duty on the line it was making as light as possible.

Opposed to the French divisions were German divisions of all classes and complexions with, at this period, a considerable showing of highly rated divisions on that part of the front near Verdun and from Nancy to St. Clement. These divisions were not exerting themselves offensively, however, and so far as could be gathered from the prisoners taken were, at the beginning of 1918, largely absent on leave. The German battle order was, wherever extended, wary and very clever and at all times on the alert. As the American troops came upon the line they found that practically along all this frontage the Germans had held a positive command of No Man's Land, that stretch between the two lines which both sides claimed and which each had to control to guarantee the security of his forward posts.

IV

GERMAN ATTACK BY INFILTRATION

Penetration by Encirclement and Outflanking Executed by Large Forces on a Wide Front

THE German did not accept the French manner of organization of the terrain passively. He had devised a new and decidedly effective plan for setting at naught the French scheme. The essential characteristic of the French scheme was purely defensive and did not lend itself to counter-attacks launched at a moment's notice on a large scale. The French type was a breakwater for the waves of an assault. The Germans accepted this conception, and, apparently, reasoning that if the French plan were constructed to disintegrate the continuity of attack, they would plan an attack by discontinuous elements who would be strong enough to penetrate at some place the exact location of which could not be foretold, and be able

to put themselves in the rear of the French defensive organizations and turn these or attack them in reverse.

Considerable secretiveness was observed as to the German plan. The frontage of the Eighth French Army was never called upon to meet the execution of this plan on a large scale while the plan was still new, with the possible exception of the strong enemy incursion made against the 26th Division on April 20, 1918, in the locality of Seicheprey.

This form of German attack was termed "infiltration." A moment's reflection will show that it required experienced and self-reliant troops to execute it; and pausing right here, it is a positive commentary on the power of the Germany Army at the opening of

spring, 1918, that, in the great assaults attempted by it, it had sufficient troops of a proficiency and experience great enough to insure a successful application of this plan on a large scale.

In order to infiltrate successfully, the command engaged in so doing had to be constantly maneuvered. In the first place, although attacking as part of the unified wave of assault, the infiltrating elements were ready at any moment to be left to their own devices, and without reference to what was transpiring on

this form of attack, always lent cover to the assault and was a positive threat to those troops in whose rear such a natural formation lay.

ISOLATION OF COMBAT GROUPS

To a frontal assault carved out by unified masses and lines, attacking in extended order and applying the lessons of the war in so far as the use of artillery and the speed of the assault were concerned, the French theory of organization for the defense opposed a very

Rifles

Great Britain	1,963,514	
France	1,596,938	
United States	2,505,910	

Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles

Great Britain	179,127	
France	223,317	
United States	181,662	

Rifle and Machine Gun Ammunition

Great Britain	3,428,195,000	
France	2,959,285,000	
United States	2,879,148,000	

Smokeless Powder

Great Britain	291,706,000	
France	342,155,000	
United States	632,504,000	

High Explosive

Great Britain	765,110,000	
France	702,964,000	
United States	375,656,000	

Official Government Statistics

Comparative Production of Ordnance

Showing the relation between the productions of Great Britain, France and the United States from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918.

their flanks, charged with the mission of rolling around and seeping into the teeth of the comb of the French defense as rapidly as possible. They were not required, except to prevent their own extermination, to assault frontally the Allied strong points, but, in a sort of revolving, circling manner, to circumnavigate them. In fact, in the description of this plan of attack the vocabulary of the seas is much more expressive and accurate than that of exact military science. The circumnavigation, of course, was accomplished by virtue of the peculiarities of the terrain. A ravine or a sharp fold in the ground, with

stout obstacle. To isolate strong points, or to encage them and their observation posts in a box barrage, wither them with the heat of artillery bombardment, crumble their trenches and smash in their dugouts by the weight of the metal sent down, was feasible and was practiced frequently. This type of attack was necessarily local. The consequences of it were as terrible as any phase of warfare that the war produced and the stoutness of heart required by the defenders was superlative. It was a very dramatic and very exciting procedure. A few moments after the encaging, destructive artillery fire

had lifted, the enemy assaulting troops who had crept close behind it, taking advantage of the apertures in the wiring which had been prepared in advance, pounced upon the islets of resistance that had been chosen for immolation. It was then a question of a few seconds whether the survivors of the garrison were sufficiently numerous to interpose a defense, and whether, if they were, they would be able to move from their shelter to their battle posts in time to repel the invader. It became a violent *mêlée* in close quarters. It imposed upon the garrison of the strong point the absolute necessity of determining when the artillery preparation had lifted and the assaulting troops might, with but a moment's delay, be expected.

This machinery of assault, however, required an immense amount of artillery and ammunition, and owing to the necessity of a preparation, served to inform the defenders that the assault was imminent. It was, therefore, hardly expedient on a large scale under the conditions prevailing on the front of the Eighth French Army, and it must be stated to the credit of the German High Command that they never, after Verdun, attempted this manner of assault on a many kilometer front. That they singled out special points in the line, either to give them a dose of the rigors of this type of warfare and to shake the spirit of a particular garrison, or as reprisal for a similar treatment of one of the German positions, was doubtless true, as the records of each American division that took the front

during the period of stabilized warfare will reveal.

ELEMENTS OF SURPRISE IN THE ATTACK

The new plan of infiltration carried with it surprise at all stages. The artillery preparation, in many cases, might be, and was, dispensed with. The mists of the morning, the exhalations of the early evening, the natural advantages of forest or cover, all lent themselves to the furtherance of this plan, assuming troops were experienced and skilful enough to execute it. By flowing around the Allied strong points in detached units strong enough to hold their position in rear of the Allied positions that had been circumnavigated, the separate elements of the German assault that had successfully accomplished this would be able to link hands in the rear of the French positions on a large front; or, if not able to do this, a number of elements would be able to consolidate and by attacking the defenders in reverse or strongly on the flank, could deliver a powerful assault with all the elements of surprise included.

It is now known that to prepare the Army for this type of maneuver line troops of the first quality were rotated to the rear, were taught the details of this plan and encouraged in the self-reliance necessary to make it successful, while their officers, all skilled in maneuver, were given additional training calculated to enable them, or their successors in case of casualty, to take advantage by maneuver of the success which the shifting, serpentine column was bound to afford.

V

DIVISIONAL SECTORS—SPRING OF 1918

Problem of Superimposing American Divisions on Sectors Designed for French—Enemy on Alert to Locate American Elements

THE scheme of defense upon the front into which the elements of the American Army were injected has been seen, and the attack that the German was about to broach has been indicated. There remains but to refer to the inherent difficulty of interposing the American divisional units on the French front.

The American division, as is well known, is a tactical unit, so comprised of the different arms of the service and including such weapons, special agencies of both attack and defense,—and possessing such means of transportation as to make it self-sufficient, mobile, and complete in itself for the performance of

the ordinary missions to be entrusted to it. The American division included four infantry regiments, each nearly four thousand strong, three machine-gun battalions, three artillery regiments, two of which were equipped with 75-millimeter guns and the remaining one

one supply, one ammunition and one sanitary train, and a troop of cavalry known as the "headquarters troop,"—a large, multifarious body of men, that in a single column would extend over fifty kilometers (31.2 miles) of French road and for the movement of which,



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American Machine Gunners at Rest

The Machine-gun Units played a part of steadily increasing importance as the war progressed, as is proved by the heavy losses they inflicted.

with 155-millimeter howitzers, one trench mortar battery, one engineer regiment, one field signal battalion, which included a wire company, a radio company and outpost company, two companies of military police (later modified to a single military police company, the remaining company being detached for duty with the army net), and one engineer,

with their field equipment, by rail (motor transportation being excluded) fifty-nine standard troop trains of fifty cars each, were required.

THICKENING THE LINES A DISADVANTAGE

The infantry of the American division was about twice the number, and the machine-gun

v—2

elements about one-half greater than in the French division at this time. The French form of organization, as has been seen, was designed to accommodate complete combat units, such as a battalion, as entireties in the defensive scheme, each battalion unit usually holding one Center of Resistance. To substitute the American battalion for a French battalion, under these circumstances, would have been to thicken the garrisoning of the line at a time when the entire tendency was to thin out as far as compatible with defense. Thickening the garrisoning of the lines was, under the French scheme of islets of resistance, a positive disadvantage. The small labyrinths which constituted the strong point could accommodate a limited number in its shelters. To build additional shelters sufficient to hold a double garrison, or to remodel the old and abandoned ones and make them habitable for those numbers, would have been to attract the attention of the enemy for no useful purpose, would probably have resulted in interference of the work by his artillery and a number of raids on the site of the work to see what it was all about, and more seriously, would expose a greater number to artillery fire and to the difficulty of maneuver in those few brief moments when the barrage lifted and the enemy assault was made. It would make more to feed. It would require more to carry for those fed, thereby increasing the delay in this respect. And finally, in time of assault it would have contributed very little to have twice the number of men present in strong points in which maneuver was difficult and where only a certain number of effective battle posts could be established.

Accordingly, the American organization had to be adapted to the French scheme of defense, not by modification of the American organization, but by the exercise of skill in disposition and administration of battalion units. This identical problem was presented to each of the American divisions on the front of the Eighth French Army, and the solution of it was invaluable to the understanding of this type of warfare on the part of the commanders involved and on the part of the divisional staff.

AMERICAN DIVISIONS GO IT ALONE

The American divisions took their share of responsibility as and when it was entrusted to them, without trepidation or apprehension. The 1st Division took the front early in January, as has been stated, with one brigade in the line. At the end of March the 26th Division was withdrawn from its training area near Soissons, and the 42nd had just completed its tour of training by interpolation with four French divisions, the 41st, 164th, 13th, and 128th, all of the Seventh Corps, commanded by General de Bazelaire.

This division had an invaluable series of experiences in its training period, somewhat unusual for American divisions. The front of the four divisions on which it was receiving its training extended about 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the north of Dombasle to the eastern boundary of the Eighth French Army. This front had been quiescent for a long time, and on part of it, as has been seen, the 1st Division took its training tour, beginning on October 23rd of the previous year. During the last week in February the French raided, swiftly, powerfully and deeply in the forest of Parroy, north of Lunéville, and at two other points to the east, after severe artillery preparation. The result was one of the most successful of the war, with the total bag of nearly a thousand prisoners.

GERMANS STUNG TO RETALIATION

This minor operation stung the German to reprisals and this front was soon galvanized into one of unusual activity. In the sector of the 128th French Division, on the right flank of the Eighth French Army, the German, early in March, immediately north of Badonviller, singled out two combat groups which he had been annoying for years, for artillery destruction; encaged them, pounded them, and tried to wipe them out by assault at dawn. Although he did great damage, he was unsuccessful and did not set foot in the American lines. Later, on the left, he drenched the woods of Parroy with strong gas bombardment, similar to the kind that had just before been set down on the 1st Division and shortly

thereafter was loosed on the 2nd Division. These three attacks gave these units of the American Expeditionary Forces more useful guidance in the use and offensive purpose of gas bombardments than could have been gained in any other way. The 42nd Division participated, as did the others in a similar period, with the French in joint, carefully prepared raids and under these auspices took its first prisoners.

On March 21st, the German launched his great spring attack. For a number of days previous the entire Lorraine front had been treated to considerable artillery fire, the object of which was to hold troops where they were by threat of an impending attack. As the day for the German offensive approached, the diversion on the front of the Eighth French Army grew greater and the three American divisions on the line, two of which were as yet unreleased from training, thoroughly enjoyed this artillery diversion and eagerly hoped that it would be more than a mere threat.

The combat spirit of the American troops at that time was, as it always remained, excellent. The wet of approaching spring and the discomforts of an entirely new type of life were as yet novel and served to enhance this spirit. The raids on which the troops had gone, the prisoners they had taken and the consciousness that the enemy had set down a considerable artillery offensive upon them which they had successfully passed through, gave them assurance. Without exception, the American units were tired of training and very eager, if not impatient, to go it alone. The French commanders, who had been most considerate, most attentive and most conscientious in their desire to induct the new American units into their responsibilities in a conservative and thorough manner, were frank in showing their appreciation of this spirit and thought the time for the release of these troops from training had come, and, it is understood, so recommended on numerous occasions.

TRUE ENTENTE CORDIALE BETWEEN FRENCH AND AMERICANS

The relationship between the officers of the French Army and those of the American Army during the instruction period were most cordial and in all respects admirable, while be-

tween the soldiers this comradeship and fraternity in arms was reassuring and pleasant to see. The Frenchman was stirred by the vigor, the interest and the aggressive spirit of the American; he was touched by the American generosity; was impressed with his agility and adaptability; and sincerely loved him for his courage. The American admired the thoroughness and determination of the Frenchman, his orderly habit of thought and manner of life, his skill in the improvement of his position, his understanding of his duties, and his great personal bravery. In the mud they slushed along together, one youthful, and the other, apparently aged, owing to his hirsute appearance and the general maturity of his physique, both making themselves understood without limitation, and each sharing with the other the delicacies of their kitchens.

Hidden in the trees and masked by a decided rise that intervened between them and the enemy, and preserved from the inquisitive gaze of the impertinent German airman by a bower of boughs and similar concealments, and blending their smoke with the mists of the morning or the exhalations of the evening, the kitchens of the French attracted a host of American visitors; and surely the same is true of those of the Americans.

Further back, where the reserve troops were living in abandoned towns and the kitchens were concealed between walls and where were kept the great French wine vats, there were suspicious congregations of frank and decidedly bright-eyed Americans, and stolid, stocky Frenchmen, the latter with their toes turned out and both hands thrust deep in their trousers pockets, and that air of moody, placid meditation which is peculiar to the French soldier, which has given an unmistakable shape both to his figure and to his uniform. It was never a noisy gathering, and apparently no one said very much, but there was a noticeable friendliness about it and striking accord.

The American troops had gone in, company with company and battalion with battalion of the French, and the French had then entrusted to them duties which the French units of this size had performed. Close association for a number of months of the soldiers in both armies, at a time when the American troops were in a decidedly receptive frame of mind,


laid the foundations for a future in which both commands enjoyed an enviable mutual regard for each other. In the joint raids undertaken by the French and the Americans, the former trudged ahead in his observant, deliberate, meditative way, just as he had moved around the kitchens, and the American beside him went forward with the youthful, intelligent, wide-awake alertness that the strangeness of it all had elicited from the start. It was a very interesting pair; the clever, wary, hard-pulling man in horizon or dark blue, and the strong, vigorous and quick man in khaki, both of whom seemed fond of each other, probably more for the reason that they were both possessed of a genuine manhood than for any other cause. Certainly during this stage and so far as the joint, or coöperative employment of the French and American troops is concerned, at any stage, this splendid unison and respect prevailed without semblance of suspicion or breath of recrimination. It is to the credit of the American that he recognized the accomplishments of the Frenchman and tried to understand what lay behind them, and to the other's credit that he was modest regarding his attainments, rarely self-assertive and genuinely interested in imparting them thoroughly and in detail. The stubbornness and determination of the Frenchman that is seen in so many other things, applies equally to his military conclusions and viewpoint. He does not readily change these, and it was therefore decidedly easier for the Frenchman to influence the American than vice versa. However, this tenacity in viewpoint did not detract from the amity of the relationship. When it is remembered that the American divisions, excepting those on duty with the British command, served under the French command until about seventy days before the armistice the incalculable effect of the way the American and French soldier hit it off upon the entire military situation may be understood.

THE GERMAN DRIVE BEGINS

On March 21, 1918, the German struck, in the main against the British Army. He had elected the more daring course, and his initial results were striking. The effect on the Allied line was instant. Amiens was threatened, Montdidier lost. The German was

threatening to reach the junction of the Oise and the Aisne. The French responded magnificently. Besides making every effort to stem the tide in the locality of Montdidier, they combed their front for divisions which could be released for duty to repair the loss that had been so strongly inflicted. Their reserves must have been very small, nearly at the vanishing point. Apparently, on top of great superiority in numbers, the German had asserted his initiative in the game by making a spectacular advance and by again threatening the coast and the British northern line of communications. The French handled the situation heroically, filled with determination, and stiffened wherever it was necessary.

At this juncture it is well to remember a thing which the defensive operations of the Allies later showed, that an offense, no matter how well prepared, has its own limitations in



Harding in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*

The Iron Cross

point of advance; that with the large number of troops now employed, with the immense amount of transportation necessary to bring forward the requisite day-to-day supplies of food and ammunition to carry on the advance, there comes a point when the exhaustion of the men, the density of travel on the road (if, in fact, it has been so well regulated as not to amount to congestion), and the consequent delay in feeding and supplying the troops at the head of the arrow, causes the knife of attack, no matter how sharp, to meet



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Major General William G. Haan

He was in command of the 32nd Division at Juvigny and in the Argonne; later he commanded the 7th Army Corps, Army of Occupation.

a fibre which is so tough as to prevent penetration. A limit in days, as well as kilometers, to the assaults that have been attempted in 1918, is clearly noticeable in each separate operation. Thus it was that the German assault was bound to slow itself up, and when it had slowed up sufficiently, was rejected by the vigorous manner in which the French and British forces standing opposed to it stabilized and commenced the organization of the front for defense.

ALLIES MAINTAIN THEIR DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE

The general defensive attitude up to this time has been shown. The facts in March and the beginning of April, 1918, served to make it more emphatic. A time arrived shortly thereafter, with the influx in large numbers of the American divisions and other combat units when it was frequently stated that open warfare was desirable, meaning an opportunity for freedom of maneuver back and

clear of organized positions and a chance to deal daringly with moving masses of men. It was thought that when this condition prevailed the end that was being sought would arrive more quickly. This was doubtless true; it would have arrived more quickly. However, at the particular stage in question it was manifestly impossible for this condition to control without the gravest danger to the Allies. All the Allies were required to do, owing to the developments of the spring of 1918, was to defend, to hold on until such time as the weight of the American arms could be felt. The superiority in numbers of men lying with them, the thing that the German would have preferred was to have the entire Allied line in a state of flux, with the possibility of being able to break through unhindered by any formal organizations, and the chance of snapping off important links in or parts of his opponents' armies. Open warfare conditions, no matter how desirable in abstract, were undesirable at this time, with the odds and the tactical situation as we have shown.

Wisely, the entire Allied line went on the defensive. The German had yet to take the forest of Compiègne, and without this he was unable to tie in his gain between Montdidier with any projection or progression on the front he might force further east in the direction of Paris. They took the defensive, biding the time when the German, in the pursuit of his initiative, would be brought in strength more nearly on a par with the Allies, and the transport of troops overseas from the United States would suffice to tip the scales in their favor.

AMERICAN REINFORCEMENTS DECIDING FACTOR

The situation, therefore, had resolved itself into a most exciting race between the speed with which the German would be able to strike with sufficient frequency to break the Western front, and the speed with which the United States would be able to set down in France a large enough number of combat troops, first, to afford the Allies an adequate reserve in the defense, and later, to enable them to take the initiative and to have suffi-

cient reserves to clinch and exploit the gains that would be realized thereby.

This race was most dramatic, was thoroughly understood by the Frenchmen, and was generally recognized by the Americans. It presupposed that until a decision in the great race were possible, the Allies would be able to maintain the integrity of their front. This was no small task, inasmuch as the maintenance of this integrity required local actions here and there to prevent the German from exploiting the advantages of many local situations that he had gained in his swift breakthrough in the early spring.

As the peril to France was great in case of its failure, a feeling of great conservatism and caution spread over the front of the Eighth French Army. On the 1st of April, to release an excellent French division, the 128th French, for duty in the locality of Montdidier, the 42nd Division took over the Baccarat sector on the flank of the Eighth Army, and plans were made for the early relief of the 1st Division so that it might be withdrawn from the front in the Woevre and employed in Picardy, where it, as the then most highly developed striking unit of the American Army, could be most effectively employed. Accordingly, the 26th Division was turned from the area to which it had gone following its relief from its training tour, back toward the line to take over the frontage occupied by the 1st Division. Simultaneously, the 32nd Division, through the great energy of its commander, Major General Haan, was rushed to a state where it could take the front, as it did, in Alsace and became the fifth American division to serve with the French. At this juncture, a number of recently arrived divisions, among which were the 27th and the 77th, were functioning with the British in battalion and smaller groups, receiving their battle training on that part of the line.

RAIDS FOR INFORMATION

As the initial German operation had necessitated a strongly defensive attitude, those divisions which remained in Lorraine and came into Alsace and the Vosges during the period of from April 1st to the 15th of July, exercised either with their French

mentors, or in their own right, title and interest, the responsibilities which have been above described of stabilized warfare. Owing to the general situation there was no breath of offensive spirit in it, except that in order to gain identification of the troops that the German was allowing to remain on this semi-active front, the French Army ordered an interrupted sequence of strong raids to be executed by the French and American divisions under its command, which served the incidental purpose of keeping the front stirred up and embarrassing the German to that extent. These raids were splendidly prepared and executed by the American troops,

than the audacity of a Gallic or Indian tribe. To make it clear, it was individual daring rather than collective daring, that was extremely noticeable in such a large number of instances that it could well be referred to as the military attribute of the troops themselves. That love of the open and alert curiosity which takes a man into strange places under any conditions, was here to be seen.

ACTIVITY OF GERMAN PATROLS

The German had devised on this front a very effective and impudent form of sector occupation. He patrolled with unusual activity and apparently held his own lines very



American Troops Resting After a Long March

who showed a general aptitude for this type of local incursion which went far to indicate their future usefulness on the offensive that they were to demonstrate when once the opportunity was afforded. Obviously, at this time the offensive movement on a large scale was entirely impossible for the American troops. During this period are seen the characteristics of those troops under routine defensive conditions to which the German assaults on the Champagne front and on the Château-Thierry-Dormans line later supplied striking testimony.

The offensive attitude of the American was characterized by daring,—the daring of a pirate, or a single-handed adventurer, rather

thinly with moving or roving groups. He was always on the alert and he spent the night in making it bright with variegated pyrotechnic display. Those parties which he sent out to fight in No Man's Land were usually strongly armed and experienced. Those snipers whom he had planted across the front were audacious, and the advanced machine-gun detachments that he used to put down a sudden burst on the point of the line which he had found too much frequented at a time when it would do the most damage, were skilful in their movements. Apparently, his communications from front to rear were strongly planned, for he would set down strong defensive artillery fire very quickly when it

was called for. He apparently had more artillery in proportion than he had men on this frontage.

The American troops found him roaming No Man's Land and sometimes frequenting abandoned trenches on the southern side of the lines. They found French patrolling in a scarcely vigorous state. Wire patrols, who moved under cover of darkness and assured themselves that the chicanes, those openings in the wire which were left by them for the purpose of ingress and egress, were not either obstructed or extended, or that the enemy had not by trench or other artillery, or with wire cutters severed the defensive spans of wire, or that the inroads of winter had not weakened these defenses, were sent once or twice each night by the Frenchman along this wire. This patrol would usually take the side of the wire farther from the enemy for its route, unless otherwise ordered.

VIGOROUS AMERICAN PATROLLING

In taking over these duties as to No Man's Land, the offensive spirit of the American was shown. He reconnoitered the entire strip of territory. He did not rest content with patrolling the wire on its near side. He pushed out beyond it, and he sent his combat patrols, three or four a night on a divisional front to clean out this interval between the lines and to claim it for his own. Of choice he made nightly pilgrimages to parts of the German line and many times was not satisfied unless he spent the day there in addition. In short, the main change that came over the front was the constant claiming, here and there along the front of the Eighth French Army, of No Man's Land, and a departure from the prevailing condition of a tolerated mutual tenure of it by both enemy and French.

This change was so complete as to excite the German suspicion that the troops on the front were not French. Accordingly, it was determined to find out where the American was and, if possible, take prisoners. The American was extremely alert. He did not have any intention of being captured, and he fought with desperation to prevent it. Venturesome patrols, although suffering casualties inside the German lines, as a general thing

brought back the bodies of comrades with them. It was the exception where a prisoner was gained, so determined and so grim was the defense, and so effectually was the American control over No Man's Land asserted.

A large body of American troops soon became experienced and intrepid in patrol operations. Detachments for this purpose were, as a general rule, drawn from the supporting troops on the First Position, those garrisoning the *Point d'Appui*, who, although not fatigued by the nightly vigil which the forward elements of the First Position were exposed to, were yet close enough to the front to be able to observe and reconnoiter it by day and study it in greater detail by night without the effort of a long march to the scene.

RELIEVING THE TROOPS


Along the entire front, each evening, with the coming of dusk, and each morning with the coming of dawn, the garrisoning troops were alerted and occupied their battle posts. During these portions of the twenty-four hours the danger of surprise was greatest. After the passage of these periods a certain number of the garrison could safely be relieved from this duty. It was the American custom to rotate each battalion in turn to the First Position; to have the entire body of troops garrisoning the First Position, as well as the artillery defending it, rigorously observe the two alerts described, and to rotate the troops within the First Position so that all would have an equal assignment to the routine duties of the observation post, the combat group, and of the supports in the *Point d'Appui*. In this way, when its turn to pass to the Support Position arrived, each successive element of the battalion had its own opportunity to patrol.

The German troops, to check this aggressiveness between the lines, put into motion a battalion or two of storm troops, specially trained for swift and murderous raiding, and equipped with all sorts of special weapons to assist them for this purpose. The plan was to have this picked body touch in along the line where it was thought that the Americans were, either in their own right or with the French, and give them such a severe lesson that it would nip in the bud the offensive spirit which had been shown. Nothing is

more complimentary to the aggressiveness of the American, even in periods of defense, than this apparent resolve of the German to organize and operate punitive expeditions.

GERMAN GAS PROJECTOR ATTACKS

Supplementing this plan, was the employment of gas projector batteries, one of the freaks of stabilized warfare on the German side. To each of these batteries were fifty to one hundred tubes about eight inches in diameter, aligned in two or three rows at very close intervals, which hurled huge, eight-inch bombs filled with powerful gas, sometimes chlorine, sometimes phosgene, and sometimes arsene, or



From Official Government Statistics

Deaths Per Thousand in the A. E. F. According to Services

a combination of these, about fifteen hundred to one thousand yards by the pressure of an electric firing device which discharged all of the projectors simultaneously. These batteries were installed with great secrecy and fired at a time when a surprise would be most disastrous to the troops garrisoning a Center of Resistance.

Under cover of this bombardment, the German usually employed assaulting detachments, who sought to take advantage of the demoral-

ization which this very powerful and deadly form of assault was expected to cause.

A German storm battalion made a successful assault on the 26th Division on April 20th, in the locality of Seicheprey at the center of the south face of the St. Mihiel salient—to which front that division had gone in relieving the 1st Division there—penetrated a number of kilometers, and after nearly twenty-four hours within the American positions, returned to their lines with a considerable number of prisoners and the majority of their own dead. It then struck Dombasle, near where the 1st Division and elements of the 42nd Division had received their training,

and inflicted a similar but somewhat less damage on the French division there, employ-

ing their gas projectors at the same time. Progressing south and eastward, it was expected in the sector of the 42nd Division up to the time of that division's relief in June. The storm battalion did not arrive. The gas projector battery, however, did arrive there. It attacked on the right of the division first, at the point where the foothills of the Vosges commence to rise, and accurately descended upon an entire Center of Resistance. However, such of the defending troops who survived the projector attack, immediately took their battle posts and repelled the raiding parties who sought to clean up, without permitting them to enter the American lines.

The gas projector battery was then moved slightly westward, still on the front of this American division, and was hurled, although with a lesser violence, into the same combat groups in front of Badonviller which had been attacked by the German in March. The 168th Infantry, which had been on duty there on the first occasion and which had repelled the prior gas projector attack, took a swift and powerful vengeance on this occasion. The defenders bayoneted the raiding party that sought to overwhelm; blew them asunder with hand grenades at a few yards distance, and filled the maze of the trenches of their position with the dead and wounded from this discomfited assaulting party. This division was left strictly alone during the balance of its tenure of the front. However, shortly

after its departure, the German raided the 77th Division near this same point and the town of Neuville, next to the west, and on that occasion penetrated the lines and took back a score of prisoners.

The raids accomplished by the Americans were the only other feature of the period of stabilized warfare. They were usually carried out by from two companies to a battalion, and were supported by an elaborate artillery program. They were well and boldly executed by both infantry and artillery, but, owing to the newly developed plan of the German to hold his line by roving groups, the artillery preparation was sufficient to forewarn him and enable him to withstand them, and thus the raids were rarely able to net prisoners, despite the technical excellence of their execution.

AGGRESSIVENESS AND CONFIDENCE OF AMERICAN COMMANDS

Toward the end of April the French Army Command developed a high degree of caution, which, in view of the general advantage the German was enjoying elsewhere, was entirely intelligible. It was feared that an offensive might break, roughly, between Nancy and Baccarat. This possibility was prepared for in any event, and afforded the American troops involved a considerable effort in readjusting their plans for this emergency, carried out in an atmosphere of expectancy which they saw nothing to warrant. Instead of readjusting the lines to the rear and retiring, the temper of the American troops was rather to go ahead and see some of the German territory, thereby precipitating a real engagement.

Reports by the divisions that experienced the German offensive in March had been made public. The power, the depth and swiftness of the German attack were emphasized in all these accounts. The great echelonment in depth of the German column of assault was not a pleasant thing to contemplate for serious minds in a defensive sector, where the bulk of the troops were disposed over a large frontage and a depth of three or four kilometers and when there were no reserve troops known to be within fifty or sixty kilometers of that part of the line. However, the American viewed it with entire indifference, at the

heart of which was the opinion that the German was too busy elsewhere to concern himself with the front of Lorraine, and in which indifference was manifested a peculiarity of the American frame of mind, that in a period of defense it is preferable to execute a vigorous offensive within the limits of safety than to let well enough alone and thereby avoid stirring up trouble.

Although the missions of the American divisions in this sector were of lesser importance than what was transpiring with Noyon as the center, it was for each and all of the divisions involved a very earnest, serious period, in which work was very thoroughly and completely done, in which all the details and requirements of a very arduous, specialized type of warfare were observed, in which troops were always on the alert, sparing nothing, either in life or energy to assert vigorously their occupation of the line. It was a period during which the best qualities of the American soldier were developed, as well as one in which his adaptability to a type of employment that was entirely new was demonstrated. This period convinced the military observers of the mettle of the American troops. Even while on a strict defensive in sector warfare, the offensive attitude and aptitude of the American soldier had revealed itself and gave assurance to those appraising his military merits that he could be relied upon to defend, as he did defend on three or four occasions up to that time, a sector with stoutness and sureness, and could be expected when opportunity afforded to carry a dashing and intelligent offensive forward.

In Lorraine, the American soldier had proven himself to be a fighting man, not a youthful figure equipped for war with a temperament inspired to fight. He had shown that the essence of his good nature was patience and discipline, and that he was possessed of a general intelligence as well as a military intelligence, and that he had initiative and was coolly courageous.

THE 1ST DIVISION RELIEVES THE FRENCH NEAR MONTDIDIER

During this period a demonstration of these qualities was quickly made by the 1st Division, which was shifted from the Lorraine

front and was given special training in open warfare conditions, and was then placed on the front near Montdidier, at a time when the German attack was halted and the lines were becoming stabilized. The German artillery had been brought up at this time. It was the end of April and the fields were still wet and the days usually rainy. When, however, the visibility was good, observation by the German of movement was assured to him by the positions which he had taken.

On this front the 1st Division found only such rudimentary trenches and other organi-

infantry brigade in the line and the other infantry brigade under conditions in the rear that were not as arduous as those that prevailed in the forward brigade and which would serve to enable the support brigade to be available at a time when it might be called upon either to support or relieve the remaining brigade. The 1st Division at the opening of spring occupied shallow trenches filled with water, with the forward elements of the line taking their rest, when that was possible, on soggy ground, and often exposed to the cold rains which prevailed at this time of the year in Picardy.



Drawn by Capt. Harry Townsend, A. E. F.

An Infantryman

zation as the French, whom they had relieved, had been able to introduce. It was for them to hold the line and at the same time improve their conditions in so far as the so doing did not expose them to disaster from the German artillery and small arms fire.

It will be remembered that the Germans were thoroughly equipped at this time with artillery and ammunition; that they controlled their fire rapidly and accurately. Coming upon this front the 1st Division placed one

THE AMERICAN ARMY OFFERED TO THE FIRST ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

As a result of the operations commenced March 21st, the entire Allied front was placed under Marshal Foch as Commander-in-Chief, to whom, on March 28th, General Pershing as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces offered the body of the American Army, without stint or limitation. The dignified diction in which the American commander made available, without any reservation whatsoever, all that America had put in the field in France and was to place there, made an ineradicable impression, and during these dark days carried a fine spirit of staunchness and reassurance of victory.

The action taken by the American Commander-in-Chief was bound to have an immediate effect upon the employment of the American troops. They, by this act, became available for duty at the will of the new Allied Commander-in-Chief, which meant that they would be employed where most needed, irrespective of whether it was properly in the "American Sector" or not. The hopes of an American Army functioning divisions side by side on its own front, thus had gone, for the moment, a-glimmering, due directly to the manner in which Hindenburg and Ludendorff were cracking their whip on the Western front. This fact is mentioned because it increased the difficulties of operating the American Army, not only in matters of administration, but in matters of supply. With one division here, and another division sixty kilometers (40 miles) away, and then, perhaps, two divisions close to each other and one a

hundred kilometers distant, all being actively employed on a serious mission where the need was very great, the task of coördinating the affairs of and allocating the necessary supplies to divisional units so distributed can be seen. Later came the questions of evacuation of the wounded to the hospitals previously assigned to the American command and which were hardly convenient to some of the fronts on which the American divisions were serving. However, the emergency had created this special situation and it was met with a resourcefulness that only an emergency could bring forth. The coöperation between the French commands with whom the American divisions were serving with those divisions them-

selves, and the cordial relations existing between the French corps and the American divisions in them, bridged these difficulties and supplemented the earnest efforts of the American Command to cope with this extremely complicated and troublesome situation. The fact that until the formation of the First American Army, in August, 1918, the many American divisions functioned without difficulty in French corps and French armies, and, indeed, a number of French divisions in American corps, reflects credit all along the line, especially on the spirit of pulling together manifested both within the American Army and between it and the commands it was reinforcing.

VI

AMERICAN ARMY PROVES ITS METTLE

The 1st Division at Cantigny—The 3rd at Château-Thierry—The 2nd at Bouresches and Belleau Wood—The 42nd in Its Defense on Champagne Plains

WE are about to enter into a period of brilliant exploits by the various units of the American line. The dedication of the entire American Army to such employment for the general good of all the Allies as Marshal Foch might see fit, certainly gave individual units then in France, and at all advanced in their preparation for battle, a great opportunity to distinguish themselves at a time somewhat earlier than would otherwise have been the case. The German was directly responsible for the creation of this opportunity and it is thus entirely appropriate that he bear the consequences of it, as he most certainly did.

CANTIGNY

The first of these was by the 1st Division at Cantigny, a strongly located village the German had included in his front lines when he stabilized in the Montdidier salient. The Americans planned to take it by direct assault and to hold it.

In stabilized warfare, a survey will show that many villages and hamlets were, of

choice, included in either the German or the Allied lines. It is true that these abandoned settlements are landmarks and offer a better target to artillery than is the case with the low earth organizations which conform to the peculiarities of the terrain, as field works invariably do. This fact accounts in a large degree for the sorry dilapidation, and many times, for the levelling, of the strongly constructed French villages, each with its church, which the front presents. Nevertheless, in a town, no matter how exposed, there is a certain modicum of comfort for the garrisoning troops, a place in which the debris can be utilized for bomb-proof shelters that will resist the small caliber guns, where the machine guns can be located, barricades erected, and where, in case of enemy assault, a fight from the vestiges of one house to the ruins of another makes any village which is not too easy to shell, a stronghold. At this stage of the war the comfort a town, though demolished, afforded the troops frequently offset the danger of bombardment to which the garrison would be subjected and made the possession of

a village, aside from its tactical mission, relatively desirable, particularly during the periods of unsettled weather conditions. In any event, to lose a town in one's own lines caused serious disarrangement of the scheme of organization, the more so because a town would not have been included unless it had, in the first place, some peculiar tactical advantage, or, second-

German, probably as a diversion to the offensive the latter was about to launch.

MAY 28TH—THE 1ST DIVISION CAPTURES AND THEN HOLDS CANTIGNY

At 6:45 a. m. on May 28th, the 1st Division attacked Cantigny with irresistible dash, took it in forty minutes and consolidated it into



French Pictorial Service

After Cantigny Was Ours

One of the company of French flame throwers, who accompanied the attacking 1st Division, getting a German out of a cellar. In the attack itself, the 28th Regiment captured 250 Germans.

arily, because it did afford in its ruins convenient shelter.

As the general advance in the locality of Montdidier was at a halt, the retention of Cantigny was of additional importance. The 1st Division had gone in the line on this front on April 26th. But a few days before it made its assault here it had, in turn, been raided strongly but most unsuccessfully by the

the American position, and then held it. It repulsed three counter attacks on May 28th. The first was set in motion at about 7:40 a. m. against the strip of woods on the south and flank of the assault; the second, at 5:10 p. m., was delivered in strength against the woods north of the captured town and was shattered by artillery fire, while the last, launched just twelve hours after the American attack, was a

prepared effort against Cantigny itself, and broke down under the American small arms and rifle fire. The assault had been very carefully prepared by the American division, as befitted the initial American effort of this magnitude, but this preparation was consider-

French tank units, a platoon of French gas and flame troops and a detachment of 150 men from the divisional engineer regiment. The artillery preparation was one hour. There were about 200 prisoners taken. The American casualties were nearly 400 on the first day



Photo by Katiobonne

Courtesy of Leslies' Weekly

At the Heart of Cantigny

This picture shows two of a party of French sappers surveying the ruins after the bombardment.

ably deranged by the German offensive launched elsewhere the day previous, which compelled the withdrawal from participation in the Cantigny attack of a great body of the supporting artillery. It was, however, powerfully and smoothly executed by the 28th Infantry, strongly supported by the divisional artillery and certain reinforcing French groupments. Accompanying the assault were three

and 200 additional during the counter attacks on the succeeding day.

It will be remembered that on May 27th, the day before Cantigny was taken, the German launched, with an estimated force of 30 divisions, his offensive against the Aisne position (held by four French divisions on the left and three British divisions, recovering from their depletion in a prior German offen-

sive on the right), upset the entire position on the Chemin des Dames, which had been won at the expense of long effort and great cost, and was going at an alarming rate toward Soissons and the Aisne, both of which were shortly thereafter reached and passed. It was a powerful offensive, well under way, with many of the elements of surprise present, the axis of which was directed straight at the heart of France. Aroused by this success on the East, the German command on the West, near Montdidier, received the news of the suc-



Château-Thierry, Where the German Drive on Paris Was Halted

cess of the first American offensive with the determination to discount it entirely and promptly by counter-attacking and recovering Cantigny. All the available means of the sector, in both infantry and artillery, were employed for this purpose. A fire was put down on Cantigny of the highest intensity from all calibers. German trench mortars and minenwerfers pounded the settlement and the American lines which had been pushed to the north and eastward. The German foot troops sought to infiltrate into it. The 1st Division withstood this retaliation, as it always stood punishment, stoutly, and held the position gained in as firm a manner as that in which it had taken it.

THE FRENCH ENTHUSIASTIC OVER CANTIGNY

The combination of aggressiveness in the offense and steadfastness in the defense which this initial, independent American operation indicated was the only bright spot during the time when the German, pushing his advance between Soissons and Reims, crossed the Vesle and the Ourcq, and was overrunning the entire Tardenois, even to the Marne. Each of the other American divisions was stirred; and, naturally enough, actuated to emulation. The French military and the French press were quick and accurate in seizing the future significance of this fine achievement. They read in it power to take and power to hold, and despite the developments of the day elsewhere, drew a great comfort from it, which by the subsequent exploits of June and July was brought to a point of genuine enthusiasm.

During this period the backbone of the German initiative was broken forever. American troops took a greater part in this than a consideration of their numbers would cause one to believe. It may be safely asserted that the example set by the 1st Division in this initial trial went a long way to giving that confidence to the American troops in the strength of their arms which was shown successively by each of the elements called upon for a great effort. To draw a parallel from an entirely different field, one often observes with interest the election in a very small community or locality of the country, for the reason that the vote there cast is thought to be indicative of the manner in which a certain group, of which the particular community is representative, is inclined. One often sees, therefore, in this community a struggle for election which is out of all proportion to the size of the community and which elicits widespread interest similarly disproportionate. In this way Cantigny was a local success, one of the sort which had been made along the line countless times during this period of the war, one of the kind which the French, not frequently, but steadily gained during the spring months of 1918; but it was a success by a combat unit which was considered representative of those which the American Army had, or would place in the field, and its result was watched with an

interest, and its consequences took on a significance out of all proportion to the size of the operation, owing to this fact.

MAY 31ST—THE CHÂTEAU-THIERRY
BRIDGEHEAD

The second and third of these exploits were most dramatically staged at the tip of the lance which the German High Command was hurling in the direction of Paris. The offensive from the Aisne was in its sixth day. The French lines had bent steadily backward and toward the Marne. East of the great crucial forest of Compiègne they still ran. They had swept from Soissons to the east edges of the important forest of Villers-Cotterets, in the locality of Longpont and Faverolles, and on June 2nd, into the eastern portion of that forest, known as the Forêt de Retz; had crossed the Ourcq where it makes its sharp break to the south in its course toward the Marne; had bellied out to the west in the valley of this river; had reached Château-Thierry and the Marne at the latter point; had run along the Marne to Dormans. Then, turning northward, the new German lines skirted the east of the Tardenois, running west of Châtillon-sur-Marne and of the Montagne de Reims and then curved around Reims, which had been seriously menaced, extending thence eastward across the chalky heights of the "Dry Champagne." This brought the German closer, and in a more threatening manner, to Paris than at any time since the 1914 battle of the Marne. It placed him on the national highroad from Château-Thierry through Montreuil-aux-Lions to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, which leads from the last named town almost due west through Meaux to Paris. It is a rolling terrain—a smiling countryside, abounding in beautiful homes and splendidly built villages, and extremely fertile. Its woods are dense, but, although not large, very numerous. The fields were showing the early shoots of grain. Before the high-water mark of the German advance was attained however, and at the moment when reaching the Marne he threatened to force the passage thereof, the 7th Machine-Gun Battalion, 3rd Division, made a most spectacular, determined and successful stand in that part of Château-Thierry south of the river.

GERMAN INCURSION HALTED AT THE MARNE

The 7th Machine-Gun Battalion was a motorized unit. The 3rd Division, of which it was a part, had recently completed its preliminary training and was now being hurried on a long journey to the front when this opportunity was offered. On May 31st this machine-gun battalion, on the road for over twenty-four hours and in battle for the first time, flashed, with its own motors, upon the scene at Château-Thierry itself. It quickly dismounted and established its guns and put them into immediate action at close range, in gaping or windowless buildings on the marge of the river and at the very head of the existing crossings. Due to boldness and speed, it was able to reinforce the French Colonial troops defending the crossing at a most crucial time. Its fire arrested and forbade passage to the repeated, plunging and heavy efforts to cross and establish this bridgehead. It halted and pinned the German line down to the north bank of the Marne. On duty here and still coöperating with the French, it remained until the German attack of July 15th broke, breasted the artillery preparation on the town and its emplacements therein and thereabout, and there it stood when the German lines receded from the Marne.

This example of brilliant and spectacular leadership, on the first occasion when American elements were opposed to the German offensive of May 27th, by its opportuneness and the immediate effect that it had in turning back a large force which was on the point of exploiting a success on the south bank of the Marne, is entitled to the recognition which it was accorded by the French and the Americans; which recognition certainly exceeded any that a unit of the same size,—for a motorized machine-gun battalion, at organization strength, consists of a headquarters and two machine-gun companies, each company being about one hundred and eighty men,—was ever singled out to receive.

The German, taking advantage of the sweep that had brought him to Château-Thierry, and with his crossing interdicted at the latter point, crossed the Marne near Jaulgonne and Chartèves on the following day in numbers, with the intention of pushing up

the valley of the Surmelin towards Montmirail, which had played such a prominent part in 1914 and was the junction of two most important highroads leading directly to Paris, the northerly of which joined the Châ-

coöperating with the French near Fossoy and Mézy-Moulins, vigorously and effectively hurled the battalions of the German who had set foot on the south bank, back across the Marne.



Airplane View of the Town of Vaux

It was an important point on the Château-Thierry-Paris highway, and was captured by the 9th and 23rd Infantry, 2nd Division, soon after the Belleau Wood action. The circle A marks where the Germans fell. The circle B marks where the Americans stood.

teau-Thierry road at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and the more southerly passed through La Ferté-Gaucher and Coulommiers, between which roads ran the valley of the Petit Morin. To have succeeded in this would have been a great catastrophe and was, indeed, one of the objectives of the final German effort launched in the following month. By this time infantry elements of the 3rd Division, after their long forced march, had reached the scene, and,

JUNE 4TH—BOURESCHES AND THE BELLEAU WOOD

In reaching the highwater mark outlined at the beginning of the preceding section of this chapter, the machinery of the German assault had been greatly taxed and that natural limit possible for an attack on a large scale, which has been previously referred to, was being approached rapidly, owing to the speed and the depth of the German advance.

V-3



Drawn by Joseph Cummings Chase

Major-General James G. Harbord

First Chief of Staff, General Headquarters; Commanding General, Service of Supplies.

At this juncture, the 2nd Division, which had been in reserve in the Montdidier salient, was swung eastward by motor transport across the gap between that salient and the newly created one on the Marne preliminary to taking the line at the apex of the German advance. This was on June 2nd. The 2nd Division, which had just been released from its training tour near Verdun, demonstrated in a minimum of time the sterling military qualities that it possessed. Beginning on June 4th, it opposed itself stiffly against the further progress by the German, in case that had been desired, and applied itself without delay to rectifying the front of such recent date, with the towns of Bouresches and Torcy as its objectives, between which two towns lay the hamlet of Belleau and Belleau Wood. It was through the rolling valleys and wheat-fields and the patchy woods of this terrain that their efforts lay, across which the two kilometers of Belleau Wood, with its arms of saplings and tangled second growth reaching out toward the new American division, obstructed the control of the Torcy-Bouresches road which led down along the railroad from the latter town to the national highway at Vaux, about three kilometers west of Château-Thierry.

The task was pushed most determinedly against conditions of defense in many respects novel to American troops and was the first time the American was called upon to overcome a most highly specialized form of German offense, the machine-gun nest, which at this time and at this place was being garrisoned by experts in machine-gun employment, whose performance of their missions must surely have been made more desperate and audacious by the encouragement of the deep advance which had just then been realized.

THE GERMAN MACHINE-GUN NEST

The phrase "machine-gun nest" has become so common that a brief epitome of what it stands for is offered. The German was equipped with two entirely different forms of machine gun, known as "heavy" and "light" guns, respectively. The former was mounted on a heavy support and was a weapon of great offensive power and solidarity, while the latter

could be readily man-handled, and, although not as light as the name would indicate, was capable of operation either with the use of a small support that did not contribute to the weight, or from the ground. The mount for the heavy machine gun was ponderous. It was frequently carried extended, and when so seen appeared similar to a stretcher carried by litter bearers. On this stretcher the gun or the ammunition could be transported. The German infantry was, in 1918, re-equipped with an increased proportion of light machine guns, and at least half the personnel of the infantry in the "good" German divisions, as the statements of prisoners substantiated, had received special instruction in the use of this arm. The heavy gun was usually operated by special troops formed into heavy machine-gun detachments to serve with the infantry companies. The use of the two types of gun simultaneously in the same nest was not infrequent, as the gunners of the light guns served in this manner to protect and cover the operation of the heavier and more powerful, but less mobile pieces.

The nest was an organization of the terrain or a position upon it which could be occupied by a number of these guns. Pairs were the most usual form of grouping. If time permitted, the position was entrenched so as to afford the gun crews a slit in the earth in which to conceal themselves against the artillery searching for them, and if other means were available, wired in. The German was instructed to prepare a large number of these positions for occupation at points from which he could deliver a cross or enfilading fire on the attacking troops and yet afford support to the other similar posts in proximity to himself. A large number of these posts checkerboarded and staggered across in echelon from front to rear, tied in from flank to flank and generally interlocking, were quickly set up by the German wherever his lines were halted. Similar positions were constructed in the rear of his lines in case he were compelled to withdraw.

CLEVER MASKING BY USE OF TERRAIN

The amount of work necessary to prepare these positions varied with the terrain; it frequently approached nil. At this time of the year the height of the wheatfields and the

tangled density of the foliage which the 2nd Division found on this front were ideal places to conceal machine guns in strong positions. A group of four or five saplings or a hedge would invariably be prepared in advance by the digging of a rudimentary hole and the

positions from which they could interpose a sanguinary resistance to any effort to penetrate. The cleverness of these dispositions was constantly manifesting itself and troops who were successful in overcoming one nest would often find themselves in the jaws of



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Brigadier-General Walter A. Bethel

Judge Advocate of the A. E. F.

deposit of the necessary amount of ammunition for the position. The heavy guns, of course, would be installed in their positions and were not capable of unrestricted mobility, but the light guns were constantly being shifted when they were spotted by the artillery and infantry observers and moved according to no rule, but in such a way as to make observation difficult, to one of a number of

seven or eight located on the flanks and to the rear. The German handled his guns very boldly, clinging to the fringe of the woods and improvising cover with great skill. The interrelation of the different machine-gun positions was thoroughly understood by the troops manning them and the plan on which they were laid out, although usually improvised rapidly on the terrain, was such as to prevent

one German group from being wiped out by another, and yet at the same time to enable each to support the other.

METHOD OF OVERCOMING MACHINE-GUN NESTS

This redoubtable form of organization, scientifically developed and carefully mastered by those to whom it was entrusted and daringly executed, made the semi-stabilized conditions which the 2nd Division encountered most significant. In the following months a similar defense was met by all American troops. The 2nd Division (9th and 23rd Infantry, 5th and 6th Marines) explored it for the first time and made a most valuable contribution to the vital subject of how to overcome it. Later experience showed that, excepting those rare cases where tanks were available and able to operate, the most successful way was to stalk it, to locate it as nearly as possible and then, with great patience and daringly maneuvered infantry, to work up upon it and around it until it was isolated and could be reduced. This was a very tedious and hazardous procedure, which was like as not to expose the troops attempting it to great danger from a position flanking that which was being attacked, and also one which the great mobility of the light machine-gun nests often frustrated when the personnel of that nest, either realizing or apprehensive of the attack being made upon them, would foil the effort by moving to another position. This feature of mobility made the use of a small volume of artillery of very doubtful value under the circumstances. Unless the plan were to reduce a position infested by machine-gun nests by a large operation supported by a vast quantity of metal, which had to be executed with surprise and in a short space of time to prevent withdrawals and readjustments under the elastic German scheme, the overcoming of a machine-gun nest was a test of infantry pluck and courage. Nothing exemplifies more strongly the ease with which machine-gun nests are enabled to stand out under their special local conditions as long as they can be ammunitioned and fed, requiring reduction by the infantry at the point of the bayonet, than the fact that although the towns of Bouresches and Torcy fell to the 2nd Division

in the course of its operations at an early date, it was not until nearly a month afterwards that the woods of Belleau standing between them were cleaned out, and then only at a great cost.

Both the Marine Brigade and the other infantry brigade of the 2nd Division undertook this task, and all these troops engaged entered into this difficult and trying work with great heart and with an increasing measure of skill, pushing their efforts day and night,



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Baker and Pershing Studying the War Map

The Secretary of War was in France during the critical days of March, 1918.

and by their courage and dash breaking the temper of the strong defense in numerous and difficult emplacements. The dash and boldness of the American troops asserted itself in the first instance, and upon the heels of these qualities followed the understanding of how to gain the same results, just as dashing, just as surely, but also as economically in point of human life as possible. Those long periods of training which the American troops had undergone had supplied them with a routine system of life and understanding of

discipline and of the fundamentals of both offensive and defensive maneuver. However, against such a reality as a machine-gun nest there was necessarily one other factor, one without which the greatest skill and the highest point of training were of no practical value, and that was the will and resolution to conquer, irrespective of the difficulties, by means which could only be arrived at by an understanding of the difficulty and meeting it face to face. This factor was constantly demonstrated by the 2d Division in its operations in the Belleau Wood.

LINKING OF MILITARY WITH CIVIL SCIENCES

The Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, in elaborating on the desirability of linking the civil arts, sciences and learning with the military in such a way that the latter can always be in touch with and abreast of the former and take advantage of the progress in the former, has stated that the "old-fashioned studies of boards of strategy, seeking to anticipate possible campaigns and developing plans based upon topographical maps, have become relatively useless." This statement is peculiarly true in reference to what the summer of 1918 pre-

sented to the American Army. The plans for what troops were to do, either on the defense or offense, would have come to naught, irrespective of how well prepared and well calculated to assist the troops who were to execute them toward their end, if it had not been for the initiative, intelligence and courage which the American soldier and his officers manifested in meeting the particular situation that had developed on their front by interposing body against body in strife and unhesitatingly risking life against life. Large bodies of troops can rarely succeed towards a remote purpose without good plans; but even with good plans, large bodies of troops cannot succeed unless they have demonstrated qualities of endurance and determination. These were unequivocally and conclusively shown to the entire Allied world for the third time by the Americans in the operations around Belleau Wood.

The final exploit which determined the caliber of the American Army in its employment under Marshal Foch, transpired on the chalky plains of the Dry Champagne, in the area of the Fourth French Army, commanded by General Gouraud.

VII

REDISTRIBUTION OF OUR TROOPS

During the Lull in German Offensives, American Divisions Await
Impending Assault Against the Marne and Champagne Fronts

UP to the 1st of July, the trend of the year was dominated by the two great onslaughts of March 21st and May 27th, which, judging from their results and a casual view of the map, were highly successful for the German, but, nevertheless, indecisive. To offset this there were: the partial check administered the German in his third offensive, the one in the center launched in the locality of Noyon and Lassigny; the fact that the Marne salient was an uncomfortably narrow pocket, the widening of which would necessitate a large scale operation; the local recoveries accomplished by the French; and, lastly, the highly creditable manner in which

the new American Army was showing itself under difficult conditions and in the moment of emergency. The race between the attempt of the German to finish it and the trans-Atlantic movement of troops from America in numbers sufficient to make this impossible, was a most exciting one. The German had loosed in battle a huge number of divisions, more than he had ever been able to marshal on the West front before, owing to the collapse of the Eastern front and the employment of Austrian elements at certain quiet points of the line. His divisions were still possessed of a high morale, which considerable success had induced. They did not an-

ticipate great difficulty from the Americans. An estimate by a German staff officer possessed of unusual analytical skill and of a gift of expression, coolly appraised the fighting qualities of the American troops of the 2nd Division that had been shown in the Belleau Wood, with emphasis more on their brawny fearlessness than anything else, and detailing at considerable length their deficiencies from the finished product.

SHIFTING OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS

Meanwhile, the operation of the unification of the Allies, commenced under Marshal Foch, had worked a swift readjustment all along the front. The 42nd Division was relieved in the Baccarat sector by the 61st French division with the 77th American division, recently transferred from its original duty on the British front, as a reinforcing element. Shortly thereafter the American division took over the sector by itself. The 26th Division was similarly relieved in the locality of Flirey. No less than five of the ten American divisions, of which the 77th was one, were transferred from duty with the British to active duty in Lorraine and the Vosges, or to augment the reserves in the locality of Paris. In the meantime, the 32nd Division was finishing its sector tour and was about to be shifted westward.

The explanation of this great amount of movement of the American divisions in June was twofold. Paris was menaced since early in April, it is true, but more so, owing to the success that brought the German down to the Marne. Consequently, a redistribution of forces was made to create reserves for the defense of Paris and to reinforce the parts of the line where an attack was probable.

NEW DIVISIONS ARRIVE FROM AMERICA

Unknown at that time to the great body of American combat units then in France, was the astonishing speed with which the United States had set down in Europe an increasing number of divisions. The most exciting point in the race between the power in the field of the German and of the Allies had arrived. It must be said with certainty that few realized it at that time. The American troops on the line were determined not to be overrun; to die

rather than to permit this to be accomplished by the Germans. The French had toughened in their opposition, and realizing the gravity of the situation, were again asserting "They shall not pass," and they meant it. In anticipation of the decision, the moment of which was approaching, a special long-range gun continued the sporadic shelling of Paris begun months before. The First American Corps had moved its headquarters from Neufchâteau to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre to be convenient to the operations around Château-Thierry. The 42nd Division arrived in the valley of the Marne during the last week in June, between Châlons and Vitry-le-François, while the 26th Division a few days later, reached the Marne valley in the locality of La Ferté, and in the rear of the 3rd Division, the 28th Division was shortly thereafter seen pulling into stations south of Dormans and near the valley of the Surmelin.

Now the weather had turned very hot. The beautiful Marne valley was depopulated, large numbers of its inhabitants fugitive. Its slopes finely grown with grain or grape, and its commodious farms and great, splendid homes that lined its heights, were facing a keen harassment and the unveiled threat of a powerful invasion. It is not too much to say that the entire Marne valley, from Château-Thierry to Vitry-le-François, stood in apprehension of an immediate attack, upon the future of which hung the fate of France. It had been positively cautioned of this by the French High Command.

THE VON HUTIER METHOD OF SURPRISE ATTACK

Beginning with the March offensive, the German attacks had broken like a thunder-clap, while the swiftness and surprise with which they were launched made the application of the principle of infiltration that has been described and on which the enemy relied for so much initial success, possible. To insure these elements the method erstwhile devised for the surprise offensives on the Russian front by a German general of unquestionably French extraction—von Hutier—was imported westward early in 1918. All columns of German troops were brought to the site of their assault at the very last moment, re-

lieving or attacking through other elements who had been holding the German line up to that time. For days previous the assault units had been in motion, usually by night, with the greatest secrecy, in long columns moving from rear to front, in the order in which they were to attack, by road, rail and camion. The preliminaries for the artillery assault were most sedulously pursued. By a shot

the great power and in the great numbers that the German was depending upon in 1918 was awaited by the defending troops can be imagined. In this particular instance the French were positive of their diagnosis that there would be an attack on a wide frontage and, proceeding from that conclusion, had prepared for the defense in a manner that was a revelation, preserving a secrecy in so doing



Photo by Steel

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly

American Troops at Rest in a Field Close Up to the Marne Front

here and a shot there at infrequent intervals, separated by days, the German would succeed in registering those guns the proving of whose fire was absolutely necessary, without, as he thought, exciting the suspicion of his opponent. The formalities of artillery preparation, and in many cases the preparation itself, were dispensed with, and the infantry assault would often be attended with the breaking out of the German supporting artillery at the moment of assault, but not before. The sensations with which an attack of

similar to that with which the German studied to shroud his own operations.

TERRAIN OF THE MARNE SALIENT

The front between Château-Thierry and the Argonne forest was of two parts, entirely dissimilar. On the west the salient of the Marne included the entire Tardenois, as the locality bounded in a general manner by the Soissons-Château-Thierry road on the west, the Marne on the south, the Montagne de Reims on the east, and the River Vesle on the north, was


termed. This country was a succession of formidable ridges from the heights north of the Marne to those north of the Vesle, to which the valley of the Ourcq contributed two extremely steep, and at many points, bare slopes. It was a country known for its hunting, where the woods were large and dense and filled with great trees. On the other hand, it was generously patched with large farms devoted to wheat raising. East of the Montagne de Reims and stretching to the massive tangle of the Argonne forest, were the Catalaunic plains, a white and most outlandish part of the terrain. Close about Reims, running down to Épernay and extending to Dormans, were the great vineyards of the Champagne, while extending eastward across the plains, rolled a blankness and bareness that at this time of the year made this stretch known as the "Dry Champagne,"—frequently as the "Lousy Champagne," owing to its meagerness—a complete study in arid desolation.

Viewing the Tardenois as a whole, there were four roads of the first importance: The Soissons-Château-Thierry highroad on the

west; the Châtillon-sur-Marne-Ville-en-Tardenois-Reims highroad on the east, the Reims-Fismes-Soissons highroad on the north, and the road running along the north bank of the Marne from Château-Thierry to Jaulgonne, that then turned due north to Fère-en-Tardenois and there divided in such a way as to run east and west through the center of the district, serving to link the Aisne near Vic-sur-Aisne with the Marne and the highroad second mentioned.

THE "DRY CHAMPAGNE"

In the "Dry Champagne," however, the opposite was the case. The chalky soil, lending itself peculiarly to this purpose, was cut by superb roads running straight as an arrow, many of them of Roman origin. In the Dry Champagne the woods were patchy, straggly and stunted, and the entire territory was cut by great undulations with bare slopes, which became steeper as they rolled northward and more ravinous as they neared the Argonne, at the bottom of each of which there ran a stream, tenuous at this time of the year—the Vesle, the Suippes, the Ain, and the Py, the



The Marne Salient in July, 1918

The shaded areas show the last German advances before the counter-offensive. The small shaded area east of Reims marks the scene of the German attack on the French Fourth Army, in which the 42nd American Division took part.

two latter being tributaries of the Suippes,—all of which figured largely in the military history of the war. Featuring this expanse were the chalky bluffs to the north known as the "Buttes," that under the July sun shimmered like snowfields. Toward the west was a group of hills which has attracted the greatest attention, owing to the sanguinary nature of the fighting for their possession, known as the "Monts," Haut, Carnillet, Sans Nom, Teton and Casque. Limned against the sky was the gloomy bulk of Montagne de Reims, made even darker and taller by the dense forests upon it. During the month of June it and the steep knobs about Reims had served as a bulwark against the flow of the German assault down toward the Catalaunic plains.



Gen. Henri Gouraud

Commander of the French Fourth Army, which checked the furious German offensive in the Champagne (east of Reims), July 15, 1918.

At the outset of July this front was ominously quiet, as though withered by the heat of day and shriveled by the glare from the chalky slopes. Both the German and the French lines were at a standstill. At night the lines of the Allies were galvanized to the greatest activity. The roads were incessantly used by new artillery going into secret positions over the fine, hard roads, by interminable ammunition columns, restocking dumps and establishing vast reserves at the positions, by

the movement of engineers' supplies and material and the installation of shelters, additional to the vast number of deep underground ones available on this front, by the erection of field hospitals, and, by the arrival of the incoming units detailed to the defense.

42ND DIVISION JOINS THE FRENCH

On the 4th of July the 42nd Division, which had for three days previous been training for a special operation to be launched from the north bank of the Marne near Châtillon in the direction of Ville-en-Tardenois, left its stations for this purpose on and about the famous Camp de Châlons and was noiselessly amalgamated with the 13th and 170th French Divisions of the Twenty-First French Corps, as a part of the defense on the front of the Fourth French Army, of which the Twenty-First French Corps held the center in front of Châlons. Here the American division found the terrain organized defensively in a way such as it had never seen before or since. The three positions previously referred to were here in their completed state, dug deep, and wired in. The great strength and resisting power of the chalk lent itself to huge, deep dugouts that here were amazingly numerous. There was a host of wide, connecting trenches, scooped out by machinery, a myriad of gulleys, serving as most desirable byways of travel from the enormously used routes, and a matchless series of hard roads linking the very foremost posts to the rear. Here was a front of long standing, organized with immense fidelity and enormous labor into a web of defenses, which, on the long, generally bare, slopes, were of the greatest strength and lent themselves to the employment of all the arms. On this territory, fought over so frequently, both in the past war and through the ages, and where, during the period of the present war it has been estimated that more men have been killed and wounded for each minute of the war than at any other place in the line, not a shell came over by day, not an aeroplane was up by day, and there was very little enemy movement or circulation observable by night; only the hum of the bomber's plane on the clear, starlit nights carried any sinister suggestion.

GENERAL GOURAUD'S EXHORTATION

Disposed on this position, so strong by nature and organized for the defense with such incalculable labor and detail, the 42nd American Division, located in the center of Gen-

You are fighting on a terrain that you have transformed by your work and your perseverance into a redoubtable fortress. This invincible fortress, and all its passages, are well guarded.

The bombardment will be terrific. You will stand it without weakness. The assault will be ferocious, in a cloud of smoke, dust and gas.



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Brigadier-General Harry A. Smith

He was in command of the Army Schools at Langres, and after the armistice had charge of civil affairs in Germany.

eral Gouraud's Fourth French Army, awaited the assault and received this exhortation and expression of confidence:

"To the French and American Soldiers of the Fourth Army:

We may be attacked at any moment.

You all know that a defensive battle was never engaged under more favorable circumstances.

We are awake and on our guard.

We are powerfully reinforced, in infantry and artillery.

But your positions and your armament are formidable.

In your breasts beat the strong hearts of free men.

None shall look to the rear, none shall yield a step.

Each shall have but one thought: To kill—to kill a-plenty, until they have had their fill.

Therefore, your general says to you: You will break this assault, and it will be a happy day.

(Signed) GOURAUD."

The author of this masterly message was a leader of the first stature, one of the finest products of the French military system, whose career during the war was unsurpassed because of the success that uniformly attended his efforts and the devotion which his personal example unquestionably aroused in his commands. Suffering the loss of an arm at Gallipoli, he had returned to France, and during the most difficult years of French arms had made the kindness of his personality, as well as his nobility of character and military genius, thoroughly recognized. He was in command of a powerful front, which, in a calm, but most impressive manner, was being rapidly polished off for a most desperate defense. Besides his own personality, he brought to the situation an invaluable quality of fine self-composure, and daringness of conception.

GOURAUD'S PLAN OF DEFENSE

He had specialized in all the essentials of an attack at that period. However, he did not rest there, but devised a plan of defense designed especially to meet the offensive here expected. In order to defeat the newly devised German form of attack, consisting in infiltrating through organized positions, General Gouraud worked out a scheme by which he planned to break the entire shock of the German blow, which, he anticipated, would be dealt by a superior number of troops and possibly supported by more artillery. It was to withdraw from those forward positions which the enemy would plan to assault with his greatest forces and on which he would, in preparation for his assault, put down his heaviest artillery blow; and in this way the aggressive and brave French general reasoned he would cause the force, probably the greatest and most brutal, of the German blow to land in the void.

To carry out this plan of defense, General Gouraud ordered the front line positions that were extremely strong and had been won at great cost, and which the German would (particularly in view of the announced French policy not to yield an inch of ground) never suspect would be voluntarily given up, to be evacuated at the moment the German attack was launched. Withdrawal from the front

positions having been properly effected at the last moment, the plan of General Gouraud was then to slaughter the enemy by artillery on the evacuated first positions and to complete the slaughter by infantry on the intermediate and second positions directly in the rear. It was a daring plan, which could only be carried out by great boldness on the part of the defending troops, by measures calculated to deceive the enemy, and, lastly, by the establishment of signal groups who would stay in the front line, and even though surrounded and cut off, advise the artillery and infantry as to the progress of the enemy.

The 42nd Division disposed its infantry brigades on the Intermediate Position, on which the full brunt of the German blow would be struck after the abandoned First Position had been passed, and on the Second Position immediately in its rear. On a front of thirteen kilometers and of two French divisions, this American division garrisoned for the defense one-third of the first line on which General Gouraud planned to check the enemy and the entire support lines, and in addition had a number of elements advanced forward to posts in the front-line position that was to be abandoned.

NEW DISPOSITIONS ON THE MARNE

Meanwhile, on the Marne around Dormans and the points west of Château-Thierry at which the 2nd Division had been operating, the 3rd and 26th American Divisions, in different capacities, the latter having taken over the front of the 2nd Division, and being a part of the First American Corps, awaited the impending assault on their part of the front. The assault here, owing to the proximity of Paris and the consequences which might attend the German exploitation of the River Surmelin beyond the confluence of that river with the Marne at Mézy-Moulins, past Condé-en-Brie and into the valley of the Petit Morin near Montmirail, had to be held at all costs. The 28th Division was south of Dormans. Furthermore, the 32nd Division was on the point of entraining, headed westward. The 1st and 2nd Divisions were in reserve and the 4th Division was made available, for employment, for its first time, in case of necessity.

THE MOMENT FOR FINAL DECISION OF WAR

The preliminaries to the events of July 15th, 16th and 17th are thus largely dealt with because of the great significance of those three days in the actual decision of the war. The advance notices of Ludendorff's narrative of his own identification with the war were widely quoted to the effect that on these three days the possibility of a German victory disappeared from the earth. Certain it is that a lightning change was effected on the 18th of July, with a ferocious attack, which the results of the preceding three days had made possible, launched near Soissons at the point

where the Marne salient joined the line of the Aisne.

After months of defensive, the entire front was, on the Allied side, converted into a series of swinging and powerful offensives, *at the end of which was the armistice*. The metamorphosis was so sudden and the arc described by the trend in events so nearly a half-circle that it is well to pause in consideration of what was about to happen.

It was not one of those changes which was gradually asserting itself, so slowly as to be generally inappreciable. Rather, the high side of the German teeter-totter crashed to the earth of its own weight, never to rise.

VIII

THE GERMAN HOPE OF FINAL VICTORY LOST

July 15th-17th.—The Last German Offensive Shattered on the Champagne Plains by Ten Divisions, Nine French and One American

A LONG the entire front suspense continued for a week. July 14th, the French national holiday, arrived. And then, during the night of the 14th and the 15th this suspense was broken, by the German. The Twenty-First French Corps called the 42nd American Division in its turn to the telephone and gave "François 570," verified it, and said "Good luck." This code signal meant, in the Fourth French Army, that a general German attack on a wide front was expected to break and was the order for all troops to take their battle posts and "kill—kill a-plenty, until the German had their fill." Troops who had been two nights on the alert at their posts and had borne the strain with indifference, were lolling in the patches of the woods or stretched at the bottom of the trenches for a heavy sleep. They were aroused, covered with white dust that gave them an ashen and worn appearance. They had but a few moments to wait. Shortly before midnight the entire line was started. Thousands of French guns broke the weeks of quiet and fired with an intensity that caused the atmosphere to shake with a constant, rolling, unbroken sound. The deep roar of the heavy guns, crashing detonations of the smaller caliber,

and the bark of the 75's mingled with the vibrating, swishing note of the departing projectile. It was a hellish music. To its accompaniment the stars were snuffed out and the skies turned, in blotches, splashes and flashes, to red, yellow and green. The surface of the earth was like a shaking table. Back of the line of the Monts, there was a perfect ribbon of flame, and out of the void, where was the Montagne de Reims, the gun flashes loosed a matchless, nocturnal rainbow. The Fourth French Army, surrounded by a semi-circle of active guns, each firing its maximum rate, moved into a spectacle such as the length and breadth of the front never saw again.

For ten minutes the French guns alone were firing, and, sharply on the break of midnight, the infernal mingling of sounds that developed from the Allied lines seemed suddenly to be silenced, and a similar and more violent one to rush from the German.

ARTILLERY BATTLE BEGINS AT MIDNIGHT

JULY 14TH

At 10:45 on the evening of July 14th, this French Army had informed its elements that the German attack would come about four



U. S. Signal Corps drawing

“Kamerad!”

The sniper, caught, throws up his hands and begs for mercy.

o'clock the next morning, and that his artillery preparation would start at midnight; that this had been gained from prisoners taken in the very front lines, taken but a few minutes before, and that the French artillery would begin its counter preparation at the very earliest moment. Every syllable of this message had proved to be correct. In the many instances of valor that this great battle afforded, the flashing raid led by a French lieutenant into the teeth of the German position in the darkness of the evening of July 14th, by which he gathered up and brought back at top speed to his lines a large number of prisoners from the assaulting troops, who gave exact information as to when the enemy's artillery preparation would start and his assault begin, stands out as one of the most brilliant, and certainly most valuable. And the premature launching of the Allied artillery preparation which this information afforded, cost a carnage to the enemy that will long remain unknown. With absolute accuracy, the artillery had hurled their metal into the German lines, and then brought it down forward to the abandoned lines in such a way as to catch the fresh enemy troops that had been brought in for the assault; in their assembly positions.

destruction of their hitch, dashing maddened through the plain, fell from the wounds they had suffered. The white dust was slashed into a spectrum of color, through which the many furnaces of conflagrations showed the ugly teeth of the gutted works of man.

For four hours this kept up and the transformation that these minutes worked is beyond the conception of a single mind. Along the roads ammunition boxes were tumbled in irregular piles. Men lay dismembered. Across the most important roads fallen animals were passed over and plowed through by the hard-driven caissons and ammunition columns. The German preparation had answered no rule. At one time it had gone deep into the camps of the reserves, searching out the draws for trench and other artillery, while at another time it raked the roads and made the trails that were built for detour under these identical conditions a most welcome refuge. On the Monts there was a barrier fire of bursting shells, and, lastly, on the front line positions the projections rained, and rained and rained—into the void. Breaking dawn carried with it the very tints and flashes that this wild night had shown. This day was to hold the fate of France, and perhaps the civilized world.

HAVOC AND HORROR—WORK OF A FEW HOURS

Attending this immense volume of artillery in which the freaks of acoustics seemed to indicate a numerical superiority of the enemy, myriad rockets of all colors rose and fell, while flares of every type sent out blinding and wavering planes of light. It was often so bright that one could read as though by day. Overhead was the sound of shells racing in both directions, and along the lines and along the roads and back in the towns, were the spurts of light and geysers of smoke that marked the end of their trajectories. The highroads were in a mist of powder that hung among the great trees lining them. In the towns within range of the high-powered, long-range artillery, fires had shot up and a black pall hung as though each were Pompeii, and each doomed. Dumps, like pyres, were burning in every direction. Barracks and shelters were in flames. Draft animals, surviving the

ENEMY INFANTRY ATTACK SHATTERED

Hardly was it light when the hitherto uninterrupted intensity of the roar of the German guns was augmented to high, straining, howling notes. The rolling barrage was launched at 4:15 a.m., and from behind it those German troops who had not been caught in the brilliant handling of the artillery, moved forward in wave after wave to the attack. Again the Allied artillery came down and for a steady hour its sound rolled high over that of the German. So great was the din that shells came in with roar or rush inaudible, soundlessly, as though from aeroplanes. The German guns not firing in the barrage attended to the front and intermediate positions, with a fire, confined within an area barely three kilometers in depth, designed to obliterate the garrison, and so far as the few survivors were concerned, to shake their nerves asunder. On came the German



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"America"

After the painting by René Mal in the Salon de Paris, 1918

waves and into the trenches of the front line. Up went the rockets of the signal groups. The fight was bitter and violent. Defending machine guns were cracking on a field of targets, and yet the German pushed on. The outpost position from the Monts to the Main de Massiges was in his hands, by design of the French, and with the greatest cost to the German. Halting but a moment and reforming the machinery of the assault, he was again under way; now it was a different story. In some manner the garrison of the intermediate position, although bearing heavy casualties, had weathered the storm of the artillery of the enemy. On these garrisons, closer and closer came the waves, and of a sudden literally hundreds of combat groups loosed their small arms fire and light artillery (75's), from which no concealment was possible for the German.

The surging waves shivered and broke backward. At this impact the force of the German assault started to spend itself. Lines of attack were halted in disaster, shattered, gashed by hand-to-hand combat, slaughtered by the artillery in the abandoned positions and by the infantry on the defended positions. Recoiling from the defense, the German tried to work around the points of resistance. The Catalaunic plains were not to be penetrated. Again and again the assault was renewed, but each time it was less. There was a hopelessness in the last few efforts, and then it stopped.

On the front of the Twenty-first French Army Corps, with which we have seen the 42nd American Division serving, the intermediate positions stood, with the exception of two small points on the extreme right in the sector of the 43rd French Division, into which the German had succeeded in penetrating by help of the broken terrain, and from these points he was shortly thereafter ejected. The German Army, which by 10 a. m. had figured on being through the second position and along the road from Suippes to Châlons, had taken, with terrible cost, just that which General Gouraud was willing to concede. Here, where the 42nd American Division was entwined with the 170th and 13th French Divisions, the 1st German Division, the Prussian Guard Cavalry Division (dismounted),

the 1st and 2nd Bavarian Divisions, from right to left in the first line, and the 72nd Reserve and 30th German Divisions from left to right in the second line, fell in disaster and defeat.

On the entire front of General Gouraud's Army attacks continued with special violence in the region of the Monts for two days, at the end of which the German was lodged solely in parts of the abandoned front positions and was actually at that time in process of being thrown back from these places of lodgment.

AMERICAN FORCES ON THE MARNE HOLD BRILLIANTLY

The situation at points along the Marne, where the Americans were likewise involved in the German offensive of July 15th, was of similar intensity. The front of the Fifth French Army, between Reims and Dormans, had fared somewhat differently from that of General Gouraud's Army. Between Épernay and Reims, in the neighborhood of Bligny, the Germans had forced their way through the Italian troops defending there and threatened to take the Montagne de Reims, Reims itself, and the Reims-Épernay highroad, a catastrophe which was averted by the gallant efforts of French and Scottish troops. And, in the valley of the Marne, the German had forced a passage, establishing a bridgehead near Châtillon and was exploiting to a considerable depth south of the southern heights of the Marne. On the front of the Sixth French Army between Dormans and Mézy-Moulins, the German made a similar effort, the frustration of which will always stand to the credit of American arms, to which, more particularly, the 3rd Division, ably commanded by Major General Dickman is entitled.

With the river as an obstacle, and with the heights of the Marne to contend with, the scene on the night of the 14th and 15th was of the same character as that described in the Champagne, modified by the special elements of the problem with which the German was contending. The violence of the artillery fire and the magnitude of the attack were similar. In addition, under cover of darkness, the German rushed to the banks of the Marne



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Major-General Joseph T. Dickman

He commanded the 3rd Division, Fourth Army Corps, and First Army Corps; he was in command of the Third Army (Army of Occupation).

a great number of pontoon detachments, who actually forced their bridges of boats across that deep and rapidly moving stream in defiance of the Allied artillery striving to interdict this, and passed the infantry columns over them at the earliest streakings of the dawn. They had done the identical thing on the front of the Fifth French Army and succeeded. The 3rd American Division threw its entire weight in combat at close quarters with the troops that had so crossed the river on its front. From its position on the heights, irrespective of the manifest danger on all its flanks, this division first checked, then repelled the penetration. From a point east of Mézy-

Moulins, westward to Chierry, which latter town lies on the Marne at the outskirts of Château-Thierry, this division held the river and the highroad on a front of over 7 kilometers (about $4\frac{1}{4}$ miles), being nearly one-half of the entire stretch from Dormans to Château-Thierry. In this brilliant defense, the 3rd Division withstood in the open a savage artillery concentration on the town and locality of Mézy and refused to be disconcerted by the dense smoke with which the German sought to mask his operations. It did not yield. Indeed, one of its regiments, the 38th Infantry, facing attack from three independent directions, held its ground, and

v—4

then, by a brilliantly executed counter-attack, repulsed the striking forces drawn from not less than two German divisions, put them into confusion and to rout, and captured about 600 prisoners from the 6th Grenadier Regiment.

Finally, this division further distinguished itself shortly thereafter by leading the assault across the Marne and up its northern heights.

In a similar fashion four infantry companies of the 28th American Division advanced forward from the main body of the division to points south of Dormans to oppose the German progress that was gaining speed there, took their stand, and though greatly outnumbered, held unflinchingly. In a nearly hopeless position they delayed the onslaught and plugged the dike at the instant when the flood of enemy forces was about to surge through the fissure that had developed.

FINAL GERMAN OFFENSIVE FAILS

The huge German offensive of July 15th had failed. The gains in the direction of

Épernay and on the Marne from the locality of Dormans to that of Oeuilly and Boursault, imposing as they appeared on the map, merely complicated the situation for the German in view of the total and complete check administered on the expanses of the Champagne and in the region of Château-Thierry. With these great reverses fell the hope of the German of forcing a successful conclusion in 1918. The craft bearing the expectation of victory and the hopes which the events of the spring months had raised high,—the same craft which we saw launched so boldly at the outset of the preceding winter,—had capsized. It was never righted, nor was its cargo ever recovered.

We pass now to a phase of the greatest activity, which the severe reverses just described made possible, and which commenced without delay thereafter, so rapidly, indeed, as to be a demonstration of the skill with which the Allied Army was handled under its single head.

IX

THE MARNE SALIENT UNHINGED

In a Smashing Counter-Attack the 1st and 2nd American and Two French Divisions Reach the Soissons-Château-Thierry Highroad

ON the 17th of July, the German effort had died out on the entire front menaced, except that a certain pressure was being exerted at the advance points of the line where the German had broken through on the south bank of the Marne. This pressure was, however, offset by the reserves hurried towards the point. In the effort just past the German suffered the gravest casualties, but more than this, the offensive morale of his soldiery was chilled by the cold of defeat and the events of the following days showed unmistakably to each German soldier that he had participated in a momentous failure. It must be stated to the credit of the German Command that it recognized, with the check it received on the front of the Fourth French Army, that it had failed and

immediately put into operation a huge plan of withdrawal, the essence of which was speed, so far as the German troops on the Marne were concerned. To the credit of the Allied Command it is stated that they had divined both the German plan of offensive and his procedure in case it failed and acted automatically, with incredible swiftness, in such a way as to threaten a gigantic catastrophe to the vast number of troops and supplies which the German had committed to the salient on the Marne.

There remains a third element, and one without which the power of the vigorous French reaction would have suffered, and that is, the excellent results which attended the superb effort of the United States to set down in France the maximum number of troops in

the minimum of time. The volume of troops that had arrived had come most opportunely, inasmuch as they were available from the earliest moment, when the superiority of numbers in favor of the German was dashed to the ground, and that of the Allies, almost over night, shot above it, never to be topped. With this movement of superiority of num-

The events of July and August demonstrated it on the terrain most practically.

ALLIED COUNTER-ATTACK PLANNED

It had been hurriedly decided upon the collapse of the German effort that a counter-offensive by all available forces would be hurled against the sensitive point of juncture



Drawn by Capt. Ernest Peixotto

Neufmaisons

This is a typical village of the Lorraine front in which the American troops were billeted.

bers there flowed from the German that offensive morale, that determination and expectation of victory which, in less than a week, was wrested, as his most valuable weapon, from his hands. The published table of comparative strength in men during 1918 illustrates this shift in numbers unequivocally.

of the west face of the Marne salient with the German line on the Aisne. Against the very hinge the blow was to be struck. The Twentieth French Corps of the Tenth French Army, the latter commanded by General Mangin, was ordered to attack at the hinge eastward in the direction of the Château-Thierry-

Soissons road on the morning of July 18th. It was to be a surprise operation unattended by artillery preparation, which, until the French and American artillery supporting the attack set down their rolling barrages and the lines of attack moved forward with the mists of the morning, was to be unannounced.

The troops assigned the French Corps were the 1st and 2nd American Divisions, the 153rd French Division and the 1st Moroccan Division. The 1st American Division was en route to a rest area when its order came, and doubled back toward the lines, its infantry, engineers and artillery also transported by camion. By forced marches it was in place on the evening of July 17th. The 2nd Division, however, did not receive its instructions until the evening of July 16th and was unable to cover the distance from its stations to the site of its employment until the morning of the 18th, the 9th and 23rd Infantry arriving prior to the hour of attack by dint of an all-night movement. The Marine Brigade (2nd Division) did not, however, arrive until that afternoon.

THE GERMANS SURPRISED—MANY PRISONERS TAKEN

The battle order from right to left (south to north) was the 2nd Division, 1st Moroccan Division, 1st American Division and 153rd French Division. At 4:35 a. m. the attack, with a strong French tank accompaniment, was launched. The terrain was a rolling plateau that frequently, towards the south, was suddenly broken and revealed, unexpectedly, deep wooded folds, as at Missy and at Ploisy, which resembled gorges and seemed impregnable. Into this the attacking elements plunged with neither delay nor rest. (See map facing page 184.)

The opening hours of the assault found the German entirely unprepared, surprised. Before he could comprehend it the onslaught was upon him and rolled over him. Large bodies of prisoners and the artillery pieces supporting the forward positions were gathered in. Confronting the ravine near Missy the left of the 1st Division and the right of the 153rd

Division were halted by machine guns, the right of the 1st Division and the two divisions on the right flank pressing on. From the outset the 2nd Division, whose Marine brigade had now arrived, penetrated rapidly and deeply, as far as Vierzy on the evening of July 18th. The following day, on the resumption of the attack, this division took Vierzy and reached a point in front of Tigny about 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) west of the Soissons-Château-Thierry highroad and 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) north of the important point of Oulchy-le-Château, where that highroad crosses the Ourcq River. There it was relieved after dark on July 19th.

The 1st Division, with its left still involved in the difficult ravine and position of Missy, on July 19th reached Chazelle, at the foot of the great, flat-topped hill against the east slopes of which Berzy-le-Sec clung. At this juncture the left of the 1st Division broke through the Missy resistance and, preceded by a tank assault which was, however, checked on the rolling plateau by artillery fire, drove through to the deep fold in the terrain at Ploisy. The divisional casualties for the day were 3,000, double those of the preceding day. On July 20th the 1st Division sought to gain Berzy-le-Sec. On the morning of July 21st, attacking again with great pressure power, it took that town and with it control of the Soissons-Château-Thierry highroad, about 1 kilometer (0.6 miles) to the west. This road had been one of the arteries of supply and movement for the German salient on the Marne. The heights above Berzy-le-Sec were 5 kilometers (3 miles) southwest of Soissons and on the crest girdling it; the evacuation of that city was made necessary by the superb advance of the 1st American Division. Finally, on July 22nd, that division was relieved, after having suffered 7,200 casualties. Of the four divisions attacking on July 18th, only the 153rd French, and it largely reinforced, outstayed the 1st Division on this front.

This hard fought and bitterly won operation, the largest in which American divisions had, to its date, participated, and certainly one of the most dashing and difficult that has

at any time been executed, unhinged the Marne salient. In it the two American divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery. It had been a long time since the German had received such a sting-

ing blow on the Western front. The results were unmistakably and immediately important. They also foretold the commencement of an Allied offensive which would end only when the German capitulated.

X

THE MARNE SALIENT DRIVEN IN

With American Divisions as Its Striking Head, the Sixth French Army Forces the Enemy Beyond the River Vesle

THE opportunities offered by the success at Soissons were immediately developed. The First American Corps, under command of Major General Liggett, was operating independently at the outbreak of the German offensive on July 15th. Its two divisions, the 26th American and 167th French, underwent the bombardment then set down upon them without event. Thereafter, upon the collapse of the German effort, this Corps became available to force in the southwestern protrusion of the Marne salient. On July 18th, the 26th American Division, on the right of the Corps, advanced its left to conform with the movement eastward along the west face of the salient. On July 20th, this division took Hill 204, an eminence dominating Château-Thierry on the west and lying south of the Paris high-road, the capture of which was a direct result of the successful attack by the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments of the 2nd Division against Vaux on July 1st. The 26th Division swinging upon Hill 204 thus became the pivot for the line on the west of the Marne salient. This line was now attacking along its entire front. Its duty in this respect performed, the pivot for the general Allied advance here was shifted to the heights southwest of Soissons, and the 1st American Corps leaped forward to the attack on July 20th. The 26th Division driving in the German opposition, forced its way to the Soissons-Château-Thierry road, at and north of the latter town, with the 167th French Division abreast, and pushing on reached the road from Epieds to Trugny. The 26th Division was reinforced at this stage by the 56th In-

fantry Brigade of the 28th Division, and so reinforced, realized on a difficult terrain against the strong enemy positions determinedly defended, especially in view of the manifest menace of an advance driving diagonally across the Tardenois, a most important advance of 11 kilometers (about 7 miles).

NORTH BANK OF MARNE REGAINED

On the morning of July 26th, the 42nd Division, which, beginning on July 21st, had entrained at the scene of its defense in the Champagne and had been hurriedly grouped in the rear of the First American Corps, took over the entire front of that corps, including that of the 167th French, and also that of the 164th and 51st French Divisions, and later the 52nd French Division, in rapid succession, within the space of twenty-four hours from its arrival on this front on July 25th.

In the meantime, the 3rd American Division crossed the Marne on July 18th with the 4th Infantry, at the very heels of the German retreat, seized Jaulgonne upon the northern bank of that river and extended its grip upon that bank to the town of Chartèves and the cliffs of Mont St. Père, from which towns it and the 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division, attached to it, pushed steadily up the strong heights on the north of the river and drove home its advance about 8 kilometers (5 miles) further to the northwest, through an acclivitous, heavily wooded country to the locality of Ronchères, where, in the woods of that name it was relieved, on July 29th, by elements of the 32nd Division (newly arrived from the



Pershing and Joffre Having a Talk

Vosges) and was withdrawn for a much merited rest. The sturdy and cool defense by the 3rd Division during the German offensive of the preceding week, and its vigorous and skillful pursuit across the Marne by scaling the steep barrier on the north bank and driving through a dense woods and broken terrain, were a revelation of well-rounded fighting strength.

GERMAN INTERPOSES STRONG REAR GUARD DEFENSE

The type of attack that the American divisions were making in the end of July and through the month of August on this front, was one of great difficulty. The presence in the Tardenois of considerable bodies of heavy woods, of steep, rolling slopes, of small groups of patchy woods, and of numerous clearings planted with grain, which at this season was tall, presented a combination that was ideal for the special form of machine-gun defense that the German had developed.

Another element in the situation which made the struggle in this theater most bitter and violent, was the fact that in the locality of the Tardenois the German had concentrated his supplies of all sorts for the grand attack he had planned at Paris and the heart of French resistance, and the large bodies of troops and quantities of artillery that he had brought into this salient for that purpose. The absence of large and important roads, except as heretofore indicated, and the loss of one of those roads at the outset by virtue of the operations near Soissons and near Château-Thierry, complicated the withdrawal and made it necessary for the German to cover it and delay the enemy pursuit until the congestion could be relieved, and the danger of a whole pocket of prisoners removed. Especially threatening was the axis of attack over which the 26th Division and its reinforcing brigade from the 28th had traveled. This axis led rapidly towards the Vesle and if successfully pursued, would sever into two parts and bottle up all exit from the salient. It became desirable to reinforce opposite the front of attack, and during the last days of July the German actually thickened his lines to keep an intolerable pressure from being asserted against his withdrawal.

A STRICKEN BATTLEFIELD

Over the scene the July sun was scathing. The enemy, keeping his artillery with his infantry, defended himself by its most vigorous employment from the hills and from behind masks on the flank of the attacking troops. He threw out across his entire rear a great net of machine-gun nests, located in the wheat or in the fringes of the woods and defending themselves with the same stubbornness, and on an infinitely larger scale, that was exhibited in the defense of the Belleau Wood. It has been said that the machine guns have never been so numerous, so vigorously, and so determinedly employed as in the Tardenois. These groups, so difficult to locate, took an extremely heavy toll, despite which the advance was driven home. Over the field they caused havoc. Under the pitiless sun their victims, and themselves as victims, too, lay sprawling, or, in the darkness and damp of the forest, hidden from sight. On the field lay the vestiges of the litter and debris of the German incursion across it in the preceding May and June. Over it the enemy aeroplanes played constantly with impunity. Now across it were strewn the bodies and scattered *matériel* that bespoke, more surely than anything else, the bitterness of the struggle. The poppies in the grain fields waved red, as though to typify the bloodiness of it all. Flies in hordes ranged the scene. Woods, small and large alike, were tainted with gas that had been hurled into them, and were rank with decay. The few available sources of water were contaminated by their surroundings. It was a stricken field—a polluted battlefield, that grew daily more foul under the blazing sun. Sickness threatened, and beckoned, and spread.


42ND DIVISION CROSSES THE OURCQ

On the afternoon of July 26th, the 42nd Division jumped off to the attack. On its front the lines had been deadlocked, at a standstill, for nearly three days, during which the defenses had become carefully established and organized. A clearing in the entrance to the Forêt de Fère that led in front of it, had dominated all passage, owing to the number and power of the machine-gun defenses.

In the small clearing and along its edges the 39th French Division, which was operating with the 3rd Division in the Thirty-eighth French Corps, was immobilized by fire on its left flank, while the Forêt de Fère itself was so massive as to preclude an encirclement by a single division. The 42nd Division, exhibiting the same qualities manifested by the 1st and 2nd Divisions hardly a week before, in the late afternoon of July 26th, and upon

During the night of July 27th-28th it forced a passage of the Ourcq and lay along the sheer north slopes of that river after realizing an advance of about 8 kilometers (5 miles).

This passage of the Ourcq placed the entire Tardenois in jeopardy. Accordingly, the German immediately reinforced the strong divisions on this front, which included the 4th Prussian Guard commanded by one of the Kaiser's sons, Prince Eitel Friedrich. Orders



Sketch Map of the Marne Salient Showing the Steady Pressure of American Divisions Which Drove the Enemy Back Beyond the Vesle.

scarcely fifteen minutes notice, lunged savagely and swiftly into the clearing that was the key to the entire defense, and with the 167th Infantry Regiment, took it, as well as the Croix Rouge farm and buildings in its center and the woods abreast of it, in three hours of violent, sanguinary, hand-to-hand battle, in which, at dusk, it broke the shell of the defense with the bayonet. On the afternoon of the following day the 42nd Division, at one bound, swept through the Forêt de Fère.

were sent forward by the German to hold there at all events.

Operating for over two days with its right flank exposed, the 42nd Division received the constant fire of enemy artillery emplaced directly on its right, not 5 kilometers away in the Bois Meunière, and was periodically raided by flotillas of enemy planes, which, flying low, machine-gunned the lines. Under these circumstances it seized the town of Sergy and Hill 212 to the east, and then Seringes-et-

Nesles. Attacking over a front of about 5 kilometers in between these two towns, it pushed forward constantly against machine guns hidden in the grain of the slopes rising above, and in the south fringes of the forest of Nesles. Meanwhile, the French division on the left had seized the important junction of the roads at Fère-en-Tardenois. This movement, with the advance realized at Oulchy-le-Château (in which the infantry brigades of the 4th Division, split between two French corps, participated), put the entire valley of the

attack through a most troublesome woods to the locality of the Fresnes-Courmont-Ronchères road, and seized the strongly held Bois des Grimpettes. It was there relieved by the 32nd Division on the night of July 30-31.

32ND DIVISION REACHES THE VESLE

Thereafter, the 32nd Division, in a powerful formation, swept forward across the Ourcq, capturing Cierges on that river, and pushing through the wheatfields up the north slopes towards Bellevue and Reddy farms, at-



U. S. Signal Corps photo
Drawn by Harding

Traffic on the Way to the Front

Ourcq in the Allied hands. Again and again the 42nd Division assaulted the crest, taking lodgment farther and farther up until it was gained. This it did on August 2nd, after six days of uninterrupted battle with machine guns located densely upon and along the heights of the tenuous Ourcq.

During these six days the divisions on the right of the 42nd Division were forcing their way up abreast. The 39th French Division, battered by its constant employment, was relieved by the 28th Division, which, on the right flank of the First Corps and under the eyes of the 42nd Division perched upon the heights, swept forward its lines in stubborn

tacking on the left with great dash and determination a most dangerous and difficult clump of patchy woods along the high-road from Sergy to Chamery and Coulonges, known as the Bois Pelger, Bois de la Planchette and Les Jomblets, against which the 42nd Division, after its capture of Hill 212 and the seizing of Sergy on July 28th, had operated in order to relieve the powerful flanking fire delivered from these positions along the entire north crest of the Ourcq and into the crease where Sergy lay. Accordingly, on August 2nd, the 32nd Division, continuing its attack, now in conjunction with the 42nd Division, both divisions

swept forward in swift pursuit of the enemy, whose grip upon the north bank of the Ourcq had that morning been definitely pried loose. Skirting the Forêt de Nesles and the formidable Bois de Dôle, the 32nd Division was the first to reach the River Vesle. Along that river it captured the important town of

front, galvanized his division to a rapid pursuit that gave the retreating enemy no opportunity to stand on the strong ridge over which his retirement lay. The 4th Division, reassembled from the two French Corps with whom its infantry brigades had been serving in the locality of Oulchy-le-Château, had



A Street Barricade at Château-Thierry

Scene of the heroic defense of the bridge, June 1st-4th, 1918, by the 7th Motorized Machine-gun Battalion of the 3rd Division.

Fismes on August 6th. The Marne salient was driven in.

GENERAL MACARTHUR LEADS IN THE PURSUIT

For this swift and brilliant advance by which the Allied lines were brought to the Vesle, a great deal of the credit belongs directly to Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the 42nd Division, who, on the spot, upon the morning of August 2nd, observed that the enemy had just broken contact, and moving across his entire

been previously brought into the 1st American Corps in support of the 42nd Division, and had detached one of its regiments to reinforce the attack on July 30th by the latter division against the ridge south of the forest of Nesles and the town of Nesles itself. Upon information received at the First Corps from General MacArthur, the 4th Division was put in motion early on the morning of August 2nd, and, following the 42nd Division as the latter forced its way through the pathless and soggy Forêt de Nesles, made a running relief on the

lines at Mareuil-en-Dôle and Chéry-Chartreuve, which it completed on the morning of August 3rd.

In eight days on this front the 42nd Division had accomplished one of the greatest advances that had been recorded up to that time. In the face of a determined, reinforced enemy resistance, it progressed 18 kilometers, played a leading role in the freeing of the Tardenois and led the relieving divisions in its wake to the ridge south of the Vesle. There, its engineer regiment, thrown in on August 1st to fight as infantry at a time when the division was brought low in numbers by its steady engagement against enemy machine-gun positions of the greatest strength and number, headed the deep and final lunge of this division through a battered, muddy terrain on the very heels of the enemy and was relieved last, and farthest north, between Chéry-Chartreuve and Mont. St. Martin. The 4th Division, continuing the advance of the 42nd Division, brought its lines to the south bank of the Vesle.

OTHER DIVISIONAL ACTIVITIES

Meanwhile, following the capture of Fismes by the 32nd Division, that division was relieved on August 9th by the 28th Division, and the 4th Division, in turn, was relieved on August 12th by the 77th Division, which had been transferred from the Lorraine front. The operations on the Vesle continued with these two relieving divisions as the striking heads. The 28th Division early seized Fismette on the north bank of the Vesle, in a brilliant assault, while the 77th Division, continuing on this front until it was released for duty in the Argonne offensive, stubbornly strove to establish a bridgehead on this front, in which it finally succeeded, and during the conclusion of its tour swept its lines forward across the triangular heights separating the Vesle from the Aisne, and was relieved in the valley of the Aisne.

Following the establishment of the American divisions in the valley of the Vesle, the First American Corps was, on August 13th, shifted to the locality of Toul as an augury of its future employment, while the Third American Corps, functioning under command of Major General Bullard, took over the

operations in the valley of the Vesle which had commenced on August 5th and which, without delay, resulted in the capture of Fismes and Fismette. On September 9th the Third American Corps, in its turn, moved to the locality of Verdun, an indication of the future American operations on that front. Finally, the 32nd Division, after its relief by the 28th Division, was regrouped in the littered and battered terrain in the rear of the front on which it had so boldly and successfully operated. There it was refitted and passed through the training period prescribed for the American divisions that had been operating during July and August after they were released from duty on the front, and was there, after transferred to General Mangin's Army, where it participated, again with the greatest dash and gallantry, in a smash delivered by that intrepid French commander, this time north of Soissons; in this the infantry of the 32nd Division received the entire admiration and acclaim of the French troops specially chosen for the attack, who made up General Mangin's Army, for their dashing and determined capture of the strongly situated town of Juvigny, which, girdled by ravines, lay north of the Aisne and about 8 kilometers north of Soissons. This division, after over a month of hard fighting in the Tardenois and locality of Soissons, was next seen on the front in the Meuse and Argonne offensive.

FROM THE MARNE TO THE MOSELLE AND MEUSE

The valley through which the Marne loops and winds west from Mézy-Moulins through Château-Thierry and westward to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, had become the place of regroupment for the American divisions that had fought in the Allied offensive beginning July 18th. Into this lovely country, sun-swept and smiling, now relieved from the menace of the German penetration, the American divisions slowly descended from the line. Their ranks were thin. Their animal transportation was scarred and marred, encrusted with the mud of the Tardenois. Their hard-driven animals were emaciated. Their artillery wound slowly, noiselessly, and proudly. Ahead were the foot troops in discolored uniforms, torn and out at the knees, smudged by the filth of



Before Going "Over"

Troops moving up to their last concentration point before going "over the top."

the terrain on which they had struggled. They were weakened by the heat, by the hardships, and by the sickness that had spread. They were worn in figure and in face, but their long columns wound compactly and, though slowly, in an even and inexorable flow to the scene of their next employment. Each face showed, through the traces of a struggle passed, the light of determination and the indomitableness of spirit that actuated the body that bore it. There was a nobility and a quiet patience that raised above fatigue and lassitude, that conquered weakness, and made these powerful lines pushing forward and now privileged to move by day, the symbol of a

newly found strength of the young, gallant, and powerful Army of the United States. Throughout their length, the roads centering on Château-Thierry revealed an uninterrupted repetition of one division after another, making its exodus from the scene of its employment and carrying with it the consciousness of excellent service. Along this route the military power of the United States, which had been concealed under so many bushels and for so long a time, showed its clear and steady light.

From this locality the flow of divisions was westward to be replaced in men, refitted in *matériel* and refreshed in spirit. To their

now considerable volume there was added each week the increment of the newly arrived American divisions, which, swelling the existing volume, now made possible a large-scale offensive action under American command.

Thus was assured the First American Army, formed on August 10th. Under its wing the new divisions and the refurbished old ones were gathered. Finally, on August 30th, that part of the line beginning 8 kilometers (5 miles) east of the Moselle at Port-sur-Seille on the east and running to a point on the Meuse opposite Verdun on the west, was taken over by the First American Army. This line included the town of St. Mihiel. From this beginning the major portion and strength of our combat forces in the field functioned with American armies.

ST. MIHIEL THE NEXT VICTIM

The stage is now set for the operations in the St. Mihiel salient. With the passage to the American command of a definitive portion of the front, long lines of divisions again took the road in the back areas, moving by night towards the lines near Toul. Those same columns which we saw in their slow pace descending by day into the valley of Château-Thierry, were now, rested by their short stay in the back areas, elements of this great marching body. Their uniforms were new. Their animals were refreshed and augmented by a new issue, among which were the splendid, but altogether too heavy draft animals raised by the French. Their men were largely replaced. In an incredibly short time the bodily weariness of those who had passed through the exhausting operations of the earlier summer months had worn off. Over all these great columns flickered the light of humor and that steady patience and good nature which identifies the American soldier. In this vast caravan moved divisions released from their tours in Lorraine and the Vosges, and also those other divisions new to France and to the front, expectantly looking forward to it. Lastly, on or near the line were grouped

two or three of the newly arrived divisions, as well as the 1st and 2nd Divisions themselves, last seen in the assault south of Soissons.

The routes of travel led to the west and south faces of the St. Mihiel salient,—to the west for the 26th Division, now proceeding to the locality of Bar-le-Duc, and to the south face for the great bulk of the troops to be employed. Night after night the highroads were filled by the troops on the march. In a way similar to that in which the German, applying the von Hutier method, had brought his



An American Battery Moving in August, 1918,
from its Training Quarters to the Front

masses in a steady stream forward for the March offensive of 1918, the American elements were put in flow towards the lines. The soldier knew, just how it was impossible to say, but nevertheless he knew, that the recently formed American Army was going to shear off the large spur into the Allied lines known as the "St. Mihiel salient." These last few words were ones to conjure with. He knew the salient was of long standing and of reputed strength. He approached his task seriously and intently, but with great and animated interest. He never was apprehensive of the result.

XI

ST. MIHIEL SALIENT SUPPRESSED

First American Army's First Operation—Attacking on September 12th,
the Famous Salient Is Closed Twenty-four Hours Later

IT was now September. Simultaneously it became increasingly rainy. To the elements that were brought to the site to shear off the spur of the St. Mihiel salient, that position showed itself as a rock-rimmed angle, very liberally wooded, and rammed sharply into our line. Behind rolled the plains of the Woevre, the gentle levelness of which was emphasized by the sharply swelling rises from the beds of the many streams coursing from the heights of the Meuse in a generally north-easterly direction down to the Moselle north of Pont-à-Mousson, of which the most considerable were the Rupt de Mad and its tributary, the Madine, running diagonally across the south face of the salient from west to east, which threatened, with the volume of rain that was falling, to be a considerable obstacle to all the divisions attacking west of the Moselle.

The St. Mihiel salient measured across its base on a straight line from the town of Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle northward to Les Eparges,—was about 40 kilometers (25 miles), while measured around its south and west faces, including their meeting point at St. Mihiel, it was approximately 65 kilometers (40 miles). During periods of stabilized warfare dating back to the first days of the war, this front had been carefully organized on both sides, and very active. It had been the scene of frequent and desperate efforts highly costly in human life, the result of which was to alter the position of the lines but a few hundred meters. It was now quiet. On it many American divisions had received their battle training. In its south face it included one of the most celebrated hills on the front, Mont Sec, noticeably over-topping all elevations in its vicinity, and rising in one sheer face toward the Allied lines, and sloping steeply back to the German lines in such a way as to afford lodgement in almost unattainable positions to an unlimited amount of

artillery, as well as a superb, craggy observatory over the plains rolling to the south and of the valleys near Toul and Commercy. In its west face were included the formidable heights of Les Eparges, Combres and Amaranthe, part of the impressive rock wall of the Côtes de Meuse.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK

Four Corps, including one French Corps, were charged with the execution of the operation. On the extreme east upon the southern face of the salient was the First American Corps, commanded by Major General Liggett, which with the 82nd, 90th, 5th and 2nd Divisions in the line from east to west in order named, and the 78th Division in reserve, was assigned the mission of pivoting on Pont-à-Mousson on an attack frontage of 18 kilometers (11 miles) and of covering the flank of the Fourth American Corps. The Fourth American Corps, commanded by Major General Dickman, formerly the commander of the 3rd Division, with the 89th, 42nd and 1st Division in the line from east to west in order named and the 3rd Division in reserve, was to deliver the main attack on a frontage of 12 kilometers (7.4 miles) from Limey, exclusive, to Xivray, inclusive, on a northerly axis, and to reach a line roughly defined by the line Vigneulles-St. Benoit-Xammes. The Second French Colonial Corps, with its elements disposed from Xivray, on the south face of the salient, around the nose at St. Mihiel to Mouilly on the west, was to exert pressure on the center and realize, on parts of its front, a small advance over broken terrain. Finally, on the extreme north of the west face of the salient, the Fifth American Corps, commanded by Major General Cameron, with the 26th, 15th French Colonial Division and 4th American Division in the line, in the order named from south to north, was to seize Les Eparges,



Liggett and Edwards

Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett (right), Commander of the First Army Corps, conferring with Major General Edwards (left), Commander of the 26th Division.

Combres and Amaranthe, and then pushing downward from the heights of the Meuse, to advance in a southeasterly direction in order to effect a junction with the Fourth Corps that was striking north from the south face of the salient. In reserve of the First American Army for this operation were the 35th and 91st Divisions, while two other divisions, the 80th and 33rd, were convenient for the

employment in case that had been required.

It will be seen that the plan did not include the taking of Mont Sec by frontal assault. It, as well as the powerful positions at the nose of the salient, were to be made untenable, shorn off by the advance of the Fourth Corps and the junction to be effected between the Fourth and the Fifth American Corps. (See map in color, facing page 210.)

THE PRELIMINARIES

The disposition of the divisions for the attack was completed during the night of September 11-12. The American divisions then in the line that were to participate in the attack accomplished the side-stepping operation necessary to effect the battle alignment, while other divisions not on the line until the moment of attack, were being inserted in it under cover of darkness as a welcome termination of nearly two weeks of night marches from one staging area to another. The break in the weather made passage over the forest roads behind the lines very difficult, and contributed greatly to the labor of bringing up the necessary supplies for the attack. Concealed in the woods were battalions of small and middle-sized French tanks in charge of both French and Americans, whose passage over the slimy, torn-up, unmettalled roads worked wonders in enabling the press of vehicles to make their way over the slippery ruts thus tamped down, for the next few hours. To support the attack, the American Corps and Army artilleries were reinforced by regiments of French guns of various calibers and were augmented by the artillery of the brigades and the divisions in reserve. Lastly, gas and flame troops were inducted all across the front to lay down an initial smoke screen, which, with the artillery smoke shells, was to obscure the vision of the German defenders in their attempt to check the attack along the dense fields of wire that were characteristic of a front of long standing and careful organization.

ARTILLERY OPENS THE ATTACK

At 1 a. m. on September 12th, a savage rain storm broke over the plains of the Woivre, and almost at the same moment the preparatory artillery fire cracked out. After a short while, perhaps ninety minutes, at certain parts of the front the enemy artillery responded, with readiness, but not with power. The number of small caliber guns fired was apparently not great. These indications so readily noted, gave the impression that the problem on the day of attack, which had now arrived, would not be as severe as the terrain and its formal organization for defense had presaged.

Obviously, the German sector troops were not reinforced with artillery, and by that token, were probably not reinforced at all. It appeared not unlikely that a German retirement in force was already under way and that the First American Army, in its initial operation, was receiving the fire from the covering batteries.

ASSAULTING INFANTRY MOVES FORWARD

For four hours the artillery preparation continued, and then, at five o'clock, the departure of the first waves from their positions revealed on this murky morning a scene of great power. Across the south face of the salient, enemy shells burst in sheets of flame, sending up their pyramids of smoke. Rolling over No Man's Land, a barrage from our guns, infinitely more powerful, made a perfect line of fire. Lastly, silhouetted against the bulk of Mont Sec, an artillery smoke screen and the screen of the gas and flame troops sent long, serrated plumes of pitchy blackness, rolling northward before the breeze, which was blowing straight into the enemy lines. The rattle of the supporting machine guns grew; the waves swept down the depressions in No Man's Land, and made their way through the bands of wire that the enemy organization still held. As was to be expected, at certain strong points on the front, such as Bois de la Sonnard, on the front of the 42nd Division, a sharp resistance was immediately encountered from the 10th German Division, recently brought from Flanders and including in it the same 6th Grenadier regiment which, during the German offensive of July 15th, had attempted to cross the Marne near Mézy in the face of the 3rd Division opposition. This German division was one of three divisions rated as first-class on this front. The remaining six were composed of reserve, Landwehr, or Austro-Hungarian elements.

At this time a column of tanks waddled over the heavy terrain and steering towards the clearings between the woods sought to avoid the craters of the long-fought-for No Man's Land. As far as the eye could reach, west and east, waves of assault rolled steadily forward with a power and irresistibility that

made this scene more resemble a specially staged spectacle than an important operation.

OBJECTIVES GAINED

By midnight of September 12-13, the participating divisions were reposing on the assigned objectives. On the right the 82nd had executed a holding attack, not being called upon to advance at that stage. On its left the 90th Division, in its first offensive operation, was preparing to push up on the west of the Moselle River on the following day to the town of Vilcey, which it gained

(5 miles) over a hilly, wooded terrain, and seized Thiaucourt in the valley of the Rupt de Mad, covering the advance of the Fourth Corps at that point. In the latter Corps the 89th Division, in its turn participating for the first time in offensive operations, penetrated all three German positions and demonstrating great power and accuracy in the assault, reached the line of heights north of the Rupt de Mad, realizing an advance of 8 kilometers (5 miles). In the center of this corps, the 42nd Division, overcoming the sharp initial difficulties on its front, crossed the Rupt de



An Advance Through a Devastated Town on the Meuse

"There were rivers of mud, with occasional drops into shell holes, where everything the doughboy had on was drenched and rendered slimy."

on September 13th, penetrating the first German position and turning the second German position near that town. Still further on the left, the 5th Division, also new to the offense, had penetrated both these German positions on September 12th, and advanced to Viéville-en-Haye, about 4 kilometers (2.5 miles), while on the left of the 1st Corps, the 2nd Division, attacking with the 9th and 23rd Infantry, the regiments that had delivered the first assault in the Soissons offensive in which this division was last seen, advanced 8 kilometers

Mad and the Madine successively, as well the first three enemy positions on that front, and established itself on a line east and west through a point on the Beney-Pannes road, about midway between those two towns, and advancing a similar distance as the division on its right. The 1st Division, successfully sweeping around Mont Sec, penetrated the three German positions on the front and took Nonsard. The Second Colonial Corps made the realignment on its front required of it. In the Fifth American Corps, the 26th Divi-

v-5


son drove in the machine gun resistance at St. Remy and swept by that town to Dom-martin-la-Montagne, and the 15th French Colonial Division conservatively and surely took firm possession of the three hills on its front. Lastly, the 4th Division, on the extreme left of the line, executed on this day a holding attack. On September 13th the 4th Division surmounted the heights of the Meuse, penetrating the first German position, and moving down into the plains of the Woivre, took Fresnes-en-Woivre.

SALIENT CLOSED

The 26th Division, pushing one of its infantry regiments forward under cover, of darkness on the night of September 12-13, descended from the Côtes de Meuse, and in the early morning of September 13th reached Vigneulles, where it was shortly thereafter joined by the advance elements of the

1st Division. Thus the desired junction between the Fourth and Fifth American Corps was realized, scarcely twenty-four hours after the opening of the operation. Thereby the angle of the salient opposite the French Colonial Corps was severed from the front by the linking of the American lines in rear of this angle. The suppression of the St. Mihiel salient was complete.

The contact so brilliantly had between the right division of the Fifth Corps and the left division of the Fourth Corps, coincided entirely with the plan of attack under which the three American Corps were sent forward with the morning of September 13th in such a way as to bring the new line across the base of the salient now suppressed, confronting the withdrawal position known generally along the front as the "Hindenburg line," and in this locality as the "Michel Position." To accomplish this, the 1st Division swung for-




Map Showing the Rivers, Elevations and Principal Places
in the St. Mihiel Salient

ward north of the road from St. Benoit to Vigneulles, the 42nd Division took St. Benoit and crossed the highroad leading from Verdun to Pont-a-Mousson, the 89th Division reached the line St. Benoit-Xammes, the 2nd Division advanced to a line about a kilometer north of the line Xammes-Jaulny, while the 5th

CONFRONTING THE HINDENBURG LINE

On the 14th of September the front was pushed to the east of the Verdun-Pont-a-Mousson highroad by the further advances of the 26th, 1st, 42nd and 89th Divisions, and finally, on the 15th of September, was stabil-



The St. Mihiel Salient

The shaded area represents territory captured by 18 American divisions after it had been in the enemy's possession since 1914. See full-page color map of St. Mihiel Salient in this volume.

Division pushed forward about 3 kilometers, and the 90th Division, as has been previously stated, occupied Vilcey, covered in so doing on its right flank by the 82nd Division. On the extreme left the Fifth Corps was aligned to the east of the Fresnes-en-Woevre-Vigneulles road.

ized squarely confronting the Michel position, attended by a slight readjustment on the front of the Fourth Corps accomplished by the local advances of all its divisions. Similar rectifications were carried out of the First Corps, in which the 2nd Division advanced to points immediately south of Charey-Rembercourt, the

5th and 90th Divisions pushing forward through heavily wooded terrain, the former an average of 2 kilometers, and the latter of 4 kilometers, and the 82d Division sweeping down both sides of the Moselle River, a distance of 3 kilometers, to points slightly south of Vandières, from which Metz itself was less than 25 kilometers (15 miles) distant. This new alignment, from that moment on, was a powerful threat to Metz and the entire valley of the Moselle to the north, and afforded a most convenient place of departure for future operations in that direction or against the Briey ore basin.

This substantial advance on the St. Mihiel front netted 13,751 prisoners, 443 pieces of artillery, a large quantity of engineering and other supplies. The casualties, barely 7,000, were extremely small in view of the large number of divisions engaged, of which one-tenth was borne by the brigade of the 42nd Division attacking into the Bois de la Sonnard.

DIFFICULTIES OF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

The advance itself was swiftly and excellently carried out by the participating troops, whose powerful formations swung forward in good order and maintaining close liaison. For over two days the American soldier ranged the plains of the Woëvre, engaging in man hunting as a light occupation. Behind him, however, a congestion of the roads developed which, had it been desired to push the operation further, as seemed entirely feasible in view of the enemy resistance on the front, or had the enemy stiffened his artillery resistance prior to his stand in the rear of the Michel position, or, lastly, had he interposed a real resistance, would have dragged the operation out over a long period of time and would have militated directly against its success. For over twenty-four hours following the advance the transport of food, ammunition and other supplies was snarled, a condition that was created largely by an injudicious assignment of divisional roads, the uncontrolled use of many of these roads without the establishment of any order of precedence in the passage of supplies and the detail to traffic control posts of personnel that was obtaining its first experience in these matters. That a failure of supply was averted under these conditions was due

largely to the individual aggressiveness of the line commanders in getting their immediate necessities forward by the supreme effort of all concerned.

RAPIDITY OF ACTION ASSURED SUCCESS

In the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient many questions present themselves, one of which is the necessity of the operation. This gives rise to the query, whether the German would not have abandoned the salient in order to shorten his lines and retrench in the face of the fury with which the French, and now the British, were attacking. However that may be, it is certain that the German effected an orderly retirement in anticipation of this very attack and that according to the reports from the front-line commanders on this occasion, there would have been few prisoners to skien in and little *matériel* to capture if the assault had been either delayed or executed less swiftly. Benefited as a unit by this great field maneuver, so effective and powerful to observe, the First American Army surely was. In addition to the nine divisions we have shown in France participating with the French in major offensive and defensive operations prior to September 12th, 1918—the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd and 77th—were added four divisions, the 5th, 82nd, 89th and 90th, who took part in the operation, and five others, the 33rd, 35th, 78th, 80th and 91st, who were either in Corps or Army reserve or available therefor.

INDOMITABLE SPIRIT OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS

Gathered in the folds of the St. Mihiel operation we therefore see eighteen American divisions and that same disparity in both training and experience upon the front which was likewise noted at an earlier time, when the corpus of the American troops in France was very small. As men there was little to choose between any of the elements so gathered. They were active, strong and eager. They were convinced of their superiority over the German and they were most desirous to attack him and assert it. The same kindness to one another, steadfastness and endurance which they showed in moments of the defensive they had demonstrated in the offen-

sive, and over this steadily growing body of men there hung, as a sort of guardian spirit, a great good humor, which the long, unbroken marches to the line, frequent changes of station on short notice, rapid employment in the attack, and the sudden reduction in the scale of living that a major operation necessitates, as well as the intense, complete and constant devotion of themselves to the business of fighting from the moment of their arrival in France, could neither affect nor deflect. This largeness of spirit radiated to all, French soldier and French civilian alike, with whom they came in contact. With it they brushed aside the difficulties and hardships that they in many cases encountered, and forgot them. Without

complaint and without fear, they did all things that they were called upon to do, and at the end were ready for anything that might thereafter develop. Coupled with this spirit, their willingness, their endurance, and their entire fearlessness offset any deficiencies in their prior military training and made them swift and intelligent in their comprehension of what was required of them, and most formidable and deadly in their execution of it.

The new positions in the Woevre gained by the St. Mihiel operation had now become stabilized and were being organized for the offense and for future uses as a base of departure, in accordance with the orthodox methods that have been outlined.

XII

THE VICTORY CLINCHED—MEUSE-ARGONNE

First American Army Coöperates with Fourth French Army in Heavy Assault Against German Defense, Striking at Vital Communication Lines

DAY by day the high level of troops in the Woevre receded and that of the troops massed for a new operation grew. The American Command had taken over a frontage (additional to that assumed on August 30th) by the extension of its line westward across the Meuse in front of Verdun to and including the forest of Argonne. The First American Army was to attack from this extension on the morning of September 26th. Its attack was to be in conjunction with an attack by the Fourth French Army. The combined frontage of attack by the two armies extended from Reims to the Meuse.

GERMAN ARMY SET AT BAY

During the month of September the drives by the French, and later by the British, were bending the German lines back at three or four crucial points, precipitating forced retirement and threatening, each day more greatly, to throw the huge withdrawal that was under way into a hopeless state of confusion and disorder. We have seen the German with the

initiative in his hands, forcing it, and compelling the Allied forces to defend as and when the German desired. We have seen this initiative pass from him and have seen him go, almost without an interval of time following his defeat on General Gouraud's front, upon the defensive. We have observed him coolly carrying out an immense plan of retirement and throwing to his rear strong delaying forces and rear guards, selecting for himself the site on which these were to stand, as well as the time at which and the places to which they were to retire. Through all September, despite the heavy thrusts from the French and the British, the German had accomplished his retirement in a masterly way, choosing his positions and not being hurried past those he had chosen. He had his retreat well under control. However, it had progressed to a most ticklish point, where the west wing, against which the British, Belgians and French were operating, and the east wing, against a part of which the Americans were now operating as an army, were in such position that the former



Perspective Map of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive

Showing the American divisions on the jump-off line, September 26th, and those on the Armistice Line, November 11th. Twenty-one combat divisions (600,000 men) took part and six divisions were in reserve. Under American command in these battles there were also 138,000 French troops, most of them east of the Meuse. The enemy territory captured in 47 days equaled 970 square miles. One hundred and fifty towns and villages were liberated and over 16,000 Germans taken prisoner. The American casualties were over 120,000.

was being folded back toward the latter. The great plan was, therefore, to have the English drive back the west wing, which ran in a general northerly direction from Reims to the sea, at its center in the locality of Cambrai, and have the Fourth French Army and the First American Army drive in the east wing of the Germans from Reims to the Meuse on both sides of the Argonne Forest. The result of attacking on these two wings, which were now forming an angle of increasing acuteness with each other, would be to pinch the body of the German Army into a difficult terrain, known as the Ardennes Forest, where it would be cramped, crowded and unable to move freely, and where the supplying of the troops would be most difficult and would become a practical impossibility if the vital railroad line from Carignan to Sedan and Mézières were made impassable. Similarly, in case this railroad were cut, the withdrawal of troops, material and stores which the German had committed to France in his four years there, would be diverted from that broad railroad and he could reach the frontiers of Germany only by use of the Belgian rail system, of which but one main railway ran in a direction west to east.

THE AMERICAN FRONTAGE OF ATTACK

The front of the American attack ran from the bank of the Meuse east of Regneville, included that town, and extended in the valley of the Meuse south of Forges along the famous brook of that name, south of Bethincourt, along the north slopes of the famous hill Le Mort Homme, south of Malancourt, through the trenches on Hill 304, equally celebrated for their part in the frustration of the German attacks against Verdun in 1916, north of Avocourt, south of Vauquois, immediately south of Bourevilles, where it crossed the national highway, running northward through the valley of the Aire and then struck into the center of the Argonne Forest to La Harazée and Vienne-le-Château, in all about 40 kilometers (25 miles). From west to east this line presented the following salient features:

The Mass of the Forest of Argonne, 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) in width at the line of departure and stretching nearly twice that dis-

tance to its northern tip, skirted on the west by the tortuous valley of the Aisne and on its eastern fringes by the sharp valley through which the River Aire meandered to the northern tip of the forest at Grand Pré, emptying into the Aisne a few miles west of that town.

This forest, considered a bulwark superior to the power of modern attack, was most densely wooded, was filled with steep, sudden slopes, was cut up by ravines and valleys, and was, in the part under consideration, devoid of any important roads. It appeared a hopeless tangle under any circumstances, and in it at this time was the 2nd Landwehr Division. It had been there a year, practically undisturbed. The arduousness and impassability of the Argonne Forest were supplemented by extensive and often ingenious defenses which the industrious German, during his long occupation here, had developed to a high point.

The Valley of the Aire, broad at its base, with exceptionally steep descents into it that often took the form of bluffs. These slopes were usually wooded and in their tentacles reaching down to the bed of the river, afforded ideal lodgment for machine gun defenses. Through this valley ran the only good north-and-south road on the entire frontage of attack, a road which, above Varennes, was joined by another similar road that ran through the center of the valley between the Argonne and the Meuse, through Epinonville, Romagne, Bantheviller and Doulon, linking the Aire River road with the Meuse River road at Dun-sur-Meuse.

Eastward of the Aire Valley, a Group of Stubborn Hills, whose crests ran generally east to west and whose slopes were once heavily grown but were now largely deforested by hard usage in the intense operations on this part of the line.

NATURE OF THE TERRAIN

The entire frontage was one of desolation, pitted with shell holes, its slopes macerated by artillery fire and its towns a mockery of civilization—a waste. This section was more devoid of hard roads running north and south than even the Tardenois. Those which the map showed had been largely obliterated by artillery in the defenses of Verdun, or at this time of the year in a season that had become increasingly unsettled and rainy, were rude, muddy gulleys. From the Argonne to the valley of the Meuse, the territory northward of the line of attack, to a distance of about 30 kilometers, was known as the "Wet Champagne," in contrast to the arid slopes westward of the Argonne and because of the peculiar consistency of an oily soil that was strikingly impervious to water. In the creases of this ter-

rain water cupped itself and stayed indefinitely, a fact which contributed to the difficulty of passage through it and along its infrequent and rudimentary roads, as well as to the hardship of living upon its ground.

OPPOSING ENEMY POSITION

Northward, this frontage of attack was opposed by four strongly developed enemy positions, each availing itself of all its exceptional natural defenses. The first of these confronted the line of departure that has been described and was made more difficult by its previous heavy wiring and its sea of shell craters. The next enemy position, about 3 kilometers (2 miles) to the rear, was quite similar, except that the two considerable bodies of woods it included were more clearly in their pristine density; while the third position, somewhat farther to the rear, ran along the general line Dannevoux-Septsarges-Montfaucon-Ivoiry-Epinonville-Apremont, and contained powerful heights, with the hill on which the town of Montfaucon was perched attracting attention at the center and presenting a huge conical mass with steep, bare slopes that threatened to split the line of attack as though it were a prow. Finally, there was a fourth position on the general line Brioules-sur-Meuse-Cunel-Romagne - Côte-de-Chatillon - St. Georges-Grand Pré, known as the Kriemhilde Position, similar to the Michel position, with which it joined on the east of the Côtes de Meuse. This was the withdrawal position and served as one of the links in the line of retirement known as the "Hindenburg line."

THE KRIEMHILDE POSITION

The Kriemhilde position was the final, organized barrier on which the German might stand to oppose an attack northward. It is true that in its rear there was a further position which was, however, merely traced upon the terrain and except for that not organized. The Kriemhilde position was extremely formidable. It was tied in through a mass of heavy woods capping steep heights, and ran over a sheer rock wall deeply cut by defiles, to the Côte de Chatillon, where it emerged from the woods and descended from the shelf

that it followed into the valley of the Aire near St. Juvin and Champigneulle.

GERMAN FORCES CONFRONTING AMERICANS

The German on this front had, in addition to the forces in the Argonne Forest, the 1st Guard Division, convalescing there after its experiences on the Chemin des Dames and the Marne; the 7th Reserve Division, also recuperating, and the 117th Reserve Division, the last a polyglot of Poles and Alsatians, and therefore not entirely dependable so far as the German was concerned.

DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN CORPS

Against these divisions the First American Army attacked with three corps on September 26th, at 5:30 a. m., behind a rolling barrage and following an orthodox artillery preparation of three hours. On the right the Third Corps, last seen in charge of the operations on the Vesle, with the 33rd, 80th and 4th Divisions, from east to west in the line, and the 3rd Division in reserve, held the frontage from the Meuse to Malancourt, about 10 kilometers. The Fifth Corps was in the center and had in the line from east to west, the 79th, 37th and 91st Divisions and the 32nd Division in reserve, attacking on a similar frontage that extended to a point between Vauquois and Bourevilles. On the left flank was the First Corps, with the 35th, 28th and 77th Divisions from east to west in the line, and the 92nd Division in reserve. In Army reserve were the 1st, 29th and 82nd Divisions. The Corps and Army reserves and the participating corps were at this time commanded as we have heretofore seen them.


Of the nine divisions in the line, four in the center, the 35th, 37th, 79th and 91st, and the two on the right flank, the 80th and 33rd, were participating in their first offensive, although the 35th and 91st Divisions had served in the First Army reserve in the St. Mihiel operation, and the two last referred to were available at that time. Similarly, the 29th Division, in Army reserve, was also on trial. Of the remaining three divisions, the 28th was last seen on the Vesle, the 77th in its

sweep forward to the Aisne, and the 4th in its action on the left of the Fifth Corps in the St. Mihiel operation.

SUPPORTING ELEMENTS AND ARMS

The large concentration necessary for this operation was again effected, with precautions as to secrecy. Until the last moment a thin French garrison held the line of departure to

German had swept over them, were now concealing in their dilapidation from the aviators' eyes the largest concentration of American troops that had been effected under American command in France. To support them, the French detailed a total of 35 artillery regiments of various calibers, and in addition, railway units, and to accompany them there were gathered over 200 tanks of the French



From L'Illustration

A Bird's-eye View of the Country Ahead of the American Line

screen the introduction of the American divisions and to avoid the chance of the German getting American prisoners before the attack was launched. The great highroads from Bar-le-Duc and to the Verdun-Ste. Mennehour line nightly were in a swirl of white dust churned by the passage of the swift French camions with their Indo-Chinese drivers, transporting the Americans to the scene. The lesser roads—not *routes gardées*—brought steady lines of artillery and animal transport of the incoming elements. Small towns in the rear of the front, badly damaged when the

type, operated two-thirds by the Americans and one-third by the French, to the employment of which the shell-holed, tangled terrain did not readily lend itself.

AMERICAN PLAN OF ATTACK

The American plan was to penetrate the first, second, third and fourth, the last named being the Kriemhilde position, on the very first day of the attack, realizing an average distance of 18 kilometers (about 11 miles) in so doing, to effect a junction with the French at Grand Pré and to force the retirement of

the German from the Argonne Forest by virtue of this junction, and then to carry on a combined offensive with the Mézières-Sedan-Carignan railroad as the objective. The advance anticipated for the American Army on the first day was a long way, especially on the terrain to be passed over and the difficulties attending the extreme paucity of north and south roads. It had a very strong reason behind it, however, namely, to rush the German so swiftly and hard that in his retirement he would not be able to stand on any of his organized positions. If the attack could swoop through the defense in this manner before the small body of German troops could get set for the defense and be reinforced on one of their strong, organized positions, a most threatening position would be precipitated that


would have an instant effect on the conclusion of hostilities.

In the American plan the mission of the Third Corps was to sweep forward, protected on its right by the Meuse, and cover the attack through the center delivered by the Fifth Corps. The Fifth Corps was to deliver the piercing attack and put itself in rear of the Kriemhilde position, while the First Corps was to cover the right flank of the attack and keep the enemy engaged in the Argonne, advancing along the axis of the Aire valley. To confuse the German as to the location of the attack, the divisions on the St. Mihiel front were ordered to make a series of strong raids and the divisional artillery there to participate in an artillery diversion. The launching of the attack was, however, not an entire surprise to



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Filling Up the Entrance to Their Dugout
As Bairnsfather would say, "If you know a better 'ole, go to it."



Map Showing the Principal Towns and Roads in the Country Across Which the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive Was Fought
(See full-page color map in this volume.)

the German, although, certainly, its exact limits and direction were.

The American plan was a bit too ambitious to be realized on that front in the time as-

signed. Accordingly the operation, of its own development, divided itself into two stages, that of the advance to the Kriemhilde position, and the advance through it.

XIII

ADVANCE TO THE KRIEMHILDE POSITION

The First Three Positions Fall—The Enemy Then Re-forms His Defense and Reinforces Strongly

AT the termination of a very strong artillery preparation of three hours, the First, Third and Fifth American Corps moved forward. Progress by the Third Corps, on the right, was swift and sure and was abreast of the plan of attack. By evening of the 26th all three of its divisions had penetrated the first three organized enemy positions on the front. Along the Meuse the 33rd Division, crossing the brooklet of Forges, swept ahead through the strong positions in the woods of Forges to Dannevoux, while on the left of this corps the 4th Division, by 2:30 in the afternoon, had made a most powerful assault on the narrow front assigned to it, smothered a desultory machine gun resistance before that had time to develop in force, and advanced about 10 kilometers (6 miles) to the line Nantillois-Dannevoux, the ultimate line assigned it for that day's attack. Halting there, thrust out ahead of its flanking divisions, it immediately found that the German retreat had stopped simultaneously and that a more powerful and better organized resistance sprang up without delay. The center of this corps, the 80th Division, elements of which had experienced delay in jumping off to the attack, pushed up on a line between the 33rd and 4th Divisions.

On the left flank, all three divisions of the First Corps went forward according to plan, the 77th Division in the Argonne Forest making a most creditable advance through the organized tangle on its front, the 28th Division in the center and to the west of the river highroad, driving ahead to Montblainville, about 6 kilometers (3.7 miles), and the 35th Division on the east of the Aire

valley passing Varennes and Cheppy and bringing its lines to Charpentry.

HILL OF MONTFAUCON A PROW PARTING WAVES OF ATTACK

In the center corps, however, trouble developed on the right flank near Montfaucon, due primarily to the natural strength of the commanding hill of that name. The 79th Division had encountered initial difficulty with the wire and shell holes on its front, which were, indeed, considerable, and was unable to have its progression conform with that of the rolling barrage. As a result, the enemy machine-gun defenses in the dense woods of Malancourt, Montfaucon and Cuisy, across its front, delayed and destroyed the continuity of assault and halted the advance temporarily at the base of the cone of Montfaucon itself. In this aerie and upon its bare slopes, the German made a strong stand. On the left of the 79th, the 37th Division and the 91st Division penetrated the first three German positions and were well ahead. Accordingly, the line showed a great dimple at its center, a concave indentation where a convex arc had been desired. The delay here interposed necessarily checked the entire line and gave the German infantry and machine gun elements in retirement a chance to stand, and the withdrawing echelons of artillery an opportunity to go into position, and hurl their metal into a front every inch and fold of which was thoroughly known during the years of German occupation.

To overcome this retardation and to free the flanks of the 4th and 37th Divisions from the enfilade that they were beginning to receive from the Montfaucon positions, the in-

fantry of the 4th, 79th, 37th and 91st Divisions were ordered to push the attack into the night in the hope that the pressure on the center added to that on the flanks where the 4th and 37th Divisions were well around and behind Montfaucon, would break this obstruction. Due to the difficulty of the problem presented the 79th Division, the 26th of September passed with Montfaucon still in enemy hands. Finally, on the following day, the 79th renewed its attacks, aided by a machine-gun barrage and a few tanks, took the hill and town of Montfaucon and pushed forward to a point about a kilometer south of the original objective assigned for September 26th.

ASSAULTING CORPS PENETRATE THIRD GERMAN POSITION

The First American Army now found itself in rear of the first three German positions, with about 10,000 prisoners in its hands. On its part, the necessity of moving forward the artillery and bringing up the supplies over newly acquired terrain presented many difficulties, complicated at the outset by the erratic discharge of a mine at a crucial point in the Aire River road. The days following the 27th of September were devoted to this readjustment, which entailed the necessity of constant and tireless effort of engineers in making the roads passable and to improvise detours while the consequences of the mining of the Aire River road were being repaired. They proved the endurance, pluck and devotion of artillerymen and drivers of wagon transport in continually bending their shoulders to the wheel in the effort to make a slow but certain progress over the steep, sticky and most disheartening routes (now under increasingly heavy artillery interdiction) with their guns and their vital wagon loads. For the troops, disposed on a wide terrain and constantly operating against enemy positions which were hourly made stronger and reinforced in numbers, exposed to heavy artillery harassment from the heavy caliber guns on the east of the Meuse and in the forest of Argonne, which were as yet undisplaced, as well as from the close alignment of all calibers on their front, the rectifying of the line was attended with great hardship. Steadily it was accomplished, the corps on the flank each

realizing considerable progress, a feature of which was the steady movement of the 77th Division forward over its arduous course and the center corps' slight advance beyond Cierges in the direction of Gesnes.

GERMANS MAKE STUBBORN DEFENSE

On the German side a stubborn defense had developed. The local reserves had been brought to the spot, and, constantly drawn from all parts of the line and hurriedly deflected from their passage through the Mézières-Sedan exit from France, German elements of all sizes and descriptions, from divisions to battalions, began to appear to ensure the defense of the Kriemhilde position and hold back the onslaught against their lines of communication. Those same features of rear-guard action and machine-gun employment which have been previously observed were now brought to bear, reinforced by boldly handled artillery in volume, which, in addition to the advantages of firing into a terrain thoroughly known, had that of being able to fire from ridges sharply on the flank of the attack. To the bulk of this artillery led hard roads, numerous and in good condition, while to that part of it emplaced farther forward the customary light railroads for ammunition and food supply that the German had developed, relieved his roads from the extreme press of heavy travel that was making operations most difficult for the American Army. Standing as the German did, in the interval between the third and Kriemhilde positions and evincing an intention of holding the latter at all costs, it was clear that a new attack against the Kriemhilde position, prepared in detail and executed in force, was required.

2ND DIVISION IN FOURTH FRENCH ARMY CAPTURES HEIGHTS OF BLANC MONT

Especially was this true in view of the advance the Fourth French Army, west of the Argonne, was realizing after a somewhat slow beginning. This army, sweeping forward from the Monts and the buttes, described in reference to the offensive of July 15th, was pushing forward into the valley of the Aisne. Suddenly, on the 2nd of October, the 2nd American Division became the arrow head at about the center of the French advance and

drove forward in a very rapid attack, taking, on its second attempt, the bastion hill of Blanc Mont, dominating the ridge between the River Py and the River Arnes, and then swept down into the valley of the former river, seizing St. Etienne and the cemetery on the highroad leading from that town to

sion of the Fourth French Army into the valley of the Aisne.

A NEW ASSAULT SWEEPS OUR LINES TO THE KRIEMHILDE POSITION

The final stage of the advance to the Kriemhilde position commenced on October



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Brigadier-General Malin Craig

Chief of Staff of the 5th Division of the First Army Corps, and later of the Third Army.

Machault. To accomplish this, the 2nd Division penetrated complicated defensive organizations similar to those seen upon the French side, against a very determined resistance, and on the 9th of October was relieved by the 36th Division. It was the latter's first tour upon the front. It swept ahead steadily in the progres-


4th. For this renewal of the attack the battle order was changed by inserting the 1st, 32nd and 3rd Divisions in the front instead of the 37th, 91st and 79th Divisions. With this new battle order the lines were pushed forward in stubborn fighting until they were brought up against the Kriemhilde position,

the features of which were the cleaving, rapid advances by the 1st Division against most difficult positions, and the brilliant assault by the 82nd Division, on the occasion of its relief of the 28th Division on the morning of October 7th, due westward against the ledge west of the River Aire and the storming of the heights of Chatel Chehery.

The operations of the 1st Division as the striking head on this front at this stage extended over eight days and through almost as many attacks. From the locality of Epinonville this division took one steep crest after

to Romagne itself in a series of long, stubborn operations, in an effort to keep abreast of the powerful advance of the 1st Division. The 3rd Division, in the region of Cunel and the woods of that name, made a small advance, strongly threatening the Kriemhilde position between Brioules and Cunel, despite the artillery fire that was poured into its exposed right from the Cotes de Meuse.

In the meantime, the French had pushed abreast of Grand Pré and the 77th Division, on the 9th of October, was overcoming the last enemy organizations in the Argonne and was



U. S. Signal Corps drawing

Crossing the Moselle

The ferry at Treis before the construction of the pontoon bridge.

another until it reached the Côte de Maldah about 8 kilometers (5 miles) northwestward, ably supported by its artillery, but due finally to the tirelessness and fearlessness of its infantry, and determination of its leaders. It seized the valley of Exermont, a deep defile, and later a group of no less than four lofty, conical hills that were covered with dense woods (of which the Côte de Maldah was one), whose slopes had to be taken successively by direct assault. On its right, the 32nd Division, also attacking steadily, pushed forward along the highroad from Epinonville to Romagne, passed Gesnes, and carried its lines

about to emerge from that forest. Despite the substantial progress along the Aire valley road by the Americans and the movement on the west of the Argonne by the French, the German boldly held his artillery in the gap of Grand Pré and in the heavy forest north, similar to the Argonne, and known as the Bourgogne.

1ST AND 3RD DIVISIONS ASSAULT WEST OF MEUSE. 33RD DIVISION CROSSES TO EAST OF MEUSE

In this manner the line led on the left by the 1st, and on the right by the 3rd, was

brought to the base of the wooded escarpment on which was the bulk of the Kriemhilde position in the Wet Champagne. The rear-guard and machine-gun resistance had become very strong. By this time elements of nearly thirty German divisions had been identified on the



Drawn by W. Morgan, 1918

In the Argonne Forest

front of the First American Army and the enemy artillery, with a mass of ammunition, was firing wide and deep and was gouging into the backs of our front lines from its vantage points on the flanks. It became imperative to displace this flank fire. Accordingly, the 33rd Division, on the west bank of the Meuse, changed its axis of attack sharply to the east, and, beginning on October 7th established with its divisional engineers a crossing of the Meuse at Consenvoye, over which its infantry passed and swept into the woods in the direction of the Etraye ridge. It was a daring and well handled operation. The 33rd Division, by crossing the Meuse

and joining its right flank with the left of the 29th Division, thereafter operating with the French on the east bank of the Meuse, threatened to sweep over the crest near Etraye on which the harassing German artillery was lodged, and by its speedy advance against the strong, acclivitous positions here and in the face of the mass of artillery fire delivered from the ridge, contributed directly to the relief of the American troops east of the Meuse from a considerable volume of this harassment, and made possible the capture of the Etraye ridge later in the month by the 29th Division and one regiment of the 26th Division.

To balance this success gained on October 9th, the 77th Division, on October 10th, emerged from the forest of Argonne, having forced its way northward through it.



Bringing Up Supplies

XIV

ATTACK THROUGH THE KRIEMHILDE

The Final Organized German Position Riddled on the Front of the
Fifth and Third Corps by Attacks of 1st, 3rd,
32nd and 42nd Divisions

THE four days following October 9th, although showing very slight changes upon the battle map, were, in fact, most important. They represent the progress of the 82nd Division near St. Juvin, the movement of the lines of the 1st Division into the woods across the valley from and south of the Côte de Chatillon, the advance of the 32nd Division along the highroad north from Romagne towards Bantheville (although the left of this division was badly bent back by the resistance from the irregular and massive bulwark of the Côte Dame Marie (Hills 287 and 286). On the right of the 32nd Division the 3rd Division was steadily cleaning out the wooded heights of the Bois de la Pultiere, immediately north of Cunel, and the 80th Division was pushing well up the bare slopes of the Côte 299, its lines curving thence southeastward to the Meuse and near Brieuilles-sur-Meuse. All this amounted to a general "hugging up" to a convenient line of departure for the crushing attack against the lofty ridges over which the German defense was disposed and was stubbornly forbidding an advance at this moment.

1ST DIVISION RELIEVED BY 42ND DIVISION

The 1st Division after attempting to cross the valley to the south and west of the Côte de Chatillon, was relieved by the 42nd Division on the night of October 12-13 and proceeded to the rear areas greatly depleted in numbers from the hard fighting by which it had broken the way for the sweep forward beginning October 4th. That night also its commander, Major General Summerall, was placed in command of the Fifth Corps and immediately confronted with the task of taking the Côte de Chatillon, which, during the last week had come to be recognized by the High

Command as the pin holding the Kriemhilde position and of which as a Division Commander he had himself sought to gain possession. Accordingly, the 42nd Division, upon its arrival on this front, inherited this very considerable mission.

CHANGES AFFECTED IN AMERICAN ARMY

Pausing for a moment to observe certain changes that the development of the operation of the American forces necessitated, we observe that on October 10th the Second American Army was formally organized under command of Major General Bullard, the Third Corps commander, and the command of the First Army devolved upon Major General Liggett, both of these army commanders afterwards receiving the grade of Lieutenant General. The vacancies in the First and Third Corps thus caused were filled by the transfer of Major General Dickman to command the First Corps and the assignment of the Third Division commander, Major General Hines, to the command of the Third Corps. The creation of the Second American Army at this time was directly connected with the intentment, the demonstration of which was prevented by the armistice, of striking eastward of the Meuse towards the Brieu ore basin and later by an offensive towards Château Salins, the result of which would be (in addition to the further severance of the German lines of communication and the recovery of the mines of Brieu which had been in German hands since the outbreak of the war) the distinct isolation of Metz.

37TH AND 91ST DIVISIONS SENT TO BELGIUM

During this period likewise the 37th and 91st Divisions were withdrawn from the American portion of the line, and, because of

the offensive in Belgium that had begun on October 14th, moved rapidly to the locality of Ypres, where they detrained, and functioning with two French corps, attacked on October 31st, the 37th Division crossing the River Escaut on November 3rd, and the 91st Division seizing a difficult woods on its front by a well executed flanking movement and reaching Audenarde on that river. With the advance of the British Armies between Cambrai and St. Quentin in full swing, the Belgian offensive on the eve of being launched and the French Fourth Army threatening to reach the railroad at Mézières by an advance which had, in turn, brought it against the German retirement position on its front, there known as the "Brunhilde Position" (and extending along the crests north of the Aisne valley north of Rethel and Vouziers and thus lying considerably north of the location of the Kriemhilde position on the First American Army's front), the situation on the American front was one of the gravest danger to the German. In addition to the great menace to the lines of communication they carried, the dogged and heavy attacks of the American despite all obstacles of weather, terrain and weariness had converted this part of the line into a great maw in which enemy troops who could be ill-spared elsewhere were being killed, wounded, captured or rendered unfit for duty at an appalling rate.

COTE DE CHATILLON STORMED BY 42ND DIVISION

The Côte de Chatillon, to which we now return, has been frequently likened to the hill of Montfaucon. Nothing could be more dissimilar. Although rising sheerly from the valley in a strongly conical form, this hill was wooded over its entire expanse; nor was it open to the encirclement possible at Montfaucon. In the first place, the Côte de Chatillon was so tied in with a group of three sheer-walled and wooded heights, Hills 242, 288 and 286, running diagonally across the front of attack from southeast to northwest, that possession of these three supporting hills was essential before the Côte de Chatillon could be taken. In the second place, the enemy had disposed on these positions and in the carefully organized and wired trenches leading

across them, all his available forces, which he was reinforcing so far as he was able for the defense.

HILLS 242 AND 288 TAKEN BY AMERICANS

On the morning of October 14th, the 42nd Division, reinforced by the artillery brigade of the 1st Division and in liaison with the 32nd Division, hurled the 84th Infantry Brigade, boldly and stirringly commanded on the site and in the midst of the arduous and difficult operations, by Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur, and consisting of the 167th and 168th Infantry and the 151st Machine Gun Battalion, into the tangled slopes and ravines at the base of Hills 288 and the Côte de Chatillon while the left brigade sought to move through the open and push up the bare slopes through the wire on the crest in front of Landres-et-St. Georges. On October 14th Major Ross, the front line battalion commander of the 168th Infantry, seized Hill 288, working up its sheer slopes, and, already reinforced for the purpose, pushed on to Hill 242. This he took on the 15th and at night he thrust his lines, now consisting of two battalions, into the Tuilerie Farm at the foot of the Côte de Chatillon on the southeast. Informing the infantry regiment on his left of an opening in the heavy wire to the rear of the farm, he prepared for the final assault. This was launched on the morning of October 16th. Supported by fire from the artillery of two divisions and by the brigade machine-gun battalion massed and handled as a single battery and all superbly delivered, the two infantry regiments rammed their way behind the wire and took the hilly bastion of the Kriemhilde position by storm. At dusk on October 16th the remaining and reserve battalions of these two regiments took over the front line prepared to exploit their success in case that had been ordered. Although the pin had been extracted from the Kriemhilde position, it was, however, not ordered.

Attending the vigorous and brilliant assault against the straight faces of Hill 288 and the slopes of 242, and with the pressure on its left flank from Hill 286 now relieved by the fall of Hill 288 (less than a kilometer to the northwest), the 32nd Division swept steadily forward and by the night of October 18th had

V-6

taken possession of the woods of Bentheville and the town of that name, thus placing itself, in turn, in the rear of the Kriemhilde position. There it was relieved by the 89th Division.

**BOIS DES RAPPES "HOG-TIED" BY 3RD
DIVISION**

Similarly, the 3rd Division now attacking with the 5th Division on its left, pushed

you herewith the Bois des Rappes hog-tied." Shortly thereafter this division was also relieved.

DIFFICULTIES ON THE FLANKS

With the center of the First American Army establishing itself at vantage points in rear of the now badly riddled Kriemhilde position, the scene of operations shifts to the flanks. On the left the 77th Division was



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Major-General Charles P. Summerall

He commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade at Cantigny; he was in command of the 1st Division at Soissons and St. Mihiel; and in the Argonne he was in command of the Fifth Corps.

ahead along the road to Clery and finally seized the Bois des Rappes, a most important and harassing hilly woods that had long defied the assaulting troops, and the capture of which prompted the famous and epigrammatic message of the new Division Commander, Brigadier General Preston Brown, "I hand

relieved on October 16th by the 78th Division and the 82nd Division was on the point of relief by the 80th Division. The town of Grand Pré was now definitely in American hands and northward of it the 78th Division was making a slow and difficult progress in its effort both to work up the west edges of

the Bois de Bourgogne displacing the artillery lodged in that massif and to turn the enemy out of a square kilometer of woods (the Bois des Loges) between the Bois de Bourgogne and Champigneulle, which interdicted progress to the east of it along up the ravine of the

quently mentioned heretofore as the Côtes de Meuse), commenced by the 33rd Division on October 7th and 8th, now took on most significant proportions. By the progress realized here the divisions on the west bank of the Meuse were enabled to cross that river



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Brigadier-General Preston Brown

He commanded various divisions in the Marne fighting and at St. Mihiel; he was later Assistant Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q., Germany.

Agron rivulet extending northward from Grand Pré.

OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MEUSE—33RD, 29TH AND 26TH DIVISIONS

Meanwhile, on the east of the Meuse the operation to sweep eastward over the rocky escarpment separating the Meuse valley from the Woevre plains (this rock wall being fre-

farther to the north when, beginning on November 1st, they were ordered to do this. The 29th Division with the 26th Division on its right facing a continued and violent artillery fire still set down from the Etraye ridge and beyond, made slow but determined progress through the heavily wooded terrain until, on October 23rd, reinforced by a regiment of the 26th Division, as has been seen pre-

viously, it took the Etraye ridge by storm. On October 27th the 26th Division cleaned out the strongly defended patch of woods of Belleu and seized the lofty Bois d'Ormont, both positions of great natural difficulty. The powerful attacks by the 29th and later the 26th Divisions gave the French Corps with whom these divisions were serving as a part of the First American Army a firm seat on the Côtes de Meuse and definitely relieved the divisions west of the Meuse from the galling artillery from this flank to which they had until this time been exposed. It also unshackled from a similar fetter any general renewal of the advance on the Meuse-Argonne frontage.

FINE ACHIEVEMENTS OF 27TH AND 30TH DIVISIONS IN SECOND CORPS ON BRITISH FRONT

The developments of the latter part of October indicated that the time to break through the Mézières-Sedan-Carignan rail line had come. On the British frontage, Lille had been recovered. The Second American Corps, with which the 27th and 30th American Divisions were serving, followed its dashing break through the Hindenburg line near Cambrai, in the attack beginning September 27th, with a highly important advance along the Selle River in which it realized 21 kilometers (13 miles) gain during the period from October 6th to October 19th, capturing during these two actions, over 6,000 prisoners.* An offensive in Flanders commenced on October 14th was gaining great momentum. Farther afield Turkey was about to surrender and the Austrian arms, recoiling before the Italian attacks of October 24th and 29th, were tottering to a collapse.

*In the survey of the field operations just concluded the activity of the American elements on the British and Belgian fronts have been referred to only in connection with those on the front of the French Armies. The participation on the former fronts of the American divisions, such as the fine thrust at Hamel on July 4th, in which selected elements from the 33rd Division took a very creditable part, and the larger and more extended operations of the 27th and 30th Divisions with the 2nd American Corps, as well as the advance of the 37th and 91st Divisions into Flanders, deserve a detailed

consideration not possible within the scope of the foregoing chronicle.

WITH GREAT HEART, DEVOTION AND STAMINA THE AMERICAN OVERCOMES DETERMINED ENEMY RESISTANCE

The entire month of October had been rainy and cold. In the wooded terrain through which the German offensive positions wound, it had presented a stern test in endurance and stamina. The number of German prisoners was on the increase. Wearied by their fighting elsewhere and their hardships on the front of the First American Army, they were, generally, dispirited and low in morale. The strength and willingness of the American soldier, however, surmounted the very obstacles that had shaken the confidence of the German. In the "Wet Champagne," with its woods filled with gas and pounded by artillery, he carried out, often unsupported by artillery, a ceaseless series of assaults. The numerous fine shelters the German had erected were either too foul, too tainted with gas that had been loosed in them, or too apt to conceal infernal machines to afford him any cover against the hard rains and chill. Besides, they usually faced the wrong way, that is, were exposed to the enemy shelling because they had been located so as to take the cover of the slope toward the original Allied front. His only cover was the foxhole, a slit scooped from the side of the bank or hill, interposing itself between himself and the enemy, where, huddled in dampness, he took such little comfort as his wet blankets and his cold rations (manhandled countless kilometers each day through a sea of slime and soggi-ness by carrying parties), could offer. Under these conditions he was constantly attacking, and, facing them, he seized by his boldness, brawn and bravery, some of the strongest positions that nature and the art of military organization could present. He penetrated trackless ravines and stormed nearly vertical crests. His willingness, his patience in adversity and his great physical strength were superior to every test. Possessing these qualities when his adversary did not, he could not fail. Before him lay the unorganized ridges leading to the frontier, where he could be delayed and temporarily checked. If, how-

ever, the German were unable to stand on the organizations of the Kriemhilde position, it was apparent that with that position on the point of being lost, he could hardly hope to hold upon the strong, but unorganized hills'

north of Buzancy. For a number of days the thinning out of the front by the German was observed as though the enemy was merely deferring his retirement until the attack was launched.

XV

THE BREAKING UP OF THE ICE

The Crossings of the Meuse and Advance to Sedan—The German Line Recoils, Disintegrates, and Enters Into Full Retreat

THE attack to dislodge the Germans from the west bank of the Meuse and to carry the lines beyond that river from Dun-sur-Meuse to Mézières and exploit the east bank of the river, was ordered by the High Command for the morning of November 1st. It was designated to render the Mézières-Sedan-Carignan rail line absolutely impassable and thereby to lop off this paralyzed and withered arm of German supply and, now, of withdrawal.

This mission was entrusted to the Fourth French Army on the west and the First American Army on the east, acting jointly. The obstacles of the forests of Bourgogne, Bas and Boulton, which were, in fact, the northern projection of the mass of the Argonne lying above the gap of Grand Pré, were to be overcome in a way similar to that in which the Argonne forest itself was reduced: by the passage of the French along its western face and of the Americans along its eastern face. The French were to strike through the northern section of the forest of Bourgogne to Boulton aux Bois, which lay on the great highroad leading from Vouziers to Buzancy, and thence to the Meuse at Stenay and on past Montmédy to the important frontier town of Longuyon, known as "Route Nationale No. 47." At Boulton aux Bois the American Army was to effect a juncture with the French and in so doing the former was required to pass up the tortuous, narrow and difficult valley of the Agron rivulet and skirt the many wooded protrusions that jutted forward in clumps and patches at the base of the mound over which stretched the three forests named above.

On the eve of, and in preparation for the attack on the American side of the obstacle, the 2nd Division was inducted to the line on the Côte de Chatillon in front of Landres-et-St. Georges and became the left division of the Fifth Corps, and in so doing relieved the 42nd Division which had been operating on that front since the middle of October. In the First Corps the 80th Division supplanted the 82nd Division, and between the former and the 78th Division the 77th Division again took the line now confronting the difficult position at Champigneulle. Finally, the 1st Division was brought forward as reserve of the Fifth Corps and the 42nd Division was prepared to sidestep westward at the moment of attack and serve as the reserve of the First Corps. These two divisions were to trail the initial assault, ready to displace any reinforcement or stiffening of the German line that might hold up the general advance of their respective corps, or to exploit the success anticipated.

THE GERMAN LINE CRUMBLES

On November 1st the attack was launched, preceded by a brief but crushing artillery preparation, probably the greatest in power and volume the American Army had ever set down, and accompanied by a terrific, massed machine-gun fire executed by brigade and divisional battalions on the forward enemy positions. At 5:30 a. m. the assault moved forward. It was soon seen that the enemy resistance on the Kriemhilde position had crumbled or was absolutely shattered and that the ten enemy divisions then on the front of

the American Army were on this day put into a state of flux.

The general result of this offensive was the destruction of the homogeneity of the German front opposite the attack, maintained for so long and over so many kilometers of France. The unity of the German line on this stretch, which had been balancing on a thin thread, now fell. The entire frontage of defense became disintegrated. Liaison to the right and the left was interrupted, and here there was

During this process of penetration, rear guard defenses were carried out by the Germans, often with the greatest determination and self-sacrifice, and frequently by selected units of every conceivable kind and complexion, which were thrown in (from reserve positions or from the road or rail lines on which they were moving ever eastward) to steady the front and to prevent the pursuit from precipitating a rout. These elements, carrying out a previously published plan of withdrawal, blew out



Interior of Bomb-proof Dugout Made by Officers of the 77th Division

seen the recoil of the defending troops, who, in a series of groups, frequently less than a division in size, made such a stand as the opposition in front of them warranted, and at the last moment compatible with their escape from encirclement or capture, withdrew, posthaste, under cover of night if possible, and if not, in the face of the pursuit. The only parallel to the fragmentation of the German defense enacted in the opening week of November is the breaking up of the ice, the great polar pack, after it has become a shifting, but fissureless, barrier during the Arctic winter

the culverts and the bridges on all roads and opened up gapping mine craters to obstruct passage and delay the Allied advance. German machine-gun detachments, acting on their own initiative and often with desperate self-abandonment, withdrew from point to point, attempting to hinder and waylay the columns that were pressing on, and, on numerous recorded occasions, engulfed and without ammunition, were captured and exterminated.

On the side of the attack all possible speed was effected through the gallant efforts of the foot troops, already heavily tried, in order that

the enemy might not delay and make a considerable stand. Back of the waves of attack the roads became crowded and congested, and finally, nearly impassable, with the swirl of artillery urging the draft teams to the point where they could maintain their support of the infantry; with echelons of wagon and truck; with the sanitary trains; and, with the reserve divisions, which, shifted and displaced from the roads thus loaded, by hugh exertion wallowed in the wake of the advance.

Passing now to a more detailed consideration of the pursuit, the valley of the Meuse demands attention. It was the purpose of all the corps to reach this valley and effect a passage of the swift stream, of an average width of 100 meters, that ran through it. The Meuse, flowing in a generally northward direction from Dun-sur-Meuse past Mouzay and Stenay to Inor (all four of these towns on its east bank), then bears off to the northwest to Mouzon and Sedan (both on its north bank) and thence passes between the twin cities of Mézières and Charleville, the former lying to its south and the latter to its north. At this part the river maintains a serpentine course amidst flats rarely greater than one kilometer in width and often less, and flanked by steep, wooded hills which, at Dun-sur-Meuse, tower sharply and loftily above the great river road, extending through Mézières to Charleville, through Sedan, Mouzon and Stenay to Dun-sur-Meuse and Verdun. Back of these forests and rocky battlements in the locality of Dun, the German had maintained his assembly and supply points for his great operations against Verdun and behind their mask he had kept ensconced a mass of artillery similar to that previously alluded to on the Etraye ridge, whose enfilading fire was one of the great obstacles the attack was called upon to overcome.

It was the mission of the Third Corps on the Meuse to pass the Kriemhilde position west of the Meuse, whirl sharply through an arc of nearly forty-five degrees to the northeast and force a passage on the general line Vilosnes-sur-Meuse to Mouzay, progressing but a few kilometers, but confronting a redoubtable natural position in so doing. The operations of the right element of the Third Corps, the 5th Division, which first came into

the focus of this study in the St. Mihiel offensive, and the astonishing vigor and success of that division from the first days of the November attack until the hour of the armistice, with especial mention of the 60th Infantry and the divisional engineers, make one of the brightest pages in the closing hours of the war, and one which does not suffer in comparison with any of a similar sort the war has shown.

The Fifth Corps in the center and the First Corps on the left were to progress in a generally northerly direction, inclining somewhat towards the east. On the frontages of these corps the valley of the Meuse, owing to the course of that river, lay many kilometers distant and similarly remote, therefore, in point of time. In the center of attack the Fifth Corps, led by a brilliant advance of the 2nd Division, rapidly penetrated the vestiges of the Kriemhilde position at Landres-et-St. Georges, and on the first day, overrunning with dash and determination the strong heights near Bayonville, on which the enemy sought to stand, pushed to a point about 2 kilometers north of the latter town for an advance of 8 kilometers (5 miles). In the same fashion the 89th Division on the right of the Fifth Corps, attacking out of the woods of Bantheville and through somewhat formidable enemy interdiction, advanced its lines through the woods of Barri-court to a point south of the town of that name, substantially abreast of the 2nd Division.

On the right flank the Third Corps overcame in the first day the resistance north of Cunel which had checked its progress during the past month, reached the heights of Andevanne with the 90th Division, its left element, and with the 5th Division, swept past Cléry le Grand on the west bank of the Meuse.

On the left of the attack, however, considerable difficulty was encountered by the First Corps, whose right was held up from the start by strong opposition from the patch of woods south of the hamlet of Alliepont. At the same time the attack of the 77th Division was held up by resistance out of Champigneulle and from the west slopes of the Agron rivulet. Under these circumstances the progress of the 78th Division on the extreme left was necessarily halted. However, on November 2nd, the initial difficulties in refer-


ence to the Agron river were overcome, and the First Corps struck forward with evening to points immediately south of Route Nationale No. 47, due to the skilful maneuver by which the 360th Infantry of the 77th Division seized the mill of Champigneulle north of the town of that name, turning the enemy out of this position. Thus, by evening of November 2nd the 80th Division had pushed through Buzancy, the 77th Division had reached the road between Harricourt and Buzancy and near Route Nationale No. 47, and finally, the 78th Division, overcoming, on the night of Novem-

At noon on November 5th, the 42nd Division, which had been combating the great press of traffic in the rear of the advance and had made its way over the wet, slippery roads from the front of the Fifth Corps to close support of the First Corps, relieved the 78th Division in the locality of Sy-Oches and immediately pushed forward in the attack.

The 80th Division, whose line of advance had now swung out of the limits of the First Corps into the frontage of the Fifth Corps, had, during the night of November 5th-6th, attained with its forward elements a line ex-



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TOTAL FOR WAR

Sources of America's 4,000,000 Fighting Men

ber 1-2, the resistance in the troublesome Bois des Loges, took Briquenay on the afternoon of the latter date and by dark brought its line to the ridge south of Boulton aux Bois and along Route Nationale No. 47.

On November 3rd the 78th Division had established contact with the French in the valley of the River Bar at Belleville and Chatillon-sur-Bar (located at the northeast tip of the forests of Bourgogne, Bas and Boulton), and the remainder of the First Corps had forced its way well north of Route Nationale No. 47 on both sides of the valley of the Bar and through the woods of Sy to a point on the westernmost part of the highway from Le Chesne to Stenay.

tending from the northern edges of Beaumont to a point directly north of Yoncq, taking advantage on its right during the last stages of this progression, of the movement of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, around Beaumont on the previous night and the mopping up of that town by elements of the 23rd Infantry, 3rd Brigade, on the morning of November 5th.

Here, at 6:30 a. m. on November 6th, the 1st Division, after a long, all-night march for the purpose, passed through and relieved the 80th Division, and without delay, lunged forward in the direction of Mouzon, aided in its advance over the road from Beaumont down to the river opposite Mouzon by the prior action of the 9th Infantry (3rd Brigade, 2nd

Division) in clearing out on the night of November 5th-6th the important woods athwart this route and also the heights and town of Villemonty, thereby covering the right of the 1st Division.

During these four days the Fifth Corps, continuing its rapid advance with the 2nd and 89th Divisions nearly abreast, reached the general line Fosse-Nouart-Tailly on November 2nd; the general line Sommauthe-Beauclair on November 3rd; cut the Route Nationale from Le Chesne to Stenay at points on the west and east of Beaumont; and, emerging from the heavy woods of the Forest of Dieulet in which it had been operating for over two days, swept down into the "U's" of the Meuse from Laneuville, opposite Stenay, to points across from and west of Pouilly with the 89th Division, and thence northward to the heights of Villemonty, with the 2nd Division. In so doing, the 89th Division, checked in its center on November 2nd by machine guns in Barri-court, progressed with its right to Nouart and Tailly and then broke through on its entire front to Beauclair and the Bois des Dames on November 3rd, thereby reaching the valley of the Wiseppe rivulet which runs a short course to the Meuse, and to Beaufort on November 4th, and on November 4th-5th swept through the forests on the west of the Meuse (its right following the Wiseppe) down to the river; and the 2nd Division, on the night of November 3rd, despite heavy casualties on the ridge south of Vaux, had reached the south edge of the woods of Belval, and during the night of November 3rd boldly passed a battalion of the 9th Infantry with a battery of the 15th Field Artillery, through these heavy woods under cover of darkness to a point six kilometers behind the enemy's lines—a skilful maneuver which directly resulted in unseating the enemy resistance gathered about Beaumont on the northern side of the Forest of Dieulet.

On the day of November 6th the 1st Division continued its determined march to the river at Mouzon and then, without rest, was, somewhat unaccountably, swung out of the frontage of the Fifth Corps into that of the First Corps in no less than four columns, which cut the axes of supply of the elements of the latter corps in as many places from front to

rear. Finally, on the day of November 7th, the 1st Division, hungry and sleepless, ended its superb fighting career by attacking, with the 83rd Brigade, on the left of the 42nd Division and on the extreme left of the front of the First American Army, a group of three strong, lofty hills, lying between Noyers-Pont Maugis and Chevenge and across the river from Sedan, on which German machine-gun detachments clung with desperation and valor until, out of ammunition, they were bayoneted.

In the meantime, the pivoting of the Third Corps on Briulles-sur-Meuse synchronized with the swinging advances of the two other corps on their larger radii. Operating each on a brigade front, the 90th Division took Villers-devant-Dun on November 2nd, while the 5th Division occupied Clery-le-Petit and Hill 261, dominating Doullon and the road crossings at Dun-sur-Meuse. On November 3rd the 90th Division reached the line of heights above the Meuse at the same time the 5th Division, occupying Doullon with the 61st Infantry, commenced with the 60th Infantry the crossing operation, described below, that resulted in the establishment, by the evening of November 5th, of a bridgehead of eight kilometers.

The apparent discrepancy in dates on which the various corps swept their lines forward to the river from the frontage of attack on November 1st until the First Corps with the 42nd Division reached the heights of the Meuse opposite Sedan on the evening of November 6th, is explained, as has been previously suggested, by the course that the Meuse follows. The average distance the First Corps was called upon to traverse was over 40 kilometers (28 miles). Along the axis of the Fifth Corps the distance to Pouilly was about 25 kilometers (16 miles), while the right of the Third Corps was but a few kilometers from the Meuse at the commencement of the operation. Thus it was that on November 5th the 42nd Division on the left and the 77th Division on the right of the First Corps reached the general line La Besace-Stonne-Artaise-le-Vivier, and on November 6th, attacking with the morning, the 77th Division swept its lines through Autrecourt

and the 42nd Division, realizing an advance of 16 kilometers by nightfall of the 6th of November, seized the heights of the Meuse dominating Sedan, having covered a distance of 21½ kilometers in 29 hours.

Thus, during the period of from November 3rd to November 6th, the First American

line from Mézières to Sedan to Carignan on the north.

On the night of November 3rd-4th the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Infantry, assisted by Company E of the 7th Engineers, all of the 5th Division, attacked on the extreme right of the line on the east of the river at the pivotal



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Brigadier-General Avery D. Andrews

Assistant Chief of Staff, G. H. Q.

Army was aligned on the west bank of the Meuse. Here it directly confronted the great river road from Mézières to Verdun lying opposite its front from Briulles-sur-Meuse on the south to Wadelincourt on the north. Besides, it threatened at any moment to cross the Meuse, drive eastward toward Briey on the south and move athwart the now obsolete rail

point near Briulles-sur-Meuse. Two companies of this battalion, using rafts, poles and bridges improvised and handled by the engineer company, and also by swimming, succeeded in gaining the east bank of the river, and, traversing the flats that separated the Meuse from the canal on its east, took a foothold on the sharp edges of the canal, and at the

base of the heights the enemy held directly above the scene of the attack, and clung there.

The day of November 4th found this intrepid body taking what cover it could against the enemy observation and the constant and violent fire that was poured into them in the vain effort to negative their achievement.

On the night of November 4th-5th a battalion of the 60th Infantry rushed the river in a similar manner, again ably assisted by elements of the divisional engineers. This second crossing was about three kilometers north-

of the Woevre. Here the 5th Division played a leading rôle, ably supported by a strong advance on its left by the 15th French Colonial Infantry Division, that resulted immediately and almost automatically from the capture of Vilosnes and the heights north thereof. On this front the 5th Division maintained its rapid pursuit. Simultaneously, the Second Colonial Corps (which was serving on the right flank of the First American Army and as an element of the latter), exerting great pressure, was enabled to surmount that northern part of the



U. S. Signal Corps photo

Sedan, Captured by the French Two Days Before the Armistice

ward near Cléry-le-Petit. Moving from these footholds the two elements of this regiment now east of the Meuse seized Vilosnes-sur-Meuse and the strongly organized woods of Chatillon on the knob of Hill 252, which protruded above and between the canal of the Meuse and the great river road. Later, on November 5th, a bridgehead was assured to the 5th Division by the capture of Dun-sur-Meuse and Milly-devant-Dun by the 61st Infantry. In this vigorous manner a frontage of eight kilometers on the heights east of the river road was seized by the 5th Division. By its action the enemy was finally driven from the heights of the Meuse down into the plains

Côtes de Meuse against which it had been operating for about a month.

On November 6th the 5th Division had seized Lion-devant-Dun and then pushed through on November 7th to Brandeville on the fringe of the Woevre plains, overrunning in so doing the powerful buttress of Côte St. Germain, that horseshoe-shaped northern terminus of the Côtes de Meuse. On the following days the left of the 5th Division pushed on towards Mouzay, which was actually seized on November 9th, while its center and right had pushed on to Louppy and Jametz, and its right had in the meantime linked up south of the latter town with elements of the

32nd Division which had been introduced into the line as a *liaison* between the right of the Third American Corps and the left of the Second French Colonial Corps.

On November 10th the leading elements of the 5th Division passed the northeastern part of the great Forest of Wœvre and into the dense woods that straddles the road to Montmédy, and at the same time its left, still operating along the Meuse, turned over Mouzay as a bridgehead, to the 90th Division, on whose frontage it lay.

Finally, in the last hours of the war, the 5th Division was pushing rapidly towards Montmédy to a point about nine kilometers south of that important rail point. On the left of the 5th Division, the 90th Division, facing devastating fire from across the river, effected its crossing on November 10th and took over Mouzay from the right division of its corps. Later, on the same day, it advanced against Stenay and Baalon on Route Nationale No. 47, about three kilometers east of the latter town. At both these places the 90th Division took lodgment and on the final day proceeded to mop up. In the meantime, a detachment of the 89th Division was passed across at Laneuville, and, under cover of the attack of the 90th Division against Stenay penetrated into the latter town.

Another crossing of the 89th Division was effected in conjunction and *liaison* with the 2nd Division on the night of November 10th-11th. At this time the 2nd Engineers bridged the Meuse between points below Letanne and Villemontry, over which two Marine battalions and two machine-gun companies passed to the east bank, and then the *liaison* battalion of the 89th Division. The Marine elements, pushing ahead vigorously, on the final day penetrated the woods of Flaviers and drove on up the heights to the river road between Mouzon and Inor, establishing in a short time a bridgehead extending from Bellefontaine Farm, about two kilometers south of Mouzon, to the locality of Autreville. At the latter point the front of the 2nd Division joined up with the 89th Division, which latter division by this time had a total of seven battalions east of the Meuse disposed between Autreville and Stenay.

Northward on the front of the First Corps outposts of the 77th Division had crossed the river at Villers-devant-Mouzon on the night of November 6th-7th, and a battalion of the 306th Infantry had penetrated on November 7th in the evening to the heights of Ambli-mont, east of the river road. The lodgment this element thus effected was thereafter maintained by patrols.

During the afternoon and evening of November 10th the news was distributed along the front that an armistice had been agreed upon to begin on November 11th at 11 a. m. In the very closing hours the Second Army was attacking on the front that had been stabilized after the St. Mihiel operations and was making good progress. At the moment when hostilities were stayed the American Army in the field was disposed from right to left on the general line Port-sur-Seille—Vandières (on the west bank of the Moselle)—Bezonnaux (at the eastern base, near the northern tip of the Côtes des Meuse)—Inor, and thence to a point slightly west of and across the river from Sedan.

The Commander-in-Chief has reported this line more specifically as follows:

"... the line of the American sector from right to left began at Port-sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandières and through the Woevre to Bezonnaux in the foothills of the Meuse, thence along the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre forests to the Meuse beyond Stenay, thence along the west bank, crossing the river 1 kilometer northwest of Inor, thence along the eastern edge of the Bois de Hache, west to northern edge of Autreville, thence northwest to Moulins-Mouzon road, along that road to Bellefontaine Ferme, thence northwest crossing the Meuse; from there along the west bank of the Meuse to a point near Sedan, where we connected with the French."

On the day and hour of the armistice there were looming up major operations by the First American Army in the direction of Longwy and by the Second American Army toward the ore basin of Briey, and lastly, an offensive in the direction of Château-Salins. In one of these the 1st, 2nd, 6th, 32nd, 42nd, 89th and 90th Divisions were to have attacked on November 15th. In another, scheduled for the day before, the 3rd, 28th, 29th, 36th and 88th Divisions were to have participated with twenty French divisions.

PART II. THE STORY OF THE A.E.F.

By SHIPLEY THOMAS

CAPTAIN, 26th INFANTRY, 1st DIVISION, U. S. A.

INTRODUCTION

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL U. G. McALEXANDER, U. S. A.

AN opportunity is here presented to the public to obtain an excellent account, from official and other reliable sources, of the great events in which the American Army participated in Europe during the war just ended.

The author has taken great pains to present historical facts in an attractive, readable form and to show to the mind a realistic picture of the whole scene of operations.

It may be noted that the Germans made five major drives against the Allies. The last was the only one directed against Americans. The first drive was in August and September, 1914, through Belgium and Northern France down to and including the Marne east of Paris.

The second was against Verdun in 1916.

The third against the British Army and Amiens in March, 1918.

The fourth between Reims and Soissons down to the Marne including Château-Thierry, in the latter part of May, 1918,—thus making what was known as the Marne Salient.

The fifth offensive was against the French and Americans on July 15th, and was made to deepen and widen the Marne Salient and, if possible, to capture Paris.

At the end of the third and fourth drives the morale of the British and French reached their lowest levels. The attack by the 1st Division at Cantigny in May, 1918, the actions of the 2nd Division northwest of Château-Thierry in June, and the now famous defense made by the 3rd Division on the Marne July 15th, by which latter the tide of the war was turned, so reacted on the morale of the British and the French Armies as to restore great confidence. Perfect assurance of ultimate success followed the counter-attack near Soissons on July 18th. The Allied offensive was then continuous until the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

I

PERSHING ARRIVES IN FRANCE

Incidents of His Reception—Organizing an American General Staff— Problem of Training New Officers

ON the 6th of April, 1917, the United States of America declared war upon Germany. Late in May of the same year, Major General John J. Pershing, with a Staff of 53 officers and 146 enlisted men, boarded the *S. S. Baltic* and sailed for Europe where he, as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, was to prepare for the arrival of these forces.

On June 8th, on the *Baltic's* arrival at Liverpool, General Pershing was received on the dock by a British general with a regiment as guard of honor. As General Pershing stepped down the gangplank, the regimental band played the "Star-Spangled Banner." There also to greet the American commander were the British Admiral who commanded the port and the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. General Pershing reviewed the guard of honor, and after the formal ceremonies were over the train for London was boarded, the State car being placed at General Pershing's disposal.

In London he was received by Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, General Lord French, the Ambassador of the United States, and Admiral Sims of the United States Navy. The following day General Pershing and his Staff were received by King George at Buckingham Palace, where General Lord Brooke, commander of the Twelfth Canadian Infantry Brigade, presented the American commander to the King. It was upon this occasion that King George made a speech in which, among other things, he said:

"It has been the dream of my life to see the two great English-speaking nations more closely united. My dreams have been realized. It is with the utmost pleasure that I welcome you at the head of the American contingent to our shores."

The following days were spent in receptions and official calls, while the Staff spent

most of the time with the corresponding staff members of the British War Office, and General Pershing also spent much of his time with the heads of the departments. The entire British military system was placed at his disposal, and many of the developments of American Staff training were learned in those few days in the British War Office.

On June 12th General Pershing was taken to the training camp near London to observe the British Army methods, and the reception in England closed with a formal dinner at Lancaster House.

ARRIVAL IN FRANCE

But an even greater welcome awaited General Pershing on French soil.

It was at Boulogne on the morning of June 13, 1917, that General Pershing landed in France. As he came off the ship, General Dumas, commanding the northern region, greeted him and said: "I welcome the United States of America who have now become united to the United States of Europe." This was the first time that a soldier of the United States in uniform had landed on the European continent to conduct war. On the dock was a French regiment in their horizon-blue battle uniforms. They were, for the most part, middle-aged men who had seen three years of war. Among the other officers who met General Pershing at the pier was Brigadier General Pelletier, who became chief of the French mission to the American Expeditionary Forces; General Dupont represented General Pétain, and General George Fowke represented Sir Douglas Haig.

The reception given to General Pershing in Paris was marked by scenes of rejoicing such as that city had not seen since the outbreak of the war. At the Gare du Nord

the platforms and streets were lined for blocks with soldiers. The entire route from the station to the Hotel Crillon in the Place de la Concorde, where the General was to make his temporary headquarters, was lined with soldiers. At the station the band of the guard of honor played the "Star-Spangled Banner" and the "Marseillaise"; and there were there to greet him Marshal Joffre, M. Viviani, M. Painlevé, Minister of War, Generals Foch and Dutail, and Ambassador Sharp. The tens of thousands who had turned out to see the first Americans arriving in France cheered as though the whole American army were marching down the street.

On June 14th General Pershing visited the tomb of Napoleon. Marshal Joffre took General Pershing down into the crypt where, for the first time in a century, the case containing the sword of Napoleon was opened and the sword was handed to the American General. It was the first time this signal honor has ever been bestowed upon anyone.

PERSHING AT LAFAYETTE'S TOMB

That afternoon General Pershing received a remarkable ovation at the Chamber of Deputies. On the afternoon of June 15th, he paid the last of his official calls, which had been occupying nearly all of his time, and also a visit to Picpus Cemetery, where he placed a wreath of American Beauty roses on the tomb of Lafayette.

From that day, General Pershing devoted his entire time while in Paris to organizing the headquarters of the A.E.F., a small office in the rue de Constantine. There were, as yet, no troops in France, the 1st Division of regulars being still upon the seas. Plans were made at this time for an American Army of two million men, which was to be the strength of the A.E.F. This would necessitate the expansion of every branch of the service, and in giving shape to this expansion the experience of the British and French was carefully studied.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Experience has shown that a military commander in the field can deal directly with but few men; the maximum number of subordinates that one commander can personally direct

is from four to six. There had as yet been no General Staff system of any consequence in the American Army, for in an army that has but five kinds of troops, infantry, cavalry, artillery, signal corps, and engineers, the bureau system is capable of handling all the Staff work, but as the conduct of the war became more and more complex and more and more



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General Pershing and Marshal Pétain
At General Headquarters, Chaumont.

auxiliary services were brought in, the need of the modern system of the General Staff became more and more apparent.

If all the activities of modern war were each controlled by a bureau chief, it would be beyond the power of any commanding officer, no matter how able, to control the whole. For this reason, the activities were grouped under responsible subordinates, so that the number of groups would not be excessive.

Theoretically, the action taken at the headquarters of any commander is his personal action. In practice the commander has certain staff officers in whom he has confidence, who have good judgment and who are kept con-

stantly informed of the commander's general plans and policies. Knowing the General's plan, these staff officers give orders as to the details in carrying out the plan, in the name of the commander. This is practically as well as theoretically the action of the commander himself.

In organizing the General Staff of the A.E.F., while the experience of the British

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

The Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces was early divided into three main heads; the General Staff, the Technical Staff, and the Administrative Staff. The Administrative Staff concerns itself with the routine duties of the command, in accordance with established laws, regulations, orders and cus-



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General Pershing at the Tomb of Lafayette

On this occasion the American Commander-in-Chief is reported to have said: "Lafayette, we are here"—implying that America would now repay France for her help in the American War for Independence.

and French was taken into consideration, the organization was made on different lines, and it has worked, on the whole, very satisfactorily. None of the Allied Staffs could have been copied exactly, because they were based upon the laws of the different countries involved, as well as upon the psychology of its people, and had they been merely copied, they would not have worked well in the A.E.F.

toms. It conveys to the command the general instructions of the commander, arranges and preserves the records of the administrative business, and is, for this purpose, divided into six groups, namely, the Adjutant General, whose duty is routine orders and personal records; the Inspector General (general efficiency); Judge Advocate (general law and discipline); the Chaplain (moral and spiritual

welfare); the Headquarters Commandant (commands the personnel of the headquarters); the heads of the Attached Services (Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., etc.). The Administrative Staff plans its own work under the general direction of the General Staff, and in so doing exercises direct and indirect supervision over corresponding parts of the staff of subordinate commanders.

TECHNICAL STAFF

The Technical Staff consists of a group of officers each of whom represents one group of combat or supply troops; and these officers exercise direct technical supervision over the various units in the name of the commanding officer. The Technical Staff is made up of such officers as the Chief Quartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, Chief of the Motor Transport Service, etc., and these form what is known as the supply group. The other group of Technical Staff officers is the combat group. This consists of the Machine Gun Officer; the Chief of Artillery; the Chief Engineer Officer; the Chief Signal Officer; in other words, these are the heads of the technical troops assigned to the command. The functions of the officers of the Technical Staff are to advise the Commander-in-Chief or the General Staff as to the necessities, possibilities, and limitations of their own particular arms or services, and to supervise the function of the technical troops of the command in subordinate units.

THE GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff is divided into five sections through which the commander deals with his command as follows:

G-1 Administration—procurement of supplies, transportation, storage and replacements of men and animals.

G-2 Intelligence—collects and collates information regarding the enemy.

G-3 Operations—has charge of all steps pertaining to strategy, tactics and tactical employment of all troops.

G-4 Coördination—distribution of supplies, replacements and ammunition throughout the command.

G-5 Training.

In the cases of an army corps or smaller

unit only three branches of the General Staff exist: G-1 combines the procurement of supplies with the distribution of supplies; G-2 deals with intelligence; G-3 combines with G-5.

To coördinate the work of the branches of the General Staff and the Administrative and Technical Staffs, there is a Chief of Staff who directs the work of the entire staff, and transmits to them the will of the commanding officer.

The smallest unit which has a staff is the battalion. Here three staff officers—the Adjutant, the Intelligence Officer and the Supply Officer—perform all the functions of the General Staff, the Technical Staff, and the Administrative Staff.

THE STAFF COLLEGE

The most important function of the Staff is to assist troops in combat and in preparation for combat. The General Staff Officer has no command and is the servant of every soldier in the entire command. The efficiency of the organization depends upon the efficiency of its staff, and, by the selection and choice of staff officers is the making or breaking of a unit determined.

For this reason, in the A.E.F. there was immediately established the General Staff College, which was the highest school in the A.E.F. The graduates of this school became members of the General Staff and were sent out to fill the General Staff positions in the various divisions, corps, and armies in the A.E.F. The policy was early maintained that General Staff vacancies could only be filled by General Staff officers sent out by G.H.Q., and it was the wisdom of this which resulted in having for each army corps and division a uniformly trained General Staff, to whom the workings of the superior and inferior and adjacent staffs was well known. The success of the new divisions going for the first time into battle in the Argonne was largely due to the fact that many trained General Staff officers were sent to these divisions during the training period.

G.H.Q. MOVES TO CHAUMONT

On September 1st, the General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces

moved from Paris to Chaumont, Haute Marne. Paris was the center of the French supply lines and this change placed the American G.H.Q. on the American lines of communication, about midway between the great

own headquarters. About him were grouped the Chief of Staff and the heads of the sections of the General Staff. In the preliminary organization the General Staff was divided into but three sections, as follows:



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Major-General James W. McAndrew

He was in command of the Army Schools at Langres, and succeeded General Harbord as Chief of Staff, G.H.Q.

base depots of Bourges and Tours and the front. The town itself is a pretty little French garrison city on the headwaters of the Marne; and the huge French stone barracks offered an ideal place for the housing of the enormous staff which eventually would be created to handle two million men. Here in the now famous room 51 of building "B," in the French barracks at Chaumont, General Pershing on September 3rd established his

Chief of Staff—Brigadier General Harbord.

G-1—Colonel James A. Logan.

G-2—Brigadier General D. E. Nolan.

G-3—Colonel J. McA. Palmer.

It soon became apparent, however, that G-3, Operations and Training Sub-section, was so important that it could be best handled by separate sections; and early in August, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief directed a re-

organization of the General Staff in five sections, under the Chief of Staff, as follows:

1st Section (G-1) *Administration*—Brigadier General Avery D. Andrews.

2nd Section (G-2) *Intelligence*—Brigadier General D. E. Nolan.

3rd Section (G-3) *Operations*—Brigadier General Fox Conner.

4th Section (G-4) *Coördination*—Brigadier General G. Van H. Mosley.

5th Section (G-5) *Training*—Brigadier General H. B. Fiske.

General McAndrew succeeded General Harbord as Chief of Staff, and the permanent organization of the General Staff as thus constituted was continued throughout the military operations.

PROBLEMS OF TRAINING

From the landing of the first units until September, 1918, a period of over a year, the American G.H.Q. did not have command of a sector of the front; but, instead, American divisions were fighting as parts of British or French Armies. This put but very light duties on the 2nd and 3rd Sections of the General Staff. But this period was an extremely busy time for G-5. Training was the one great requisite of the American Army in France, and for this a huge educational system was organized whereby newly arrived divisions received instruction in the very latest developments of the art of war.

Training divides itself into two parts; the training of officers, and the training of men. In expanding a small army into an enormous army the greatest difficulty was found in developing a corps of officers. For this competent instructors were needed—both line and staff officers—for the ever increasing need of trained staff officers was clearly felt. The first big problem therefore was to train officers so that they could train the men. Some slight instruction had been given in the training camps in the United States, but this was found to be entirely inadequate for the more advanced requirements of a European war.

SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS

Accordingly, following the precedents of the British and French, a great system of

schools was inaugurated. The old saying that the best training for war is war had proven an utter fallacy. Service in battle hardens officers and men but it does not school them. It was found that by sending officers to the school from the line the best results were obtained. Then there was another point; the losses in officers was heavy, and this meant a constant and urgent demand for new officers and trained officers. Therefore the schools were organized to give the newly arrived officer from the United States a more rigorous course of instruction, to give the officer just back from the line a refreshing course, and to ground the newly created officer in the fundamentals.

Part of this training system was incorporated in the replacement system. The original idea of replacement for the Army was worked out so as to give to each corps six divisions; four combat and two replacement divisions. One of these replacement divisions was to remain in a training area and train replacements in both men and officers—from privates to generals. The sixth division of the Corps was to be the Depot Division, situated somewhere near the seacoast where it would receive and organize drafts from the United States. This scheme, however, was never fully developed, but it formed the basis of the training system of the A.E.F.

The corps were to be kept mobile, whereas the schools worked best when stationary; and as the Replacement Division of the corps was stationary, it was decided that the Corps Schools should be situated with this division, and thereby the labor and demonstration troops would be available to the school.

The need for coördination in these Corps Schools led to the establishment of a group of Army Schools to furnish instructors for the Corps Schools, so that the Corps Schools could train officers rapidly, and send them back to their commands. Students graduating with distinction from Corps Schools were sent to Army Schools. These two school groups provided the great bulk of the training of line officers, but it did not cover two great requirements. New officers were constantly demanded to fill the places of those fallen, and trained staff officers were needed on the many new staffs which were being de-

veloped daily. Therefore a Staff College and a Candidates' School were established. The city of Langres was chosen for this work and here the Army Schools, the Candidates' School, and the Staff College were established. The town was not far from Chaumont and this fact made possible constant touch with G.H.Q.

The Staff College opened for its first class on November 28, 1917, with Brigadier Gen-

eral Bjornstad as its first director. With him were four French and four experienced British General Staff officers. Four classes in all, 534 officers, were graduated; and many of these replaced the British and French officers as instructors. The course was of

three months' duration, but the number graduated was so limited that a more simplified course at the School of the Line was begun for officers of less military training.

11,985 OFFICERS FROM THE RANKS

The Army Candidates' School was organized to meet the serious shortage in officers. In addition to those coming over with re-



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Brigadier-General Harold B. Fiske

Head of Training Section, G.H.Q.

eral Bjornstad as its first director. With him were four French and four experienced British General Staff officers. Four classes in all, 534 officers, were graduated; and many of these replaced the British and French officers as instructors. The course was of

placement troops, the War Department sent over 6,000 casual officers in the junior grades; but the lines of communication, the requirements of the S.O.S., and the battle wastage were so enormous that in the early fall of 1918, the A.E.F. was faced with a big short-

age of officers. The Army Candidates' Schools were enlarged to cover every arm of the service, and the number of men sent to them was steadily increased. The courses were for three months and there were graduated 6,895 infantrymen, 3,393 artillerymen,

was split up with a French division and trained under its control. This was not found to be altogether satisfactory. Accordingly, when the training section of the General Staff was organized, a schedule was made out for the 1st Division, and it was carefully super-



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Brigadier-General Fox Conner

Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Section, G.H.Q.

1,332 engineers, and 365 signalmen, which made a total of 11,985 officers graduated from these schools from the ranks of the A.E.F.

TRAINING THE TROOPS IN FRANCE

Besides the task of training officers was the equally vital one of training the troops. When the 1st Division arrived in France it

vised. The same system was applied to each division on arriving in France; and thus a uniformity of training, rather than the whim of the division commanders, was the final result in the training. The original plan was to give each division three months' training in France; but the German spring drive in 1918 made it necessary to reduce this to but four

weeks before the division went into the line, and a heavy schedule of work for those four weeks was ordered. This only gave time for small units—companies and battalions—to practice together. Meanwhile to get the training of the regimental, brigade and division commanders and their staffs, to accus-

under French command, and both line and staff learned the actual workings of the corresponding French unit without having the responsibility. Then came the third period of training, when, for four weeks behind the lines, maneuvers were held for the benefit and instruction of higher commanders and staffs in



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Brigadier-General Dennis E. Nolan

He was Chief of Intelligence Section, G.H.Q.; he commanded the 55th Infantry Brigade in the Argonne.

tom them to functioning together, terrain exercises were held with assumed conditions of actual warfare and with experienced instructors which developed this side of the training. During the second period of training, the American higher commands worked with the French staffs in the line as observers, while the battalions of the division were in the line

their functions in battle. This was in brief the A.E.F. training program. Scarcely any divisions had the full four weeks for the last stage; the time averaged between six days and three weeks.

It was found impossible to train artillery units with their divisions during the first stage. To make use of the existing French

ranges, the artillery brigades were therefore sent to so-called organization and training centers for about six weeks and usually rejoined their divisions while the latter were in the line for the first time with the French.

The German drive in the spring of 1918 forced the speeding up of the transportation of troops, and ten American divisions, less their artillery, were trained with the British. Here again the training was done according to a plan drawn up by the training sections of the British and American G.H.Q., and for the same three periods, but the exigencies of the situation resulted in the shortening of most of these periods.

A studied policy underlying all this training which was constantly emphasized was the education of the troops for the offensive. There was never the slightest doubt that the

German line could not be broken. An aggressive self-reliant infantry was the basis of this doctrine. This was shown in every document of instruction. In connection with this, great emphasis was laid on the importance of rifle fire, and the justification of this came on the Marne in July, 1918, when the sharpshooting ability of the doughboy was tested in actual warfare, and with complete success.

After the armistice, a comprehensive school system was ordered, which included Post Schools, Divisional Schools, and the American University at Beaune. University courses were also offered at a large number of British and French universities, and roughly 200,000 officers and men were at one time enrolled in the various schools of this valuable educational program.

II

FIRST AMERICAN TROOPS IN FRANCE

Strenuous Months of Training for the First Four Combat Divisions During the Rigorous Lorraine Winter of 1917-18

EARLY in the morning of the 26th of June, 1917, the first great American troop convoy steamed into the harbor of St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the River Loire. Admiral Gleaves had accomplished his mission, and with such secrecy was the move completed that scarcely a soul either in the United States or in France knew it had taken place. It was a sensational surprise to the inhabitants of St. Nazaire. The news spread through the town like wildfire, and by the time the transports reached the docks where the troops were to debark, many thousands had gathered—townspeople, soldiers on leave, and French sailors from the naval station—to greet the new Allies from across the seas. There were other spectators, not quite so enthusiastic, but intensely interested, the German prisoners of war at work in the freight yards nearby. Bands on the warships and transports were playing the "Star-Spangled Banner" and the "Marseillaise." From every mast floated the Stars and

Stripes or the Tricolor of France. The town was hastily decked with flags, for the day became a holiday. The cheering throng on the docks was ever swelling until it seemed as if the whole town were there.

PITCHING THE FIRST CAMP

The troops were debarked and marched to the flat plain overlooking the harbor, on the outskirts of the city, and the first camp was pitched. Major General William L. Sibert was in command of this force, which consisted of four regiments of the old Regular Army—the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Regiments of United States Infantry, and the 5th Regiment of the United States Marine Corps. But a few weeks before the four Infantry regiments were guarding the Mexican border; but so swiftly and so secretly had the move been made, that not even the families of these men knew that they had been sent overseas. They had embarked from New York June 14th.

The voyage over was not without incident. Admiral Gleaves reported to the Navy Department that German submarines had twice attacked the convoy. The first attack was on the night of June 22nd when a torpedo missed by twenty feet the bow of one of the transports. All the ships immediately changed their courses and every gun was put into action. Apparently the submarine fled. The second attack came next morning. The unmistakable evidences of a submarine appeared

talion, 16th Infantry, paraded in Paris. The Fourth of July was enthusiastically celebrated throughout France. In Paris the chief feature was the parade of Americans, for all France was eager to see the new Allies, and everywhere the Stars and Stripes were flying. Public buildings, hotels, private residences; even taxicabs flew the colors, and it seemed that every pedestrian was wearing a miniature flag. The enthusiasm of the vast crowd reached its highest pitch when General



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

The First American Camp in France

It was at St. Nazaire and was occupied by troops of the 1st Division (Regulars).

directly ahead. An American destroyer darted between a couple of transports, and going at full speed, dropped a depth bomb over the spot. There could be no doubt as to the result, for with the explosion, a column of smoke and water rose high in the air, and as the transports passed the spot, the water was covered with floating oil and strewn with wreckage. General Pershing, accompanied by General Pelletier, representing French General Headquarters, visited the camp on June 28th, and inspected the troops.

The last units of the first expedition arrived on July 2nd, and on July 4th, the 2nd Bat-

Pershing, escorted by Marshal Joffre and President Poincaré, reviewed the American troops, and the American band playing the "Marseillaise," while the French band played the "Star-Spangled banner." This was the last of a long series of welcome demonstrations, and on July 6th, it was announced that the American Army would immediately begin its training for the line.

THE FIRST TRAINING AREA

General Sibert moved his command by rail from St. Nazaire to the Gondrecourt Area, with headquarters in Gondrecourt,

Meuse. This town lies near the head of the Ornain Valley between Neufchâteau and Bar-le-Duc, and the five regiments were billeted in the small towns in the valley. General Pershing says in his report: "After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was decided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of 3,000 men each, with three battalions to a regiment, and four companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments, a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staff and military police." This gave each combat division a rifle strength of 12,000 out of a total divisional strength of 28,000 officers and men. The four infantry regiments were then formed into the 1st Division and began their training. To each battalion of this 1st Division, the French sent a battalion of "Chasseurs Alpins" and all during July and August they lived and drilled together until the Americans had picked up from their French instructors all the little points of trench warfare which it is possible to learn outside of actual combat.

NEW OFFICERS ARRIVE

In September, 1917, came the second great movement of American troops to France. The increases in the Regular Army had brought with it automatic promotion for the officers of the 1st Division, which meant that by this time almost every lieutenant who had sailed with the 1st Division, was now a captain, and there were practically no lieutenants of infantry in the division. Accordingly, when the first series of Officers Training Camps closed on August 15th, about one thousand lieutenants were selected and ordered immediately to France, for there was a crying need of officers. Staffs were forming, schools were organizing and a long line of communications all combined to draw officers from the 1st Division. About the first of September these officers from the training camps in the United States began arriving, and were immediately sent to the various British and French Army Schools for a course of instruction, where the details of modern minor tactics were very care-

fully taught. In October, when these officers joined the 1st Division, each one was an expert in his own line, whether trench mortars, 37 millimeter cannon, bayonet, wiring, telephone, sniping, grenades, or the thousand and one technical requirements which three years of trench warfare had developed. They brought this knowledge, and with it they brought assurance, for almost all of them had spent a week in the trenches with some British battalion after the close of the school, and had seen the theory in operation.

THE 26TH AND THE 2ND DIVISIONS

On September 21, 1917, the second convoy arrived at St. Nazaire, bringing with it the first elements of the 26th Division. This division was composed of National Guard units from New England, and was commanded by Major General Clarence R. Edwards. The Division went to its training area, with headquarters at Neufchâteau, for about four months, which time the troops spent partly in training, but for the most part as Lines of Communication Troops, taking over the work the 5th Marines had been doing in making preparations for the army which was to arrive. This division was organized and trained in the United States, and was the first to come to France as a division, the 1st and 2nd Divisions having been organized in France.

Meanwhile another regiment of the United States Marine Corps (the 6th), had arrived in France and had a similar experience to its predecessor's, the 5th Marine Regiment, which had been detailed as Military Police, and Lines of Communication Troops. The arrival of two Regular Army infantry regiments (the 9th and the 23rd Regiments, United States Infantry) on September 21st, permitted the forming of the 2nd Division with one brigade (3rd) of infantry soldiers and one brigade (4th) of Marines. This division was organized during the last three months of 1917, with headquarters at Bourmont (Haute Marne). Meanwhile the four regiments continued their duties along the lines of communication while the 2nd Artillery Brigade was in training. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, United States Marine Corps, commanded the division until Novem-



Drawn by Joseph Cummings Chase

Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett

Commanded First Army Corps during operations on the Marne, the St.-Mihiel offensive, and the Argonne offensive. Commanded First Field Army in the Argonne.

ber 7th, when Major General Omar Bundy was assigned to the command.

THE RAINBOW TAKES FORM

The 42nd or Rainbow Division, composed of National Guard units from almost every State in the Union, was assembled at Camp Mills, N. Y., in the fall of 1917, and on October 18th the division sailed for France. The first elements of the division arrived at St. Nazaire on October 29th, while others arrived at Brest, and some came through Liverpool. The division was assembled in the Vaucouleurs Area, where it remained until December 11th. On that date began the memorable march south of the Rainbow Division,—55 kilometers (35 miles) in two and a half days to the La Fauche Area. Major General Charles T. Menoher relieved Major General William A. Mann in command of the division. Then on Christmas Day, accompanied by a heavy snowstorm, orders came to march 75 kilometers (47 miles). Through those three days of marching over ice-coated roads, bucking a blizzard, the division pushed steadily ahead. There were men without overcoats, and gloves were the exception, while many a foot left its red trail of blood in the snow; but the spirit of the men was never broken. Chilled to the bone, the Rainbow Division made that memorable march, and through it developed a spirit and courage which were to mark it throughout its entire course, the unbeatable spirit of the Rainbow.

Late in the fall of 1917 there arrived, also from the United States, a replacement battalion for each of the four infantry regiments of the 1st Division. When this division sailed in June, the regiments were not filled to the prescribed full war strength, and immediate steps were taken in the forming of replacement battalions to fill these up to strength. When these battalions arrived they were amalgamated into the various regiments, but even then there were still some vacancies, and there were also gaps in the ranks of the other three combat divisions, for, while they had not yet suffered casualties from action, accident and disease had reduced slightly the numbers, and there was at that time no replacement system for the combat organizations.

The 41st Division, National Guard of

Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, was organized at Camp Greene, N. C., under the command of Major General Hunter Liggett. The last units of this division arrived in France on December 7, 1917, and the division was assembled in the St. Aignan Training Area, near Tours, and was designated as the First Depot Division. The 41st Division was then broken up into training cadres for the instruction of replacements for combat divisions on the front. The 66th Artillery Brigade was left intact, however, and after its period of training, became, on July 1st, the corps artillery of the First American Army Corps. As such it served throughout the three big American campaigns of the war.

THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY CORPS

This gave the United States, at the close of the year 1917, four combat divisions in France: the 1st (Regular), 2nd (Regular and Marine), 26th (New England National Guard), and 42nd (Rainbow); two Regular Divisions, and two National Guard, as was the plan. Then, in addition, there was the 41st Division which was now known as the First Depot Division. These were all made a part of the First American Army Corps, and in the middle of January, 1918, General Liggett was placed in command of the Corps, with headquarters at Neufchâteau.

A corps differs from a division in that it has no divisions which regularly belong to it, but at different times certain portions of the line are assigned to it. Divisions are assigned to the corps, fight, are then relieved, and new divisions are assigned to it. Divisions in action may start as part of one corps, only to find in the midst of the action that they have been shifted to an adjacent corps.

The First Corps, although organized January 20, 1918, was prevented by the German attack of March 21st from taking over a sector, to be held by two American divisions with the other two in reserve. The first assignments of divisions to the First Corps came on July 4, 1918, when the 2nd, 26th, and 167th French Divisions were ordered under General Liggett's command, on the Marne Salient. From then on until the armistice, this corps was almost constantly in the thick

of the fighting and had, at one time or another, assigned to its command, sixteen American and three French divisions.

THE AMERICAN ZONE

That the four American combat divisions were all in one large area, centering in the triangle formed by Chaumont, Bar-le-Duc,

ing's report (page 69, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1918):

"The eventual place the American Army should take on the Western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British Armies' shipping and supplies, while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port



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General Tasker H. Bliss

American Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.

and Neufchâteau, seemed to indicate where the American zone of operations would be, for these divisions were all within hearing of the guns on the front, with St. Mihiel, the nearest point, about twenty miles distant. Why the American Army was given this part of the line can best be explained by General Persh-

ing's report (page 69, Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1918): "The eventual place the American Army should take on the Western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British Armies' shipping and supplies, while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port

lating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.

"With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover, broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of ship-

in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Châteauroux, so that our Armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the Western front."

ARTILLERY

The Artillery brigades for each of these divisions had now reached France and were being trained by the French in the use of the French 75 (3-inch) millimeter gun, and 155 (6-inch) millimeter howitzer. The decision to avail ourselves of the French and British offer to supply us with artillery was made by the mission in Paris, headed by Colonel House and including General Tasker H. Bliss of the Army, and Admiral Benson of the Navy. As a result, this cablegram was sent in the fall of 1917:

"The representatives of Great Britain and France state that their production of artillery—field, medium, and heavy—is now established on so large a scale that they are able to equip completely all American divisions as they arrive in France during the year 1918 with the best make of British and French guns and howitzers. With a view, therefore, to expedite and facilitating the equipment of the American Armies in France, and second, *securing the maximum ultimate development of the munitions' supply with the minimum strain upon available tonnage*, the representative of Great Britain and France propose that the field, medium and heavy artillery be supplied during 1918, and as long after as may be found convenient, from British and French gun factories."

OUR FIRST HOSTILE SHOT

The 1st (Regular) Division had by October completed its preliminary training and was ready to go to the front. The sector selected was that of Sommerville, ten kilometers south-east of Nancy. This was, at that time, a very quiet sector, well fitted for instructional purposes. On the night of October 20, 1917, one battalion of each of the four regiments, 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th Infantry relieved alternate French battalions holding their allotted sectors of the line; and American troops were occupying the front line for the first time when dawn broke on the 21st of October, 1917. The battalions were under the command of the French regiments holding the sector, and French and American battalions alternated along the line. Each American bat-



Graves of the First Americans Killed in France

(Translation, . "Here lie the first soldiers of the Great Republic of the United States of America fallen on French soil for Justice and for Liberty, November 3, 1918."

building at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage depots.

"All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war, we must utilize the western ports of France—Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire, and Brest—and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere

talion stayed in ten days, with one company in the front line, and the others in support and reserve, and these companies alternated so as to give each an equal amount of front-line experience. The divisional artillery—5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments of United States Field Artillery—had come up from the artillery

West Point where it now forms part of the collection of trophies of the Military Academy, while the brass shell case was sent to President Wilson.

The sector was very quiet, the front lines were almost a mile apart, and the intervening space was well filled with belts of barbed wire,



French Poilus Instructing Americans

These men are being shown how to use the deadly hand grenade. It was a dangerous business and caused a great many injuries.

school, their training finished, and had gone into position in support of the infantry along with the French artillery. There was great rivalry as to who should fire the first shot, and on October 23, 1917, Battery C of the 6th Field Artillery won this honor, and fired the first hostile artillery shot of American troops in the war. The gun was later sent to

for this front had seen practically no fighting since 1914, and was used as a rest sector for divisions worn out through fighting elsewhere. The German Intelligence Service was not long in finding out that there were Americans in the sector, despite all the care our French preceptors took to keep the fact hidden. On November 3rd, the Germans

raided the front held by the 16th Infantry. Without warning their artillery laid a barrage which isolated an advanced post; the raiding party blew a gap in the wire, and captured the few men in the outpost. The company rallied to drive out the attackers, but they had not remained. While this was the only raid the Germans attempted, the other battalions of the 1st Division, all shared equally the other experiences of trench warfare, suffered casualties, were shelled, went out on patrols, and lost their first fear, which new troops always have.

On November 20th, the last battalion of each regiment had completed its ten days' trench duty, and the division was once more collected in the Gondrecourt Area, this time with the 1st Artillery Brigade, engineers and all the component parts of a combat division, and began training as a division. The thirty days of trench service was marked by 56 casualties—3 killed, 43 wounded, and 10 captured,—while one German prisoner was captured by the Americans—the first prisoner of war to be captured by the American Army.

THE WINTER OF 1917-18 IN LORRAINE

During the summer and fall of 1917 victory seemed within easy grasp of the Allies. In April the British began their succession of advances in Flanders at Vimy Ridge. On May 4th the French took Craonne. On May 14th the Italians started their great drive towards Trieste. General Pétain was made Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies. On June 2nd the British took Messines Ridge, and on July 1st, the Russian Army, which the world had been watching with much concern since the revolution, commenced its great offensive, under Kerensky. The Germans apparently were in trouble, with Austria crumbling, (for Bethmann-Hollweg was dismissed), and on July 19th the Reichstag sent out its terms of peace. Apparently Germany had lost the diplomatic battle in Russia, that of fighting with diplomacy rather than force of arms, and a new Russia in the field, with all the elements of treachery removed, presented a new problem. The military situation was very delicate. On the West front, the Hindenburg line was under attack, and a weakening of any portion just

at that time might mean a break which would put the Allies on the German border. Then the Italian campaign on the Carso had reached such proportions that aid must be sent to Austria, as well as to France; the submarine campaign had failed, so that by the next summer American troops would give preponderance on the West front to the Allies, and the only apparent path left open to Germany was to negotiate some sort of a peace.

For a time things seemed to drag; then in the latter part of July the Russians suffered a defeat in Galicia principally through mutiny of their own troops. But this was offset by the great British victory in Flanders. The salient at Ypres, to which the British had clung for three years, was no more, and Flanders was free from its constant menace. The Russians continued in retreat, and again the Allies in Flanders made another big attack. Then France on November 1st delivered a smashing blow, and drove the Germans off the commanding ground of the Chemin des Dames, northeast of Soissons. Italy was apparently in rout, and French and British troops were rushed there to hold that front. Meanwhile the British stormed Passchendaele Ridge on November 6th. The Italians made their stand on the Piave on November 9th; and, on November 20th the British astonished the world by the attack on Cambrai. Apparently the war could be won by the Allies whenever they decided to win it, and America's contribution to the war was to be chiefly in money, food and raw materials, with only a few troops sent for the moral effect.

November, 1917, will go down as one of the big months of the war. The chief occurrences were: the disastrous retreat of the Italian Armies, the mutiny of the Bolsheviks and the establishment of their Republic in Russia, the British victory in Palestine, the British and French gains on the Western front, the first Americans in the trenches, the coming into power of Georges Clemenceau as Premier of France, and finally the decision to form a Supreme Allied Council of War.

The Russian mutiny, retreat, and Republic, which culminated in the armistice of December 6th, released the entire German Army of more than 63 divisions on the Eastern front, and gave the Germans again the preponderance

in guns and men on the Western front—a maneuvering army, which changed the Allies' plans immediately from offense to defense. The German counter attack at Cambrai, which was so disastrous to the British, proved that Germany was far from beaten.

WHERE PERSHING INSISTED

That winter of 1917-18 in Lorraine will ever be remembered by those four divisions for

To practically everyone in the American Army this appeared to be folly. Officers returning from British schools were full of the new British plan of defense,—the policy of "let them come on" (which was to prove so costly to the British in the spring drive)—the great British machine-gun defense in trench warfare. The French also were practicing the niceties of trench warfare, and the plan of the "yielding defense" was put forth



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine.

"All Work and No Play"

To take his mind off the grim business of war, relaxation and healthful exercises for every soldier were emphasized most strenuously in all the camps.

the intense suffering it entailed. The training of the American Army was immediately put on a slightly different basis, and while trench warfare was studied, all the practice marches, all the maneuvers in the snow and rainstorms of that excessively cold winter were in preparation for open warfare.

in mid-winter, and at once, throughout the French sectors, work was begun on second and third lines of defense with belts of barbed wire ten miles behind the front.

Meanwhile, in the sleet and bitter cold, through snow, and over the frozen hills of Lorraine during that awful winter, the

Americans were practising open warfare. Each evening the junior officers would gather in one room, each bringing with him his precious small armload of wood, and while they vainly tried to get warm, they would pour out their troubles which almost amounted to mutiny. They talked—as junior officers always do in a cock-sure way born of youthful enthusiasm—of the uselessness of “chasing the Indians,” of Generals who “had learned nothing since Custer and apparently couldn’t learn,” and who did not know that every German artillery shot was plotted days in advance. Night after night in the miserable, frozen billets, the junior officers of the 1st Division (for it was the 1st on whom experiments were always tried) poured forth their woes over the incompetence of Generals who taught open warfare and attack, “when any fool could see that it was the Germans, and not us, who were going to attack.” And still American G.H.Q. insisted upon open warfare; and now those officers of the 1st Division who are still alive, who suffered those horrors of open warfare that winter of 1917-18 in Lorraine, realize that General Pershing, who insisted upon it, was the wisest of them all, for every moment of this training proved later that it was justified. The actual tactics may have been antiquated; but the confidence and ability it gave to those officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the 1st, and of all succeeding divisions, in the use of unfamiliar ground, in fighting in the open, in establishing and maintaining contact, and in ever pushing onward, was what enabled the American divisions, green and unused as they were to the tactics of this war, to fill the breach in defense, and then on July 18th, to take up that most glorious unrelenting offensive which never stopped until the Germans asked for peace.

Too much credit cannot be given to General Pershing and to the General Staff for clinging to their American creed of open warfare, not of defense, but of offense, in the face of utter discouragement.

Those four divisions will never forget that winter of maneuvers, which developed the toughest army, physically and mentally, in the world.

SCARCITY OF SUPPLIES

Of food there was plenty, but of all other supplies there was the greatest scarcity. Shoes, for example, were almost impossible to obtain, for many reasons. The chief among these was that in order to keep warm, each soldier was wearing two pairs of heavy knitted socks, and this added to the cold and wet and the exceptionally heavy packs, which increased the average shoe two and three sizes, made the call for shoes much bigger than those sent over according to old standards.

There were plenty of small shoes, but the order for the larger sizes had to go back over such a long line of communications that it was late in the spring before the divisions were fully supplied. And still the training went on, for every head among the Allies' armies had to be counted now.

THE TOUL SECTOR

On January 19, 1918, the 1st Brigade of the 1st (Regular) Division, 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments, under the command of Brigadier General George B. Duncan, relieved the French in the sector northwest of Toul, and that became the American Sector, better known as the “Toul Sector.” Here was to be the final training. At first the sector remained under the command of the French, but when the organization of the division headquarters and their training was completed the sector passed to the command of Major General Robert Lee Bullard, who had succeeded General Sibert in command of the 1st Division in the late fall. This too was a quiet sector when the French held it, but the Americans decided to liven it up, and General Summerall, who commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade began to increase the firing schedules. The Germans were not long in replying.

This sector in which so many American divisions received their final instruction before being put into battle, held none of the charm of the sectors in the Vosges (those sectors between Nancy and the Swiss Border). Instead, while quite safe from general attack, the infantry was given every oppor-

tunity to realize to the full the worst of sector warfare. The front lines lay in a low, marshy valley, so that the trenches were always awash with mud, and each night the demand for working parties required almost the entire garrison to repair and drain these trenches. The main line of resistance, about 2,000 yards in the rear, was on the crest of the rise which was just high enough to be

ridge was constantly shelled. But the one great feature of the landscape was the German position. The German front lines were also in the marsh, and their support lines on the rising ground beyond, somewhere in the edge of the woods, but above all was Mont Sec. Immediately in front of the Toul sector stood this hill—solitary, conical like a sugar loaf, 457 feet above the valley bottom—and

		BELGIAN	FRENCH	BRITISH	AMERICAN
Jan. 31	5	69	25		
Feb. 28	5	67	25	3	
Mar. 21	5	68	25	4	
Mar. 30	5	72	19	4	
Apr. 10	5	70	19	6	
Apr. 20	5	72	17	6	
Apr. 30	5	72	17	6	
May 10	5	71	17	7	
May 20	5	74	17	4	
May 30	4	75	16	5	
June 10	4	73	16	7	
June 20	4	68	18	12	
June 30	4	69	18	11	
July 10	4	67	17	12	
July 20	4	67	18	11	
July 30	5	63	18	14	
Aug. 10	5	58	20	17	
Aug. 20	5	58	19	18	
Aug. 30	5	56	19	20	
Sept. 10	5	54	19	22	
Sept. 20	5	56	20	19	
Sept. 30	6	58	18	18	
Oct. 10	3	55	19	23	
Oct. 20	6	53	22	19	
Oct. 30	4	60	17	19	
Nov. 11	6	55	18	21	

From Official Government Statistics.

Per Cent. of Western Front Held by Each Army During 1918

The Italian troops are included with the French and the Portuguese with the British.

a watershed, and on this, parallel to the front, ran the great national highway which connected the towns of Bouconville, Rambucourt, Beaumont, Flirey, Limey, to Pont-à-Mousson. These towns were for the most part Regimental Headquarters, and, being on the skyline, outlined with the regular double row of trees which marked the highway. This road was the sole way for transport. Just behind the road lay all the divisional artillery, so with these three targets together the whole

from it the Germans saw every move that was made in the sector and were able to adjust their artillery fire with the greatest nicety. Mont Sec was just 2,000 yards behind the front line, and with its concrete dugouts and tunnels and observation posts, it commanded the entire country for miles around—a fortress unassailable by any force at our command.

The front lines of both sides were a snarl of old trenches, which, when the 1st Division

V—8

first took them over, were fairly well held. A new plan of defense was worked out, however, which moved the majority of the garrison back to the Beaumont-Rambucourt road. But this did not lessen the discomforts of the platoons which held the front line in and around Seicheprey, Xivray, Marvosin. These towns, which were Battalion Headquarters, received their full share of attention from the Germans. It was no uncommon occurrence to look from the observation post in Rambucourt towards Xivray, the town in the hollow just inside our lines shrouded in the low hanging fog of early morning, shells bursting in and around the town, and vainly speculate as to what was going on. All means of communication were very soon put out of action when any shelling started, so well did the Germans know the sector.

LESSONS IN PATROLING

It was between the front lines, in the maze of old abandoned trenches, and in the marshy No Man's Land between these, that the American Army in France had its first taste of real patrolling. Each night, every battalion in the line would send out a patrol on some mission or other; and every now and then the Germans would send one out, and occasionally these two would mix in the pitch black night and fight it out. The Americans were very brave, while the Germans were very skillful, so the honors at first went mostly to the enemy until it was learned by sad experience that it does not pay to send a patrol of ten men out every night at precisely the same hour, through the same gap in the wire, on the same sort of mission. The capture of one such patrol of the 16th Infantry Regiment taught the whole American Army a lesson. Then the 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Regiments) of the 1st Division, having finished its term in the line, was relieved by the 2nd Brigade (26th and 28th Infantry Regiments) and the 1st Brigade went out to practise for the first American raid, in retaliation for the many such compliments the Germans had lavished upon them; but especially in retaliation for the big raid on the 18th Infantry, when that regiment, with the immediate support of the 1st Artillery Brigade

had prevented the Germans from entering Seicheprey. General Pershing came up from G.H.Q. to witness this first raid, which, in reality, was to be a dual affair—simultaneously one raid by each regiment. The artillery preparation was perfect. The infantry went over; and then—where were the engineers who were to blow up the barbed wire? That taught the American Army something about the necessity for "guides"; and a week later, when the raid was tried again, everything went smoothly and it was a reassuring success.

FRENCH TUTELAGE

The second of the four combat divisions to go to the line for its final training was the 26th Division (New England National Guard). For this purpose it was assigned to the Eleventh French Army Corps, and ordered to the Chemin des Dames. This was the famous sector between Soissons and Reims where Nivelles, in the spring of 1917 and again in the early fall, had thrown the Germans off the commanding position. The sector was now quiet; but as there was no certainty of its remaining so, the French exercised the greatest care with the new troops from America. The plan was to send two battalions at a time into the line with French battalions; and for this purpose the 26th Division was attached to the 4th French Division. This was the first of the National Guard Divisions to go into the line, and much greater care had to be taken with them than with the Regulars who had gone in the line the preceding October, and were now holding the Toul Sector. The artillery of the 26th Division also went in with the French and on February 5th went into action; and on that night units of the 101st Infantry Regiment went into the forward position with the French. The 26th Division was scattered over a front of 40 kilometers (25 miles) for this course of instruction under the French. While there they helped the French beat off a German raid; and then, for the benefit of the Americans, the French raided the German trenches. Some Americans were taken along, and the raid was a complete success. No Americans were killed or wounded; two

German officers and twenty-one men were captured; and the 26th Divisional Artillery helped cover the attack.


The division had completed its training by March 20th and left the Chemin des Dames under orders to proceed to the Bar-sur-Aube area, near Chaumont. Many of the officers and men had been decorated with the Croix de Guerre by the French, while others had been recommended for the American D.S.C. The division was once more concentrated in a rest area and three new General Staff officers took over the work of the Division Staff.

HAPPY DAYS IN THE VOSGES

The 42nd Division (Rainbow—National Guard) was also ready for the line; and was accordingly assigned to the Seventh French Army Corps and ordered to the Vosges Mountains—"Baccarat Sector"—near Lunéville. On February 16th, the first elements went into the line. This time the plan was different. Four famous French divisions (41st, 164th, 14th and 128th) were at that time in the line, and the various units of the Rainbow Division were split up among these for training. This sector, as well as the Toul Sector, was to become famous in the American Army as the training school of many a new division; and those who have left there to go elsewhere, still speak of the happy days in the Vosges, for, when not in the front line, it was one of the pleasantest spots in France. Being very quiet, the civilians lived close to the lines, and battalions at rest were billeted in towns where eggs were to be had and other things that go to make life pleasant in the war zone.

The Baccarat Sector in the Vosges Mountains extended for a distance of 15 kilometers from the forest of Elieux north of the village of Badonviller, through the Bois Communal de la Woivre, Bois des Haies, the villages of Merviller and Ancerviller, along the edge of the Bois Banal, to the southern edge of the Bois des Pretes. This sector in the beautiful wooded hills and mountains of the Vosges was quiet in that it was practically free from the danger of a great German offensive, as there was nothing to gain, while enormous losses were certain in trying to

march armies over the mountains. The French and Germans had used the sector as a position where divisions worn out with fighting elsewhere in the line could break in their recruits or "replacements." The shell fire was consequently held down to a minimum by both sides so that the much needed rest could be obtained before the call came for the division to go to an active front. American troops—a division at a time—were brought into this sector with a French division. The latter had command until, after a couple of weeks the Americans had become accustomed to the



From Official Government Statistics.

Comparison Between Deaths from Disease and Deaths in Battle

working of the sector, when the French withdrew, and left the command of the whole sector to the American major general commanding the division. The division then did a lot of patrolling and raided into the German trenches, to true up the fighting edge of its men; after this had been done two or three times, the Germans could be counted upon to return the compliment and to do it in finished style. Such was the quiet sector experience which no amount of training behind the lines could give.

While the 42nd Division was occupying the four sectors in this fashion, the division had the benefit of a large scale raid by the French, which netted over a thousand prison-

ers, and later the 168th Infantry, 166th Infantry and 165th Infantry in order named, took part in three special raids, while to the 167th Infantry goes the credit for the first prisoner captured by this division. The American artillery did their part to liven up this sector, and the Germans retaliated with a severe raid.

BOCHE KNIGHTLINESS

The 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marines) was the last of the four combat divisions to go into the line for its final training. The place selected for this division by the French was the western side of the St. Mihiel salient, near Verdun. With its units scattered under French command, the 2nd did not have to look for trouble in this sector. The French always said that there were two kinds of Germans: *Verdun Boche* and *Boche*, for they seemed to inherit the aggressive spirit of the locality. The 2nd Division suffered the steady toll of casualties from the heavy shell fire every day, and their stay was also punctuated by several very clever German raids, the best of which was when the Germans in the midst of a box barrage on an outpost yelled "Gas." The Americans instantly obeyed the familiar command and put on their masks, then the Germans rushed them. The fight was unequal, but the Americans soon discovered the ruse and chased the Germans back across No Man's Land, and retook the few prisoners including the battalion surgeon.

The 2nd Division on leaving the sector was entrained in the vicinity of Bar-le-Duc, and sent to Chaumont-en-Vexin, northwest of Paris, where it was to rest until the 1st Division needed relief, or some other eventuality turned up, for Marshal Foch it seems had picked the 1st and 2nd American Divisions to fight there at the proper time.

WHEN EVERY MAN WAS NEEDED

On March 21st, the German offensive began. Every available man was needed for the battlefield and the period of tutelage under the French for these first four divisions was brought to a close. The 42nd Division (Rainbow) was withdrawn from the front, and assembled for its march back to the train-

ing area, when it received orders to relieve the 128th French Division in the Baccarat Sector, which it did on April 1st. On April 4th the 26th Division (New England National Guard) relieved the 1st Division in the Toul Sector, and the 1st was assembled behind Toul. This gave the American Army two sectors, each held by veteran divisions, and two divisions available to be sent wherever the need should arise.

One more division was now added to the lists of those in France. On February 24, 1918, the headquarters of the 32nd Division, made up from the National Guard of Michigan and Wisconsin, with Major General W. G. Hahn in command, were established at Prauthory, Haute-Marne, near Langres. This was designated as the 10th Training Area, and the division was designated as the Replacement Division of the First Corps.

For about four weeks it continued to function as such, until the enemy offensive of March 21st made it imperative that all available troops be utilized for combat duty. Accordingly the division was inspected by the Training Section of the General Staff and was made a temporary combat division.

EARLY CASUALTIES

The training of these divisions was now over, and, while the primary object of occupying trenches on different parts of the line had been the instruction of officers and men in that side of modern warfare which can only be learned under fire, the beginnings of the nation's sacrifice was shown in the War Department Casualty List of March 15, 1918, which included the figures from the arrival of the first contingent to date:—

Killed in action.....	136
Killed by accident.....	134
Died of disease.....	641
Lost at sea.....	237
Died of wounds.....	26
Died, various reasons.....	38

TOTAL DEATHS 1,212

Wounded	475
Captured	21
Missing	14

TOTAL CASUALTIES 1,722

III

OUR FORCES GIVEN TO FOCH

Allied Armies Placed Under One Command to Meet the German Drive—

American Regulars Capture Cantigny

THE long expected spring drive of the Germany Army began March 21, 1918, crashing upon the junction of the British and French Armies between Cambrai and St. Quentin. In three days Bapaume and Péronne were captured, and the drive was pushing at full speed towards Amiens and the Channel ports. Those were the darkest days of the war, the crucial time when as Field-Marshal Haig's report said, the British were fighting with "their backs to the wall." Four million men were engaged in this battle on a front of 150 miles. The Allies had known that this attack was imminent, for during the previous two months they had observed the withdrawal of first class German divisions from the front and their places being taken by the 63 divisions transferred from Russia; which made a total of 206 German Divisions on the Western front. The Allies had watched the growth of the three great concentrations of German Divisions behind the lines, and yet, lacking unity of command, the British and French were powerless to stop this powerful drive.

The crisis of the war had been reached. A decisive Allied step was imperative. On March 28th, Marshal Foch, by agreement of the Allies, was made Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. General Pershing on that day unreservedly placed at Marshal Foch's command all the American forces, to dispose as his judgment dictated. In his report General Pershing said: "We had four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed. At his (Marshal Foch's) request, the 1st Division

was transferred from the Toul Sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont-en-Vexin" (about thirty miles northwest of Paris just south of Beauvais).

From this time until the St. Mihiel offensive, when the First American Army was formed in September, General Pershing exercised no tactical command. As fast as American Divisions were trained they were placed at the disposal of the Allies, and entered the line as units of the British or French Armies.


1ST DIVISION MOVES TO THE BIG OFFENSIVE

On the 4th of April the 26th Division (New England National Guard) relieved the 1st Division (Regulars) in the Toul Sector, and the 1st was assembled in the big camp at Bois l'Evêque, in the wooded plateau between the two branches of the Moselle river south-east of Toul. The division was given a few days' rest after the long march back from the trenches, and then, clean, refreshed and ready once more, it entrained and moved towards the scene of the great battle. Twenty-four hours in troop trains brought the division to the Chaumont-en-Vexin area. As this was the first real test of the administrative ability of the staff, it is interesting to know that the movement was a reassuring success. Moving 28,000 men, 1,700 animals, and 1,000 vehicles three hundred miles, at the same time turning over a sector to another division, giving the men a chance to rest and bathe, all in twelve days, proved the efficiency of the staff. How it was done no one knows, for the railways were choked with ammunition, reinforcements, supplies, etc., while the cross-country roads were jammed with ambulances, motors, trucks, fugitives and troops. Sur-

mounting these obstacles without disorganization of the forward movement was not the least of American feats in the war.

At Chaumont-en-Vexin the 1st Division spent a week in open warfare maneuvers preparing for an attack under the close supervision of French and American Generals, and finally General Pershing came up from G.H. Q. to witness the largest of these maneuvers and later had all the officers of the division assembled on the lawn behind the château and made a short speech to them. He told them that they had been selected to make a name and reputation for the American Army, fighting with the best units of the British and French Armies in Picardy. His speech on this memorable occasion will never be forgotten by those officers, and it is generally re-

coming up in trucks from reserve, had stopped the fierce German thrust towards the Channel ports but two days before. The front lines had finally been stabilized in a wheat field lying in a shallow valley. There were



From Official Government Statistics.

The Growth of the American Army in the World War (Expressed in thousands).

ferred to as "Pershing's Farewell to the First," for in this speech he told them that the command had passed to the French.

A HOT CORNER OF THE FRENCH LINE

On April 25th, the 1st Division relieved the French before Cantigny, five kilometers west of and facing Montdidier on the Montdidier-Noyon front. The French officers said at the time, "We are not turning over to you a sector, but a good place to make a sector." It was then the hottest position on the Western front, for it was here that the French,

no trenches, there was no barbed wire; only a line of occupied shell holes marked the front lines. It was daylight from three in the morning until nine at night, and the enemy artillery fire was so intense that to show oneself was to court sudden death, so the troops holding the front line had to lie for eighteen consecutive hours each day in those shell holes, baked by the hot sun of late spring, and wait till darkness came before they could send carrying parties back for food and water. During the short night they dug furiously into the chalky soil, to make the holes deeper

and finally connect them into a trench. The support lines were back about a mile along the crest of the slope on the edge of a long fringe of woods and villages, where in the deep wine cellars of the buildings the majority of the garrison was housed. The cellars had of necessity to be deep, for the enemy threw over on an average 3,450 shells a day on a front of 5,000 yards. Contrary to popular impression, the bulk of this shell fire was not directed at the front line, for at that time it was impossible to plot exactly where the front line of either side was, so close were they together in the wheat field; but instead, the full brunt of the shelling was upon the support positions and especially upon the batteries which were among these positions. At night every road was swept with a fire of murderous accuracy, and yet through it all the troops never missed a single meal. The food was cooked far in rear, and, as soon as it was dark, the Regimental and Battalion Supply officers started out with the train of sixteen one-mule ration carts and drove them up to each company headquarters, bringing the one hot meal of the day, and enough cold rations to last until the next night. The men who drove those carts over those roads night in and night out in this and other American sectors are the unsung heroes of the war.

AMERICAN COURAGE PUT TO THE TEST

No description can picture the terrific shell fire in that sector. Every moment day and night, shells screeching overhead made a hell of that otherwise lovely country. Official reports credit the Germans with an average of 3,450 rounds per day, and in one single gas attack, 15,000 rounds were used. The American artillery averaged almost five to the enemy's one, and it was amid such conditions that the 1st Division had been called upon to establish the name and reputation of the American Army—and did so in the taking of Cantigny on May 28th. Until that time, no American combat division had taken part in any big action, and while the conduct of the Americans in the quiet sectors had come up to all expectations in most cases, the Allies were very anxious to know of what mettle

our troops were made, and as to how the command would function alone in a real battle. Upon this test of American courage, organization, leadership and skill in modern warfare, the Allies and also the Germans waited with ever increasing anxiety, the latter with the determination to smother this first attempt and thereby break the morale of the American and Allied armies. Captured orders show this very clearly, and it was for this reason that in front of the Americans in the Cantigny Sector the Germans placed such a heavy concentration of artillery.

There were by this time six American combat divisions in France. The last to arrive was the 77th, the first of the National Army Divisions, made up chiefly of men and officers from New York City. Under the command of Major General George B. Duncan this division was in training back of the British front near St. Omer with the 39th British Division. The 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) had gone into the line in Haut-Alsace for its initial training with the French, where it remained, patrolling and having constant skirmishes with the enemy until July 19th. The 42nd Division ("Rainbow" National Guard) was still in the Baccarat Sector, where by a succession of raids and patrols it was establishing an enviable reputation in this quiet corner of the front. The 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) had left its training sector and after a rest had moved to the Chaumont-en-Vexin area, where it was in reserve for the battle front in Picardy; and now the 1st Division was in line before Cantigny. While none of these divisions had fought any action of any consequence, all had acquired a valuable experience.

SEICHEPREY

On April 20th at an outpost of Seicheprey the 26th Division (New England National Guard), soon after it had taken over the Toul Sector from the 1st Division, had suffered a most unfortunate raid, in which the Germans captured almost the entire garrison of the forward position, about 179 men and 24 machine guns, and remained in the town for

about twelve hours, until the Americans, assisted by the French infantry from the right, forced them to withdraw.

Coming at this time, just when the Allies were beginning to count on American aid to help stem the German tide, the success of this raid was particularly regrettable. The Ger-

The taking of these prisoners had put the American Army in a rather unfavorable light at the time, and the Germans, who had planned the raid for just this purpose, made the most of it. Into neutral countries, dropped by airplane went long accounts with pictures of this affair; and the wireless station



Copyright by Joseph Cummings Chase.

Major-General Hanson E. Ely

He was Chief of Staff of the 1st Division; and later commanded the 3rd and 28th Infantry Brigades.

mans, who knew the sector like a book, and watched every move from the top of Mont Sec, had timed their raid to a nicety. A relief had just taken place, and the relievers did not know the sector as they should have known it, for the division had had very scant training. Troops and officers of fourteen days' experience were surprised by veteran troops and officers, because the mechanical niceties of trench raiding were new to them.

near Berlin told all the world about it in boastful terms. The only thing the American Army had done to offset this was the gallant action of 300 men of a Railroad Engineer Regiment who had been caught in the opening of the German offensive on March 21st. They were among the forces hastily gathered by Major General Sanderson Carey, which stopped a gap in the British line when General Gough's army was driven back. They were


in the very thick of the thirteen days' fighting. They were armed with machine guns found in a machine-gun school, but although only a few knew how to work them, still the detachment held a mile and a half gap for six days with great gallantry.

CANTIGNY—OUR FIRST OFFENSIVE

IT was very evident that the American Army would have to do something which would forever vindicate its name both among friends and foes. During the month following Seicheprey, many plans were laid by the staff to accomplish this purpose. One very

artillery, and was to be on such a small front that the entire artillery of the defenders could be concentrated on that one spot, and all the reserve used in counter-attack. It was, as a matter of fact, a Staff battle, with the Allied General Staffs as well as the German General Staff as spectators, while the 1st Division proved itself in the ring for the American Army.

The 28th Regiment of Infantry, commanded by Colonel Hanson E. Ely, was chosen to make the attack. The 26th Infantry was to fill in the right flank as soon as the town was taken.



Sketch Map of the Battle-line near Cantigny

(The broken line shows the 1st Division's advance).

elaborate plan was for the whole 1st Division to attack and take Montdidier; but for this a division on the right and left would have to advance also, and as this was to be purely an American show of strength, another plan was finally agreed upon. One regiment of the 1st Division was to take Cantigny, which lay in very much the same relative position inside the German lines that Seicheprey occupied within the American lines. Having taken it, they were to hold it. The latter was the hardest thing to do, for the advance was not to penetrate deep enough to capture any

GERMANS OPEN WITH A GAS ATTACK

Great secrecy was maintained, for, if the Germans had known of the proposed attack, they could have wiped out the attacking force just before the jump-off. Additional jumping-off trenches had to be constructed, and the engineers laid these out so well that even the regiments who were digging them considered them only a doubling of the front line trenches. Outside of the 28th Infantry only four officers in each regiment, the Colonel and his Staff, knew that the attack was in

prospect. This was particularly fortunate, for the Germans, observing the excessive activity in the sector, determined to find out what was going on. Accordingly, just twenty-four hours before the attack, they delivered a series of raids along the entire front held by the division. At midnight they began a very heavy bombardment with gas shells on the

first news came by a runner, almost exhausted, who had found his way through the barrage, the gas and the fog to regimental headquarters, with a note from the battalion commander, which said that at 6:30 a. m., under cover of a rolling barrage, the enemy had attacked, that the front lines had shot up all their S.O.S. rockets, calling for a protective bar-



Photo by Ratisbonne

Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly

French and American Veterans

These men fought side by side at Cantigny.

batteries and support positions, which lasted until six in the morning. Some 15,000 gas shells were used, which drenched the entire belt in a poisonous cloud and cut every means of communication with the front. In addition a dense fog made it impossible for the infantry or artillery observation posts to discover what was happening in front. The

rage, but as these had been lost in the fog, no artillery support was given, and the infantry were fighting off the attacking waves with volley fires. Another message came a few minutes later, just as the fog cleared and all had quieted down, which said that the raids had been completely repulsed, the enemy reaching the American trenches only at two

points, that we had captured two prisoners, but that they had captured one of our men. This was most serious. The question was did this man know of the impending attack on Cantigny, and if he did, would the German Intelligence officers be able to get it out of him?

Cantigny was on the point of a little salient which projected into the Allied line five kilometers west of Montdidier. The town itself was situated on rising ground, backed by groups of woods which gave ample protection for the reserves. The front lines lay about 700 yards in front of and circling the town, and the whole was fortified and garrisoned as a "Strong-Point." A battalion normally held the town, and with machine guns cross-firing at every angle, each approach was swept, so that to take it, not only courage of the highest order would be needed, but also great skill in following the barrage and keeping in liaison with the tanks. The attack was to be on a front of little over a mile, and ten French tanks and a platoon of French flame throwers assisted by 150 men of the 1st Engineers, had to be worked into the plan, and liaison maintained most carefully in order to have the operation work correctly.

That night everything seemed quiet, yet on the roads and on every path leading down to the front went constant files of infantry, machine gunners, engineers, and carrying parties. New telephone wires were laid, big supplies of ammunition were brought up to each battery, new batteries which had come in late in the afternoon were connecting in on the much overcrowded telephone system, and everyone was tense, waiting for that long anticipated moment to come when we should strike back in retaliation for the long months we had sat, taking our daily toll of casualties which in this last sector had averaged almost fifty a day. The moment was at hand when the Americans, acting as part of a French Army, would make their first attack.

"IT WAS PERFECTLY DONE"

At 6:45 a.m. on the morning of May 28th, after an hour's artillery preparation by both lights and heavies, which tore the town of Cantigny to shreds and nullified by counter-battery every German battery which it had

been possible to locate by aviator, sound ranging or any other device, the 28th Infantry, under Colonel Hanson Ely, and the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry under Major Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., following closely their rolling barrage, jumped off for the capture of Cantigny. It was perfectly done. The artillery barrage moved forward at a rate which averaged twenty-five yards a minute, and the infantry followed so closely that, eighty-eight minutes after H hour, just as the artillery barrage reached its final line where it was to stand, the infantry reached its final objective, 2,186 yards from the jumping-off line, having captured or killed all the defenders of the salient, and then started to dig in. The commander of the 5th French Tank Battalion said in his report of his own operations: "Aside from the evidence of spirit and courage which aroused all admiration on the part of all members of Tank Battalion No. 5, the American Infantry showed a remarkable knowledge of how to use tank assistance, following them closely without allowing themselves to be held up by them and sticking close to their own barrage."

Two hundred and fifty prisoners came in the first batch, a much larger number than had been expected, and it was learned from these prisoners that a relief was just in progress in the salient, so that instead of capturing the salient with one battalion as its garrison, at the time of the attack there were two German battalions in the salient. These prisoners paid a high tribute to the fighting qualities of the Americans, which was far more than the perfunctory answering of the questions of the interrogator at the cage.

THE AMERICAN LINE HOLDS

Five minutes later came the first of the counter attacks which were to attempt to dislodge the Americans before they had time to dig in and consolidate the position, and while the first reaction after the strain of the attack was upon them. This was a small attack launched against the extreme right, and was easily beaten off. Except for constant pounding of our new lines the day passed quietly, but at 4:26 p. m. the first of the big counter attacks came, preceded by a heavy bombardment of the whole front line as it

now stood. This fire was directed by the German aeroplane which circled over the lines. At 5:10 p. m. the enemy infantry moved forward to attack, preceded by a rolling barrage. The enemy was caught by the American barrage and counter preparation fire before reaching the lines. The system

a third time repulsed, without winning back one foot of the ground. The 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry, which had moved out to connect with the right flank of the 28th Infantry, repelled two other counter attacks coming up the draw from the south. Then the German efforts to dislodge the Americans



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Major-General William M. Wright

He successively commanded the Third Corps, the Fifth Corps, the Seventh Corps, the 89th Division, and the First Corps at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne.

was working perfectly. Every means of communication stood up under the test. At 6:40 p. m. the second big counter attack met the same fate, and those of the enemy who were missed by the barrage were mowed down by the infantry from the front lines. At 6 a. m. next morning came the most determined counter attack in two waves. The Germans were

from the first town and scrap of ground they had captured ceased. Although of practically no tactical importance, other than of relieving a very touchy spot in the line, the capture and holding of Cantigny showed, and at exactly the right time—for just the day before the Germans had commenced their drive on Paris)—that American troops were worthy of being

placed in the line with the best of the Allied divisions, and fully capable of doing their share of the fighting. Had it not been for Cantigny, the French would certainly not have entrusted a portion of the defense of the Marne to two other American divisions a week later.

In the capture of Cantigny the 1st Division suffered 1,067 casualties, of whom 199 were killed.

ALLIES CALL FOR MORE TROOPS

The situation on the Western front by this time had become acute, and with the Germans ever threatening either to cut the British and French in two or else take Paris, the great cry was for men. General Pershing says in his report:

"As German superiority in numbers required prompt action, an agreement was reached at the Abbéville Conference of the Allied Premiers and Commanders and myself on May 2nd by which British shipping was to transport ten American Divisions to the British Army area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional British shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for us elsewhere."

This conference on May 2nd resulted in the great midsummer troop movement from the United States. During the months of May and June over half a million men were embarked from the United States for France, and the troop movement continued at this rate or better to the armistice. (When the armistice was signed 2,045,000 troops, and 30,000 Marines had embarked for France). The man-power question was now solved, and the next question was, could these new divisions be trained in time to stop the present drive, and be used in the counter drive which would follow as soon as the Allies had gained the numerical superiority.

FIVE MORE DIVISIONS ARRIVE IN MAY

During the month of May, 1918, five combat divisions arrived from the United States, and two of these, without any previous trench experience, saw action in the Second Battle of the Marne (July 15th-18th). These divisions were, in order of their arrival in France:

The 5th Division, made up from units of the old Regular Army, organized and trained at Camp Logan, Texas. On arrival in France,

under the command of Major General James E. McMahon, the division went to the Bar-sur-Aube Area, between Chaumont and Troyes, for training, and remained there until June 1st, when it left by rail for the Vosges, and relieved the 21st French Division in the Colmar sector, where it remained, under instruction from the French until July 16th.

The next division to arrive was the 35th (Missouri and Kansas National Guard). This division landed at Liverpool under the command of Major General H. M. Wright, and reached France on May 11th, where it trained with the British in the area of Eu until June 11th, then until June 30th, in the Arches Area. From this training sector it went to the Vosges for training under the French in the De Galbert and Gerardmer sectors.

The 28th, or Keystone Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), landed at Calais on May 18th, under the command of Major General Charles H. Muir and trained with the British in the vicinity of Neilles-les-Blequin for about two weeks. It then was moved to the Marne.

The 3rd Division was organized from units of the Regular Army at Camp Greene, Charlotte, N. C., and arrived in France at the end of May under the command of Major General Joseph T. Dickman. The division was concentrated in the Château Villain Training Area, 15 miles southwest of Chaumont.

The 4th Division, composed of units of the Regular Army, was trained at Camp Greene, arrived in France in the latter part of May, via England and Calais, and went to the Sammer training area, under Command of Major General George H. Cameron for training with the British. The Artillery Brigade went to train at Camp de Souge. On June 9th the division moved to Meaux, on the river Marne, midway between Château-Thierry and Paris.

By the end of May, 1918, there were eleven American combat divisions in France, approximately 300,000 men. Two of these divisions, the 1st Regulars and the 26th (New England National Guard), had completed their training; two, the 2nd and the 42nd, were just finishing their training; the 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard) was in

the line for the first time; the 77th (New York National Army) was not yet in the line, and the five divisions which had arrived in the month of May were, according to custom, becoming acclimated and taking up intensive training prior to entry into a quiet sector. The exigency of meeting the German drive had disrupted temporarily all plans for an American sector, under command of General Pershing, and necessitated making the American divisions integral parts of the British and French Armies, being distributed to all parts of France, the American headquarters having no tactical control over them. The Americans fought under these conditions until September, including their participation in the great action in the Marne Salient, which is so often referred to as the drive on Château-Thierry because that was its designation in the first dispatches reporting the fighting.

The location of these eleven divisions at the end of May was as follows:

- 1st. Cantigny Sector, between Amiens and Beauvais.
- 2nd. In general reserve at Chaumont-en-Vexin.
- 3rd. Château Villain Training Area 15 miles southwest of Chaumont.
- 4th. Sammer Training Area, near Boulogne sur Mer.
- 5th. Bar-sur-Aube Training Area, between Chaumont and Troyes.
- 26th. Toul Sector.
- 28th. Conesse Area, ten miles northeast of Paris.
- 32nd. Alsace Sector, near Belfort.
- 35th. Eu Training Area in Flanders.
- 42nd. Baccarat Sector, Vosges Mountains between Nancy and Epinal.
- 77th. Eperlecques Training Area, near St. Omer.

IV

BATTLES IN THE MARNE SALIENT

The 2nd and 3rd Divisions Join With the French in Stopping the German Drive—Château-Thierry and Belleau Woods

THE fighting in the Marne Salient, comprising as it did 72 days of combat of varied intensity (from May 27th to August 6th) was not one battle. "The Second Battle of the Marne," as it is so frequently and erroneously called, was divided into four separate and distinct battles. General Pershing, in the General Order which awards campaign badges, so divided the fighting during this time. These four major operations were as follows:

1. *Aisne Defensive*—On the Chemin des Dames and northeast of Reims, between May 27th and June 5th. This was the first phase of the German drive towards Paris, which on June 1st reached the River Marne near Château-Thierry. The 3rd Division (Regulars) took part in this defensive, while the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) was

in support and on the last day took over the front line.

2. *Montdidier-Noyon Defensive*—Between June 9th and 15th. In this operation the Germans attempted to widen the Marne Salient to the west, and the 1st Division (Regulars) was in the line of defense in support of the British and French.

Between the close of the first operation on June 5th, and the beginning of the third on July 15th, the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) took the town of Vaux and Belleau Woods.

3. *Champagne-Marne Defensive*—Between July 15th and 18th. This was the first phase of the Second Battle of the Marne. The Germans attacked to cross the Marne and drive towards Paris, and were checked by the French and two American divisions, the

3rd Division (Regulars) and the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), which were in the same line with the French and helped to stop this attack. At the same time the Germans drove southward in the Champagne, east of Reims, and here the 42nd Division ("Rainbow" National Guard) fought as a part of Gouraud's Fourth French Army, and helped to stop the attack. The Germans were stopped on all sides, and a vulnerable flank was left open.

4. *Aisne-Marne Offensive*—Between July 18th and August 6th. Foch now took the initiative and drove a swift counter attack into the German's exposed right flank (Soissons). For this (July 18th-22nd) he used the 1st Division (Regulars) and the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) along with the French 1st Moroccan Division. The attack was such a success that the Germans were forced to retreat from the Marne, and in further driving the Germans from the Marne, the following American Divisions took part in the action from day to day: 3rd (Regulars), 4th (Regulars), 26th (New England National Guard), 28th (Pennsylvania National Guard), 32nd (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), 42nd ("Rainbow" National Guard), and the 77th (New York City, National Army).

THE MISTAKE REGARDING THE MARINE CORPS AT CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

So much was written during the war regarding the Marne fighting when the designation of units could merely be hinted, and it was so generally treated as one big battle—the "Second Battle of the Marne"—that great confusion has arisen as to the actual facts. The word "Marines" was used in the early dispatches and so much was made of it as to give the impression that the United States Marine Corps was fighting this entire series of battles alone. The 6,000 Marines who formed a part of the 2nd Division, did fight a very gallant, small local action in Belleau Woods, but it seems unfortunate that they were given the credit for what was really accomplished by the 250,000 American Infantry, and the million of French Infantry who fought through these 72 days.

The chief reason for this mistake was the censorship. Early in the fighting, the censor permitted the word "Marine" to be used in connection with the engagement in Belleau Woods. The designation of any other unit that fought in this sector was carefully deleted at the time. It was quite natural that the United States Marine Corps should have used this engagement for recruiting and publicity, but the general impression was created that the Marines were rushed up to fill a gap in the line at Château-Thierry and saved Paris. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Marine Brigade did not fight in Château-Thierry. There was no gap in the line. The Marines simply were put in behind a French Division in support, and on June 4th, three days later, the French, under orders, fell back through them, and this put the Americans in the front line, facing Belleau Woods. Here the Marines remained for two days, and then, as part of no large movement, they attacked the Germans who were entrenched in Belleau Woods. This was merely a local affair and its result had no other than a sentimental bearing upon the actual battles of this campaign. The Marines fought gallantly, and in 20 days' continuous fighting cleared the wood of Germans. The big part the Marines played in the war was not in Belleau Woods, but a month later, in Foch's counter offensive south-east of Soissons on July 18, 1918, as part of the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines).

THE AISNE DEFENSIVE

IT is worth while to try to picture the succession of events that led up to the situation at the end of May, 1918. On March 21st, the Germans began their great offensive towards the junction of the British and French, at St. Quentin, with the intention of dividing these two Allies before America could throw enough men into the fight to make herself felt, and by seizing the Channel ports, to menace England with invasion. How close they came to success can be seen in the fall of Bapaume and Péronne on March 24th, the fall of Armentières on April 11th, and the bloody battle for Amiens on April 24th, by which the offensive was stopped. Then



A Marine Recruiting Poster

came a month of inactivity on the front while both sides reorganized and replaced their combat divisions. It was a month of anxious waiting to see where the Germans would strike next. Marshal Foch had a formidable problem to face, for with approximately the same reserve force, he was on the outside of a right angle, with the apex at Amiens, while the Germans were on the interior lines. Roughly speaking this put all the German forces together in one great central group, able and ready to strike in any direction, while the Allied reserves had to be scattered in three great groupings, one behind the British front, one behind the apex at Amiens, and one behind the French front. Watching every slightest move of the enemy and keeping the reserves in just the right place and always mobile involved an enormous task.

On May 27th the tension was broken and the Germans committed themselves to the drive on Paris by their attack on that day on the Chemin des Dames. The French had practically no reserves behind this sector and the line, which was held by British and French divisions badly shattered from the defense of Amiens and sent there to rest and be refilled to strength, was unable to withstand the terrific onslaught. A rearguard action was therefore begun which brought the line steadily nearer the Marne river. French reserves were not at hand in great numbers, for the lengthening of the line had used up practically all that were available. There were, however, several American divisions in various stages of training, and on May 28th one regiment of the 1st American Division had shown the mettle of these troops in taking Cantigny.

By May 30th the French had stopped the German drive on the banks of the Marne, and had established a line running from Bligny (9 miles southwest of Reims), southwest to the River Marne east of Dormans, thence west along the Marne to Château-Thierry, thence northeast to the towns of Belleau, Torcy, Venilly-la-Parterrie, Chézy, Faverolles, Long Pont, Chavigny Farm, Chaudon, to the River Aisne six and a half miles west of Soissons. It was a solid line without gaps, but not a very strong line, and accordingly Marshal Foch decided to use two American

divisions to reinforce parts of this line where the Germans might try to continue the attack.

2ND AND 3RD DIVISIONS PUT IN THE LINE IN THE MARNE SALIENT

The 3rd Division (Regulars), in the Château Villain area (15 miles southwest of Chaumont), was ordered to Château-Thierry (where the Germans were still striving with the French for the possession of the town). The 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines), at Chaumont-en-Vexin (50 miles northwest of Paris), was ordered to Lucy-le-Bocage (5¼ miles northwest of Château-Thierry) where a main highway, leading west from Château-Thierry along the north bank of the Marne, crossed the line which the French were holding. These were two important points in case the Germans should renew the offensive on this front on a large scale. When, however, these two divisions were brought up on May 31st the lines were stationary, and the fighting in the streets of Château-Thierry was merely local for the possession of the bridge.

On May 30th the order to move came to these divisions as a complete surprise, for the 2nd Division was under orders to leave next day to relieve the 1st Division in the Cantigny Sector; while the 3rd was preparing to leave its training area and go into a quiet sector for its first experiences in the line. Major General Bundy received a French staff officer at five in the morning at 2nd Division Headquarters in Chaumont-en-Vexin, who handed him orders to put the whole division aboard trucks and send them with all speed to Meaux. This indeed was a change, for to see a French staff officer at five in the morning when not in the line portended big things ahead for the 2nd Division. General Dickman, then commanding the 3rd Division, was making a tour of inspection of the quiet sector to which this division was to be sent very shortly for its first trench training, when he was overtaken by the order to move the division to Château-Thierry. He returned at once and issued the movement order, and the division started on its long journey, preceded by the 7th Machine Gun Battalion, which, being motorized, went ahead.

THE MARNE COUNTRY

The Marne river flows in a westerly direction between high banks which, on the north side from Essomes-sur-Marne ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles west of Château-Thierry) east as far as Vincelles, come down to the water's edge. The bottom lands or flats are on the south side of the river in this vicinity. A small tributary enters at Essomes from the northwest, and in the angle thus created is a commanding elevation, Hill 204. Ten miles to the north the

Château-Thierry by a narrow-gauge railway. Along the Marne tributary are the towns of Monneaux and Vaux. Château-Thierry is a town of considerable importance due to its being a communication center, both by highway and rail. It is built on both the north and south banks of the Marne, just where the river takes a sharp bend to the south, and is only about fifty miles from Paris. Scattered along the Marne and at average distances of less than a mile apart are numerous small



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

The Borealis of No Man's Land

A remarkable photograph of the explosion of an illuminating bomb, typical of warfare conditions on the American front at night.

Ourcq river flows west, then bends sharply south and empties into the Marne twenty miles west of Château-Thierry. Flowing west parallel to the Marne a tributary of the Ourcq has its headwaters about a mile from the headwaters of the Marne tributary which enters at Essomes. Along the Ourcq tributary to the northwest of Château-Thierry are the towns of Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, and Bussiares distant three, five, six, and eight miles, respectively, and connected with Essomes and

towns, the most important of which are Mont St. Père-Chartèves (five miles distant), Jaulgonne (one mile further east), and Dormans (ten miles from Château-Thierry). The importance of these towns is due to the bridges across the Marne at these points. All the surrounding country is broken and covered at intervals with forests and woods. This made the German position on the north side of the Marne almost impregnable from frontal attack.

7TH MACHINE GUNNERS BEAT OFF THE GERMANS AT CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

The first American unit to arrive in the Marne sector was the 7th Motorized Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division. While the remainder of the division was speeding along in French railroad trains, the machine gun battalion had come overland and arrived in the sector at 4 p. m., May 31st. They detrucked and, carrying their guns and ammunition that night, marched into the shell-swept

men with two guns were sent across the stone bridge and established at the roadfork just north of the bridge to keep open the line of retreat for the French. At dawn on June 1st, the Germans assaulted this position. During the night they had infiltrated into the town and were making a determined effort to seize this bridge. Time after time they assaulted the little group of Americans, but without success. All day long Bissell stayed there holding his position, and not until dusk was the order given to retire to the south



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

The Miracle of Lucy-le-Bocage

Men of the 2nd Division, on entering this town, back of Belleau Woods, found it a wreck; in the church, however, the crucifix had escaped with scarcely a scar.

town of Château-Thierry. A battalion of French Colonial Infantry was holding the place while the Germans were trying to force their way into it, so as to gain possession of the two bridges across the Marne. The 7th Machine Gun Battalion was quickly put in to reinforce this French battalion and took up positions along the south bank of the river. Here from the windows of houses they trained their guns on the bridges. Part of the French battalion was also fighting on the north side of the river, and Lieutenant Bissell and twelve

bank. He remained in position to cover the retreat of the French, and, at 10:30 p. m., just as he was about to retire, the bridge was blown up. There was left then only the iron bridge and he led his twelve men towards that, only to find that the Germans were closing in on the bridge; but this was not all. The Americans on the south bank, believing that everyone was back, were pouring a deadly fire on the northern approach of the bridge. Finally Bissell reached the bridge alone and called to Lieutenant Colby to cease

firing. His voice was recognized, the fire stopped, and carrying their wounded, he led his small force back over the bridge.

The 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division had traveled the night before 110 miles in its trucks before it went into action, and it was the first American unit to go into the line in the Marne salient. It fought steadily for four days in Château-Thierry, using every available window on the river front in that part of the town which still remained in the Allies' hands, and, apparently unheeding the sharp fire maintained by the Germans from the north bank, it frustrated all German efforts to cross the river. On June 3rd, it was relieved by the 9th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division, and on leaving the town for its short rest, it was given the highest praise by the French in orders:

"The episode of Château-Thierry will remain one of the most remarkable deeds of this war. It is a pleasure for us all to know that our valiant allies have shared with us there."

For the gallantry thus displayed Marshal Pétain, on November 24, 1918, issued the following citation, which speaks for itself most eloquently:

"The 7th Machine Gun Battalion, American, under the command of Major Taylor, barred to the enemy the passage of the Marne. In the course of violent combat, particularly the 31st of May and the 1st of June, 1918, it disputed, foot by foot, with the Germans, the northern outskirts of Château-Thierry, and covered itself with incomparable glory, thanks to its valor and to its skill, costing the enemy sanguinary losses."

Contrary to the popular belief, there was no gap in the line at Château-Thierry, as there had been after March 21st in front of Amiens. The French lines were intact and the German drive had reached its limit. Americans of the 3rd Regular Army Division, the 7th and 9th Machine Gun Battalions and the 4th Infantry Regiment, were put in to relieve the French, who had stopped the drive and to prevent the Germans from exploiting their success. It is but just to these units and to those of their number who fell there to make it clear that there were no units of the Marine Corps in Château-Thierry.

3RD DIVISION RELIEVES THE FRENCH

The remainder of the 3rd Division, less the Artillery Brigade, was now brought up and

relieved French units along the south bank of the Marne, and became a part of the 38th French Army Corps. The division was placed eastward from Château-Thierry in order from left to right as follows: 4th Infantry in the town, connecting with the 39th French Division on its left; 7th Infantry, 30th Infantry, 38th Infantry, which connected with the 125th French Division in the Jaulgonne bend of the Marne. The line was stabilized now along the river. The 3rd Division was holding the south bank, sending constant patrols across the river into German territory on the north bank, and, in so doing, gaining their first experience in action.

The 39th French Division, which connected with the 4th Infantry in Château-Thierry, had stopped the Germans west of Château-Thierry on the line Monneaux-Vaux. This gave the enemy Hill 204 which dominated the whole position, and overlooking Château-Thierry made the protection of the river crossings there most difficult. The lines in this sector had become stabilized on this general line of the tributary of the Marne which enters at Es-somes.

On the night of June 6th, a combined attack of French and American Infantry (3rd Division) was launched and captured Hill 204. This secured Château-Thierry to the Allies, who held it from the south bank of the Marne principally with machine-gun battalions of the 3rd Division, supported by the French occupancy of the Hill 204. From this time on, the line from Château-Thierry east along the Marne being stabilized, the 3rd Division, on the south bank, kept up constant patrolling on the north bank, and German attempts to reconnoiter the south bank were frustrated.


THE BELLEAU WOODS ACTION

THE 2nd Division (9th and 23rd Infantry, 5th and 6th Marine Regiments), which had been moved in French trucks from Chaumont-en-Vexin, arrived at Meaux, twenty miles east of Paris on the Marne, and immediately started toward the front. The trucks could go no further than the town, the roads being congested with the huge traffic of sup-

plies for the new front, and with refugees leaving the scene of battle. On the night of June 1st, the 2nd Division went into position in support of the French who were making a stand on the line Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, Bussiares. The 6th Marine Regiment was now moved up to the support position from Le Thiolet (four miles west of Château-Thierry), Triangle Farm, Lucy-le-Bocage, to

2ND DIVISION RELIEVES THE FRENCH

On June 3rd and 4th the Germans attacked the French, but gained very little ground. The French, however, by this time were in need of reorganization, and accordingly at 4 p. m. on the 4th of June they retired through the line held by the 2nd Division. This put the Americans in the front line. By this time the



The Château-Thierry Sector on the West

This map shows the location of the Belleau Woods action (5 miles northwest of Château-Thierry), where the Marines, beginning June 6th, successfully withstood the German drive. The map also shows the highway to Paris via Château-Thierry, this town having been defended from May 31st, at a bridge over the Marne, by the 7th Motorized Machine-Gun Battalion.

Hill 142 southwest of Torcy. By midnight of June 1st-2nd, the 9th Infantry Regiment was in position on the right, south of the Paris-Metz road, and the 23rd Infantry Regiment on the left from Champillon west. This put the 2nd Division in the support position immediately behind the French who were holding the line.

divisional artillery was in position, and the division was ready to stand alone. But the front the division was now holding was much too long to be held by that division alone, and accordingly the 167th French Division relieved the 23rd Regiment of Infantry on the extreme left of the position from Champillon west. The 23rd Infantry then moved to the

right and went in between the 9th Infantry Regiment and the 6th Marine Regiment. The 5th Marine Regiment was now brought up and took over the sector from Lucy-le-Bocage to Champillon. The line was thus formed and the sectors established on the night of June 5th-6th. Although there was some shelling of

connected with the 3rd American Division in Château-Thierry). The 2nd Division connected on its left with the 167th French Division.

On the night of June 5th the Allied line ran: South bank of the Marne, Essomes, west edge of the Bois du Loup, Crogis, northeast



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U. S. Marines in Belleau Woods

Drawn by a Signal Corps artist with the 2nd Division. It was here that the enemy first experienced the skill of the American soldier in bayonet-work.

the lines while they were being established and one attack shortly after the French passed through, the fight for Bouresches and Belleau Woods was not begun until June 6th. The 2nd Division was now a division of the 21st French Army Corps, joining up on its right with the 39th French Division (which in turn

edge of the Bois de la Marette, east edge of the Bois de Clerembauts, Lucy-le-Bocage, Champillon. The German line was as follows: North bank of Marne, Bois de Corteau, Monneaux, Vaux, western edge of Bois de Belleau. This put the Germans in an advantageous position for continuing the attack at any future

time, for their front lines were just over the crest of the hill with the line of woods behind them, and behind these woods lay the shallow valley of the tributary of the Ourcq, containing the towns of Belleau and Bouresches. The Allies were in a very disadvantageous position, being much more in the open, with no woods behind them, and in positions lower than the Germans, which gave the latter observation of the Allies' rear, while the German rear lay in the shallow valley. Accordingly an attack was ordered to take the wooded crest including the Bois de la Marette and the Bois de Belleau and the town of Bouresches, in order to put the Allied front line over the crest of the hill and get the woods behind them.

MARINES GO INTO ACTION

The attack was launched on the morning of June 6th by the Marine Brigade of the 2nd Division under a rolling barrage to improve their position. They swept rapidly across the open and took the town of Bouresches, but they were only partly successful. The Germans had fortified the Bois de Belleau with machine guns, and Belleau Woods a forest about a mile square, with dense undergrowth, was practically impossible to penetrate. Held as it was by determined infantry, well entrenched, whose machine-gun nests and trench mortars were well concealed and well supported by artillery, it was a strong position which rendered almost futile any attempt to take it. The capture of one machine-gun nest only disclosed that its position was commanded by another nest of guns. But the Marines would not give up, and, despite terrific casualties, they maintained their foothold in Belleau Woods. Two additional advances in the next three days gave some additional ground, and there were almost continual skirmishes in the wood until June 10th, when General Harbord, commanding general of the Marines, called attention to the condition of his brigade and asked for relief. To afford some measure of relief, General Bundy, the division commander, readjusted the brigade sector and assigned the ground from Triangle Farm to Bouresches to the 3rd Brigade (9th and 23rd Infantry), which it took over on the night of June 13th. On June 14th, the 167th French Infantry Division took over some of the sector of the 2nd

Division to include Hill 142, thus relieving the Marine Brigade on the left as well as on the right and making their sector Belleau Woods alone. But the resistance remained the same and very little progress was made.

Arrangements were then made to borrow the 7th Infantry Regiment from the 3rd Division, and it was placed at the Marine commander's disposal for six days. The 7th Infantry Regiment relieved the Marine Brigade on the night of June 15th, in Belleau Woods. For six days the 7th Infantry attacked continuously. It was able to gain but very little ground. However, it did not lose any ground, and on the 21st-22nd of June, when the six days were up, the regiment was withdrawn; the Marines, who once more took over Belleau Woods, did so on almost the same lines on which they had been relieved the week before.

Though the Bois de Belleau (Belleau Woods) was reported clear of the enemy on June 12th, when the capture of 300 prisoners was announced, it was not wholly and finally taken until June 26th; the fight for its possession had gone on almost continuously from the initial attack on June 6th. With its capture this part of the line was stabilized.

CAPTURE OF VAUX

The 3rd Brigade (9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments) during these twenty days, held the sectors assigned to it, and coöperated in various attacks, until the morning of July 1st, when a battalion from each regiment, supported by the 12th, 15th and 17th Artillery Regiments, in conjunction with the French who were attacking on their right, captured the village of Vaux and the Bois de la Roche.

This put the Allied lines on the dominant ground from Château-Thierry westward, including Hill 204, Vaux, Bouresches, and Belleau Woods. On the night of July 9th-10th, the 2nd Division was relieved by the 26th Division (New England National Guard) which had just come from the Toul Sector, and the 2nd Division was placed in reserve.

The relief of the 2nd Division by the 26th Division brought to a close the Belleau Woods-Vaux action, which, while not a part of any major engagement, was a brilliant local engagement which prepared the 2nd Division for

the big work ahead of it. Like Cantigny, it was a local action, to relieve an awkward position on the front of the division, and had no part in the Second Battle of the Marne, other than demonstrating to the Allies that the Americans were eager to fight. The great and conspicuous part that the 2nd Division played in the war was not at this time or in this place, but a month later on the 18th of July, in the great Allied counter attack southeast of Soissons. However, in recognition of the brilliant achievement of the 4th Marine Brigade in their stubborn fight for Belleau

Woods, the French Government ordered the name of that now famous bit of woods changed to *Bois de la Brigade de Marine*.

The 2nd Division left this sector for replacement and rest with the assurance that they had established a remarkable record for bravery, courage and reckless gallantry in action. They had captured 1,400 prisoners in the month's steady fighting, and a feeling of comradeship and coöperation had developed between the soldiers and the Marines.

The Marine casualties in this action were 5,201.

V

MONTDIDIER-NOYON DEFENSIVE

The 1st Division in the Line During the German Drive of June 9th-15th,
but Does Not Figure in the Fighting

STOPPED on the Marne finally on June 5th, the Germans decided that the Marne salient, whose apex rested at Château-Thierry, was too narrow and hence vulnerable at the hinges, either from the forest of Compiègne on the west, or from Reims on the east. The dense and impenetrable forest of Compiègne had limited the width of the salient on the German right as they swept down over the Chemin des Dames towards Paris; and the fortified city of Reims, with its deep dugouts and endless system of trenches had limited the width of the salient on their left. Two plans were available to widen the salient. Either they could take Reims and push eastward or else they must come down west of the forest of Compiègne just as they had come down east of it to Château-Thierry in May. Going through the forest of Compiègne was an impossibility; and as the taking of Reims either by frontal attack or by enveloping it would be practically as difficult as squeezing the Allies out of the forest, and in the end would take them further away from Paris, the die was cast on June 9th and the attack on the whole front from Montdidier to Noyon was launched.

The 1st Division was still sitting in front of Montdidier in the Cantigny sector, where

it had been since April 25th, vainly speculating on when the division would be relieved. The sector was still so hot that the daily toll of casualties was very high, and the casualties from the Cantigny attack had left great gaps in the regiments, both among officers and men. For some days the German attack had been expected. Each night saw more and more Allied artillery move into the sector, and this time it was batteries of 155-mm. G. P. F., those long-barrelled, high-powered, six-inch rifles on rubber tires, which move around almost like field artillery and deposit their projectiles with great accuracy eighteen kilometers (11 miles) away. Then too the infantry had not been idle. Each night the position of platoons and machine-gun nests was changed, so that the photographs taken by the German aviators would be useless for artillery targets. The third and most unmistakable sign of all was the sudden increase in German airplanes over the sector.

A HEAVY ALLIED BARRAGE

Starting about midnight on the night of June 8th-9th, the area along the support positions, where all the batteries and headquarters were located, was deluged with a most intense bombardment of gas and high explo-

sive shells, which lasted until dawn and cut every means of communication. Throughout it all, however, the Allied artillery kept up its immense schedule of firing on every road in the German lines which led to the front, the gunners suffering heavy casualties despite the fact that gas masks were worn all night. With the coming of dawn, all the light guns concentrated their fire, forming a barrage along the Allied front, through which the Germans would have to pass to assault the Allied line. From the support lines it was impossible to see the front because of the heavy fog and the gas cloud which had rolled down off the hill of the support position, and lay in the shallow valley where the front lines were. All communications with the forward battalions was cut off, and the artillery was firing merely on the supposition that the Germans had launched their attack. Communication with the front became the immediate concern of everyone along the support position.

MOUNTED ORDERLIES BRING INFORMATION

This contingency had been anticipated; mounted orderlies had been stationed at each of the forward Battalion Headquarters; and a mounted officer with two mounted orderlies had been sent to the forward Battalion Headquarters of the French regiment on the right of the 1st Division, in the draw which the Germans were expected to come up. They were to bring messages to the 26th Infantry Regimental Headquarters, where a buried cable gave telephone connection to all the artillery and headquarters in rear. Soon after dawn the messages began to arrive. It appeared that so far the German infantry had attacked on a broad front, but not on the front of the 1st Division. The French division on the right of the 1st was involved. The artillery was immediately notified, and the fire was shifted to the front of the French division. It soon became apparent that the 1st Division would not be included in the infantry attack of that morning, although it had been included in the intense artillery preparation. The mounted orderlies were a new thing in trench warfare, but their use justified itself in the accurate information they brought. They presented a strange spectacle to that little group of officers standing on the hill by Regimental

Headquarters, looking eagerly towards the sea of poisonous fog which enveloped the front. Out of this yellow cloud suddenly appeared galloping furiously a foam-covered horse, splashed to the withers with mud and made monstrous by wearing a gas mask, and on



The Gas Mask, Ready for Action

him riding as fast as his spurs could make him, a man disguised beyond recognition by his gas mask.

GUNS ALMOST HUB TO HUB

The attack between Montdidier and Noyon failed. The Allies had banked too much artillery to permit of any other outcome. The guns stood almost hub to hub along this entire front; and in those few spots where the German infantry did penetrate the line, they were unable to bring up the reinforcements necessary to continue the advance. The French had played a clever game. Practically the entire garrison of the sector attacked had been withdrawn in accordance with Marshal Foch's tactics to the main line of resistance,

a line of wooded heights from two to five kilometers in rear of the front lines; and at this point the advance of the Germans had been in all but a few points definitely stopped. The German infantry had attacked in waves only to be mowed down by the Allied artillery and machine guns.

The Germans tried to continue the attack during the succeeding five days, but without any further success; and in some parts of the line, French counter-attacks easily won back some of the ground, and the second phase of the attack on Paris was stopped. The sector

then rapidly became quiet, as the Germans withdrew their assault divisions and artillery in preparation for their last great attack on Paris. The 1st Division remained in the Cantigny Sector until July 7th, when it was relieved by a French division, and the 1st went for needed rest a few miles north of Paris. After 78 days in the Cantigny Sector, the whole division was worn out from the strain. The cost in casualties had been 238 officers and 5,593 men. A long rest seemed to be in store for it after its six months' continuous duty in the line.

VI

JUNE 15th-JULY 15th—A MONTH OF WAITING Rearranging the Combat Divisions Preparatory to the Next German Drive—New Divisions From America

WITH the stopping of the Montdidier-Noyon attack, the second phase of the last German offensive was brought to a close, and once more, for thirty days, the war was at a standstill while both sides reorganized their fighting forces, regrouped their reserves, and vainly tried to outguess each other's intentions. The Allies were still on the defensive, for the Germans had superiority in manpower. But on the other hand, the Germans were in a deep and narrow salient pointing towards Paris, and in a much wider salient towards Amiens, so the grouping of the Allied reserves in the right angle between these two salients was logical, for it was evident that in the very near future the Germans would strike again in one or the other of these two directions. Many changes were made in the American divisions. The quality and dependability of the troops was no longer a question, but an assured fact. The 1st Division at Cantigny, the 2nd at Belleau Woods, and the 3rd at Château-Thierry had established an enviable record for the American Army. And now while the Germans were organizing for their next offensive the stage was being prepared for the employment of many more American divisions, both those that had re-

cently arrived and those that were due to arrive within a few weeks' time.

DIVISION MOVEMENTS

The 77th (New York National Army) the first of the National Army Divisions to arrive in France, had by this time finished its preliminary training with the British at St. Omer and was now ready to go into a quiet sector. Major General George B. Duncan, who as a brigadier had commanded the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division, was assigned in May to command the New York Division. He was at that time the most experienced General in the American Expeditionary Forces, having in the eleven months he had been in France, commanded a brigade in the line. The 77th Division was carefully watched by everyone, for it was indeed an experiment to take a thousand men from civil life in May, 1917, train them for three months, then commission them and order them to Camp Upton with only a dozen Regular Army officers to instruct them. In September the first increment of the draft arrived; and, by gradual stages the regiments, which at first were composed solely of the officers, were filled to strength. By mid-October, 1917, the division was practically complete and was drilling to all appearances like veterans. Eight months later, in June, 1918, the 77th was in France, packed into the funny little *Hommes 40 Chevaux* 8 cars, a battalion on each train, hastening eastward across France, past Paris, past Nancy, until finally the trains stopped at a

little, unheard-of place and the troops were ordered out of the cars. Two days marching followed, and then the different units were all finally grouped in the vicinity of Rambervilliers. It was now announced that the 77th was to occupy a quiet sector on the front and would relieve the 42nd or Rainbow Division in the Baccarat Sector. For the first part of its stay, the New York Division was to occupy the sector jointly with the French 61st Division, as was the usual custom when new divisions went in the line for the first time, and the sector remained under the command of the French, who acted as in-

in the Vosges had tasted every experience of trench warfare; and, while the sector was quiet, still there were occasional raids and minor attacks by both sides, besides gas attacks by shell and projector, so that the Rainbow Division was now considered as through with its training and a first class combat division, ready to fight as a unit with best French, British and American Divisions in the counter-offensive which was sure to come. This division was now transferred by rail to the Marne valley, and placed in reserve in the troop-worn towns between Vitry-le-François and Châlons-sur-Marne, along the Paris-Nancy high-



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From Leslie's Weekly

Infantry's New Cavalry

A motorized machine-gun unit, one of the new and most efficient adjuncts to our fighting forces. Three battalions of machine gunners were attached to each division.

structors in the little points of trench warfare. This was the first time the 77th had come in contact with the French Army and it was the beginning of that close friendship which grew stronger between these comrades in arms as the war progressed. The relief was completed by the 26th of June.

THE 42ND DIVISION

The Rainbow Division (National Guard from many States) had held the Baccarat Sector since March 23rd, and had been in the line there 140 days, being finally relieved on June 21st. This division in these three months of trench warfare

way. Here it remained until the night of June 22nd-29th, when, as part of the Fourth French Army, commanded by General Gouraud, it began its long march of 35 kilometers towards the front; and at dawn reached the famous maneuver field known as the Camp de Châlons, 15 kilometers behind the Champagne front, midway between Châlons and Suippes. Here the Rainbow Division began a series of rehearsals for an attack in conjunction with divisions of the Fifth French Army, all under General Pell, the French Corps Commander. The Americans welcomed this chance to do some real fighting, for after six months in a quiet sector, taking the daily shelling

and discomforts, without ever the chance to strike back, this seemed like the opportunity that all had been waiting for. It was, however, never carried out. Instead, the ever threatening German attack caused the Rainbow Division on July 4th to be made a part of the Twenty-first French Army Corps, to defend the Champagne.

THE 28TH DIVISION

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) during June was gradually assembled, less the 53rd Artillery Brigade, in the area just north of Paris. June was a very tedious month for its four infantry regiments (109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th) and for the 103rd Engineer Regiment, for looking in one direction they could see Paris, and in the other at night the flashes of the guns at the front and still they could go to neither place, but worked on and on according to an endless training schedule wondering all the time whether the war would be over before they should ever get into it. Towards the end of June the evidence that the Germans would attempt to cross the Marne became unmistakable, and more reserves would be needed. The 28th Division was the nearest, and, while it had never been in action and still lacked its Artillery Brigade, it was nevertheless ordered to a position in reserve, about ten miles south of the Marne, in rear of the 3rd Division, and became a part of the French Army defending the road to Paris.

THE 4TH DIVISION

The 4th Division (Regulars) landed in May and was training with the British in the Sammer area while its Artillery Brigade went to Camp de Souge to get its guns and horses and learn the working and firing of the French 75's. This division on June 9th was entrained and brought down from the British area to Meaux, midway between Château-Thierry and Paris on the Marne river. Here it remained in general reserve until June 15th, when, as it was still without its artillery and had not yet been in the line, it was ordered to join the 164th French Division at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, twenty kilometers west of Château-Thierry on the Marne. The infantry regiments immediately began training for an attack with the French, while the engineer regiments constructed a secondary position for defense along the hills above Crouttes.

This arrangement of the American divisions in June put two American divisions in the line of the Marne salient, the 3rd (Regulars) from Château-Thierry eastward, and the 26th (New England National Guard) in Belleau Woods. Five other American divisions were located in rear of the lines of the salient, in reserve, as follows:

1st Division at Dammartin, 20 miles north-east of Paris.

2nd Division at Montreuil-aux-Lions, 10 kilometers behind Belleau Wood.

4th Division, La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, west of Château-Thierry.

28th Division at Montmirail, 10 miles south of Château-Thierry.

42nd Division at Camp de Châlons, north of Châlons-sur-Marne.

TEN NEW DIVISIONS ARRIVE IN JUNE

The great mid-summer troop movement was now in full swing. Troops were landing in every port and were assembled in training areas, put through the preliminary training, and then sent to quiet sectors under the British and French. In the month of June ten divisions, two hundred and fifty thousand combat troops, and one depot division were landed in France. This gave an added stimulus to the Allies in that month of waiting, as General Pershing says in his report:

"The great June-July troop movement from the States was now well under way, and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves."

THE 82ND DIVISION

The 82nd Division was the first to arrive. Organized at Camp Gordon, near Atlanta, Ga., under the command of Major General Eben Swift, with personnel drafted from the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, it was called upon to furnish replacements for the National Guard divisions from these states, which left it but 863 of its original men. It was in turn filled with men drawn from almost every state of the Union, and these soldiers were descended from every nationality in Europe. So thoroughly did it represent the nation that it was called the All-American Division. This division left the United States on April 24th, the first elements arriving in France, via England, in the middle of May, and by June 1st the whole division was in training with the British on the river Somme west of Abbeville, except the Artillery Brigade, which went to La Courtine in central France to receive its equipment and final training. During its stay in the British area, it was under tentative orders to form part of the defense of Amiens, should the Germans attack again. On June 16th, this division left the British area without having gone into the line, and went by train to the Toul Sector, where, in conjunction with a French Division it

occupied the line. The relief was completed on June 27th, and the 26th Division, which was relieved, moved by train to the Marne, to relieve the 2nd Division in Belleau Wood.

THE 78TH DIVISION

The next division to arrive was the 78th (National Army) with men drawn from northern New York, New Jersey and Delaware and commanded by Major General James H. McRae. This division was organized at Camp Dix, New Jersey, and on May 8th, began the movement overseas. The Artillery Brigade landed in France

Eu Training Area in the British zone. On June 13th, the 108th Engineers of the 33rd Division were sent forward to work on the defenses of Amiens, where the next German drive was expected, and on June 20th-21st the remainder of the division moved into the Amiens area. Here it was trained by the British, occupying portions of the front line and participating in a number of small operations. On July 4th four companies of infantry from the 33rd Division, namely, Company "C" and "E," 131st Infantry, and "A" and "G," 132nd Infantry took part in the attack on Hamel. These were the first American troops



International Film Service

The Type of Firing Trench Adopted for Use by U. S. Infantry

and proceeded to Brittany for training. The infantry units landed in England on June 4th and 5th and crossed to Calais by boat, three or four days later. The last unit arrived in France on June 11th. The infantry began its training behind the Hazebrouck front in the British area, and on July 19th, moved to the St. Pol Area, west of Arras.

THE 33RD DIVISION

The 33rd Division (Illinois National Guard) was trained at Camp Logan, Texas, with Major General George Bell, Jr., in command; and on April 23rd the first units left camp for overseas. The division arrived in France at Brest, the last units arriving on June 11th. The division was immediately sent to the Huppy area, near Abbéville, and on June 9th, proceeded to the

to fight alongside the Australians, and this was the first time that Americans had fought with the British in an action of any magnitude. Although of minor importance, the attack on Hamel was of great value in showing the British that not alone the American Regulars, but all the American troops were capable of the bitterest fighting. It was an Australian Colonel who met these companies on their return from this mission, saying: "Yanks, you're fighting fools; but I'm for you."

THE 80TH DIVISION

The 80th or Blue Ridge Division, was organized at Camp Lee, Petersburg, Va., by General Adelbert Cronkhite. Its name was derived from the fact that the enlisted personnel were drawn exclusively from the States of Virginia, West

Virginia, and western Pennsylvania—the region of the Blue Ridge Mountains. On May 17, 1918, the division began to move to France, where the troops debarked at Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, and Brest; and on June 12th, the entire Blue Ridge

men from all parts of the United States. It was trained at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, Meade, and Dix. On June 2nd, the division was assembled at Camp Upton for embarkation overseas; and on June 19th, Major



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Major-General William Lassiter

He commanded the 51st Field Artillery Brigade; he was Chief of Artillery, First and Fourth Army Corps and Second Army.

Division, less the Artillery Brigade, was sent to Calais, where in the middle of June it was assembled in the Sammer Training Area for instruction by the 16th (Irish) and then the 34th (English) Divisions, which through losses were but mere skeleton divisions.

THE 92ND DIVISION

The 92nd Division, popularly known as the Buffaloes, was made up of colored National Army

General Charles C. Ballou and Division Headquarters arrived at Brest.

THE 37TH DIVISION

The 37th or Buckeye Division (Ohio National Guard) was organized at Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama. For more than ten months it was trained in the United States until, on June 11th, under the command of Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, the Buckeye Division be-

gan its movement overseas. The division on arrival was assembled, less the Artillery Brigade, in the Bourmont Area.


THE 30TH DIVISION

The 30th or Old Hickory Division (National Guard from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee), was organized at Camp Sevier, S. C. The first units sailed for overseas service on May 7th, and the last units landed at Calais on June 24th. The division was ordered to the Eperlecques Training Area, with the British, and remained there until July 4th, when it was ordered into Belgium to serve with the Second British Army Corps, being placed in support of the 33rd

June, where it was assembled in the Fouche-Tramptot Training Area.

THE 29TH DIVISION

The 29th, or Blue and Gray Division, was made up of the National Guard of New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, and was commanded by Major General Charles G. Morton. From the fact that States both of the North and the South were represented in the division, the name Blue and Gray was adopted. The division left Camp McClellan, Alabama, and arrived in France at the end of June, at the ports of Brest and St. Nazaire. This division was then ordered to the Prauthoy, 10th Training Area, while the Artillery Brigade



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Marines Passing Through a French Village

and 49th British Divisions. Division Headquarters was located at Watou, and it was in this sector, with Major General George W. Read in command, that the division received its first training in the line.

THE 89TH DIVISION

The 89th, or Middle West Division, was organized at Camp Funston, Kansas, from men drawn from the States of Missouri, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona, by Major General Leonard Wood, who remained in command until he was relieved on the eve of the embarkation for overseas. Major General William M. Wright commanded the division during its active campaign. This division, less the Artillery Brigade, began to leave Camp Funston on May 22nd, arriving in France late in

was sent to Camp Meucon, just outside of St. Nazaire, for its training and equipment.

THE 83RD DIVISION

In addition to the above nine combat divisions, the 83rd Division (Ohio and West Virginia), arrived in France on June 21st. This division was organized at Camp Sherman, Ohio, under the command of Major General Edwin F. Glenn. Upon arrival in France, the 83rd Division was designated as a Depot Division, and was ordered to the Le Mans Area, midway between Paris and St. Nazaire. Here the division was broken up; the 158th Artillery Brigade and special units, such as the 308th Engineer Regiment and the 308th Field Signal Battalion, being sent forward as corps and army troops. The other organizations of the division were held in the area and trained



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A. Cronkhite

Painting by Joseph Cummings Chase

Major-General Adelbert Cronkhite

Commanded the 80th Division in Albert sector, St.-Mihiel offensive, and Argonne offensive.

as replacements for the combat divisions at the front.

A PERIOD OF HIGH TENSION

By the end of June, therefore, there were twenty American combat divisions in France (about 240,000 rifles). Seven of these were in the Marne area, four with the British, and the remaining nine divisions were either in or about to enter quiet sectors in the Vosges Mountains for their preliminary training. This was how matters stood with the American Army during that long month of waiting, from June 15th to July 15th. Gradually unmistakable signs pointed to a recommencing of the drive on Paris in the near future; the Allies estimated the day as July 5th, but that day passed quietly, and still there was no evidence of the drive starting. All France was tense with anticipation. Could this drive be stopped as the Montdidier-Noyon drive had been stopped a month ago? No one knew just how much the Germans would be willing to sacrifice to gain Paris. It would have to be an enormous sacrifice, for the French had filled the Marne valley with troops and guns, so that marching on Paris would not be as easy for the Germans as they had expected. And yet no one could be confident that the German drive could be stopped. If the German High Command should strike with fifty divisions, pay the cost and continue the drive on Paris, what then?

To the outsider Paris seemed even gayer than before. True, the long-range German gun was dropping a shell into the city every twenty minutes, but no one paid the slightest attention to that. The Germans were but fifty miles away, and Paris was bombed nightly by aeroplane, which made the city stay absolutely dark at night. Those who had cared to flee had done so months before, and those who had remained watched the events with that sort of fascination which holds one in the presence of great danger. No places of business were closed, but in most of them

the books were carefully packed each night so that they could be placed on a wagon and taken to a place of safety should the need arise.

JULY 14, 1918, IN PARIS

The 14th of July, the great national holiday of France, came at the climax of this month of waiting, the day before the last German drive started. A great parade was staged in Paris on that day. Each of the Allied nations was to send a battalion to represent it in the parade, and word was received that the 1st Division had been selected to represent the United States. A battalion was hurriedly made up of one company from each infantry regiment, and with the 5th Field Artillery's band, they boarded trains for three days' stay in Paris.

Perhaps there shall be even greater parades, but this one stands today as the summit, for on this bright clear July morning of the national holiday, when all Paris turned out to see the Allies parade just as the tide was about to be forever turned, battalions from each of the Allied nations, French Chasseurs Alpains, British Guards, American Regulars, Italian Bersaglieri, Portuguese, Russians, Czechoslovaks, Poles, Rumanians, Serbians, Greeks, each with their national colors displayed and their bands playing national airs as the procession flowed down the Champs Elysées from the Arc de Triomphe towards the Place de la Concorde, with the enemy but fifty miles away straining like dogs at the leash—this was up to that moment the most brilliant and inspiring spectacle of the war.

The enthusiasm passed all bounds, the enemy was forgotten, and Paris enjoyed this one day to the full. That evening the Provost Marshal sent word by the military police for all American officers to return at once to their organizations, and at dawn the next morning, July 15th, the German Army crossed the Marne in its final attack on Paris.

VII

LAST GERMAN DRIVE SMASHED

Three American Divisions Join With the French in the Marne Fighting,
When the Turning Point of the War Was Reached

THE second battle of the Marne, comprising, as it does, two major engagements (the Champagne-Marne Defensive, July 15th-18th), and the Aisne-Marne Offensive (July 18th to August 6th), was the turning point in the war. During the first the Germans launched their last great drive, or "Peace Offensive," on a front of 50 miles between Château-Thierry and Suippes only to be stopped across the Marne and in the Champagne by the gallantry of the French and American troops who were holding this line. Their whole offensive which they had been planning for weeks here crumbled to pieces. Then, while the Germans were suffering the shock of this unexpected setback, Marshal Foch counter-attacked with all the troops at his disposal, and on July 18th-22nd by a sudden, swift and unexpected assault southeast of Soissons* he cut the Germans' line of communication at Château-Thierry, removing forever the menace on Paris, and forced them to retire in a series of disastrous retreats in this sector which culminated on August 6th in the re-establishing of the Allied line from Soissons along the Vesle to Reims.

Eight American divisions took part in this second battle of the Marne, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, and 42nd. Three of these fought in the Champagne-Marne Defensive, better known as the Defense of Paris. These were the 3rd, 28th, and 42nd which as units of three French armies along that fifty miles of battlefront assisted the Allies in the defense.

THE THIRD REGULARS AT THE MARNE

The 3rd Division had now been holding its position along the Marne for a month and a half. We have seen that in the early days of

June, when it was for the first time in the line, it had demonstrated superb courage and gallantry in preventing the Germans from crossing the bridges at Château-Thierry. During June and early July, the 3rd Division had clung to its position on the south bank of the Marne in anticipation of this second and much heavier attack. In the attack in June, the German Army was almost spent and therefore much more easily stopped, whereas now it came with the full force of a new drive, with its artillery up in close support, with pontoons, and with preparations made to overcome all opposition in crossing the Marne, and then to drive ahead on the road to Paris.

As the front had settled to a state of semi-stability during June, the elements of the 3rd Division were gradually brought together into a more compact sector, which occupied about a ten-kilometer (6¼ miles) front on the south side of the river, reaching from Château-Thierry on the left (west) to the Jaulgonne Bend of the Marne on the east. Under heavy fire from the hills across the Marne, a sector was established. Three belts of barbed wire started, but only a small part of this had been completed by July 15th when the attack came. The front line consisted of rifle pits dug in at the water's edge on the river bank, which were occupied each night at dusk, and evacuated each morning at dawn. Three or four hundred yards in rear of this, the Paris-Metz railroad ran on a high embankment through the low flats of the south side of the river. This railroad embankment made a natural bulwark for the main line of resistance, and here the majority of the garrison of the front line battalion lay in shelters dug into the south side of the embankment. On the north side of the Marne the steep hills which came to the water's edge effectively screened all but the front lines of the enemy, and gave them direct

*This operation is dealt with separately in the chapter which follows this one.

fire into the positions held by the 3rd Division. The division had the 125th French Division on its right, and the 39th French Division on its left. The latter crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry and connected with the 26th Division in the Belleau Wood Sector.

An attack by the Germans to extend the Château-Thierry salient southward, to force a crossing of the Marne in the Jaulgonne Bend, to capture the heights on the south side

question was when the attack would take place. On the supposition that it would come on the night of July 4th-5th to catch the Americans when they were celebrating their national holiday, the French Fifth and Sixth Armies, to which all the American divisions in the Marne area belonged, were kept on the alert that evening, but when morning dawned with no sign of the expected attack another date had to be guessed at. Thereafter every



By Sergeant Kerr Eby

From a Soldier's Sketch Book.

Washing Day

of the river, which commanded the valley of the Surmelin River, and thus to debouch to the south towards Montmirail and the highway to Paris, and at the same time to widen the Château-Thierry salient to the east of Reims in the Champagne had long been expected. Air reconnaissance, prisoners, and captured documents all confirmed this. In the latter part of June, a French patrol had crossed the Marne near Dormans, and captured a German engineer officer who had in his possession the plans for the crossings at Mont St. Père and Jaulgonne. The only

night these two armies were "alerted," for patrols of the 3rd Division had heard what sounded like pontoon bridges being brought down to the river's edge.

THE GERMANS CROSS THE MARNE

Early in the evening of July 14th word was passed along from the rear that the attack so long expected would come at dawn next morning. About midnight the preliminary bombardment began. The Germans had moved up much artillery until on the front of the 3rd Division they had eighty-four bat-

teries—336 guns—against thirty-one American and French batteries—124 guns. The Artillery Brigade of the 3rd Division had just come up from its training area, and this was its first glimpse of actual combat. With this preponderance in artillery, the Germans were able to smother all the Allied batteries, and in addition they drenched the whole country with gas, high explosive, and smoke shells, so that by 3 o'clock in the morning, when the German infantry began moving out over the hills down to the river, where their pontoons lay concealed in the brush, they were unseen by the men of the 3rd Division until they were in the boats and starting for the south shore. The following account by Lieutenant Lovejoy, 38th Infantry Regiment, tells of what he experienced that day on the south bank of the Marne:

"The shelling on the river bank began about 3 o'clock. Fifteen minutes of this destructive fire preceded the rolling barrage, and the few *liaison* agents from the river platoons who reached their company P. C.'s on the railroad line reported that the enemy, under cover of smoke screens, was about to cross. Day was just breaking; and through the mist, fog and smoke one could see the boats and rafts loaded to the gunwales with enemy infantrymen and machine gunners set out for the southern bank. That was about 3:30 o'clock. Yet not one crossed that day in the center of the sector, in front of Company H or on the right in front of Company E. Men of the 38th, who had escaped the hours of shelling, met every attempt with rifle and automatic-weapon fire. Scores of those boats were shattered and sunk or else disabled and sent drifting harmlessly down the river. Hundreds of Huns jumped into the water and were drowned. Those who reached our side by swimming were either killed or captured.

"Soldiers, wounded in the early morning, remained at their automatic rifles or in their rifle pits unflinchingly until killed. One man of Company G was later found lifeless with his rifle and pistol empty, and in front of him a heap of twelve dead Germans. Another private's body was found surrounded by five of the enemy, all killed by a bayonet; but his own rifle was clutched in his hands, ready


for more work, when he was stopped by a bullet from a machine gun.

"At this time Company G was really the pivotal point of the attack, because in front of this company the Germans had erected a pontoon bridge, over which swarmed a host of machine gunners. By means of a second pontoon bridge, the enemy was enabled to direct a flanking fire on the left. But Company G, under Captain Wooldridge, made heroic counter-attacks, in the course of which it took more than 400 prisoners, in spite of overwhelming odds."

The brunt of the attack by the right wing of the German Army in its attempt to cross the Marne on July 15th fell on the 3rd Division. The 39th French Division and the First American Army Corps, comprising the 26th Division, and the 167th French Division, were not involved. In fact the attack was all east of Château-Thierry. No crossing was attempted on the front of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Division; but on the front on the other three infantry regiments—the 7th, 30th, and 38th, respectively—and further to the east, on the front of the 125th French Division, crossings by boats and pontoon bridges were attempted. Near Mézy, and up the river above it, in the Jaulgonne Bend, the Germans managed to get two pontoon bridges laid across the river; and the 30th Infantry was forced out of the town of Mézy. A line of battle was hastily formed near Fossoy, about a mile back of the river and prolonged toward the Surmelin River by the 7th and 30th Infantry Regiments. This new line was never broken despite furious attacks by the Germans from Mézy.

THE 38TH INFANTRY'S HEROIC STAND

By eight o'clock on the morning of July 15th the fighting on the left and center of the 3rd Division (7th Infantry and 30th Infantry Regiments) had virtually ended. On the extreme right (38th Infantry), however, the situation was yet serious. The 38th Infantry Regiment was still holding its outpost line in the rifle pits along the edge of the river. The 125th French Division, on the right of the 38th Infantry, had fallen back in conformity with the divisions on its right who



Among the Ruins—Flirey



A Blue Devil



One of the 40th

A Siesta

Drawings by Sergeant Kerr Eby in His "From a Soldier's Sketch Book"

were making a stand some miles back from the river on the first high ground, for the railroad there went along the river bank and was useless to the defenders.

This left the right flank of the 38th Infantry Regiment, on the extreme right of the 3rd Division, exposed to attack from the Germans who had crossed and were occupying the Jaulgonne Bend. The 38th Infantry Regiment could not, however, withdraw from its position along the river bank, for to this regiment had been entrusted the front where the Surlin River, flowing due north down a narrow valley, emptied into the Marne, and along both sides of this river lay two splendid roads leading to Montmirail, upon which the Germans had planned to transport their artillery and supply trains for the exploitation of the first success. The Surlin River valley, then, with its two roads, was the crucial point in the whole attack; and the 38th Infantry was holding their front with the object of preventing any pontoon bridges from being thrown across the river to connect with these roads. All other crossings were useless to the Germans if they could not seize these roads; and consequently from both the right and the left, where they had succeeded in crossing, the Germans concentrated their attacks on the flanks of the 38th Infantry Regiment.

To hold his position Colonel Ulysses G. McAlexander, 38th Infantry, was obliged to throw his right flank around facing northeast across the hillslope toward Varennes, which town the enemy had captured. He had foreseen the possibility of this, and two days before had dug a series of rifle pits in echelon just over the crest of this hill to cover his entire right flank. The reserve battalion of the 38th Infantry was brought up under fire, and occupied these pits, while the French were withdrawing before the heavy attacks of the Germans. In addition to this, the capture of Mézy by the Germans, and the reforming of the line by the 7th and 30th Infantry in the vicinity of Fossoy, seriously menaced the 38th Infantry from attack on its left flank as well as its right, while its front still held on the river bank and prevented by its determined rifle fire any crossing of the river here. Time and time again the Germans in boats and pontoons tried vainly to land, but each time

the boats were sunk in midstream either by rifle fire or by hand grenades. Colonel McAlexander's regiment had a left flank of two kilometers, a front of two kilometers, and a right flank of nine and a half kilometers, a total of thirteen and a half kilometers (8½ miles). During fourteen hours' fighting the 38th held this position and effectually beat off the continued attacks of two first-class German divisions—the 13th and the 36th, which were made up of such regiments as the 6th Prussian Grenadier Guards and the famous 5th Grenadier Guards, so much importance did the German High Command attach to the capture of the Surlin Valley.

The courage and confidence of the men of the 38th Infantry on this morning of the 15th of July was shown by the message which Major Rowe, surrounded on three sides, and holding the point on the river, sent to Colonel McAlexander that morning: "Am holding the line, and could do so indefinitely."

Colonel R. H. C. Kelton, General Staff, Chief of Staff of the 3rd Division, in an article in the *Century Magazine* entitled "The Miracle of Château-Thierry," says:

"No finer example of control by a regimental commander, or of confidence of the men in the wisdom of his instructions, can be conceived than this performance of the 38th U. S. Infantry on July 15, 1918; and it may be very justly said that Colonel U. G. McAlexander was the Rock of the Surlin Valley, just as General George H. Thomas was at Chickamauga; nor is there any finer example of soldiery coolness and courage under fire than the action of Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Adams of the 38th Infantry, who personally directed the change of front on the extreme right flank, and thereby won his Distinguished Service Cross."

General Pershing says in his report:

"The 3rd Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surlin to the west of Mézy, opposite Château-Thierry, where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of the 3rd wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at critical points, which succeeded in



By Sergeant Kerr Eby

From a Soldier's Sketch Book.

A Company of the 26th Division Coming Out of Action at Château-Thierry

throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners."

By the evening of the first day, July 15th, the German attack was brought to a standstill by the sudden and unexpected resistance of the French and American troops along the whole front from Château-Thierry to the east of Reims, where the 42nd Division (Rainbow) was in the line. On the 16th and 17th of July, the Germans tried by local attacks to gain some ground and better their positions.

THE 28TH DIVISION IN THE MARNE BATTLE

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) had been for some time in the vicinity

of Montmirail, ten miles in rear of the 3rd Division. The 109th Infantry Regiment of this division was brought up on July 13th as far as Condé-en-Brie, in the Surmelin Valley, three miles behind the lines. The regiment went into position on the line Monthurel-St. Agnan, about two miles south of the Marne, where it dug in on the crest of a hill. The 110th and 111th Infantry Regiments were also stationed on this general support line, as was the 103rd Regiment of Engineers, and the line held was the support line running roughly from Chézy (two miles south of Château-Thierry on the Marne as it turns and flows south from Château-Thierry) to Vaux (west of Château-Thierry, where the 26th

Division connected with the 39th French Division). This put the 28th Division in immediate support of the French on a wide front.

This division had had no previous experience in the line, and when the call came for reinforcements was put in—a company or so at a time—with French units. The situation was too delicate to allow any chances to be taken. Regimental and Divisional Staffs without experience could not be given a sector unless it was absolutely necessary, but individual companies and battalions could be of the utmost assistance in warding off local attacks. Four companies—L and M of the 109th Infantry, and B and C of the 110th Infantry—had been engaged in the main attack of July 15th. On the evening of the 14th, French Staff officers had conducted these companies to positions where the French lines were weak: Company M, 109th Infantry, below Passy-sur-Marne, and Company L back of Courtemont-Varennes, in the Jaulgonne Bend of the Marne, while the two companies of the 110th were back of Fossy and Mézy. Then, at midnight on the 14th-15th of July when the German offensive began with galling barrage and artillery preparation, the regiments in the support lines shared equally with the four companies of the division in the front the awful havoc of those three and a half hours of preparation, which with German thoroughness were intended to search out every nook and cranny in the whole landscape, and in this they succeeded admirably.

At 3:30 a. m., under cover of the barrage, the Germans had thrown their pontoon bridges across the river against this position, and over them marched through the smoke and fog the vanguard of the seemingly never ending hosts of gray-green figures. The four American companies which were scattered in among the French were for the first time in the line. But as the enemy advanced the nervousness and fear, which the three and a half hours of preparation by artillery of all calibers and the rolling artillery barrage had caused, suddenly dropped from them, and courage sprang up. The French said afterwards that they were amazed and deeply proud of the steadiness and calmness of their American comrades. Nothing seemed to stop the Germans. Though

machine-gun and rifle fire mowed them down they continued to come on and when they had enough men on the south side, they swarmed to assault the Allied line. Up the wooded slopes they swept in waves, regardless of the furious fire of the defenders. One man fell only to have another take his place. They broke into the first line. Gone then was the science and skill of war; there was but one thought, kill or be killed. Hand to hand and breast to breast they fought. Companies were no more. Men fought in little groups and no group knew what the other group was doing. And then came the tragedy for those gallant four companies of the 28th Division. Something had gone wrong. Somewhere, due most probably to the difference in language, an order had not been understood, or perhaps the officer to whom the order was given to retire had been killed. At all events, the French had slowly drawn back to the main line of resistance, and it dawned upon the Pennsylvanians that they were alone. The French had used their "yielding defense" tactics of which these brave men were ignorant. Alone now, little determined groups a thousand yards apart, they were facing the entire German assault army. The majority of those who still remained alive were quickly surrounded (the groups were so small) and were taken prisoners; but some groups—led by officers to whom this was the first battle of their lives—fought their way out, and by a skillful rearguard action brought the survivors back to the lines where the French were making their stand. Such is the heroic story of four companies of Pennsylvanians in the Second Battle of the Marne.

The remainder of the 28th Division, while not figuring quite so spectacularly as those tragic four companies, soon found that the support line which they had dug the night before had become the front line. Alternating along this front, French and American companies and battalions fought side by side. In response to Colonel McAlexander's request, Companies "H" and "D" of the 109th Infantry Regiment were sent to hold the Bois de Condé, which menaced the position of the 38th Infantry. When they arrived there they found that it would be necessary to take the

wood, which they did. Fighting as small units along that front, this division of the Pennsylvania National Guard won for itself the right to the distinction from that time on of being ranked with the finest assault divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces. That proud title they never lost.

On July 16th, counter attacks along the Fossy-Crezancy-St. Agnan line drove the Germans back across the Marne, so that by July 18th the German offensive was over—a complete failure.

The 26th Division had meanwhile been holding the sector northwest of Château-Thierry, which, although it was not involved in the battle, was far from a pleasant place. The shallow and incomplete trenches extending from near Vaux and Bouresches around the last and northeast edges of the *Bois de la Brigade de Marine* to a point near Bussiares were under constant harassing fire from the German batteries running far back across the hills to the northeast, while German machine guns and snipers were comfortably installed all along the edges of the woods, and in the ruined villages of Belleau and Torcy. On the morning of July 15th, coincidentally with the big attack on the 3rd and 28th Divisions, the Germans made a small demonstration on the front of the 26th Division at Vaux, and made somewhat of a penetration by infiltration. A barrage was brought down which stopped all further attempts, and counter attacks drove the Germans out of the part of the line they had captured.

THE RAINBOW DIVISION IN THE CHAMPAGNE

The 42nd Rainbow Division (National Guard from every State) was brought up on July 5th and made part of the Fourth French Army, and on that day this division took over defensive positions in rear of the 170th and 13th French Divisions on the Champagne front, midway between the city of Reims and the Argonne Forest. For several weeks evidence had been accumulating that the next German attack would extend the Château-Thierry salient south of the Marne, and at the same time widen it toward the east in order finally to effect the capture of Reims and overrun the terrain to the southeast as far as Châlons-sur-Marne. This was evident

from many things. Air reconnaissance, prisoners, and all else pointed to the attempt to widen the salient on the east, since the attempt to widen it from Montdidier to Noyon had failed on June 15th.

The Champagne front where the 42nd now found itself had been for a long period the most continually active sector on the whole front, but now it was as quiet as the Vosges. Great preparations, however, were in progress for the defense against the impending German attack, and General Gouraud's army had these practically completed. The positions on both sides were very strong by nature, and, in addition, had been organized for defense with incredible labor and detail.

General Gouraud's plan of defense, devised both to defeat the new German method of attack by "infiltration" and at the same time to break the force of the assault, was as ingenious as it was bold. It was, simply, that at the last practicable moment after the beginning of the enemy's concentration fire on the first positions, the Allied lines should withdraw to a second strongly prepared position and from there concentrate a heavy fire upon the positions just evacuated, and so cut in pieces the enemy advancing to take them. Signal groups were to remain in the front line positions to keep the artillery and infantry informed of the enemy's progress. There were intermediate positions to be evacuated according to plan.

Elements of the 42nd were detailed to these intermediate stations, but the main body of the division was assigned to the second position to which the front line was to retire.

On July 7th, in readiness for the attack, General Gouraud issued his famous order, reproduced in full elsewhere in this volume, in which he charged the men to have but one thought, "To kill a plenty, until they have had their fill" and added, "Your General says to you: You will break this assault and it will be a happy day." Good General and good prophet, too, was Gouraud on this battlefield.

For an entire week the suspense continued and then, on the night of July 14th word was sent up from Twenty-first Corps Headquarters that the German attack would come at dawn, and for all troops to take their battle stations. The lethargy of the quiet sector was



Shell-Torn Essey



From Missouri



Poilus

Drawings by Sergeant Kerr Eby in His "From a Soldier's Sketch Book"

gone. White with the chalk of the trenches the men looked weird in the moonlight. All was quiet, but they had not long to wait. Shortly before midnight the silence of the past weeks was broken by the sudden roar of thousands of guns, French and American, from the little three-inch 75mm. of the divisional ar-

dot of midnight, according to schedule, all of the powerful artillery which the Germans had brought up for this grand attack thundered forth messages of death and destruction upon the Allied lines. The artillery of both sides covered the entire countryside. Dumps were set afire and burning and the




Photo U. S. Signal Corps.

A Wounded Tank

Held up for repairs during its advance, it awaits relief before driving ahead to its objective.

tillery, to the big guns and mortars of the Corps artillery, whose monstrous guns mounted on railway cars, one to a train, belched forth with titanic fury as they fired at maximum speed. Looking forward the earth was lit up with splotches of red, yellow and green, where the shells were bursting, while, looking to the rear, the sky was white with the gun flashes. For ten minutes the Allies were firing alone; and then, on the

light turned everything into fantastic shapes; roads were torn beyond recognition, while rest billets in rear, which for so long had been spared by both sides, were made a shambles in that four hours of preparation.

At dawn the German rolling barrage began, and behind it those German troops who had not been caught by the French artillery's counter-battery and counter-preparation moved forward in wave after wave to the attack;

and again the French artillery with the American artillery came down, and for a steady hour played on that front line. Up went the rockets from the signal groups whom the French had left behind in the front line, telling the Allied artillery just where the attacking force was.

The Germans had gained the outpost position, and were reforming to assault the intermediate positions. This message was given the Allied gunners, and in a minute all the Allied light artillery was playing on this captured position which the Germans were now holding.

Meanwhile the German artillery had been battering the Allied trenches ahead of this infantry. In the intermediate positions a few of the Allied infantry had been left to break the full force of the blow; and while they had borne heavy casualties from the German artillery barrage, still through smoke and fog, they began firing on the advancing waves of Germans while the Allied artillery placed the protective barrage in front of these positions. Again and again the Germans renewed the assault, but each time with less force, and finally the attack ceased.

The intermediate positions on the front of the Twenty-first Army Corps with the exception of two small points, had not been

entered by the Germans. The German Army, which by 10 o'clock had figured on being through the second position and along the road from Suippes to Châlons was stopped in front of the intermediate position. They had taken, with terrible losses, just that ground which General Gouraud was willing to give them.

In the holding of its part of Gouraud's front line the 42nd Division lost a total of 43 officers and 1,610 men.

On all parts of the front the great and last effort for an offensive on the part of the Germans was completely defeated and by July 18th, three days after the drive had started, it was forever crushed. Hertling, the German Chancellor, said three days before his death that on July 1, 1918, he was convinced the Allies would propose peace before September. He said: "We expected grave events in Paris before the 15th of July. But on the 18th, even the most optimistic among us knew that all was lost. The history of the world was played out in those three days."

Colonel Kelton, in the article previously quoted says: "There is no better epigrammatic reference to the character and the result of the fighting on July 15th than Frederick Palmer's remark that 'We did not dash the cup of victory from his lips; we smashed it to splinters in his face.'"

VIII

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE

The Swift Counter-Blow Against Soissons by the 1st and 2nd Divisions the Boldest Stroke of the War

THE GERMAN LINE EXPOSED

ON July 16, 1918, the war was at a standstill. Both the Allies and the Germans were momentarily paralysed,—the Germans, from the failure of their great offensive, despite the preponderance of men and guns at their command; and the Allies, from the sudden realization that, though the weaker force, they had halted the enemy's fierce attempt to break through. Both sides stood on

dead center without any plans. General Pershing at this time urged Marshal Foch to use the Americans and strike at the hinge of the Marne salient. A day's delay might mean failure, for the Germans could in that time recover their equilibrium and protect themselves against attack at this point. The Germans had taken the supreme chance. They had exposed themselves in a long narrow salient that reached from Soissons on the

west to the River Marne at Château-Thierry, thence east along the Marne almost to Épernay, thence north back to Reims, where it joined again the straight line which ran due east and west from Montdidier to Verdun. Twice in vain the Germans had tried to widen this salient, only managing to lengthen it. Its two most vulnerable points were: one on the west, just southeast of Soissons, where it hinged at right angles with the main battle line; the other just northwest of Reims, at the junction of the salient with the main battle line. If the Allies were to strike at all, one of these two points must be chosen. Marshal Foch decided to attack at the very hinge of the Marne salient from the west, by driving straight east for Soissons and thereby cutting the communications of Château-Thierry.

FOCH DECIDES TO TURN ON THE ENEMY AND ATTACK HIM

The risk was enormous,—the Germans still had the superiority in men and guns, the Allies were almost worn out by the heroic defenses of the spring and summer—but it was an opportunity, one that General Pershing thought should not be missed. He urged that the four veteran American divisions, although tired, were still fresh enough and eager to strike back. There was another factor which strongly influenced the decision to attack at this time. The great May and June troop movement from the United States had landed seventeen new American divisions in France. These had not been reckoned in the calculations of the Allied Supreme Command, because of their inexperience; but, when the news spread that green, untried American divisions, the 3rd and the 28th, had assisted the French in defending the mightiest German offensive at the Marne, the Allies discovered that the American Army was no longer a promise of future strength, but a powerful military actuality. If newly arrived troops could fight like that, then there were available twenty-five divisions capable of offensive action, instead of the four veteran divisions which, but the day before the Allies had reckoned as the limit of America's striking strength. Foch promptly determined to attack, hoping to make the entire salient untenable by the Germans.

The decision made, speed and secrecy were the two great points to be kept in mind,—speed to deliver the attack before the Germans recovered their breath from the defeat on the Marne, and secrecy to prevent the reserves in the salient, which were now down ready to cross the Marne, from being brought hastily back to strengthen the position about to be attacked.

The attack was to be made by three divisions, brought up the evening before to the Forest of Retz. They were to attack from the Forest of Retz, due east, across the broad flat plain just south of the River Aisne, and, to keep on going, delivering one attack after another until they had cut the German line of communications to Château-Thierry. Meanwhile the other divisions which were in the line of the west side of the Marne salient from the Aisne river down to Vaux (where the 26th American Division was in the line) were to move slightly forward on their fronts in conformity with the attack. To General Mangin, then commanding the Tenth French Army, was given this mission. Mangin was the attacking general of France. At the outbreak of the war, the grizzled Colonial soldier had been a colonel, and his speedy rise to the command of an army was due to his skill and daring in always attacking with whatever troops were at his disposal. This sudden surprise attack, without any artillery preparation, was to add another great victory to the now swelling list of his achievements. The best troops were needed for the attack, but as there was no time to bring 60,000 troops from other fronts or rest areas far away, troops at hand had to be used.

From the million men concentrated around the Marne area, Marshal Foch chose the three divisions to make the main attack. He chose the 1st American Division (Regulars), which, although worn through six months' constant fighting, had demonstrated its fine mettle at Cantigny; the 2nd American Division (Regular Army and Marines), which also was in need of rest and replacements after its heroic struggle in Belleau Wood and Vaux; and the famous French 1st Moroccan Division, of which the Foreign Legion formed a part. With these three divisions, the pick of the Allied Army there present, Marshal Foch delivered



Resting at Bouillonville



Cathedral Corner—Toul



A Breton Peasant

Drawings by Sergeant Eby in His "From a Soldier's Sketch Book"

what turned out to be the crushing blow of the war to the German Army on July 18th.

Without any preparation, without any warning, these divisions were suddenly concentrated on the night of the 17th in the Forest of Retz, near Villers-Cotterets. At dawn, preceded by a rolling barrage, they jumped off in an attack which drove a flying wedge into the very hinge of the German salient; then, turning due east towards Soissons, they cut the enemy's line of communications to Château-Thierry and threatened the entire German Army in the Marne salient with capture unless it immediately pulled out across the fields back to the Vesle river. By this sudden attack on the weak link in the German position, Marshal Foch wrested forever the initiative from the Germans; and it was this attack which started that succession of never-ending thrusts into the vital points which caused the great German Army to withdraw so swiftly from France in the succeeding four months.

NEW GERMAN TACTICS

WITH the beginning of the great spring offensive in March, 1918, trench warfare, except in the quiet sectors of the Vosges, ceased. The Germans once more took the initiative on the Western front, and now, no longer content with small advances, brought forth their new tactics of 1918. Before each attack careful preparations were made in the sector. Huge quantities of supplies were brought forward, an artillery concentration was effected, and then during the six hours of preparation fire by the German artillery, fresh German divisions were rushed up to the point where the attack was to be made. At dawn, following a rolling barrage, the German infantry attacked, and pushed on by sheer weight of numbers and force of guns, until they had captured all the Allied positions and all the Allied artillery in that sector. This was done in one sudden thrust and usually before 9 o'clock in the morning of the attack. The road thus cleared for the Germans they pushed on, without much opposition, until they were forced to halt that their supplies could catch up with them. Here the attack stopped until

new divisions were rushed up, and going through those which had made the first assault, continued the attack. All this was new to the Allies. Heretofore, months were spent by the Germans in preparation for the assault, and the advance was pushed to a limited objective of a few thousand yards. With this new plan, the Germans prepared only during the three days prior to the attack, which did not give the Allies time to make counter preparations. Another startling innovation of the Germans was in having their divisional artillery follow closely behind the infantry, making effective artillery fire at all times possible. Attacks with limited objectives of a few thousand yards were no more.

Having decided that the time had come for the Allies to strike, General Foch realized that success depended not only on keeping from the German Intelligence Section any intimation of the impending attack, but also upon the employment of new tactics. Accordingly all preparation was eliminated. This was, of course, taking a terrible risk. If the Germans had the slightest suspicion of the coming attack, and if it were to come in the most logical place for such an attack, they could decimate the attacking troops while they were concentrated for the jump-off, or else sow the front with machine guns, quickly brought up from the rear, and remove their infantry to the reserve lines, just as Gouraud had done in the Champagne three days before. No works would be destroyed for the attacking troops, every feature of the German defense would be intact, and the Allies would have only their divisional artillery, with what ammunition could be brought up during the night before, to help the infantry through against the machine guns and batteries. Happily, the defenses were very light on this front. There were no trenches, no barbed wire, for the lines had not been stabilized for very long, and the sector was quiet. To this point in the Marne salient, both the Germans and French had sent divisions to rest and to be ready for a second thrust when needed, and they were spread out over the sector, with no anticipation of anything bigger than a raid on that front. They relied on their intelligence section to inform them of future trou-

ble in time to move in sufficient infantry, machine guns, and artillery to make the line impregnable.

WHAT PREPARATION ENTAILS

It may be explained that preparations for an attack are always an enormous task. In the first place the artillery supply must be pro-

need it. The evacuation of the wounded is a big problem and requires a definite plan, with mobile hospitals, evacuation hospitals, and ambulance trains to work between these and the aid stations of the front line troops, while special railroad trains for transporting the wounded to base hospitals must be arranged for. These are a few of the enormous



By Sergeant Kerr Eby

From a Soldier's Sketch Book.

Through the Muddy Streets of Thiaucourt

vided. for. Dumps of all caliber ammunition must be located at the proper points so that the supply will be never-ending. Food dumps must be worked well forward so that the ration carts of the companies in the front line can get food to the men at nightfall at the extreme point of the advance. Watering points must be selected near the front so that horses, men, and kitchens can get water when they

staff problems to be met and solved long before the attack order is written and the artillery schedule made or the troops brought into the area. Months were usually spent in such preparations, but for this attack no time was available for any such purposes. Whatever was done in the way of preparations was decided after the troops were actually moving into position. Everything seemed a gamble

in that attack. Everyone had to take his very brief instructions and interpret them for himself. It was a necessary trusting to luck that each would do his utmost to make the attack a success. Not a wheel was turned, not a movement made in the sector until after dark on the night of July 17th. At dawn the artillery was to fire a rolling barrage from positions not reconnoitered beforehand, firing to be entirely by map and schedule, while the infantry which had marched up during the night jumped off for the attack. The attack order stated that after a certain point had been reached, the artillery dump would be at a certain point, and yet, at dawn there were no signs of any artillery ammunition at this point. If the officer in charge failed to get the ammunition, if a map put it at a wrong point, or if something happened on the railroad which was to bring up this ammunition, what would happen to this attack? Many things had to be taken for granted by those Regimental Commanders of Infantry to whom the attack, once it had started, was entrusted. They knew very little about where to get what they most needed, but they had supreme courage and great faith, and they went ahead, trusting that those in the rear would anticipate their every want, send them food, ammunition, water, maps, ambulances, and the thousand and one things which are essential so that advancing troops can push the initial victory and continue the advance. To General Mangin and the Staff of the French Tenth Army, to the General and Staff of the French Twentieth Army Corps, to the Division Staffs of those three divisions (the 1st and 2nd Regulars and the French Moroccan Divisions), as well as to the great gallantry and never faltering heroism of the infantry and artillery which made the attack, is due the extraordinary success of this greatest of all ventures—the boldest stroke of the war!

GOING INTO THE LINE

THE 1st Division (Regular Army) was on its way to a rest area when it received the news that it was to go back to the line. During the past six months it had been almost constantly in the line and had suffered casualties until there was great need of re-

placements to bring the infantry regiments and the artillery up to full strength. This division had left the Beauvais area, where it remained a few days after its relief from the Cantigny sector, and had reached the Dam-martin Area, just north of Meaux on the Paris-Soissons road. Here the division was to remain a few days while a battalion paraded in Paris on the 14th of July. So when the order came on the afternoon of July 16th for the 1st Division to entruck at once for the front, there was a big problem ahead of it, for the various elements were scattered about throughout the countryside in little hamlets and towns. Some of the officers and many of the men were still in Paris with the battalion, and everyone was taking his ease, little suspecting that he would have to go back to the line at once. But these new orders not only called for action, but for immediate action. No destination was given. French officers arrived with the trucks; they merely had orders to go north on the Paris-Soissons road to a regulating station, where further orders would be given. Regimental Staffs, who but an hour before were dreaming of their first leave at Biarritz, were now madly trying to get extra trucks at the last minute for the rations and "business end" of the rolling kitchens, for the transport was to follow, and sad experience had taught them the necessity of always taking food and the kitchens along with the troops as trains were the easiest things to lose in France. But the 1st Division was experienced and no order within reason could excite it. Order was swiftly brought out of chaos; each company loaded its kitchen and rations on a truck, and then marched off to the other trucks, where, twenty men to a truck, they climbed in and made themselves comfortable for a long night's journey. It was not the first time that they had been moved virtually at a moment's notice. One by one the headquarters were closed, and the whole division was on the road; the infantry and machine-gunners in a thousand French trucks, while the artillery and trains followed the same general direction, but by roads used only by horse-drawn traffic. In two hours after the receipt of the order, the 1st Division was off on this great adventure.



By Sergeant Kerr Eby

From a Soldier's Sketch Book.

“Goodbye—Cigarette?”

“SURELY THIS WAS A QUIET SECTOR”

Dawn broke, the trucks stopped, and weary officers crawled down off the trucks at the insistent clamor of the French drivers. They would go no further. Just then a Division Staff officer came along in a motorcycle sidecar and gave instructions to get the men out of the trucks immediately and march them with all speed across the hill and into the forest before it grew light enough for the Germans to see. Evidently this place was near the front. The gloom of early morning was now and then pierced by the white rockets the Germans always sent up to illumine No Man's Land at dawn, and now and then an

occasional gun would boom away its morning tidings. Surely this was a quiet sector to which the 1st was being sent! The men pulled themselves out of the trucks, slung their packs, fell in on the left of the trucks, as they had always done, and one by one the platoons were marched over a hill and into the woods, which proved to be the western extremity of the Forest of Retz. The rolling kitchens were brought up and, under cover of the forest, breakfast was cooked and then everyone went to sleep. It was the morning of July 16th. That afternoon orders were received that the 1st Division would that night move up in close support to the French division which was holding the line, and reconnoiter the po-

V—11

sition preparatory to relieving the French. Great secrecy was to be maintained, no movements were to be made by daylight, and the troops were to be well screened in the forest by dawn. Dawn of the 17th found the 1st Division ten miles behind the front in the Forest of Retz.

About three o'clock in the afternoon of July 17th came the attack order. Battalion and company commanders were quickly called together, the plan was read to them, the intricacies explained, maps marked and gone over, the order of battalions given, then all returned to hurry along the evening meal, which for many would be the last hot meal in many days, and, when dusk gathered, platoon by platoon, the 1st Division started its long march to the front, to jump off at dawn.

NATURE LENDS HER HELP

Luckily it rained that night, so that the German airplanes (which the night before had made it necessary for the moving columns to take to the fields instead of the roads, for the latter were white ribbons in the moonlight), did not notice the movement into this sector of three divisions of troops and all the materials of war. A heavy thunder shower,—a rare thing in France—kept the sky overcast and the German aeroplanes did not venture forth. Truly God must have been with the Allies in this enterprise, for the roads that night presented an unmistakable target. Along the three roads leading toward the front, came two American and one French division, 67,000 men, 5,000 animals and 3,000 vehicles, each with a separate mission to reach a certain point before a certain hour. The pitchy darkness which so effectually screened the movement from the enemy, added to the confusion of the Allied troops going along that unfamiliar road. Artillery pieces and caissons held the center of the road, while the infantry trudged along through the muddy ditches. Then several battalions of big French tanks came wallowing down the highway, and as they took the center of the road, everything had to give way towards the fields. Then came five-ton motor trucks, Staff cars, motorcycles, side-cars, and in and out among them all marched the steadily plodding infantry platoons. Everything was unutterably mixed

in the awful congestion of those roads. No two kinds of traffic went at the same speed.

A NIGHT MARCH TO THE JUMP-OFF

The tanks banged and roared down the middle of the road, slower than the trucks, but faster than the artillery, and the terrific roar they made drowned out the shouts of the frantic platoon leader, who dimly through the gloom saw his sergeant leading half the platoon off in apparently a wrong direction. Then, ten five-ton trucks bringing all but the most necessary part of a field hospital, would come sliding along, trying to pick their way through the tanks, while the officer in charge wondered where they had lost the other two trucks. By this time the infantry was resignedly off the roads and trudging bravely through the wheat field on the sides,—heartbreaking work it was, for the ground was soft and the rain had made it almost a quagmire. Then of a sudden would come a little village which seemed to choke the width of the road down to twenty feet, and through this neck the whole traffic must go. Down the main street would wallow a tank, then from each side, where they had been patiently waiting their turn, two platoons of infantry would start, only to be cut in two by a three-inch field piece, which with a Dodge staff car was trying to negotiate the street. Traffic could only go in one file through that town that night, and at the other side of it, officers tried vainly to straighten things out. There were no military police. Captains gave up all hope of keeping their companies together, lieutenants could not keep even their platoons together, and yet they all were surging in the pitch blackness along the one road which that division was using to go to the front. Tanks, artillery pieces and caissons, Signal Corps reel carts laying telephone wires, little one-mule machine-gun carts, five-ton trucks, ambulances, combat wagons, escort wagons, staff cars, motorcycles, and never ending columns of Infantry, were twisted and mixed and jammed but never stopped moving along that one road to the front.

Finally officers became desperate. Their watches showed that in an hour would be the jump-off and still there was no sign of that point at which the French were to have the

guides stationed to take them to the line. Then just ahead there appeared a mounted man in the middle of the road.

"What Battery is that?" he shouted.

"Gun No. 2 of D Battery of the 6th Field," came the guttural reply from the driver of the lead team, who had been cursing a French tank until he was hoarse.

"Very good, turn sharp to the left, the rest

out by battalions, and finally here were the French guides, at French Battalion Headquarters, and there was the Colonel cool, composed and smiling.

"Everything all right, Major?"

"Thank you, Sir, I believe it is. Will send you word when I am in position."

"Good-luck." The miracle of that awful night was how every unit of the division



U. S. Signal Corps photo

Putting Them Over

A French 340 mm. railway gun, range 20 miles, without re-cranking, is here seen in action, manned by American gunners of the Coast Artillery.

of the battery is about a hundred yards in there."

The discouraged Battalion Commander of the Infantry felt much better. He knew he did not have much further to go, now that he had passed the artillery positions; the road was free of everything but the infantry. Parts of sixty-four companies were trudging along, finally dividing themselves into four great groups of the four regiments, then shifting

reached its position before 4:30 a. m. Another miracle was that during it all scarcely a German shell was fired. And now the great question was, were the Germans ready for us?

THE ATTACK BEGINS IN THE DARK

At 4:35 a. m. the stillness of the night was rent with one terrific crash, as every Allied gun from the Aisne to Château-Thierry roared

with that rolling barrage, and the infantry went over. This was the hour for which every member of the 1st Division had waited so patiently through all those grim months of maneuver and trench warfare, for here now, man to man, they were to prove themselves in attack, and to show to all the world that American troops had entered at last on the real mission of hurling back the Germans.

Every step forward was a yard snatched away from the enemy, where yards counted most, for they were closing the neck of a salient.

To General Bullard his promotion had come too soon. He now commanded the Third American Army Corps, and the change had come on the very day before his 1st Division, which he had trained and watched develop under his careful guidance, was to make the attack which would print its name in letters of gold throughout the ages. Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall, who had so efficiently commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Division was this night made Division Commander.

HOW THE 2ND WENT IN

THE 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marines) had been out of the line but two weeks, when it received the order to move to the front in trucks. This division was in rest billets at Montreuil-aux-Lions, ten kilometers behind the Belleau Wood Sector, on the Paris-Metz highway. Here, under General Harbord, who had succeeded General Bundy in command of the division when the latter became a Corps Commander, the 2nd Division was busily engaged in reorganizing after the month's hard fighting in Vaux and Belleau Wood, and in training the replacements which had not quite filled the division to strength. On the night of June 16th, orders were received to move the 2nd Division in French trucks, while the transport followed in the general direction of the Forest of Retz. This was a repetition of what the 1st had gone through. Commands were hastily gathered together and entrucked, and dawn found the infantry and machine gunners in the western edge of the Bois de Retz. At four on the afternoon of July 17th, the attack order

was sent out to the various units, and at dusk the movement began. If the 2nd did not have as far to travel that night as did the 1st, they had infinitely the worst of the bargain in all other respects, for, while the 1st was moving out over an open plain to the north, the 2nd had to march directly through the forest. That part of the line which the 2nd was to jump off from was in the eastern part of the Forest of Retz, an immense, thick forest which had seen fierce fighting in the first battle of the Marne. The few roads through this forest were swamped with the traffic of the division, but this time there were no fields on either side for the infantry to move in, and the confusion was a thousand times greater in the blackness of the forest. The heavy rain made things worse. You could not see your hand before your face. Trucks and tanks, ambulances and combat wagons, jammed together and cut in two the infantry platoons, while frantic sergeants in charge of artillery sections tried to gallop their much belated guns into position down those avenues in the forest. Even had the officers reconnoitered the position, they would not have found the way that night any more easily. The infantry colonels, forward at their posts of command, became uneasy when, at four in the morning, with the attack set for 4:35, the battalions which were to lead the attack had not arrived, and rumors sifted in that the 2nd Division was lost in the wood. It would have been of no use, even had anyone thought of so doing, to attempt to halt or delay the attack. At 4:35 the barrage would cut the stillness of the night, and, if the infantry of the 2nd were not there to go over, there would be a gap in the line, where the Germans would remain, and the divisions on both sides would be enfiladed and the attack ruined.

The French who were holding the line and eagerly awaiting the arrival of the infantry of the 2nd Division, sent every available man back through the woods to find the retarded battalions. Finally, before it was too late, the leading elements of battalions of the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments of the 5th Marines appeared. They were hurried into position just as they came, without reference to order, and by 4:34 some sort of a line of infantry

was ready to go over a minute later when the guns began the great rolling barrage. By the light of the gun flashes the last of the infantry and Marines found their way and joined their comrades, coming up the last hundred yards through the forest in the light as bright as day from the incessant firing of the guns, and as they took up the orderly march they were able to straighten themselves out, for the few Germans who were there to hold the line were outnumbered a hundred to one. The artillery had arrived and was firing by schedule and map, the infantry was there on time and the reputation of the 2nd was forever saved. Then came the great good tidings. As the 2nd emerged from the woods, the advancing wave of the infantry had connected on its right and left with the French divisions who were joining in the attack, and wounded officers coming in proclaimed that "everything is fine, and going well."

HOW THE LINE WAS FORMED

Day broke now, and as far as the eye could reach over that broad, flat plain, 10 kilometers ($6\frac{1}{4}$ miles) square covered with wheat fields, and cut here and there with occasional deep ravines, the Allied line with the 1st Division on the left, the 1st Moroccan Division in the center, and the 2nd Division on the right was steadily advancing behind its rolling barrage. On the north of this line, the 153rd French Infantry Division was holding its pivot in the Aisne valley, while its southern extremity was moving out of the Ambleny-St. Banbry-Cutry ravine in conformity with the 1st American Division. This French division was one of the best, and had of necessity to be, for its mission was to move out in the very apex of the line (where it formed a sharp right angle by turning due south from the Aisne valley down the ravine) keeping the left flank of the division in the Aisne valley, while it swung the right flank in connection with the advancing 1st Division, which meant a turning movement in the face of the enemy, the most difficult of military operations. The 1st Division at-

tacked with all four infantry regiments in line, in order from left to right (north to south) 2nd Brigade (28th and 26th Infantry Regiments), 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry Regiments). At 4:35 a. m. it had jumped off from the line Cutry-St. Pierre-Aigle, where it connected with the 1st Moroccan Division. The mission of the 1st Division was to push straight forward across the flat plain towards Missy-aux-Bois and Chaudon and then to keep on going.

The center of the attack on July 18th was the famous 1st Moroccan Division, which was to set the pace for the American divisions on either flank. This veteran division of many attacks, with the justly celebrated Foreign Legion (to which war was an every day affair, which after each offensive was quickly replaced by foreigners in France from every nation who came to fight hard and die fighting) was once more in the kind of action it most loved. Caution was cast aside, as it had not been since the First Battle of the Marne. There were no fixed objectives, merely lines on which to reform, and then push on. But now there was an added stimulus, for here were American divisions on either flank, eagerly rushing ahead, and the Moroccan Division knew that the hour had come to show to these newcomers in the war, what the *élite* of the French Army could do. On the right of the Moroccan division, coming out of the Forest of Retz and moving due east towards Vierzy came the 2nd Division, 5th Marines, 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments. These three divisions delivered the main attack. The 6th Marine Regiment was then in Corps Reserve.

Joining up with the right of the 2nd American Division was the Seventh French Corps. The 4th American Division was brigaded with these divisions. Then came the First American Corps, with the 26th Division in the Belleau Woods sector. This was the Allied line from the Aisne to the Marne on the 18th of July. All these divisions advanced their fronts in conformity with the main attack, which was made by the 1st and 2nd American, and the French 1st Moroccan Divisions.

THE MAIN ATTACK

AT 4:35 a. m. on the morning of July 18th, the calm of the early hours was broken by the roar of a thousand guns as the three Allied divisions jumped off in the great counter-attack southeast across that broad plateau towards Soissons. There were three objectives laid out in the orders for the day's attack; other orders were to follow for the attacks on the succeeding days. It was an anxious moment, that moment of the jump-off, for to everyone along the whole battle line

the infantry since they had not fired a single registration shot and were firing solely by map. This gave the Germans time, after our barrage had passed them, to come up and man their machine guns before our infantry came upon them. The Allies passed the front lines without any check. There were no trenches except little shell holes, there was no wire, the front line was not well organized. Evidently the Germans in their two weeks' occupancy of this line had not thought it worth while to dig in, probably expecting to move on toward Paris almost any day.



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Doughboys Charging Over an Open Field

the question came—How much artillery have the Germans massed behind this sector? The barrage started forward, bursting ahead of the infantry and then up went the rockets and flares from the German front lines calling for their own artillery to put down a protective barrage. On went the Allied barrage and behind it the waves of infantry of the leading battalions. A minute later came the German artillery reply, but it was not strong; it was apparent that they did not have many guns on this front. Forward swung the Allies on a five-mile front, following their barrage, but that day the barrage was not as close protection as it had been at Cantigny, for the gunners did not dare to lay their fire too close to

THE GERMANS SURPRISED

The Germans certainly had put into practice all the theories of open warfare. That first line was nothing more than an outpost line, thinly held and meant only to check an advance long enough to warn the second line, and get them out of their dugouts and into the positions. But this time there had been no warning. There was no Allied artillery preparation during which the German troops in the second line could be led stoically out of the dugouts and into their fire positions. Also there was no warning from the higher staff that an attack was expected. The Germans were taken completely by surprise. And the Allied soldiers who were making that

attack that morning were the first to realize this. The Germans had been outwitted and it would be easy going for the Allies, until the Germans got themselves together and recovered from their surprise. Accordingly to every man it came that he must push on at top speed, that no machine-gun nest which got into action between our barrage and our infantry should be allowed to check that rush, and that the infantry must keep up behind the barrage as close as they could, to prevent this.

Then came the second German defensive line, and that was almost as easy as the first had been. The defenders were few and far between. What machine guns there were in action were silenced by the swift rush the Allied soldiers made to stop them. It was Allies' day. Sweeping ever forward went the Allied line. Meanwhile the second wave of the leading battalion stopped on the second German line to mop it up. They were well repaid for their pains. That second line was full of Germans in dugouts who had not been notified in time to get out to their positions before the Allied waves were upon them. The moppers-up took a heavy toll of them—in German prisoners—ten here, fifteen there, fifty in a cellar, a hundred in that cave, so that the score soon ran into the thousands. Usually they came out without any fuss on hearing that unmistakable challenge of the mopper-up. But there was one cave that the leading battalion of the 26th Infantry passed over out of which shots kept coming. The second wave tried to surround the cave and this drew machine-gun fire. Try as they might, no one could get within range of the mouth without drawing a great deal of attention. This was holding up the second wave when one of the big French tanks came along. The officer sent word to the tank to come over and help clean out the cave and in a few minutes the tank was waddling up to the mouth like a huge turtle, while the machine-gun bullets bounced off its thick sides. Down into the mouth of the cave it went firing all its guns. All was silent for a moment, and then the tank backed out, and following it came a column of German Infantry, their hands held up over their heads. Six hundred prisoners including a Colonel came out of the cave, and

a shame-faced lot they were to be caught in a hole like that. But it was still more strange to see the consternation on their faces when they saw the Americans. The surprise of that attack was written on the face of every one of those prisoners, and with it was the dread lest the stories be true that the Americans killed all the prisoners they took.

THE FIRST OBJECTIVE WON IN AN HOUR

By 5:35 a. m., one hour after the attack began, the assaulting lines were on their "First Objective," that blue line on the official map where the barrage was to stand for so many minutes, while the assaulting waves were reorganized, the front rank filled up, while the moppers-up were busy cleaning out the German second position. But this time the infantry did not have to "dig in." Very soon the barrage which was bursting out in front while the heavies were pounding the next line of German resistance would move on and with it would go the infantry. The Allies had progressed well in that first hour. The 1st (Regular) Division had swung swiftly across that flat plateau meeting very little resistance and the Second (Regular and Marine) when it came out of the wood, after its final rush to get in the line, found that it was abreast of the French divisions on its *right* and *left*, and the whole line was moving along as per schedule.

WAVES OF INFANTRY SWEEP ON

Then the barrage started forward again. The Allied guns were shooting at almost their extreme range now, and the barrage was placed well ahead of the infantry, for the zone of dispersion increases with the range. Then, too, some batteries were not firing, for the Allied artillery was now moving forward, a battery at a time, and this thinned down the barrage. Still, the advancing waves pressed on, and now the tanks were there to help them. As soon as a German machine-gun nest opened its fire, word was sent to the nearest tank and it headed for the nest and began firing its sawed-off 75mm. gun and all its machine guns, and the Allied infantry rushed the spot as soon as the German fire slackened. The German resistance was stiffening but was not yet fully organized.

This the attacking troops realized, and they realized also that speed and still more speed would be the salvation of that day. Every yard they went forward meant a yard lost to the Germans, but more than that, every minute that they lost meant stiffer resistance on the German third line which they were approaching. It was the first great attack for the Americans, and to both the French and the Americans, there was that feeling that they had been selected from all the Allied

For instance, the citation for the award of the D.S.C. reads: "Jim Quinn, second lieutenant 28th Infantry. For extraordinary heroism in action near Soissons, France, July 18, 1918. With a small platoon he attacked and captured a fortified French farmhouse in an open field. He so courageously and skillfully handled his men that this German strong point, held by 100 men and 5 machine guns, was promptly captured." Every farmhouse on that broad, level plateau $6\frac{1}{4}$



Marine Gunners With a Three-inch Gun

These men of the 2nd Division took part in the counter-offensive southeast of Soissons, where a glorious American victory was achieved July 18-22, 1918.

strength to make this decisive blow which, as the news spread, would cheer the hearts of millions in all the Allied countries, who the day before were silently wondering when Paris would fall. To be the picked troops, champions of all the Allies, and to be fighting alongside the famous 1st Moroccan Division with its Foreign Legion, was incentive enough to those officers and men of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, from the Regular Army and the Marine Corps, to bring out the greatest qualities of heroism in pushing that line forward.

miles square was a fortress to the German defenders, and every one captured was taken by just such skill and heroism on the part of the attacking troops.

REMEMBER THE ARTILLERY

But not alone to the infantry is the credit for that swift advance due. The field artillery of those three divisions also did heroic work in that attack. Heedless of personal danger they limbered up the guns and took them forward along the shell-swept roads, across the fields on which the Germanartil-



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French Guns for American Forces

These 155 mm. guns are being transported to the U. S. Artillery station. They were built by the French Government for the American army in France.

lery was beating and went into battery behind the infantry. As soon as the attack began, all attempts at screening of movements, all camouflage for batteries was abandoned. Speed in getting the guns forward so that the infantry should have all the protection that it was possible to give them, speed in bringing up caisson after caisson of ammunition so that those guns should never be silent, and speed in running forward observation officers with telephones, were the watchwords with the artillery that day. The batteries fired from each position until the range became too great; then one by one they limbered up, and went forward at a gallop to the place where the battalion commander, coolly sitting his horse on that shell-torn field, gave them orders to put the battery into action. Swiftly the guns were unlimbered despite the hail of German machine-gun bullets and high explosive; and the horses were scarcely led away before the guns were in action, so perfect was the teamwork of gunners and drivers. The roads, once the attack started, were a mass of transport moving forward. Every road out of the forest was choked with the trains of a division, while through them all galloped the artillery. It was once more "Forward the Guns," that old cry of open warfare almost forgotten in the three years of trench warfare. To see the guns go forward is the sure sign of victory.

The other sure sign of victory was the stream of walking wounded and the prisoners moving back across the plain in little groups slowly finding their way to the rear, the wounded acting as guards for the prisoners, and the prisoners supporting the wounded to the aid station. Meanwhile the stretcher bearers followed the advancing waves in search of the more seriously wounded, and as they found them they carried them to the nearest road where in groups on litters, or on blankets over rifles, they waited the first caisson, slat wagon, or empty ambulance going to the rear. And for many it was a long wait that day. There had been no time to arrange for extra ambulances, and the division had to use its ambulances not only to gather the wounded forward, but also to transport them back to the railroad where the train lay to take them to southern France. But, though

the delays were long there was never a murmur of protest from those white, drawn faces of the wounded as they lay there in the hot glare of the July sun on the flat plateau.

THE FRENCH CAVALRY CHARGE

By noon of that first day, the Allies were half way across the plateau, and it looked like a complete break-through. If the Allied infantry had wiped out the entire German de-

screen in front. Following a succession of most gallant infantry charges which had cleared half of that great wheat-covered plateau, and while the artillery was moving forward at a gallop, there came moving majestically out of the Forest of Retz two columns of splendid cavalry at a trot. It was one of the greatest sights of the whole war. On they came, the blue helmets glistening in the sun. Every button, every bit and spur



Filling a Dugout With Shells

These Marine Gunners are storing ammunition preliminary to an assault on the enemy lines.

fensive garrison, then here was the chance for the cavalry to go in and roll up the flanks. General Mangin accordingly sent in his Army reserves, two regiments of Cuirassiers, the *élite* of the French cavalry. One regiment was to go through the 1st Division and the other through the 2nd Division. The infantry throughout most of the line was on its objective, reforming, which left but a thin

was polished bright. It looked like a triumphal parade to see the entire regiment in new blue uniforms go sweeping by. Apparently heedless of the German shells they rode along, and then, as they passed through the line of the infantry supports, the Colonel turned in his saddle and shouted the command. Every trooper drew saber as the column spread out fanwise into line of battle; raising his

saber, the Colonel signaled the charge. Madly that line swung at the charge towards the infantry outpost line. Then began the sickening tattoo of the German machine guns, which literally cut the charging cavalymen to pieces. Those who were still mounted wheeled about and reformed, but everyone knew then that not until all those machine guns were taken could the cavalry hope to get through. This was to be an infantry battle.

AMERICANS MAKE THEIR FIRST GUN CAPTURE

By six that evening of the 18th of July the center of the allied line was on its "Third, and Day's objective." The Moroccans and the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division which adjoined them were on the line and had dug in. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division and the 153rd French Division, however, were still heavily engaged in the Missy ravine, while the 2nd Division was held up in front of Vierzy. The Missy ravine cut into the flat plateau, a deep narrow ravine running north, filled with trees and brush, and the Germans had organized it for defense with all their tactical skill. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division had cleaned out their end,—the shallow end and the head,—but were unable to advance until the French cleared their end. And here the 1st Division, which had been "the first" to do and suffer so many things in the A.E.F. added another to its long lists of "firsts." In the Missy ravine the Germans had concentrated thirty pieces of artillery, and when the 1st Division swept down into this valley they captured these at the point of the bayonet. These were the first guns captured by the Americans in the war. Since standards are no longer carried in battle, captured cannon are the one great sign of victory. But not alone for this did the 1st Division relish taking these guns, for in them they saw not only the guns which that morning had been firing on the advancing waves, but also they pictured in them all the guns which had been firing on them in the past six months of trench warfare when they were powerless to strike back at them. The capture of the first guns was a gala occasion for the 1st Division. The fighting in the Missy ravine was bitter, hand-to-hand work, for the

Germans clung desperately to their positions under orders to hold at all costs until reinforcements were sent.

THE TUNNEL AT VIERZY

Meanwhile the 2nd Division on the right of the Allied line, was held up by a ravine, as was the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division. But in the case of the 2nd Division, the ravine ran almost parallel to the axis of attack while the Missy ravine ran parallel to the front. The 2nd Division had run into this ravine very soon after emerging from the wood, and had fought its way up the ravine all day long. This ravine towards its head forked into a Y and at the head of the eastern arm of this Y lay the village of Vierzy. The railroad from Villers-Cotterets to Soissons ran up this ravine and at Vierzy entered a tunnel through the plateau. The tunnel was about a mile in length and the other end of it was the broad valley of the Crise. This valley was the real objective of the Allied attack. The Crise flowed due north down its valley and joined the Aisne at Soissons, and in the valley lay not only the railroad but also the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway. Soissons lay at the juncture of these two valleys—the Crise and the Aisne. The Allies were attacking across the broad, flat plateau which ended abruptly overlooking both valleys and the city of Soissons. If the Allies secured this plateau, Soissons, the railroad center and the meeting point of six national highways, the center of the German supply system for the Marne salient would have to be abandoned by the Germans. In their initial assault, the Allies had gained half of this plateau, but now that the German resistance had stiffened somewhat, the Allied lines were held up before Missy-aux-Bois on the north and before Vierzy on the south. This was at 6 o'clock on the evening of July 18th, the first day of the attack.

2ND DIVISION TAKES VIERZY

The 2nd Division held Vauxcastille, the little village on top of the plateau overlooking Vierzy and the mouth of the railroad tunnel in the ravine, but all attempts to take Vierzy had been met by fierce counter-attacks from the tunnel. To hold Vierzy, as General Har-

bord realized, necessitated the capture of the far end of the tunnel and the hamlet of Lechelle where it emerged, and to do this meant taking another half mile of the plateau. The 5th Marines, 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments were worn from the long night's march through the forest, as well as from fourteen hours of continuous fighting, but General Harbord knew that to wait until morning would only give the Germans time to reinforce the position, and accordingly he ordered an attack for 6:30 that night. The artillery was brought up and from the information sent back by the troops who had gained a footing in Vierzy and had been thrown out again, a complete artillery schedule was prepared. The attack was to be made by the 2nd Division and the Moroccans, for the village of Lechelle was in the Moroccan sector, and 15 big French tanks were brought up to assist the infantry through the machine-gun nests on the forward and reverse slopes of the rise in the plateau. That night the 5th Marines, 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments wrote the 2nd Division into history, when, in one great sweeping attack, they mustered all their reserve strength, captured the hill, the town of Vierzy, and the tunnel, despite the utmost resistance of the German defenders, and established a line on the forward slope of the hill overlooking the village of Tigny. They were now well beyond their day's objective.

While this attack was going on, the 2nd Brigade (28th and 26th Infantry Regiments) fought their way doggedly through the underbrush and tricky defiles of the Missy ravine. Tanks were of but little assistance there, and by nightfall, the town of Missy-aux-Bois was captured and the line extended slightly beyond the town and beyond the Missy ravine. The 153rd French Division, on the left of the 2nd Brigade, was still involved in the ravine, which prevented the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division from advancing further until the whole ravine was cleared, so as not to expose a vulnerable flank. That night the 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments dug in on the line, while in the twilight on the rising ground in front and to the left of them, just across the Paris-Soissons road, they could

plainly see German machine-gunners bringing their pieces up and putting them in position.

THE LEFT FLANK EXPOSED

General Summerall was faced with a peculiar situation. His right brigade was advanced and on its third objective beyond the village of Chaudun, which the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments had taken, while his left brigade was held up on the line of the second objective just beyond Missy-aux-Bois. This left an exposed left flank of the 1st Brigade open for a kilometer with only one battalion of divisional reserves to hold it. General Summerall believed that the 2nd Brigade would advance in the morning and accordingly left the 1st Brigade in its advanced position, while he moved the 1st Engineer Regiment up with the 1st Machine-gun Battalion as Divisional Reserve, for there was a big possibility that, if the Germans had large reserves near at hand, they might counter-attack in force down the Paris-Soissons road, which came diagonally across the plateau, and separate the 1st and the 2nd Brigades. A quick movement of this kind would let the Germans in behind the Allied attack. At nine o'clock in the evening of July 18th the Allied line was stabilized for the night to include the towns of Breuil, Missy-aux-Bois, then out one kilometer to Chaudun (which the 1st Brigade, 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments, had taken early in the day) thence along the forward slope of the hill, where the Moroccans were holding, to include the new position of the 2nd Division.

A BUSY NIGHT ON THE BATTLEFIELD

That night was a busy one for the Allies as well as for the Germans, and the artillery of both sides fired all night on the roads to cut supply lines. The 6th Marine Regiment was brought up and put in position so as to jump through the line at dawn in the sector of the 2nd Division, while in the sector of the 1st Division the engineers were moved forward, battalions shifted about and the front line organized in depth to prevent the possible German counter-attack at dawn on this one weak spot in the line. All over the Allied sector artillery moved forward, ammunition was



Committee on Public Information

Marines With Hand Grenades Trying to Surprise an Enemy Trench

brought up in great quantities, ambulances plied back and forth, and out of the Forest of Retz at nightfall began a seemingly never ending procession of those little one-mule ration carts and water wagons with a hot meal and drinking water for the troops in the line. The congestion on those roads during the day was simple as compared with the congestion of the night, and regimental staffs worked all night to see that the food, water and ammunition carts went forward to the proper points and that carrying parties met them at the right time, while the Regimental Commanders went back to Brigade Headquarters and thence back

to Division Headquarters to be given the attack orders and the maps with the sector boundaries and objectives for the next morning's attack. When the commanders returned with these orders, copies of orders and maps were sent to the battalion commanders in time for them to notify everybody in their battalions before morning.

RICHTHOFEN'S "CIRCUS" APPEARS

The staffs had an enormous task that night which would have been difficult had the short hours of darkness been quiet. But throughout the night the Germans shelled the area

behind the lines with all the artillery that was within range. Then to add to this, the first German supports to reach this sector was their air service. Late that afternoon Baron Richthofen's "Circus," those unmistakable red-nosed planes whose number appeared to be as the sands of the sea, quickly drove every Allied plane from the sky. Then, after locating all the Allied positions for their artillery, they flew back over the lines and bombed the transport on the roads, and shot up with their machine guns the Allied infantry, defenseless in their little shallow holes. The activity of these enemy planes seemed to increase with the coming of darkness, when the Allies began moving bodies of troops about. The German planes flew low and dropped great balls of light suspended in the air by parachutes, and, by the light of these, which lit the whole plateau like daylight, they were able to bomb the Allies with great effect. Yet through it all the drivers on those carts with the ammunition, food and water (the scarcest thing on the hot dry plateau) never faltered, but pushed ahead with only one thought in mind—to get their load forward to the troops, to get "chow" forward to their companies.


GERMAN RESISTANCE STIFFENS

At 4 o'clock in the morning of July 19th, under cover of another rolling barrage, the Allies attacked along the whole front; but during the night the Germans had brought in some reserves and the resistance that morning was much stiffer than it had been the day before. Especially was this true of the northeast corner of the plateau. It was this corner that the Germans had to hold at all costs, for the loss of it meant to them the loss of Soissons; so during the night they had sown this three-mile square with machine guns backed up by artillery. Access to this corner of the plateau from Soissons was easy for the enemy, as the Paris-Soissons highway bisected that corner of the plateau between the Missy ravine and the Crise valley which the Germans chose to defend to the end. When the Allied advance began that morning, therefore, it was met by a withering fire from in front of the

153rd French Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, and the remainder of the Allied attack which was ahead of these two units received an enfilading fire on their left flank which, added to the frontal fire, made that day's advance very difficult. The 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division had again the most difficult part of the whole Allied sector, for it was on its front that all these German machine guns had been planted, where the terrain best suited this kind of defense. In front of the 2nd Brigade the plateau rose gently, and just below the crest of the rise the Paris-Soissons road ran diagonally across the front. This gave the Germans plunging fire on the attacking waves; nevertheless the 2nd Brigade went on.

TANKS GO INTO THE LINE

As soon as the situation was sensed, all the available tanks were rushed to the aid of the 26th and 28th Infantry Regiments, which were making such heroic attempts to cross the road and reach the hill-top. The arrival of the tanks made things go more easily. They waddled over the road and up the slope, shooting up every machine-gun nest that lay concealed in the tall grass, but as they reached the summit they met a swift end. The Germans had left several 77mm. field guns on the far side of the slope, and, as the tanks came up on the skyline, the Germans put them all out of action by direct fire. The presence of these guns was not known to the Allies, as all the Allied airplanes had been driven from the sky. The Allied infantry, which had followed the tanks closely, was now on the crest of the low hill. It seemed impossible to advance, for the slightest movement brought a hail of bullets which cut down every one standing. The artillery was then brought up closer, and under cover of short bursts of fire, little by little the line was advanced, and by night it had reached the head of the Ploisy ravine. The 1st Brigade and the Moroccans also met stiffened resistance that day. The fire from their front was determined, but what stayed them was the galling flanking fire which enfiladed them from the left, just where the Germans were expected to counter-attack;



Where the Tide of War Changed

On the 18th of July, 1918, the first serious Allied attack began at 4:35 in the morning. The Allied line ran from in front of Ambleny south into the Forêt de Retz. The 153rd French Division had the northern flank of the attack. Our 1st Division was next with instructions to take Berzy-le-Sec. Then came a Moroccan division and then our 2nd Division, whose first day's task was to reach Vierzy from the edge of the Forest. Vierzy for the 2nd Division and the Missy and Ploisy ravines for the 1st Division were the hardest points. Before the action was over the 2nd Division had reached Tigny, near the Soissons-Château-Thierry road. This attack of July 18th forced the Germans to begin the evacuation of the Marne salient on the east.

this held their gain for that day down to one mile, and they were forced to stop at the head of the Chazelle ravine.

GERMAN COMMUNICATIONS CUT BY THE 6TH MARINES AT TIGNY

In the sector of the 2nd Division, the 6th Marines leap-frogged the remainder of the

division, as they were still fresh, and alone followed in support by the 5th Marines, 9th and 23rd Infantry regiments, the 6th Marines attacked at 4 p. m. and with their usual dash and reckless driving swept over the remaining two miles of wheat-covered plateau, through, into and past machine-gun nests, until they reached the Paris-Soissons road. They

had met bitter German resistance all the way, had fought their way along yard by yard, but they had not stopped until they reached the road. Once on the road they met the full force of the German resistance. Time after time, by repeated assaults, they reached the road only to be thrown off again; finally they dug in between the village of Tigny, which they had taken, and the road. They had accomplished their mission, and won immortal glory, for the road now lay in No Man's Land and the communications between Soissons and Château-Thierry were cut. On the night of the 19th of July, therefore, the Allied advance rested its right (south) on the Paris-Soissons Road, at Tigny, whence the line ran northwest across the heads of the Chazelle and Ploisy ravines, where it turned sharply to the west back to the Missy ravine.

GREAT LOSSES BY THE 2ND DIVISION

That night the 2nd Division was relieved by the 58th French Division. It had cut the road to Château-Thierry in the face of the utmost resistance of von Hutier's attacking army. The divisions it met and defeated in its magnificent dash across the plateau in those two days were the pick of the entire German Army, who had been selected to make the assault on Paris. Against these the 2nd Division (Regulars and Marines) advanced eleven kilometers (7 miles); but in so doing the losses were very heavy. The Germans threw every man they had into the line to save this position, and the taking of the plateau was accomplished at a cost of over 50 percent. of the infantry regiments. The 23rd Infantry Regiment alone lost 62 officers and 1,922 men. The 2nd Division captured more than 3,000 prisoners (of whom 2,125 were credited to the 23rd Infantry) belonging to eleven German regiments, and in addition to this captured 66 guns and countless machine guns. The 5th and 6th Marine Regiments lost a total of 70 officers and 1,522 men.

The Germans then held but three big knolls and the two ravines which separated them at the northeast corner of the wide plateau. General Mangin now ordered the French and the 1st Division to capture the three knolls and the two ravines, Ploisy and Chazelle, so that the Allies could look directly

into Soissons. The largest of the knolls (the northern one, bounded on the west by the Missy ravine, on the north by the Aisne valley, and on the east by the Crise valley) was too large to be taken by frontal attack, as it was protected by the heavily reinforced artillery on the heights behind it north of the Aisne; but by capturing Berzy-le-Sec, which dominated the Crise valley, the Germans would be flanked out, and forced to evacuate the northern knoll, which would give the Allies command of Soissons. In order to take Berzy-le-Sec, the two smaller knolls and the two ravines had to be taken first, and on these the Germans were also massed in great strength. During the night the Germans brought up several divisions and among them the 1st Prussian Guards Division. Their artillery was reinforced, both on the actual front where the attack was to come and on the big knoll on the left flank. There were guns of all calibers, but worst of all, 6-inch rifles, which enfiladed the ground over which the Allies were to attack in the morning. Machine guns in great quantity were put into position to cover every angle of the Allied advance, and, while the German airplanes bombed the rear areas during the night, the German artillery fired gas and high explosive in great quantity into the whole area.

THE CAPTURE OF BERZY-LE-SEC

On the morning of the 20th of July, the third day of the Allied attack, the assault was carried forward. The orders called for the French on the left to push on straight along their front and take Berzy-le-Sec; the 1st Division was to take the Ploisy ravine and in *liaison* with the French to take the knoll in front of Berzy-le-Sec. The Moroccans were to advance their line to the Paris-Soissons road. At dawn the Allies attacked in accordance with this order, and again and again the last of the three American battalions to be put in the line advanced resolutely to the assault only to have the ranks thinned and very little ground gained at each attempt. The Germans were making a desperate stand. Machine-gunners of the Prussian guards lay in the small clearings they had made in the wheat, and as the waves of attacking troops approached they loosed off belt after belt of

ammunition, firing at top speed, regardless of the certain death that would come to them when the Americans came through that galling fire. There were no prisoners taken in this fierce assault. The Germans fired until they were killed. Still the Allies advanced. Each rush gained some ground. Commands were shattered, but the discipline and the heroic gallantry of the troops carried them on, until finally they crossed the crest of the knoll, where they stopped and dug in. The 1st Division was on its objective, but the French had not taken Berzy-le-Sec. The last knoll of the plateau, overlooking the wide valley of the Crise, was taken, and the outskirts of Soissons were visible. But the knoll was difficult to hold. The Germans still held half of it, for on the left the French had been held up, and were exposed to the direct fire of 6-inch rifles from the north. There was a hay-shed on the summit of the knoll, and to go within a hundred yards of it meant death, so accurate was the enemy artillery.

At twenty minutes before 2 o'clock that afternoon, an order was received by the Regimental Commanders of the 26th and 28th Infantry (1st Division) to attack Berzy-le-Sec at 2 p. m. From this order it was apparent that the heavy artillery fire which the Allied batteries had been and were still firing was the two hours' preparation fire. It was over a mile to the leading battalion, and the order had to reach it in time to get everyone up and started by 2 o'clock. The Staff officers took the order and ran. They reached the battalions just as the barrage began. The men had to be told, and the word passed quickly down the line. As there was too little time to do this, the attack lacked the usual initial punch, but still the troops went on. Wave after wave marched stoically into the German machine guns, and down the wooded slopes toward Berzy-le-Sec. They advanced the line in the face of a murderous fire, but they did not take the town.

That afternoon Major General Summerall went all over the lines. His 1st Division had been ordered to take Berzy-le-Sec and though the ranks were thin, with but few officers left, he decided to take the town next morning. Accordingly, during the night the ranks of the 26th and 28th Infantry of the 2nd Brigade


were recruited on the field of all available men—cooks, kitchen police, orderlies, clerks from Regimental Headquarters, military police, and engineers—and with what was left of each of the infantry regiments all were grouped together for the final assault. At dawn, on the morning of July 21st, the fourth day of this historic attack the artillery of the 1st Division skillfully played on the treacherous, wooded defiles which led down into Berzy-le-Sec while the infantry doggedly worked its way forward into the very teeth of the German machine guns, but always continued the advance. Finally General Buck, who commanded the 2nd Brigade, took personal command. His citation is as follows:

"Beaumont B. Buck, brigadier general, 2nd Infantry Brigade, 1st Division. Before and during the attack on Berzy-le-Sec, France, July 21, 1918, he displayed conspicuous gallantry and heroic leadership of his command. When most of the officers of his brigade had fallen, General Buck, with contempt of personal danger, and in spite of heavy artillery bombardment and machine-gun fire, traversed the front of his advancing forces, gave correct directions to his organization commanders, and led the first wave of the culminating attack which stormed and captured the town."

The 1st Division had taken Berzy-le-Sec. It had cleaned out the town by its intense artillery preparation, which was as skillful as it was heavy, and the town fell before the gallant assault of its two regiments of infantry of the old Regular Army (the 26th and 28th). The line now held was the western bank of the Crise. The 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry) had crossed the Château-Thierry-Soissons highway and railroad. The Germans were pinched out of the pocket and the Allies commanded the city of Soissons, which lay but three miles down the valley of the Crise from the present front lines. The loss of Soissons was the greatest defeat the Germans had suffered since 1917. It meant that the entire Marne salient would have to be abandoned, and it would show to all the world, both friend and foe, that a crushing defeat at the hands of the Americans had been administered to the German Army. In this their first major action, the 1st and 2nd Divisions, representing the American Army, had defeated the finest fighting troops Germany could put in the field,

The fighting was now over for the 1st Division, and it was to have been relieved that night; but somewhere along the line the relieving troops were held up and daylight found what was left of the division still in the line along the Crise, with the sector organized for defense. On the evening of July

left to command it; sergeants, corporals and in one case a private were in command. Battalions were commanded by captains, and in the majority of cases by lieutenants, for every infantry battalion commander of the 1st Division was a casualty. Three of the regiments lost all of the field officers except the colonel,



Drawing by U. S. Signal Corps artist.

American Infantry Advancing With Tank Protection

22nd-23rd, the 15th Highland Division of the British Army marched up at dusk with their pipes playing, and relieved the division.

1ST DIVISION LOSSES

The 1st Division was now assembled in the Forest of Retz, where the kitchens of each company were ready with a hot meal, for many the first in five days. One by one the companies and battalions marched in. There was but a handful left of each of the four infantry regiments when they gathered that evening. Scarcely a company had an officer

while the 26th Infantry lost all of its field officers, and came out commanded by a captain (Barnwell R. Legge) of less than two years' experience.

The price paid for victory was the highest to date for any division, 8,365 casualties, of whom 1,252 were killed. One officer to every sixteen men was killed, an extraordinary proportion which tells its own tale of highest gallantry and heroic devotion to duty. The captures from the enemy included 125 officers (of whom one was a colonel), 3,375 men, 75 cannon, 50 mortars, 300 heavy machine guns,

and a wealth of ammunition and supplies. Promotions quickly followed this victory of the 1st against six German divisions. General Buck and General Hines were given their second stars and their divisions, while Colonel Campbell King, the Chief of Staff, and

THE 4TH AND 26TH DIVISIONS

General Pershing, in his final report to the War Department, December 15, 1919, says: "The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent



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Major-General John L. Hines

He commanded the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, and later the Third Army Corps.

Colonel Holbrook of the 7th Field Artillery were made brigadiers, and the promotion of the other officers throughout the division followed soon after. Meanwhile the French and American Governments decorated many of the officers and men for their gallantry in this action.

dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2nd Divisions the tide of the war was definitely turned in favor of the allies."

In this offensive other divisions took part in a less important way. The Seventh French Army Corps on the right (south) of the 2nd

Division, advanced its front in conformity with the general attack. Brigaded with divisions of the Seventh French Army Corps was the 4th Regular Division less the 47th Infantry, which was held in Corps reserve. On the right of this French Corps was the First American Army Corps, from left (north) to right (south) in the line, 167th French Division, 26th Division (New England National Guard). These divisions also advanced their front slightly, the 26th Division acting as the southern pivot. This division was in the Belleau Woods sector, and its mission was to hold the left (southern) pivot of the attack at Vaux, while the remainder of the line moved slightly forward and took the villages of Torcy and Belleau. The 52nd Brigade (103rd and 104th Infantry Regiments) was in the line at this time and without much

difficulty, it moved forward on July 18th and captured these two points in the enemy front lines, and took 26 prisoners in the first assault, the front line being very lightly held. Some elements of General Cole's command, forgetting that the 26th was not an attacking division, but a pivotal division, and with the vivid memory of facing Mont Sec for two months in the Toul sector, continued their advance past the given line of the railroad, and up the slopes of Hill 190. They had almost reached the summit when they were hastily recalled. The attack had not at this early hour advanced to such a point where flanks could be left wide open, and Army orders in such cases were explicit, so down they came, back to the valley, while the Germans moved up machine guns on the crest of the hill.

IX

GERMAN RETREAT FROM THE MARNE

American Doughboys of Seven Divisions in Bitter Fighting from
July 18th to August 6th Drive the Enemy Back to the Vesle

THE swift success of the attack by the 1st and 2nd American Divisions and two French Divisions southeast of Soissons had forced the Germans to pull back across the Marne, and its continuance up to the very doors of Soissons forced them to decide to evacuate the whole Marne salient. If they could evacuate slowly, they would be able to pull out most of their *matériel* and especially the great wealth of guns brought down for the assault on Paris; but if pressed hard, they would have to abandon everything. Accordingly the Allies pressed them on every front of the salient, and to save their guns the Germans had to fight a determined rearguard action all the way back from the Marne then across the Ourcq to the Vesle. From time to time they made a stand, until the guns could be withdrawn, then the whole line would retreat until another height was reached where they would stand again. Seven American Divisions, the 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd, 42nd, and 77th, fighting as part of three

French Armies, took part with the French in this following action, and fought their way forward to the River Vesle, forcing the Germans to abandon much valuable material in their retreat.

On the night of July 19th-20th, the Germans evacuated the south bank of the Marne, and set up their machine guns on the north bank to prevent Allied troops from following them over. The 3rd Division (Regulars) was on the Marne from Château-Thierry east as far as the Jaulgonne Bend, where they had been since June 1st. Here they had stopped the first drive in June, the big drive of July 15th, and now once more on the morning of July 20th, they were still on the Marne and the Germans had pulled back to the northern bank.

NO DOUBT ABOUT THE RETREAT

The 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard), brigaded with the French on the right (east) of the 3rd Division, had borne


the full brunt of the German attack of July 15th, and with the French had made the stand along the heights south of the Marne until July 18th, when, by persistent counter attacks, gaining a little ground here and there, they had finally, by July 20th, driven the Germans back and were once more on the banks of the Marne. It was evident to all that the Germans were in retreat. There was therefore no further need of reinforcement for the French at this point, as the line was shortening; so on the night of July 21st the elements of the 28th Division in that line were drawn out, and the entire division was assembled in rear of the front to rest. Details from the various organizations were sent out to bury the dead on the battlefield over which they had fought so gallantly with the French. The 28th had suffered heavily in those six days of its first action. The 109th Infantry Regiment especially had experienced very bitter fighting, with casualties of 4 officers and 75 men killed, 10 officers and 397 men wounded, and 6 officers and 311 men missing, a total of 20 officers and 783 men casualties for the one regiment. The other regiments suffered proportionately heavy casualties, but those six days on the Marne had demonstrated to all the world the mettle of the Pennsylvania troops, and they left the field with the conscious pride that in their first engagement they had met and helped to stop the most furious and most powerful attack of the German Army, and had then with dash and drive pushed the Germans back across the river.

On the morning of July 21st, the 26th Division (New England National Guard) finally received the long awaited order to attack. They had lain in the Belleau Woods sector taking their daily casualties too long to suit any of them, and here was the opportunity for which they all had hoped. That morning they were to attack, but the Germans had fled in the night. The 26th was ordered to pursue them in *liaison* with the French division on either flank. German tricks had to be ever kept in mind, so as they went on, they carefully felt out all the pockets in the rough, broken country for stray machine guns, left behind to cut to pieces the pursuing columns.

The Soissons-Château-Thierry road was crossed without incident. The division advanced until they came to the villages of Trugny and Epieds, with the forest of Epieds between them. Here the Germans made a stand, their line sewn thickly with machine guns, while from the forest their artillery opened a heavy fire on the advancing American and French lines. Trugny and Epieds lie in a shallow valley, four miles north of the Marne, between Château-Thierry and the Jaulgonne Bend, and the German stand was to protect the road running north from Jaulgonne to Fère-en-Tardenois, so that they could get their ammunition and artillery out. The 26th Division immediately opened out into line of battle and began the assault on this well-held German line.

On the left of the 26th the French were also advancing, and brigaded with the divisions of the French Seventh Army Corps were units of the 4th American Division (Regulars). The 47th Infantry Regiment with two companies of the 11th Machine-gun Battalion and two companies of the 4th Engineers were held out in reserve, while the remainder of the 4th Division began the attack on July 18th. Day by day they advanced with the French through the villages of Hautevesnes, Courchamps, Chevillon, Sept Bois, Priez, in conformity with the main attack towards Soissons on their north, and by July 22nd, they too had crossed the Soissons-Château-Thierry road and had taken the Bois de Châtelet. At this point the elements of the 4th Division were withdrawn from the line and the division assembled in the vicinity of the original line as reserve to await the arrival of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade which was still in training at Camp de Souge, outside of Bordeaux.

Meanwhile, on the morning of July 21st, the 3rd Division had received orders to attack across the Marne. Bridges were laid without much opposition, and at dawn, the 4th Infantry Regiment crossed the Marne at Château-Thierry and found the city practically deserted. Patrols immediately began the ascent of the ravine east of the town, while other patrols cleared the north bank, thus permitting the 7th Infantry Regiment to cross at Mézy. The 30th and 38th Infantry Regi-



Where American Divisions Defeated the German Drive on Paris and Turned the Tide of War Against the Enemy

The 42nd (Rainbow) Division, fighting with the French under General Gouraud, helped to check the German drive on July 15th east of Rheims. On the same day the 3rd Division held the enemy at the Marne. On July 18th the 1st and 2nd Divisions suddenly counter-attacked on the west, and after four days' fierce fighting isolated Soissons and forced the enemy to give up the important highway to Chateau-Thierry. Then the whole Marne salient was driven in by American divisions operating from the south, and the enemy retreated to the line of the Vesle by August 4th.

ments crossed the Marne in the Jaulgonne Bend, and by the evening of July 21st, a secure bridgehead had been established, and the line of enemy resistance developed up the valley towards Le Charnel. By the evening of July 21st, Château-Thierry was completely evacuated by the Germans and the line held by them showed a retreat of from three to six miles. But here the 3rd Division met deter-

had heroically defended the Marne twice, and now had come the opportunity to clear it forever of the German troops who were making temporary stand on these wooded hills.

THE 3RD AND 26TH PUSH ON

The 3rd and 26th Divisions, on the morning of July 22nd, were both attacking the line where the Germans were making their



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Major-General Robert L. Howze

Commander of the Third Division, Army of Occupation.

mined enemy resistance well staged to make the most of the natural defenses of the hills and forests north of the Marne. Each day the division pressed the attack and gained ground now here, now there. They were proud of their title, the Marne Division. They

first stand in this stubborn rearguard action, the 3rd on the southern flank, the 26th on the western flank. The 3rd had been fighting continuously since July 15th, first on the defensive, now on the offensive, and during the past eight days there had been no let-up in

the intensity of the fighting. The 3rd crept steadily up the steep wooded heights, in the face of determined fire from the German entrenchments. When night fell, the line had advanced a thousand yards.

The 26th Division, despite the fact that, in the fast advance of the day before, units had become mixed and the transport delayed, attacked the well entrenched line of German defenses between Epieds and Trugny, time after time. But the Germans were too well organized for an attack of this kind to penetrate; so General Edwards halted the attack until night. The next morning (July 23rd) after a skilful battering of the German positions with gas and high explosive shells by the divisional artillery, the 101st Infantry assaulted the Bois de Trugny, and by noon had penetrated almost through to the other side of this piece of woods. But in the afternoon the Germans rallied; machine-gun nests firing from every angle of the woods forced the Americans to draw back to the western edge. That night the Corps Commander, General Liggett, reinforced General Edwards with the 56th Infantry Brigade of the 28th Division, Brigadier General Weigle in command. This brigade (111th and 112th Infantry Regiments) was disposed by General Edwards during the night to assist the 26th Division in the attack next morning on the Bois de Trugny. But, when the attackers moved out on the morning of July 24th, they met with no resistance in the woods; the Germans had held it long enough to suit their purpose, and had, during the night, pulled back their lines to a new position. To locate this new position the Americans and French pushed valiantly forward that day. Leading the pursuit went the motorized 101st Machine-gun Battalion of the 26th Division, much as cavalry did in former wars. On they went across that rough country and through the forest of Fère until they were stopped by heavy fire from the Croix Rouge Farm on the Jaulgonne-Fère-en-Tardenois road. Here the whole division was quickly put on the line and the German position discovered. The 39th French Division, on the right of the 26th, and the 3rd

American Division on its right, were also held up on this line; so the Allies dug in until the artillery could be brought up and an assault made in the morning. On the night of July 24th, the Germans were holding the line of the Jaulgonne-Fère-en-Tardenois road, from Le Charmel (where the 3rd Division was held up) to the Croix Rouge Farm, two miles north of there (where the 26th and the 28th Divisions had been stopped).

The 26th had in the seven days' fighting from the 18th to the 24th of July, suffered heavy casualties. The total losses since it had entered the sector were about 5,300 officers and men. It had advanced 17 kilometers in pursuit of the enemy, had captured 250 prisoners and had taken four field pieces of German artillery. On the night of July 24th-25th, it was relieved by the 42nd Division (Rainbow National Guard).

The 83rd Brigade (165th and 167 Infantry Regiments) of the 42nd Division took over the front held by the 26th Division along the eastern edge of the Forêt de Fère. The 56th Brigade of the 28th Division was withdrawn from the line and became Corps Reserve. Then during the night the Allied forces were shifted about. The 84th Brigade of the 42nd Division (164th and 166th Infantry Regiments) was brought up and took over the front of two French divisions on the north. The shortening of the Allied line by the German withdrawal had practically squeezed these divisions out, so that the actual front of the 42nd Division was only three kilometers (2 miles). This division now occupied the entire front of the First American Army Corps. The other two divisions of the Corps (26th American and 167th French) were in reserve. In this position the 42nd Division remained for 24 hours, the whole Allied line being at a standstill, until the afternoon of July 27th. The Allied line ran now in almost a straight line from Soissons south to Le Charmel (3 miles north of Jaulgonne on the Marne), and the key to the southern end of this portion of the line, was the strongly fortified buildings of the Croix Rouge Farm, opposite the front of the Rainbow Division. The 3rd

Division was on the southern face of the right angle which the German line made at this point and was part of a French Corps.

42ND DIVISION CROSSES THE OURCQ

At 5:30 p. m. on July 27th, the Allied advance was taken up once more. The 42nd

the left flank reached and seized Hill 190, overlooking Ronchères and the valley of the Ourcq. The backbone of the watershed between the Marne and the Ourcq was now crossed. Continuing that night the 42nd Division cleared the remainder of the dense forest of Fère, while the southern half of the



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Major-General Frank L. Winn

He commanded the 89th Division in the Toul Sector, in the St. Mihiel offensive, and in the Argonne.

Division after heavy artillery preparation, crossed the open space which separated the Croix Rouge Farm from the forest, and took the position with great dash at the point of the bayonet. So swift and brilliant was this action that it cleared the way for further advances. Meanwhile the 3rd Division also attacked, and in spite of heavy resistance, advanced its front toward Ronchères, while

Division swept down the slopes towards the Ourcq, and in spite of furious machine-gun fire from the heights on the north bank and from the towns of Sergy and Cierges, three battalions were pushed across the stream that evening.

The Germans were making a determined effort to stand on the line Fère-en-Tardenois, Sergy, Cierges, Ronchères. But the taking of

Hill 190 by the 3rd Division had already partly turned the flank of this position. On the morning of July 28th, the 3rd Division took the town of Ronchères, and then, swinging more to the left moved against Cierges, while the 42nd Division improved its position in front of this town. Hard fighting with little or no progress ensued this day and the next. The Germans drenched the valleys with gas. On the extreme northern flank, however, the 165th Infantry Regiment of the Rainbow Division advanced with the French and seized Hill 184 which made possible the capture of the towns of Seringes and Nesles by the Americans, and completed for the French the encircling of Fère-en-Tardenois.

During the nights of the 29th and 30th of July, the 3rd Division was relieved by the 32nd Division (Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard), which had been holding for two months a sector in Alsace. The 3rd Division retired for rest to its old area south of the Marne. The spirits of these regular troops,—who had been in the line constantly since June 1st, and in the last fifteen days had been heavily engaged in the most bitter of defensive and offensive fighting—were high as they once more crossed the Marne, this time with their bands playing, for they had won a great battle. The Divisional Artillery remained behind until August 2nd to help drive the enemy from the Ourcq, then it also joined the division in the rest area. The 3rd Division had in the two weeks' fighting played a decisive part in defeating the last German offensive, and then had advanced 15 kilometers (10 miles) through most difficult country where every foot was contested by the defenders. In these actions it had lost 5,986 officers and men, of whom 40 officers and 876 enlisted men were killed.

28TH DIVISION

Between the 42nd and 32nd Divisions was the 39th French Division and to this had been added a brigade of the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard). To date this division had never held a sector of the line under its own command, but had been fighting constantly under the French.

A little after 2 o'clock on the afternoon of July 30th, the 32nd Division (Michigan and


Wisconsin National Guard) and the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) took up the attack and pressed on into Grimpettes Wood. This wood lies midway between Courmont and Cierges. The attack was met by heavy machine-gun fire from Grimpettes Wood and from Cierges Wood, but, never faltering, both divisions pushed on through these woods until they came to the edge of the village of Cierges, only to find that the village was full of gas. The lines were withdrawn to the edge of the woods and during the night a heavy counter-attack was driven off. Meanwhile the 32nd relieved the 28th Division, as this division was worn from the long marches and heavy fighting with the French in this same sector, and on the morning of July 31st, the 42nd and 32nd Divisions together held the line on the Ourcq, with some troops of the latter across the river.

The 42nd Division, with two battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Division (Regulars), starting at 5:00 a. m. July 28th, crossed the river Ourcq and after vigorous fighting, took Seringes-et-Nesles and Sergy, with its left flank just east of Fère-en-Tardenois. Being ahead of its schedule, it went over into the sector of the 32nd Division and took Hill 212. On the morning of July 31st, the 32nd Division took Cierges, and on August 1st it took Hill 230 and Planchette Wood. The fighting throughout was a bitter struggle to advance in the face of strong machine-gun fire; the Germans used these weapons with the utmost of their tactical skill. Each gun seemed to be covered by two others; to attempt to outflank one gun meant to draw fire from two others, and still, through it all, each day showed a steady advance against that accurate rearguard action of the Germans.

Then came August 2nd. That morning when the two American divisions began the attack, they found no Germans on their front. The whole position was evacuated, and the French on their flanks reported a like experience. That was a great day for the Allies. Soissons had fallen, Reims was freed, and the Germans had fallen back on the line of the River Vesle. Both American Divisions were immediately ordered in pursuit. The 42nd Division put its engineer regiment (117th Engineers) in the line on the left and by night-

fall the line had cleared the forest of Nesles, which had been holding up the division, and the last ridge south of the Vesle was reached on the line Chéry-Chartreuve, Mareuil-en-Dôle. Here the 42nd Division was relieved by the 4th (Regular) Division on the night of August 2nd, and marched back to the valley of the Marne. During its eight days of

north of the river. It took three days of very fierce fighting for these two divisions to establish themselves on the river banks, every attempt to cross the river in force being met by violent counter attacks from the Germans. The 32nd Division won the last of its honors in that sector when it drove the Germans out of the town of Fismes, which lies on the south



U. S. Signal Corps drawing

Troops of the 42nd Division Billeted in a French Farm Building

fighting on this front, the 42nd had advanced 15 kilometers in the face of resistance at a cost of 184 officers and 5,469 men in this action.

THE AMERICAN LINE ON THE VESLE

The pursuit from Fère-en-Tardenois, led by French Cavalry, had been a great occasion for the 42nd and the 32nd Divisions, but the situation next morning on the heights overlooking the valley of the Vesle river presented the Germans again in position, this time well entrenched on the banks of the river with their supports and artillery on the heights just

side of the river, and held the position, with the Germans strongly entrenched in the suburb of Fismette on the north bank of the river. Taken and lost, and taken again by the 127th Infantry, Regiment, Fismes finally remained in the hands of the Americans. On August 4th, the command of the American forces on the Vesle passed to the Third Corps, and Major General Bullard, formerly of the 1st Division, took command. Once more, then, the line was straight from Soissons to Reims, the Marne salient was no more, and the last German offensive was not only stopped, but was hurled back almost to its starting point.

A terrible defeat had been given to an enemy who but three weeks before had seen victory and Paris within its grasp. The 32nd Division had completed its mission with glory, and on the night of August 5th, it was relieved by the 28th Division, and the 32nd was assembled on the heights and in the villages

captured. These Michigan and Wisconsin troops had entered the fighting zone as an untried division, but left it a combat division of high standing among those of the American Army.

On July 30th, the 77th Division (New York National Army), the first of the Na-



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Major-General Charles T. Menoher

He commanded the 42nd Division and later the Sixth Army Corps.

between the Ourcq and the Vesle. In the seven days of fighting the division had gained 19 kilometers (12 miles) broken through the line of the Ourcq, taken the town of Fismes and in doing so had suffered 3,547 casualties, including 77 officers and 645 men killed. Nine pieces of German field artillery were

tional Army Divisions to reach France and to go into a sector, was relieved from the Bacarrat sector and on August 4th was brought up to the Vesle. On August 11th this division entered the line alongside the veteran 28th Division. Everyone in the army watched this first division made up of troops of the Na-

tional Army, most of them from the City of New York, go through its initial acid test in this "Hell Hole of the Vesle."

The 4th Division, which on the night of August 2nd-3rd had relieved the 42nd, had advanced during August 3rd and 4th to the Vesle River. Here it was stopped by the intense artillery and machine-gun fire from the hills north of the Vesle, but in spite of this fire, small elements were pushed across the river. The next few days were spent in digging in and bettering the positions. Every

(10 miles) and had lost in killed 752, wounded 4,912, and missing 590.

PERSHING'S MESSAGE TO HIS VICTORIOUS ARMY

On August 27th, General Pershing published the following General Order to the American Expeditionary Forces:

It fills me with pride to record in general orders a tribute to the service achievements of the 1st and 3rd Corps, comprising the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32nd and 42nd Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

In Shell-Shattered Fismes

The Hôtel de Ville (City Hall) as it appeared when the American forces entered the town.

attempt to cross the stream in force was met by the Germans with strong resistance and well organized counter attacks from the hills. Nevertheless, the 4th Division had put its front line definitely across the river by the night of August 12th-13th, when it was relieved. In this action the 4th Division advanced from the Ourcq to the Vesle, but in the entire offensive from the Marne to the Vesle, elements of the division acting with other divisions, and then the division acting as a whole, had advanced 17 kilometers

You came to the battlefield at a crucial hour for the Allied cause. For almost four years the most formidable army the world has yet seen had pressed its invasion of France and stood threatening its capital. At no time has that army been more powerful and menacing than when, on July 15th, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

Three days later, in conjunction with our Allies, you counter-attacked. The Allied Armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than to give the Allies

the support to which, as a nation, our faith was pledged. You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, and our sense of justice have not blunted our virility or our courage.

You have shown that American initiative and energy are as fit for the tasks of war as for the pursuits of peace. You have justly won unstinted praise from our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

We have paid for our success with the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always and claim for our history and literature, their bravery, achievement, and sacrifice.

This order will we read to all organizations at the first assembly formations following its receipt.

PERSHING.

FRENCH GENERAL'S TRIBUTE

The following order was issued by General Degoutte and spread upon the minutes of the United States Congress on September 9, 1918:

GENERAL ORDER

(TRANSLATION)

Sixth Army, Commanding Post,
August 9, 1918.

Before the great offensive of July 18th, the American troops, forming part of the 6th French

Army, distinguished themselves by clearing the *Brigade de Marine* Wood and the village of Vaux from the enemy and arresting his offensive on the Marne and at Fossoy.

Since then they have taken the most glorious part in the second battle of the Marne, rivaling the French troops in ardor and valor.

During twenty days of constant fighting they have freed numerous French villages and made, across a difficult country, an advance of forty kilometers, which has brought them to the Vesle.

Their glorious marches are marked by names which will shine in the future in the military history of the United States: Torcy, Belleau, Plateau d'Etrepilly, Epieds, Le Charmel, l'Ourcq, Seringes-et-Nesles, Sergy, La Vesle and Fismes.

These young divisions who saw fire for the first time, have shown themselves worthy of the old war traditions of the regular army. They have had the same burning desire to fight the *boche*, the same discipline which sees that the order given by their commander is always executed, whatever the difficulties to be overcome and the sacrifices to be suffered.

The magnificent results obtained are due to the energy and the skill of the commanders; to the bravery of the soldiers.

I am proud to have commanded such troops.

DEGOUTTE.

The commanding General of the 6th Army.

X

THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

General Pershing Assumes Tactical Command of American Divisions on August 10th—The First American Sector

WITH the closing of the Aisne-Marne offensive on August 6th, the Germans were thrown back from the Marne salient and the Allies' line was established at the Vesle. The Allies had completed by this operation the first of the offensives begun on July 18th by the French and a few American divisions, Foch's plan being to keep on striking a succession of sharp, swift blows at those points in the German lines where they had weakened their reserves in order to reinforce other points.

The operation ending August 6th had reduced the entire Marne salient and two days later, August 8th, the British began their great offensive in which the 33rd American Division took part. In the first phase of this

offensive the Germans were pushed back from Amiens. Péronne and Bapaume were retaken and the tension on this front was relaxed.

Five more American divisions having arrived during July, which brought the total of American combat forces to twenty-four divisions (about 288,000 rifles), Marshal Foch decided that the emergency requiring that all the American divisions be placed in British and French armies had passed. Accordingly, a part of the Western front between Verdun and the Moselle River was decided upon as the American sector, and the American divisions were, one by one, released from British and French armies and were assembled in the vicinity of Toul, where the American Army, as such, under the com-

mand of General Pershing, was soon to take over a small portion of the battle front. For the first time, a portion of the Western front was to be held by the American Army under its own command.

In the American zone, towards the end of August, three divisions were in the line from west to east, namely the 89th (Middle West) and 90th (Texas and Oklahoma), with the 2nd Division in reserve, these constituting the First Army Corps under General Liggett, on

make, for they were now all veteran divisions. Five Army Corps had been formed, two of which had carried on active operations in the reduction of the Marne salient. Of these the Second Corps was with the British, and the Third was still on the Vesle, so that the veteran First Corps, and the Fourth and Fifth Corps were available for use in the coming American offensive that was in preparation. On August 10th, the First American Army was formed, and General Pershing took



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine

American Troops in the Somme Sector

Advancing in open formation, supported by French tanks.

the left, the Fourth Army Corps, under General Dickman, with the 82nd Division in the line and the 1st Division in reserve. Meanwhile, the First American Army under General Pershing was making preparations formally to take over this sector from the French Eighth Army, under which the two American Corps were now serving.

Of the twenty-four American divisions in France at this time nine had taken active part in the attack which had reduced the Marne salient. These nine would form the nucleus for any attack which the Americans might

command. The Headquarters of the Army were established in the city of Toul, and plans, formulated long ago by the American Staff, were once more brought to life for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient.

The First American Army actually held no portion of the front until August 30th, the previous twenty days having been spent in the preparatory drawing in of American combat divisions from all over France. There were, however, five divisions in the area, three of which were in the line (82nd, 89th, and 90th) while the 1st and 2nd were in reserve of the

front which the American Army was to take over. Slowly the other divisions were moved in.

The fourteen American divisions which were concentrated during August and early

Division—5th (Regular). Location—Line. Arrived—Sept. 10th.

Division—26th (N.E.N.G.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Aug. 25th.



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Major-General Samuel D. Sturgis

He commanded the 80th Division and later the 87th Division.

September in the American Army Zone were as follows:

Division—1st (Regular). Location—In line, then in reserve. Arrived—Aug. 7th.

Division—2nd (Regular). Location—In line, then in reserve. Arrived—Aug. 9th.

Division—3rd (Regular). Location—Entered line. Arrived—Sept. 10th.

Division—4th (Regular). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Sept. 1st.

Division—33rd (Ill. N.G.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Aug. 26th.

Division—42nd (Rainbow N.G.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Aug. 30th.

Division—78th (N.Y.-N.J. N.A.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Sept. 10th.

Division—80th (Blue Ridge N. A.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Sept. 1st.

Division—82nd (All-American N.A.). Location—In line, Pont-à-Mousson. Arrived—Aug. 24th.

Division—89th (Middle West N.A.). Location—In line, Toul Sector. Arrived—Aug. 5th.


Division—90th (Texas and Oklahoma N.A.). Location—In line, Pont-à-Mousson. Arrived—Aug. 24th.

Division—91st (Wild West N.A.). Location—Reserve. Arrived—Sept. 11th.

The 82nd, 89th and 90th Divisions being in the line, and the 33rd Division having been sent on September 7th to occupy a position in the line in front of Verdun, there were left ten divisions in reserve. These constituted the First American Army which, on September 12th, attacked the St. Mihiel salient. These divisions were all rested and six of the ten in reserve were veteran divisions of the Marne attack. There could have been but little doubt in the minds of the German Staff, whose Intelligence Service kept them constantly informed as to the location of all the Allied divisions, what to expect in the St. Mihiel salient in the near future.

This concentration of ten first-class divisions behind Toul proclaimed the forthcoming attack even more plainly than the Paris papers which hinted at it, and the Swiss papers which confidently predicted it.

This sector now looked much different in the rear than it looked when the 1st Division marched out of it and back to Toul to take the trains for Picardy the preceding April. During those four months while the American combat divisions were busy elsewhere, the troops of the Service of Supply had been busily engaged in taking over from the French all the rear area. Toul was now an American city. There was scarcely a French soldier or officer to be seen in the streets, whereas four months ago the Americans were stared at as newcomers. Americans ran the railroads and the narrow-gauge. Every supply dump was American. At every crossroads throughout that rear area were American Military Police. The French had turned over the entire area to the Americans, and it became the "American Zone of Operations."



Shipping an American Locomotive to France

In two years the army shipped 1,791 locomotives of the 100-ton type. Of these 650 were shipped set up on their own wheels. Special ships with large hatches were withdrawn from Cuban ore trade for this purpose. When the armistice was signed the army was prepared to ship these set up locomotives at the rate of 200 a month.

FIVE DIVISIONS ARRIVE IN JULY

OF the five divisions which arrived from the United States in July, four were made combat divisions and the fifth was made a replacement division. This brought the total number of combat divisions in France on August 1st to twenty-four, and with the three replacement and depot divisions, twenty full American divisions had reached France by August 1, 1918.

THE 90TH DIVISION

The first of the new divisions to arrive was the 90th, with men from Texas and Oklahoma. It was organized at Camp Travis, Texas, by Major General Henry T. Allen, so that all the men from Texas went to the 180th Brigade, and the men from Oklahoma to the 179th Brigade, better known as the "Texas Brigade" and the "Oklahoma Brigade." By June 30th all units of the division had sailed from Hoboken. The majority of the units landed in France, while the 358th Infantry paraded in Liverpool on July 4th, and was given a banquet by the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. The division was assembled in the Aignay-le-Duc Training Area, with the exception of the Artillery Brigade which was sent to Bordeaux for its training and equipment.

THE 27TH DIVISION

The 27th Division (New York National Guard) was trained at Camp Wadsworth, S. C., under the command of Major General John F. O'Ryan of the New York National Guard, who was the only National Guard Division Commander in France, and who commanded the 27th from its organization until it was mustered out of the service. The last units of this division arrived in France on July 7, 1918. It was assembled in a British training area, and later entered the line with the British opposite Mt. Kemmel.

THE 91ST DIVISION

The 91st Division, with men from California, Washington, Oregon, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Montana and Alaska, was organized at Camp Lewis, Washington, and the first units sailed from the United States, July 6th. The last units arrived in France July 26th, and the division was assembled in the Eighth Training Area, with the exception of the Artillery Brigade, which trained at Clermont-Ferrand. On August 31st, Major General W. H. Johnston succeeded Brigadier General F. S. Foltz in the command.

THE 36TH DIVISION

The 36th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Guard) was organized at Camp Bowie, Texas, and on July 18th, sailed for France, arrived July 30th, and proceeded to the 13th training area in the vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube, near Chaumont. The division was under the command of Major General W. R. Smith.

THE 76TH DIVISION

The 76th Division (New England National Army) embarked for overseas July 5th, and the last units arrived in France on July 31st. Upon its arrival in France, this division was designated as a depot division and ordered to St. Aignan. Here the division was broken up, and the personnel was sent up to the front as replacements to the combat divisions. The specialized units were sent forward entire as Corps and Army troops. The division was commanded by Major General H. F. Hodges.

FIVE DIVISIONS ARRIVE IN AUGUST

THE August troop movement from the United States included five new divisions. Three of these became combat divisions, swelling the total of combat divisions from twenty-four to twenty-seven, and two divisions were made replacement divisions on arrival, which made a total of five replacement divisions. These five replacement divisions supplied 60,000 new infantry to the combat divisions.

THE 79TH DIVISION

The first of the August divisions to arrive was the 79th Division (Liberty). This division was organized at Camp Meade, Md., with men originally drawn from eastern

(continued on next page)
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(Continued from preceding page)

Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Most of these men, however, were sent off to fill up southern divisions and the later increments came from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. The last units arrived in France on August 3rd. The artillery brigade went to Clermont-Ferrand for its training and did not join the division until after the armistice. The remainder of the division, which was commanded by Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, was assembled in the 10th training area around Prauthoy and Champilite, between Chaumont and Dijon.

THE 85TH DIVISION

The second of the August divisions to arrive in France was the 85th division (Custer). It was organized at Camp Custer, Mich., from men drawn from Michigan and Wisconsin. The last units arrived in France on August 12th. Upon arrival in France, this division was designated as a depot division and ordered to Pouilly (Nievre), north of Nevers on the river Loire, where the infantry regiments were broken up and sent to the front as replacements for combat divisions, while the special units became Corps and Army troops. The division was commanded by Major General C. W. Kennedy.

THE 81ST DIVISION

The third in order of arrival in August was the 81st Division (Wildcat). This division was organized at Camp Jackson, S. C., from National Army drafts from North and South Carolina and Tennessee. The last units arrived in France, *via* England, on August 26th. Upon arrival in France the Wildcat Division was ordered to the Tonnerre (Yonne) training area, between Troyes and Nevers, where it remained until the middle of August. The division was commanded by Brigadier General Charles H. Barth until October 8th, when Major General Charles J. Bailey assumed command.

THE 6TH DIVISION

The 6th Division (Regular Army) was the next to arrive in August. It was organized at Camp McClellan, Ala., from units of the Regular Army, and was later sent to Camp Wadsworth, S. C. Preceding the division the 318th Engineer Regiment arrived in France on May 18th and was engaged in construction work at Gièvres before joining the division. The last units arrived in France on August 28th. The division had spent some time in training in England. The Artillery Brigade landed on July 29th, and went to Valdahon for its training, while the remainder of the division was assembled in the Châteauvillain area, southwest of Chaumont. Brigadier General James B. Erwin was in command of the division.

THE 40TH DIVISION

The 40th Division (Sunshine) was the last of the August divisions to arrive in France. It was organized at Camp Kearny, California, from the National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico. The last units arrived in France on August 28th. Upon its arrival in France, the 40th Division was designated as the 6th depot division and was ordered to the La Guerche area, west of Nevers, where the units were broken up and used as replacements for the Combat Divisions. Major General Frederick S. Strong commanded the division.

In September, 1918, therefore, there were twenty-seven combat divisions in the A.E.F. in France and two with the British. These were in five separate groups, as follows:

(1) In the Vosges Mountains for preliminary training, under the French, the 35th, 37th, 92nd, 29th, 6th, and 81st. On September 11th, the 35th Division (Kans. & Mo. N. G.) was withdrawn from the Vosges and sent as army reserve to the St. Mihiel operation.

(2) In the American Army Area were the following fourteen divisions: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th (Regular Army); 26th, 35th, 42nd (National Guard); 78th 80th, 82nd, 89th, 90th, and 91st (National Army).

(3) The 36th (Texas N. G.) Division was in a training area.

(4) In the vicinity of Verdun and the Argonne Forest were five American Divisions: 28th, 32nd, 33rd (National Guard), 77th and 79th (National Army).

(5) With the British as the Second Corps composed of the 27th and 30th National Guard Divisions.

FIVE DIVISIONS ARRIVE IN SEPTEMBER

DURING September five divisions arrived from the United States. Two of these, the 7th and the 88th, were combat divisions, while the other three became replacement divisions and sent their personnel forward during October to take the places of the men in the combat divisions who had fallen in the heavy fighting of the last three months of the war. This brought the total of American combat divisions in France to twenty-nine, and the number of replacement divisions to eight.

The 7th Division (Regular Army) was the first of those arriving in September. Organized from elements of the regular army, the division began the overseas movement on July 31st, and the last units arrived in France September 3, 1918. On August 19th the division entered the 15th training area, Ancy-le-Franc, and by September 20th, the entire division, less the artillery, was in training there. On September 30th it moved to the vicinity of Toul, where on October 10th-11th, it relieved the 90th Division on the west bank of the Moselle. The 7th Artillery Brigade did not join the division until after the armistice, and the 5th Artillery Brigade supported the 7th Division in this sector.

The 39th Division (National Guard of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas) began the overseas movement in July and the last units arrived in France, September 7, 1918. The division was designated as the 5th Depot Division, and was sent to the St. Florent area, where it remained until Nov. 1st, training its personnel as replacements for the combat divisions. The training cadres were then transferred to the 1st Depot Division at St. Aignan.

The 88th Division was organized from men drawn from North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Illinois. The overseas movement began August 8th and the last units of the division reached France September 9, 1918. The division was assembled in the 21st training area at Sammer, where it remained until September 14th, when it was placed in the Fourth French Army, and on September 23rd relieved the 38th French Division in the center sector of Upper Alsace.

The 87th Division was organized from men drawn from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The overseas movement was begun August 23, 1918, and the last units reached France September 13, 1918. This division was turned over to the S. O. S. and placed on work throughout the Intermediate Section of the S. O. S.

The 84th Division, organized from men drawn from Indiana and Kentucky, arrived in France late in September, and was designated as a depot division, and ordered to Le Mans where the units were broken up and sent to the front as replacements for the combat divisions.

XI

SMASHING THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

Brilliant Success of the American Army in Its First Offensive—Capture of 16,000 Prisoners and 443 Guns

FOR four years the activity on the Western front was all west of Verdun. The line from Verdun to the Swiss border had seen practically no active fighting, whereas from Verdun to the North Sea the line was almost constantly shifting. The line east of Verdun was still stabilized and trench warfare was the rule. At Verdun, and at Nancy, southeast of Verdun, the Germans had been stopped and all further attempts to take these two fortresses had proven futile. Between them the Germans established the St. Mihiel salient. The German efforts to capture Verdun culminated in an attempt to surround the city, and they succeeded so far as to command it on three sides, the east, the north, and the west. Eventually they were forced back on the north and west, but on the east they stuck.

Bavarian troops had captured the city of St. Mihiel, about 20 miles southeast of Verdun on the Meuse, and forced their way a short distance across the river, and there they remained for four years. By reaching the Meuse at this point, the Germans cut the railroad communication to Verdun, for Verdun lies also on the Meuse and the railroad ran down the valley. The only other rail communication for Verdun was the line from St. Menhould, which ran so close to the front west of Verdun that it was constantly cut by shell fire.

Verdun and Toul are two of the fortified cities of the eastern chain of defenses of France, and between them lies a long ridge of hills, the "Hauts de Meuse," which form the watershed between the Meuse and the Moselle. In 1870 the Germans entered France south of these mountains, through Toul and Nancy up the valley of the Moselle, and in 1914 they tried to come up both the valley of the Moselle and the valley of the Meuse. But

they found these two entrances to the plain of France too strong. Thus the main battle line, from Verdun east to Nancy, lay on the German side of the mountains. In one place, however, the Germans had driven a wedge across these mountains, and this sharp, abrupt projection of the battle line crossed the range of hills and rested its nose on the river Meuse, at the town of St. Mihiel. This was the St. Mihiel salient referred to above, and it was a constant menace to Verdun. Prisoners taken July 15, 1918, in the Champagne said that the plan of that attack was to widen the Marne salient to the east in order to join it subsequently with the St. Mihiel salient and thus surround Verdun.

The salient jutted out sharply on the northwestern hinge at Les Eparges, 10 miles southeast of Verdun. Les Eparges is a small village on the German side of these hills. From this village at the foot of the hills, the line on the western side of the salient ran almost due south 10 miles, crossing the high forested hills and descending their western slope into the valley of the Meuse, thence across the river to include a small bridgehead at St. Mihiel. Here the line turned abruptly and ran due east and included the Fort du Camp des Romains (the one French fort between Verdun and Toul which the Germans had captured and still held). Continuing due east the line again crossed the range of hills and descended into the flat marshy plain of the Woivre at Aprémont, where the lofty pinnacle of Mont Sec, a detached hill, afforded German dominance of the whole plain. From Aprémont the line ran on past Xivray, Seicheprey (the Toul sector), Fliry, Limey, Fay-en-Haye, and through the Bois-le-Prêtre to the Moselle river just about Pont-à-Mousson, about 25 miles from St. Mihiel. The total length of the line around this salient was

40 miles, and where it joined the main battle line it was 20 miles wide. Directly behind it and supporting it, with excellent rail communication, was the great German fortress of Metz, but 32 miles from St. Mihiel.

During the first year of the war, the French had made several brave attempts to wipe out this salient which so threatened Verdun, and the fighting on the heights of the Meuse was very costly, but the attempt to push little by little on those well entrenched lines by the methods of trench warfare attacks had failed utterly, and the effort was abandoned. Since then the sector had become very quiet, and when the American divisions first arrived in France the sectors around St. Mihiel salient were allotted to them as training sectors, for this was the one part of the front left where the Americans could control a line of supplies from the sea to the front lines which would not cut across either the British or French lines of supply, but would lie parallel to them.

PREPARING TO SMASH THE SALIENT

In August, 1918, when the American Army had ten divisions experienced in battle tactics after their successful reduction of the Marne salient, and the total number of divisions in France had risen until they constituted several Corps, it was in the natural order that when the First American Army was formed, the St. Mihiel salient should be chosen as the objective of its initial operation.

There were several good reasons for removing this salient. No big offensive could be started with this menace to Verdun still intact. Its destruction would free 150 square miles of France, and a city which before the war had 10,000 inhabitants. It would reverse the threat, and this time it would be a threat of the Allies against Metz, the Briey iron mines, and the Metz-Sedan railroad line to Flanders, which the Germans used so much to shift their divisions quickly along the front.

The first step in the preparations was the formation of the First American Army Staff and the drawing in of the divisions which were to make up the army for this attack. General Pershing himself took command of this army as a natural preliminary to the command of the group of armies which would soon be

formed. Then the orders, maps, and plans for the coming offensive were prepared; a huge problem for an untrained staff. Every little detail had to be worked out. The exact boundary for each division in the entire attack, the artillery schedule, the light railways which were to hook on to the German lines, the engineers to connect the roads, the tanks, the gas and flame regiments, all kinds



The "M. P.'s" Quarters

There is no luxury here and no security even to boast of. Note the caution of "poisoned water" chalked on the well in the foreground.

of aviation, cavalry, ammunition and supply trains, dumps, motor transport, hospitals, hospital trains, signal corps, troops, Corps and Army artillery, railroad artillery, water supply, anti-aircraft batteries, traffic control, prisoner cages, and evacuation,—these and many more were the details the Army Staff worked out, the record of which filled a 56-page book.

The plan was for two separate attacks to converge on a certain point. The attack from the east was to come down the plains from Les Eparges, while the attack from the south was to move up the plains from the old Toul sector. This would cut off that part of the salient which was on the hills above the

strengthen the trenches, and about two miles back of the front line they had a second line, in reality a smaller salient within the big one. The purpose of this second line was to permit the Germans to withdraw from the tip of the salient, and to prevent this was the object of the First Army.



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Major-General Henry T. Allen

He organized and trained the 90th Division and led it at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne.

Meuse. The Germans had a "Hindenburg line," which was merely a line dug in case of just such an attack, which connected the German line at Les Eparges with the line at Pont-à-Mousson, and it was to this line that the plans of the First Army directed that the attack be pushed. The German defenses in the salient were strong. During four years the Germans had worked hard to

Lieutenant General Fuchs, the German commander of the salient, had seven divisions in the line and four in reserve, equal to one division to every seven and a half miles of front, which with reserves would give a total of about 75,000 Germans in the salient. With all their artillery and vast stores of ammunition, their well fortified first and second zone, their machine guns and the good line of com-

munications to Metz, these 75,000 troops were expected to put up very strong resistance.

THE ATTACKING CORPS

On the front to be attacked, General Pershing disposed four Army Corps. The First American Corps, General Liggett, from Clemency (east of the Moselle) to Limey; the Fourth American Corps, General Dickman, Limey to Xivray; the Second French Colonial Corps, General Blondelat, Xivray to Mouilly

sion, General Lejeune; Reserve: 78th U. S. Division, General McRae.

Fourth Corps (American), General Dickman—89th U. S. Division, General Wright; 42nd U. S. Division, General Menoher; 1st U. S. Division, General Summerall; Reserve: 3rd U. S. Division, General Buck.

Second Colonial Corps (French), General Blondelat—39th French Division; 26th French Division; 2nd French Cavalry Division, dismounted.



U. S. Signal Corps photo

A Tank Going Over the Top at Mont Sec, St. Mihiel Salient

It was manned by men of the 327th tank Battalion, 1st Division.

(the latter Corps covered practically the entire front in the range of hills from the Toul sector to Les Eparges, where only a secondary or following attack was to take place later); the Fifth American Corps, General Cameron, Mouilly to Watronville.

From right to left the divisions ran:

First Corps (American), General Liggett—82nd U. S. Division, General Burnham; 90th U. S. Division, General Allen; 5th U. S. Division, General McMahon; 2nd U. S. Division,

Fifth Corps (American), General Cameron—26th U. S. Division, General Edwards; 15th French Colonial Division; Reserve: 4th U. S. Division, General Hines.

Of the two Corps attacking from the south, the right of the First Corps, 82nd Division, was to hold fast on its right, while its left moved in conformity with the main attack; and the left of the Fourth Corps, 1st Division, was to be the marching flank, which, as the line advanced, would drop off elements

to protect the flank until the connection was made with the Corps attacking from the east. Then the 1st Division was to face about and mop up the hilly part which had not been touched by the attack. The remainder of the divisions were to attack directly to their front until the objective was reached.

Of the Fifth Corps, the 26th Division was to jump off three hours after the southern attack began and march so that its right flank should be in Hattonchattel the second day, where it would meet the 1st Division. The 15th French Colonial Division was to attack to its front, and the 4th Division was to form the left pivot of the attack.

The whole great maneuver was an enveloping operation to break through the hinges of the salient, close through to the center, and pocket the garrison. Three American Corps, 12 divisions, were to make the attack while one French Corps held the line on the tip of the salient, and in addition, as army reserves, General Pershing had the 35th, 91st, 80th and 33rd American Divisions, in other words eight divisions in the line and eight in reserve. This meant 216,000 Americans and 48,000 French in the line with 190,000 Americans in reserve, or more than 400,000 American troops assembled in one Army for battle.

THREE TIMES AS BIG AS GRANT'S ARMY

General Grant's Army of the Potomac numbered about 125,000 at its maximum strength. Napoleon's Grand Army at Leipzig numbered about 160,000 with which he fought 240,000 Russians and Prussians. The German Army at Sedan numbered 250,000 men, and the Russian and Japanese Armies at Mukden, the largest on record before this war, each numbered but 310,000 men.

General Pershing's real opponent in the oncoming battle was not in reality General Fuchs, but von Gallowitz. A high ranking officer at the outbreak of the war, he had commanded a group of armies in Poland in 1915; later he commanded an army in Macedonia, and, in the fall of 1916 he commanded the Second German Army on the Somme. In the spring of 1917 he was placed in command of the Fifth Army at Verdun, and after that was given command of the group of armies around Verdun, which he still had

when General Pershing attacked the St. Mihiel salient. On the score of experience in manipulating masses of troops, on many victorious fields, he was a formidable opponent.

Seldom in history has a military operation been carried out more precisely according to program. The troops already in the line, the 82nd U. S. Division, the 90th U. S. Division, the 89th U. S. Division, the 39th French Division, the 26th French Division, the 2nd French Cavalry Division (dismounted), and the 15th Colonial French Division maintained only their normal activities until the attack began. New batteries of artillery which came into the sector did not register with a single shot. Aviation activity was not increased, and the great masses of troops marching into the area marched all night, and when daylight broke they were all carefully screened in the plentiful woods of the rear areas.


All the units had their orders and maps, the majority of the infantry who were to make the attack were back in the dense woods three or four miles behind the front where the eight-inch howitzers stood ready, and everyone knew just what he was to do as soon as it was announced which would be "D" day, and what would be "H" hour. Then the word was sent out. "D" day was to be September 12th, and "H" hour would be 5 a. m. Nothing moved until dusk of the 11th, and then everything began moving at once, and it began to rain as it only can rain in northeastern France. A long column of tanks started for the front, little French Renault tanks, but manned by Americans this time; batteries of artillery moved out from the cover of the woods toward the Bouconville, Ramboucourt, Beaumont, Fliry, Limey highway, which they all knew so well, while battalions of infantry tramped once more toward that front where they had sat so long under the all-seeing eye of Mont Sec.

GUNNERS ON THE SKIRMISH LINE

This time the field artillery did not move into fixed positions behind the highway, nor did the infantry go into the trenches. They both moved down, as soon as it was dark, into the maze of mud-choked, disused front line trenches. As the artillery was the first to arrive, the battery commanders soon found

that there was practically nothing except an occasional sentry post between them and the Germans, so they immediately sent forward the gunners to form a skirmish line in front of the guns to protect them against German patrols. Then the infantry came and lay down in that drenching rain between the old trenches to wait for 5 a. m. while telephone lines were run back to regimental headquarters. It was an intensely black night, and the wonder is that all those divisions coming

looking up at Mont Sec wondered when the Germans from that eminence would begin to pour a deadly return fire into them. The men who knew the sector best feared the most. The 1st Division knew that at dawn they would have to march resolutely past the foot of Mont Sec. While they were in the sector the winter before they often longed for the day when they would see what was behind the hill, but now that the day was fast approaching they felt that the Germans on the sum-



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

A Battle-scarred Scene in the St. Mihiel Salient

It is in the area around Mouilly, where the 26th Division was engaged.

along that one great highway did not get mixed. Some few small units did, and frantic staff officers wandered all night over the slopes and finally got the stray units into the proper position, but during it all the German batteries scarcely fired a shot.

Then at one o'clock in the morning of September 12th, the artillery preliminary began. At an instant the sky as far as the eye could see burst into a sheet of flame when every gun of the American Army fired in unison the opening shot of this the first American offensive, while platoon leaders who had spent a month

mit would mightily resent it. Then there were other divisions to whom this was their first attack, who had never heard ten German machine guns firing at them at once. To them also the hours seemed to drag, and to all lying there in that drenching rain in the pitch blackness of that night,—the intense American artillery preparation was tearing to bits the German trenches and wire in front of them and the 14-inch shells leisurely sung their way along overhead,—to all came the question as to what the dawn would bring. Old hands, who had patrolled more than once

that No Man's Land, shivered with apprehension at the thought of how much the little stream, the Rupt de Mad, would have overflowed its banks by morning.

FOLLOWING THE BARRAGE IN WAVES

Then at 5 a. m., which was still twenty minutes before daylight on that foggy, rainy

There were to be many surprises that day to those troops who had fought their way up from the Marne and knew what real hard fighting German resistance actually was. The much dreaded German machine guns started for a second and then the machine gunners held up their hands in surrender. On went the rolling barrage and following it closely



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Major-General Charles H. Muir

He commanded the 28th Division on the Marne and in the Argonne; he commanded the Fourth Army Corps, Army of Occupation.

morning, the rolling barrage began. Up came the stiff infantrymen. The major looked at his watch, then at the barrage, then at his watch again and gave the signal to advance. Off went the engineers to cut and blow the barbed wire in case the artillery had missed it, and behind them went the infantry in wave after wave toward the German front line.

went the infantry, and as dawn broke it showed them like drowned rats; they had lain all night in that marshy front position, and some had swum the creek, and caked with the slimy yellow clay they looked like nothing human as they plodded on behind the barrage. A few German batteries were firing into the advancing waves, but most of

them had quit firing by the time the second line of trenches was won; and from that time on for 36 hours during the attack not a hostile shot was heard by the troops of the Fourth Corps who were pushing into the center, and not a single shot had come from Mont Sec that day. By nine o'clock in the morning, when the sun came out, it was a maneuver for those troops in the center, and, plodding almost knee-deep in the awful quagmire they followed the barrage which splashed in the mud in front of them; the majority of the few casualties suffered were from following this barrage too closely.

Little groups of Germans who had given themselves up began to filter back towards the rear, then bigger groups went back. The advance proceeded with all the precaution arranged for beforehand. Town, woods and machine-gun nests were all very adroitly outflanked, and then mopped up. The Fourth Corps had far to go that day, and the succeeding German lines were taken almost as fast as the troops could march over them. The only serious opposition met that day was in the last trench of the Quart de Reserve. This was a small wood about a mile square, lying midway between Seicheprey and Nonsard. Here the 1st Division met determined machine-gun fire, and it cost about 600 casualties to take the woods. After that everything went easily, and before noon the line of the First Phase had been passed. By evening the line of the "First Day" was passed. The Fourth Corps had reached the southern edge of Bois de Nonsard and Bois de Thiaucourt; both towns were captured. The infantry had done over ten miles that day, and were almost worn out, for the mud made each mile seem like three. The tanks and accompanying artillery had long since been passed and now the infantry lay down to rest.

AMERICAN CAVALRY GOES INTO ACTION

Meanwhile a provisional squadron of three troops of the 2nd U. S. Cavalry Regiment was rushed up and ordered forward to cut the railroad which led from St. Mihiel to Metz in order to prevent the German divisions in the tip of the salient from escaping. The railroad was on the far side of the woods,

and there was a path through the wood up which they went. By 4 p. m. they had reached the railroad and highway, but, finding that they were not in sufficient force, the cavalry retreated. The 1st Division was then ordered to march that night through Bois de Nonsard and cut the railroad. All night they picked their way through dense forest, the men so tired that they could scarcely walk, and yet on they went until at 10 that evening, when a company of the 28th Infantry finally cut the road and stopped the Germans from taking any more troops from the tip of the salient. A brigade from the 3rd Division was rushed up to support the left flank of the 1st during this movement, so that the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division was freed to push on up the Nonsard-Vigneulles road, and by dawn of the 13th, the leading elements had cut the road north out of the tip of the salient. At 7 a. m. the patrols of the 1st Division, coming from the south, met the patrols of the 26th Division, coming from the north, in Hattonchattel. Thus the two Corps met; the salient was no more.

The three remarkable features about the operations on this day were: First, that after 9 in the morning, not a German artillery shot was heard by the troops rushing across the center of the salient to meet and cut off the German retreat; second, at about 9 in the morning, great columns of heavy black smoke began appearing from behind the woods and spread until there was not the slightest doubt that the Germans were burning all their supplies; and third, the Allies had the superiority of the air for the first time since American troops had been on the front. Squadrons of British, French and American planes cruised all over the sector unmolested, and bombed at will the enemy's retreating columns.

Meanwhile the French, on the point of the salient, performed their mission with great success. One hour after the main attack started they made small limited objective attacks which kept the Germans busily engaged on that front so that they could not withdraw. Part of the 39th French Division followed up on the left flank of the 1st Division and placed a block astride the Heudicourt-Vigneulles road. The remainder occupied the Germans on the front until the proper

time came, when with vigorous raids they penetrated the lines and occupied St. Mihiel.

A SPEEDY AND COMPLETE SUCCESS

The cutting off of the St. Mihiel salient was practically accomplished in one day, for by that time the 1st and the 26th Divisions

American Army took practically all of the 14,500 prisoners and 443 pieces of artillery which were captured in the whole operation. This was done at a cost so slight in American casualties that the long lines of ambulances over which the staff had spent such weary hours never moved from their strategic



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Major-General William R. Smith

He was the commander of the 36th Division.

had met, and all other divisions were on or beyond the army's objective. During the 13th, 14th, and 15th, further progress averaging three or four kilometers (2 or 3 miles) was made in exploitation along the front, and this was accompanied by very heavy local fighting. But in that first day, the First

positions, and operating teams in mobile hospitals which had been brought up in great numbers, stood outside the tents and watched the Allied airplanes as they swept the sky. The only units who really met any opposition and had a problem which exceeded their expectations were the engineers. Building roads and

bridges across that swollen torrent and through that mud taxed their powers to the limit.

The explanation of this sudden giving away on the part of the Germans was not far to seek. There was nothing secret about the intention to attack. Paris was talking about it for weeks before. Every supply officer up and down the long line of communications who had received an order to send an abnormal amount of his special stock in trade up to the St. Mihiel salient by September 10th predicted to a few friends that the American Army would attack. The Paris papers openly hinted at the time and the place, and the Swiss papers in their guess only missed the date by one day. But even without all these, the German Intelligence Service knew very well what was going on behind the Allied lines. Day by day von Gallowitz saw more and more divisions moving in behind the front, and with them came regiment after regiment of American coast artillery with British eight-inch howitzers and French six-inch long rifles. Then the railroad artillery began to arrive with their fourteen-inch long rifles, and it was not hard to determine what to expect.

There were but 75,000 Germans in the salient and they were for the most part very poor troops, which included one Austro-Hungarian Division, and they could not be counted upon to offer much real resistance to 400,000 Americans backed up with that enormous artillery support. The position was none too good and the Germans, outnumbered five to one, would need enormous reserves to hold it in the face of such an attack. Accordingly, the Germans began a careful withdrawal to the Hindenburg line, and had the American attack been delayed two days longer, there would have been but a handful of Germans left in the St. Mihiel salient.

Von Gallowitz could get no reserves from any other portion of the Western front, for the British and French by their ever growing offensive in the Somme and the Chemin des Dames, held all the otherwise available German reserves there. So von Gallowitz executed his skilful retreat and saved four-fifths of the garrison by the maneuver. Its cost to the Germans was slight in men, 16,000, but

the cost in strategic position was great, for, in abandoning the salient, they gave up forever the hope of taking Verdun. Then, too, the cost in prestige was enormous, for the result materially shortened the Allied line, opened the communication to Verdun, freed forever that city, but above all, it gave the Americans the inspiration of victory which was to carry them so far in overcoming the bitterest German resistance in the Argonne.

DETAIL OF OPERATIONS BY DIVISIONS THE 82ND DIVISION

The 82nd Division (All American National Army) which on August 24th had relieved the 2nd Division in the Marbach sector (east bank of the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson) formed the right pivot for the attack. The Fourth and Fifth Corps closed the salient while the First Corps, of which the 82nd was the right, was to swing forward like a door in conformity with the quick movement of the Fourth Corps. As the 90th Division on the left advanced, the 82nd Division took over the west bank of the Moselle river, and astride this wide river it advanced its left flank in a turning movement, five kilometers (3 miles). The Germans on this front were not retreating and put up a stiff resistance. It cost the 82nd Division 1,200 casualties to execute this difficult advance in the face of hot German fire from the hills east of the Moselle. The 82nd Division remained in this sector until September 21st, when it was relieved and moved by bus to the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

THE 90TH DIVISION

The 90th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Army) relieved the 1st Division in the sector on the west bank of the Moselle on August 24th. The front of the division was narrowed just prior to the attack from nine to six kilometers and the 5th Division moved in on the left and relieved that part of the 90th Division. As the artillery of the 90th Division had not yet finished its training, the 153rd Artillery Brigade of the 78th Division in Corps reserve, supported the 90th Division in the attack. Prior to the attack, patrols were sent out to cut gaps in the wire on the whole front, and at 5 a. m. on Sep-



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Major-General Clement A. F. Flagler

He commanded the 42nd Division, Army of Occupation.

tember 12th, the infantry followed its artillery barrage and went forward in assault on the German positions. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon the division was on its objective, the 357th Infantry on the left had advanced four kilometers ($2\frac{1}{2}$ miles) through dense woods, wire and trenches, and the remainder of the division, while not advancing so far, had accomplished their missions.

On the 13th, Brigadier General U. G. McAlexander, who won undying fame when he commanded the 38th Infantry Regiment on the Marne two months before, was commanding the 180th Infantry Brigade. With these

two regiments, 359th and 360th Infantry, he assaulted and captured the famous stronghold of the Bois le Prêtre, the scene of terrible sanguinary combat in 1915. It was a mass of trenches, caves, machine-gun nests, and barbed wire all cleverly coördinated in that dense forest, but, by a very clever flank movement in the early morning, General McAlexander reduced this fortress, and thereby freed the right flank of the Allied line. Meanwhile General O'Niel took the Venchères woods with the other Brigade and advanced the line to the vicinity of Ste. Marie Farm. On the 14th the advance was continued to the Bois

des Rappes, while the 180th Brigade took Villers-sous-Preney, and on the 15th, Vandières and the Bois de Villers were taken and the Bois des Rappes cleared out. On the 16th of September the advance was continued until the line was pushed forward to the edge of the woods in front of Preny, where the infantry dug in and the line remained until the division was relieved on October 10th by the 7th Division, and the 90th Division was sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In the four days of this attack, the division captured 14 German officers and 650 men, 8 pieces of artillery, 24 heavy trench mortars and a large amount of materials. The advance cost the division in total casualties 39 officers and 886 men. The extremely low number of casualties in the 90th Division and its steady advance proved this division to be one of the best of the new divisions, with officers skilful, daring and efficient.

THE 5TH DIVISION

The 5th Division (Regular Army) entered the line between the 90th and the 2nd Divisions, and took part in the attacks on the four successive days from the 12th to the 16th of September, when it was relieved. At the time of the relief the division was holding a small front facing Rembercourt on the Rupt de Mad. This division captured in all 1,243 prisoners, of whom 32 were officers, 13 pieces of artillery, at a cost of 1,563 casualties, of whom 11 officers and 249 men were killed.

THE 2ND DIVISION

The 2nd Division (Regular Army and Marine) formed the left of the First Corps. It was given the mission of taking the town of Thiaucourt, the capture of which would flank the Germans out of their last positions in the salient and force them to withdraw to the Hindenburg line. Thiaucourt was captured the first day and the fleeing enemy were pursued up the valley of the Rupt de Mad as far as Jaulny. Here on September 16th, the 2nd Division was relieved and proceeded to the Champagne. It had rapidly advanced nine kilometers (6 miles), captured a vast amount of prisoners and supplies, and suffered comparatively few casualties. A captured German report alluded to the 1st, 2nd and 42nd (Rainbow) Divisions as the three "First


Class attacking Divisions of the American Army."

THE 78TH DIVISION

The 78th Division (New Jersey and Upper New York National Army) moved into the reserve position of the First Corps on September 11th, while the artillery went forward to support the 90th Division. Here the division remained until September 15th, when it moved up to Thiaucourt and on the next night relieved the positions held by the 5th and 2nd Divisions. This division had never had the advantage of any experience in a quiet sector. As a whole it had never been under fire. The relief required the taking over of a new and unorganized sector from two divisions at a point where there was danger of counter-attacks, and where the sector was very active. For seventeen days the 78th Division (Lightning) held this front of five miles, facing four German divisions in the Hindenburg line, and in doing so suffered a total of 2,107 casualties. On October 4th the division was relieved and went to the Meuse-Argonne.

THE 89TH DIVISION

The 89th Division (Middle West) was the right division of the Fourth Corps. The front of this division was reduced the night before the attack until it covered a front of two miles in front of Fliry. The mission given to it was to attack directly to its front, to assist on the right the capture of Thiaucourt by the 2nd Division, and to assist the Rainbow (42nd) Division on its left to capture Essey. On September 12th this division had to pass immediately through the Bois de Mort Mare. This forest, on the extreme southern edge of which the Germans had their front lines, occupied the entire front of the division, and, as it was very dense and over a mile in depth, great credit is due the 89th Division for so speedily extricating itself from this and continuing on to catch up with the two veteran divisions on its either flank. That night the division reached the town of Beney and by midnight was on the day's objective. After various small advances, the 89th Division relieved the 42nd Division on the night of September 30th, and took over the front of that division. On October 4th it also relieved the 78th Division, as the front was then very quiet,



When the American Army Wiped Out the St-Mihiel Salient

In this, the first large American offensive, with over 400,000 American troops (216,000 in the line) and 48,000 French, the German line was driven in simultaneously from both sides. The main objective, Hartmannsdorfer (Vignucelles), was reached in little more than 24 hours.

and on October 8th, was relieved by the 37th Division, and was moved to the Meuse-Argonne.

THE 42ND DIVISION

The 42nd Division (Rainbow, National Guard) was the center division of the Fourth Corps. This division also had a wood on its front, but it was a smaller wood, the Bois de Sonnard. The division had been in many attacks. In a few spots the German defenders put up real resistance, but for the most part the division rushed through the wood in the early dawn, then formed up on the other side of the wood and continued its orderly advance up either side of the Fliry-Essey highway, taking without much difficulty the towns of Essey, Pannes, and Lamarch on the first day. Early on the morning of the 13th the Rainbow reached its final objective, the town of St. Benoît, and by 9:30 a. m. had firm possession of this line with patrols far out in front along the highway towards Woël, where with a couple of lost tanks the patrol fought a small war of its own up and down that highway. By this time the 39th French Division, which had come up the left flank of the 1st after the battle began, squeezed out the 1st Division, and with the 42nd formed the line which faced the Hindenburg line. In less than 29 hours, the Rainbow Division had advanced 19 kilometers (12 miles). Here they made a sector which was held until September 30th, when the Rainbow Division was relieved by the 89th Division, and the Rainbow (42nd) Division proceeded to the Meuse-Argonne.

THE 1ST DIVISION

The 1st Division (Regular Army) was the left of the Fourth Corps, and was the marching flank of the attack from the south. This division advanced past the foot of Mont Sec (constantly "refusing" its left flank against probable counter-attack from the hilly part of the salient which was not under attack) and in this the entire 18th Infantry was used. Meanwhile the 2nd Brigade and the 16th Infantry pushed on until Nonsard was captured early in the afternoon of the first day. The cavalry was then thrown in to cut the German line of retreat, and when the cavalry failed and retreated, the 2nd Brigade, which had won

such fame at Soissons, and the 16th Infantry, were ordered to push on through the dense forest and cut the road. This was done when, at 10 p. m. a company of the 28th Infantry arrived on the road. Meanwhile a brigade of the 3rd Division and the 39th French Division advanced along the left flank of the 1st, which relieved the 1st brigade. This brigade was hastily assembled and marched up the Nonsard-Vigneulles highway and at 3:15 a. m. the patrols of the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments reached Vigneulles; at 7 a. m., September 13th, the patrols of the 1st Division and the 26th Division met, and the salient was cut. The 39th French Division then went past the left of the 1st Division and with the 26th and 42nd Divisions formed a line facing the Hindenburg line. The 1st Division was held for a time in general reserve for this line and then was sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In nineteen hours it had advanced 12 miles, captured 5 officers and 1,190 men, 30 pieces of artillery and much war material; the total casualties suffered were 13 officers and 594 men.

THE 3RD DIVISION

The 3rd Division (Regular Army), better known as the "Marne Division," after its heroic defense of Château-Thierry, was in reserve of the Fourth Corps. One brigade was moved up late on the afternoon of September 12th, in close support of the flank of the 1st Division in case of possible German counter-attack from the hilly portion of the salient to the west, but as it soon developed, there were so few Germans in the salient, that this attack was impossible. On September 14th the 3rd Division was relieved and sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

THE 26TH DIVISION

The 26th Division (New England National Guard) formed the right of the Fifth Corps, which was to attack from Les Eparges on the upper western side of the salient three hours after the main attack from the southern side was launched. Accordingly at 8 a. m. the 26th Division and the 15th French Colonial Infantry Division attacked, and by noon had reached the crest of the hill of Les Eparges, and were close up to the western edge of the village and woods of St. Remy, where they

met stiff resistance from the well entrenched Austro-Hungarian Division. But the Allies greatly outnumbered the defenders and the 15th French Colonial Division captured Les Eparges hill and held it against counter-attacks. Meanwhile the 26th Division followed the retreating Austro-Hungarian Division and drove it from each succeeding position until it beat a disorderly retreat through the woods. The 26th Division, following in pursuit, occupied the towns of St. Remy and Dommartin. The 26th had now passed the last of the German positions, and there lay but five miles of forest on top of the plateau through which it must penetrate before it came out on the heights of Hattonchattel which overlooked the entire Woevre plain. By the time the 26th reached Dommartin it was dark, and it was decided to wait until morning. Then there came an order from General Cameron for the division to continue the attack at once along the "Grande Tranchée de Calonée," which was the main highway through the center of the forest along the top of the plateau to Hattonchattel. This was part of the same movement by which the 1st Division was to pierce the Bois de Nonsard and both were to meet in Vigneulles. The 102nd Infantry, which had been following in divisional reserve all day was given this mission, having the whole night in which to cover the five miles down the highway through the forest. It had to go slowly, as the woods were infested with the enemy as was evidenced by the capture of 280 prisoners. At 7 a. m. the patrols of the two divisions met in Vigneulles and the salient was closed. The remainder of the 26th Division then occupied the plateau, and moved down into the plain to form part of the battle line in front of the village of St. Hilaire. Here it remained until October 7th when it was relieved and sent to the Meuse-Argonne. In addition to a great quantity of military stores the 26th Division captured 2,400 prisoners practically the entire Austro-Hungarian Division, and its 50 pieces of artillery.

THE 4TH DIVISION

The 4th Division (Regular Army) was in reserve of the Fifth Corps. On September 12th, however, the 59th Infantry Regiment went in the line as the left pivot of the Allied

attack. Here it remained until the 14th, when, following the German retreat, it occupied the town of Fresnes-en-Woevre and Manheulles, which advanced the line several kilometers out into the Woevre plain. Here the division remained until the 19th of September, when the 4th Division was withdrawn and sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

The four divisions in Army Reserve were not brought up for this operation, and when it closed on September 16th, the 33rd, 35th, 80th and 90th Divisions were sent to the Meuse-Argonne.

General Pershing says in his report on this battle:

"At the cost of only 7,000 casualties mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners, and 443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found that they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with."

THE ARTILLERY'S EAR

Professor Augustus Trowbridge, Professor of Physics at Princeton University, who had charge of a unit in the A.E.F. which experimented in sound and flash ranging, gave the following account after the war of how a little piece of platinum, electrically heated, acted as a sort of ear for the artillery and located German guns:

"It was found possible by means of scientific machinery to locate the guns by means of the sound in rain and fog. The work was done by a small bit of platinum wire heated by electricity and connected with other apparatus which would record all changes in temperature.

"This change in temperature would take place when the vibrations, caused by the noise of the shell as it broke the air in passage, and the sound of the gun, forced fresh air against the bit of wire. Six such instruments would be set up along an arc equidistant from the suspected area.

"In addition, there would be observation posts with watchers constantly on duty. The posts and instruments were all connected to a central station. When the watchers heard a gun fired they touched a button that sent the current through the delicate wire and started the recording machinery in motion. Then by means of relays and other electrical apparatus we would have the sound wave photographed on a strip of motion-picture film. From this it was not difficult to deduce by mathematics the position desired.

"During the St. Mihiel drive, in a period of three weeks of advance, the unit found 425 separate locations of enemy batteries."

XII

THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLES

The American Army's Part in the Allies' Grand Offensive Which
Culminated in the Armistice on November 11th

BY the middle of September, 1918, the succession of Allied attacks had driven the Germans back to the Hindenburg line along the entire front from the North Sea to the Swiss border. The battle line was now back to where it had been when the Germans began their great spring drive in 1918. In March the Germans had on the Western front a great superiority of men and guns, and their troops were inspired with a high and well founded confidence in a speedy and complete victory. Five months later, however, in September, they no longer had this superiority in men and guns, and their morale as well as their numbers was badly shattered by the awful casualties which the Allies had inflicted upon them both in the attack and in the defense. They had not the replacements to fill up their ranks after such staggering losses. Whereas the Allies, due chiefly to the speedy arrival of American troops during the summer of 1918, had not only replaced their losses during the same period, but had actually increased their strength. By their great success in counter-attacks, the confidence and enthusiasm of the Allies had so risen that the desire was universal to again fall upon the enemy in the hope of completely overthrowing him. Accordingly, Marshal Foch decided to strike with his whole force.

"When this decision to force the fighting to conclusion in the fall of 1918 was reached by the Allied supreme command," says the *Stars and Stripes*, "the attack was planned not against one point or one front only, as had been the practice of Ludendorff and the German General Staff, but against all the fronts, excepting Italy, at practically the same time and on a scale far greater than had ever been attempted before. Every considerable body of the enemy was to be engaged, and thus there would be none left free to reinforce other hard

pressed fronts. It will be worth while to note once more the order in which the successive attacks were delivered.

"On September 21st, General Franchet d'Esperey launched the attack on the Macedonian front which at once broke through the lines of the Bulgarian Armies and speedily annihilated them.

"On September 23rd, the British Army under General Allenby assailed the Turks in Palestine with results quite as rapid as decisive.

"On September 26th General Pershing's First American Army, with nine divisions in line, and General Gouraud's Fourth French Army, with twelve divisions in line, struck against the vital portion of the German Western front centering on the Argonne forest from the Meuse to the Suippe river.

"On September 27th, General Horne's First British Army, with nine divisions in line, and General Byng's Third British Army, with eight divisions in the line, following up their counter-offensive operations by which, during the preceding two months, the enemy had been driven back from the proximity of Amiens, attacked the Hindenburg line between Gouzeaucourt and the Senseé river, with Cambrai as the main objective.

"On September 28th, their advance was extended southward as far as the front of St. Quentin by the attack of General Rawlinson's Fourth British Army, with six divisions in line, and from St. Quentin toward La Fère by that of General Debeney's First French Army, with seven divisions in line.

"On September 28th, also, the Belgian Army, with about four divisions in line, and General Plumer's Second British Army, with eight divisions in line, attacked in Flanders on a front extending from Dixmude to a point southeast of Ypres.

"From the beginning, all these attacks met with success, more or less rapid, according to the difficulties encountered. But all were sustained with unrelaxing vigor, and all drove forward with increasing momentum as time went on and the enemy became more and more exhausted, until the complete victory was achieved. The wisdom of placing

PERSHING'S ARMY AS THE RIGHT PIVOT

The part which the American First Army was to play in this grand Allied offensive was to be the right pivot of the Belgian, British, French and American drive on the Germans entrenched on the Hindenburg line. This combined attack had as its objective the cut-



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Inside a German Trench in the Argonne

the command of all the Allied Armies in the hands of one leader, Marshal Foch, could have received no more impressive vindication than was given by the precision and power with which, in a period of eight days, the successive blows of armies extending from Asia Minor to the English Channel were delivered like hammer-strokes upon the vital fronts of the Central Powers."

ting of the German lines of communication between France and Germany, thereby threatening the entire German Army in France and Belgium with capture unless they withdrew. Between France and Germany lie a series of concentric mountain ranges over which it is impossible to move an army. These mountains extend from the Swiss border northwest almost to Brussels in Belgium; through them

there are four great gateways between Germany and France,—at Belfort, Nancy, Verdun, and Reims,—while north of the Ardennes, the furthest north of these mountains, lies the flat plain of Belgium. In 1814 the Prussian invaders entered France just north of the Swiss border through Belfort. In 1870

ières, the fortified city of the gateway on the border, faced Belgium and was not so well guarded. But through Mons and Valenciennes the Germans made their greatest entry into France, for here was the way through the plains of Belgium into the plains of France, having no mountains or fortifications



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Major-General Edmund Witenmeyer

He commanded the 153rd Brigade on the Vesle and in the Argonne; he later commanded the 7th Division west of the Moselle.

the Prussians invaded France through Nancy. In 1914 the German Armies tried to enter France through each of these gateways. At Belfort, Nancy and Verdun they struck a stone-wall of French resistance and were unable to penetrate it. Through the Champagne and Reims they met less resistance, for Méz-

of any importance to hinder the attack. Once the Germans were established in France, they took the greatest precautions to keep these two lines of communications back to Germany, Mézières-Sedan and Valenciennes-Mons, protected against any possible attack. In France and Belgium they had seized the manufactur-

ing and coal mining regions around Lille and the Briey iron basin near Metz, and in the four years of occupation of northern France and Belgium they had constructed four successive defense systems. The first of these defensive systems was the Hindenburg line. It was the longest and strongest of the four and, until the latter part of September, 1918, had withstood all attacks. It was the German first line of defense and ran from Metz to the sea, and was organized in great depth by interlacing trenches often eight miles in depth. Behind the Hindenburg line lay the Lille-La Fère line which ran from Lille to Cambrai to La Fère, thence east to the Aisne, along the Aisne to the Argonne, and joined the first line just north of Verdun, at Ornes. The third line provided for the Allied capture of the seacoast; it ran from Ghent to Lille to Valenciennes to Mézières, thence along the Meuse to Verdun. The fourth line ran from Ghent to Valenciennes, behind the Ardennes to Givet, thence along the Meuse to Verdun. All these lines were connected together by switch lines so that a breakthrough at one point would have little or no effect on the remainder of the line.

The Metz, Mézières, Valenciennes railway was the German means of lateral communication along the front, by which the Germans shifted divisions so rapidly from one sector to another. The first three German lines of defense protected this railroad, but the objectives of the Allies in this combined attack were Valenciennes and Mézières, the two gateways to France, and with this in view the attack was launched.

PLAN OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

NOW that the American First Army had gained the necessary experience, it was given a part in the great Allied offensive, to be launched simultaneously by the British, French and American Armies. The British were to drive north of the Ardennes mountains in the direction of Valenciennes, Mons, and Liège and thereby close the northern entrance to France, for the Ardennes are impassable for troops. The French and Americans were to drive south of the Ardennes to-

wards the great railroad centers of Mézières and Sedan, and thus close the central entrance to France, while the line from Verdun to the Swiss border was to hold fast as it had done for four years, and keep closed the southern entrance to France. Once the Allies reached Valenciennes and Mézières, and held Verdun and Nancy, all the entrances to France would be blocked and whatever parts of the German Army which remained in France at that time would be captured, as there would be no way to get them out. The part assigned to the American First Army was the right hinge of the Franco-American offensive. This combined attack was to hinge on Verdun, and the objective was the Mézières-Sedan railroad, twenty-five miles due north on the Meuse river. The American First Army was to rest its right flank on the Meuse north of Verdun, and stretch over the plain of the Meuse valley to the middle of the Argonne forest, where it connected with the French Fourth Army. This French army would attack west of the Argonne forest, in the Champagne, while the First American Army attacked east of the Argonne forest in the broad Meuse valley.


The Germans had always been aware that this was one of the most probable points of attack. An incision of the line of 25 miles here to Sedan would cut the communications between the German armies in Belgium and those in the Metz area. The German lines in France and Belgium were in reality an enormous salient whose base was Cologne and Metz—a line 200 kilometers in length—while the extremity of this salient at Arras was 300 kilometers from the base. In this salient the Germans had the greater part of their army and plants and stores of four years' accumulation. If therefore an attack were launched on the left flank of this great salient, and this attack were pushed north towards Cologne, the German armies in the tip of the salient would be faced with capture. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that on this front on either side of the Argonne forest the Germans had with prodigious labor, fortified this area until it became one great zone of defensive works almost thirteen miles in depth. Time and again the French in small attacks tried to break through only to be

hurled back with enormous losses. To this front were now sent the American First Army and the French Fourth Army with the hope that, if all the German forces on all the other fronts were engaged, the German High Command might not be able to send enough divisions to this front to check the advance.

Accordingly, on September 20th the zone of the American First Army was extended

one in close support. But this front of twenty miles between the Meuse and La Harazée in the Argonne forest was perhaps the most formidably fortified portion of the German lines in France, in addition to its natural facilities for defense. Says the *Stars and Stripes*:

"Resting upon the deeply eroded valley of the Meuse river on the left flank and the precipitous and densely wooded hills of the Argonne on the



From drawing by U. S. Signal artist

An Officers' Headquarters in the Argonne

westward to take over the entire front of the French Second Army as far as La Harazée in the Argonne,—this gave General Pershing seventy-two miles of front to command,—from Clemery, north of Nancy, to the Argonne.

FEATURES OF THE ARGONNE FOREST

The area between the Meuse and the Argonne had been for a long time very quiet. Four enemy divisions held the line with but

right, all the country between for a long distance northward is furrowed at intervals of a few kilometers by the transverse ravines and beds of numerous small streams which, originating in the watershed that extends northwestward by Esnes, Malancourt, Montfaucon, Gesnes, Remonville, and Buzancy, fall eastward into the Meuse or westward into the Aire. Between these ravines are a corresponding succession of high and steep ridges and detached hills, dotted with numerous woodlands and villages. Quite aside from the elaborate entrenchments and entanglements with which it had been artificially strengthened,

the topography of the country lends itself in a striking degree to that system of defense by the cross-fire of machine-gun nests which the Germans had developed to a fine art.

"The dominating height of the whole region is Montfaucon, which, rising 342 meters above sea level, is more than 30 meters (100 feet) higher than any other eminence between the Meuse and the Argonne on either the German or Allied side of the old battle line. From a concrete observation post on Montfaucon it is said that the German Crown Prince watched the attack of his troops on Verdun in 1916; and Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304 which figured so prominently in that terrific struggle, are well overtopped by it. To safeguard this unrivaled point of observation the Germans had covered the seven kilometers (5 miles) which intervene between it and their front line with a multitude of defenses. But still other defenses extended far north of it, the four great Zones previously mentioned, though so closely woven together as to seem practically one, being in fact, first the Hindenburg line, then the Hagen Stellung, then the Völker Stellung, and last, a little farther back on the line of heights and woods defined by Champigneulle, Landres-St. Georges Romagne, and Briailles, the Kriemhilde Stellung.

"But, formidable as were the positions between the Meuse and the Argonne forest, the latter was in itself the strongest position of all. The forest stands upon a plateau, rising abruptly on its eastern side (Meuse) to heights of about 100 meters (300 feet) above the valley of the Aire, sloping off more gradually on the western (Champagne) side to the valley of the Aisne, into which the Aire flows through the gap of Grand Pré, about 15 kilometers (10 miles) north of La Harazée. The southern half of the plateau and forest was within the Allied line, the northern half within the German. Though they made several attacks upon it before and during 1915, the French were never able to break through the German front in the forest, and in the years which had elapsed since the last of these major attacks was made, the invaders had greatly strengthened and deepened their zone of resistance by interlacing with barbed wire the dense timber and tangled underbrush, which everywhere closed the precipitous ravines and hillsides, and by siting machine-gun emplacements and zones of cross-fire. The Argonne forest was in fact so strong that the entire scheme of attack of the First American Army and the Fourth French Army west of it was governed by the necessity of forcing its defenders from it by out-flanking rather than by direct attack."

The plan of attack was very carefully worked out. The French Fourth Army attacking west of the Argonne forest in the flat plain of the Champagne, did not have as great natural obstacles to contend with as did

the First American Army on the east of the forest. Accordingly their advances were to be a little deeper than those of the Americans in order that they might tend to outflank the Germans in front of the Americans. Objectives were carefully laid out for all attacking divisions except those divisions in the Argonne forest itself. The French and American advance on each side of the forest was to leave the Germans in a deep and narrow salient out of which they would be forced, as the Allies gradually approached from either side the cut in the forest at Grand Pré. The Allied divisions in the forest were merely to follow the retreating Germans and keep in touch with their rearguards.

The date for the attack was set for September 26th, and by September 22nd, the 33rd, 79th, 91st and 28th American Divisions and two French divisions were holding the line. The sector was very quiet, and it was planned not to bring in any new divisions until the night of September 24th, so as not to give warning to the Germans of the impending attack.

In accordance with this plan, therefore, as soon as each unit was freed from the St. Mihiel attack (Sept. 12th-15th), it began its movement toward the area behind the front between the Argonne forest and the River Meuse. Corps and army artillery and divisions in army reserve were the first to leave, and these were followed by the various divisions as soon as they were relieved. Great caution was used in bringing the troops into this sector in order that the enemy might not become aware of the intended attack in time to move in large reserves to stop it. Referring to this in his report General Pershing says:

"The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions and notably its machine-gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible, and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front, and to consume them while the enemy

was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do."

AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN OUR GREATEST BATTLE

THE front from the Meuse to the middle of the Argonne was divided into three areas and each was assigned to a corps. The

signed; reading from right to left (Meuse to the Argonne) they were:

Third Corps—General Bullard.

33rd Division (Ill. National Guard)—General Bell.

80th Division (Blue Ridge, National Army)—General Cronkhite.

4th Division (Regular Army)—General Hines.



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Major-General George Bell, Jr.

He commanded the 33rd Division on the British front near Amiens and on the Meuse.

Third Corps rested its right flank on the Meuse. In the center was the Fifth Corps, and on the left, connecting with the French in the center of the forest of the Argonne, was the First Corps. Then the divisions were as-

Fifth Corps—General Cameron.

79th Division (Penn. National Army)—General Kuhn.

37th Division (Ohio National Guard)—General Farnsworth.

91st Division (West Coast National Army)—General Johnston.

First Corps—General Liggett.

35th Division (Kans. and Mo. National Guard)—General Traub.

28th Division (Penn. National Guard)—General Muir.

77th Division (New York National Army)—General Alexander.

East of the Meuse were, in order from left to right (Meuse to the Moselle), the Seventeenth French Corps, the Second French Colonial Corps, and the Fourth American Corps. In the latter two corps facing the new German line where the St. Mihiel salient had been cut off were the 26th Division (New England National Guard), 42nd Division (Rainbow National Guard), 89th Division (Middle West National Army), 78th Division (New Jersey and New York National Army), and the 90th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Army).

These three Corps formed a part of the American First Army and they were ordered to join in the artillery bombardment and assist the attack west of the Meuse by making deep raids to their front and, in addition, the 17th French Corps, which extended to the Meuse, was charged with careful supervision and counter-battery work against German batteries which from the east bank of the Meuse might fire on American troops advancing on the west bank of the river.

630,000 AMERICAN TROOPS AND 138,000 FRENCH UNDER PERSHING

Had this Meuse-Argonne offensive of the First American Army occurred in 1914 it would have been the greatest battle in history in point of numbers alone, for General Pershing employed in this battle more than 630,000 American troops, and 138,000 French troops, a total of 768,000 men, against which the Germans opposed 362,000 men. The Meuse-Argonne attack functioned as part of Marshal Foch's big offensive in which two million Allied troops were attacking in unison from the English Channel to Verdun, on a front of 203 miles.

On the night of September 25th-26th, nine American divisions were in line, ready for the

jump-off at dawn next morning against the most formidable position on the Western front. These nine divisions gave the First American Army a rifle strength of about 108,000 in the line at the jump-off, and the number of infantry actually fighting at one time between the Meuse and the Argonne never exceeded this number. For the most part these troops had but little previous experience in actual battle. To some it was to be their first experience under fire. Behind these first line divisions were a few veteran divisions which could be counted on to give a good account of themselves under any circumstances.

Reading from right to left (from the Meuse to the Argonne) the nine divisions in line were as follows: The 33rd, which had attacked with the British on August 8th, was to clear the Meuse valley for five miles, and then face to the right and establish the line parallel to the axis of attack along the west bank of the Meuse river to protect the flank of the advancing army. On its left was the 80th, which had been in the line with the British in the active Artois sector. It was to advance straight to its front until the 33rd dropped off, when it was to become the right flank. The 4th was on the left of the 80th, and these three divisions formed General Bullard's Third Corps. The 4th was a veteran of the July offensive from the Marne to the Vesle, and was put in as the pace-maker for the new divisions. On the left of this division was the 79th, which was in the line for the first time; before it was the height of Montfaucon, which it was to capture. On its left was the 37th Division, which had spent six weeks in the line at Baccarat. Next came the 91st Division, which was in the line for the first time. Next came the 35th Division, which had been for over two months in quiet sectors in the Vosges, and was given the difficult Aire valley to take. On its left was the 28th Division, veteran of the Marne and the Vesle.

THE 28TH DIVISION'S IMPORTANT MISSION

The mission assigned to the 28th Division was the most difficult of all. It had to maintain *liaison* on the right with the division which was advancing rapidly down the Aire valley, while on its left the 77th, with which

it had also to maintain *liaison*, was in the forest itself, and would advance but slowly as the Germans were flanked out. The real mission of the 28th therefore was to swing around, pivoting on its left, and to outflank the high plateau of the Argonne, and yet always to keep advancing down the valley of the Aire. It practically amounted to facing

operation, General Pershing sent three of his own General Staff officers from G.H.Q., General Nolan (Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G.H.Q.) and Colonels Conger and Sweeney. General Nolan took command of one brigade, Colonel Conger command of the other, while Colonel Sweeney became Chief of Staff of the Division. These three under-



Copyright by Joseph Cummings Chase.

Major-General Robert Alexander

He commanded the 77th Division in the Argonne.

the forest and then side-stepping along its front. The Argonne plateau which these troops were to face was a series of promontories sticking out towards the east, and it meant constantly pulling the southernmost troops out, marching them along the front, and putting them in on the north of the line. To assist General Muir in this most delicate

stood perfectly the problem, as they had helped to work it out, and the marvelous progress made by this division in this battle was due not only to the heroism of its men, the experience and judgment of its junior officers, but also to the most skilful handling of the operation by General Muir, General Nolan, Colonel Conger and Colonel Sweeney.

The 77th Division, which had fought at Baccarat and on the Vesle, was to follow the retreating Germans through the forest. On the left of this division was the Fourth French Army; the 368th Infantry Regiment of the 92nd Division (colored, National Army) was brigaded with the 11th French Cuirassiers to maintain *liaison* between the two attacking armies.

In reserve for this attack were six divisions. Three of these, the 1st (Regular), 3rd (Regular), and 32nd (Mich. and Wis. National Guard) were veterans of all the battles in which American troops had played a part. They formed a most dependable reserve; their Staffs were experienced, the discipline was that of veterans, and the spirit and confidence in their officers would carry these troops through any obstacles. Of the three other divisions in reserve one, the 82nd (All American National Army) had proved itself in the St. Mihiel offensive, while the other two, the 29th (Blue and Gray National Guard) and the 92nd (colored National Army) had each spent a month in quiet sectors in the Vosges.

These were the positions and these the missions of the assaulting troops of the American First Army when at 11 p. m., on September 25th, 3,928 guns of all calibers from the divisional three-inch (75's) up to the fourteen-inch railroad guns, fired in unison the first shots of an artillery preparation which tore to pieces the concrete and the barbed wire of the Hindenburg line, and in the succeeding six hours upheaved the earth until it was a shambles, knocking out each German battery and making ready the way for the infantry, which went over at 5:30 on the morning of September 26th, into the greatest battle in the history of the American Army.

MEUSE-ARGONNE—FIRST PHASE

IN his report to the Secretary of War, General Pershing divides the Meuse-Argonne offensive into three phases of the fighting between the river and the forest. Covering a period of forty-seven days, on a front of seventy-two miles, this one great American offensive, in which three-quarters of a million Allied troops were engaged, and in

which 120,000 Americans became casualties, cannot be treated as a whole, but must be studied in the three natural phases which developed. The first phase covers the first eight days of the battle, September 26th until October 3rd, between the Meuse River and the Argonne forest. The second phase covers the fighting within the same limits between October 4th and October 31st. The last phase, which began on October 23rd, carried the fighting west of the Meuse as far as Sedan on the day of the armistice. East of the Meuse, the First and the Second Armies, beginning October 8th, made several advances to rectify the line and then, on the eve of the armistice the battle developed which was to isolate and surround Metz.

Operating with the Allies during the progress of this offensive were other American divisions. As the progress of the Allied advances was all important in that it kept the Germans too busily occupied on all fronts to send enough troops to any one special front to stop the Allied offensive there, the records of these divisions with the Allies is placed in between the various phases of the Argonne-Meuse battle so as to endeavor to keep before the reader the fact that the Meuse-Argonne was but a small part of the Allied offensive which brought the war to a successful termination.

ARTILLERY OPENS AT 11 P. M., SEPT. 25TH

The first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive began at 11 p. m., September 25th, when the preliminary bombardment wrecked beyond recognition the defensive works the Germans had spent four years in building. On no other front of similar extent had there been such a terrific bombardment. The aggregate of French and American artillery averaged one gun for each eight meters of front, whereas on July 15th the Germans had in the Champagne one gun for each twenty-five meters of front. In the first day the artillery between the Meuse and the Argonne fired over a quarter of a million rounds of artillery on the German forward positions and barbed wire. This so paralyzed the enemy defenders that at 5:30 a. m., when the eager assaulting waves jumped off behind the cover of their rolling barrage, they met practically

no German resistance. The infantry and machine gunners swept across the sea of mud, shell holes, shattered wire, and ruined trenches, nopping up the few German dugouts that had weathered that frightful storm of metal. The impetus of the initial attack carried these new troops many kilometers before they encountered any determined German resistance.

enemy lines on reconnaissance and bombing missions. Behind the advancing waves of infantry came the seventy-three tanks. The fall rains had turned No Man's Land into a quagmire; through this the tanks churned and wallowed with the accompanying batteries of the artillery, both falling further and further behind the infantry. During this first



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Major-General Walter H. Gordon

He commanded the 6th Division in the Vosges and in the Argonne.

It was not only infantry and artillery which drove forward on that day. Five hundred and eight French and American airplanes took the air that first morning. It was clear for the first time in weeks—ideal flying weather, and they swept the sky of every enemy plane. Continuing ahead they adjusted the fire of the large guns on the targets as they appeared, while some of them flew over and behind the

day while the tanks and artillery drove on through that awful battle-scarred terrain, the infantry without their support pressed on to the corps objective.

THE FIRST DAY'S RECORD

The day was fine, after weeks of rain, imparting fresh vigor to the attacking troops, so that by evening the right of the battle line

had passed the corps objective and was on the army objective.

The 33rd Division had cleaned up the town and the wood of Forges and had rushed along the west bank of the Meuse as far as Dannevoux. They had then faced to the right and dug in along the west bank of the river on a four-and-a-half-mile front.

tact with the 79th Division, which was held up in front of Montfaucon.

The 79th Division passed the first and second German lines by 1 p. m., only to be held up in front of the Bois de Cuisy. With the aid of tanks they fought their way through this, but it was then 4 p. m., and it was six o'clock before the assaulting lines reached the



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Major-General Joseph E. Kuhn

He commanded the 79th Division at Montfaucon, and at LeGrand Montagne, Argonne.

The 80th Division pressed on ever further until its right rested on the Meuse beyond Dannevoux, but the left of this division did not progress so far, being held up by determined resistance from the Bois de Septsarges.

The 4th Division also reached with its right flank the Bois de Septsarges, while its left flank was bent sharply back to maintain con-

foot of Montfaucon. Their artillery was not yet up when, at dusk, with the aid of two tanks, the 313th Infantry Regiment assaulted that impregnable mountain fortress, only to be hurled back by the German defenders.

The 37th Division had the dense wood, the Bois de Montfaucon, to penetrate on the jump-off, and although the machine gunners of

the enemy put up a good resistance, this division penetrated the wood and was occupying the ridge beyond and the left of the division was up on the Corps objective looking into the little town of Ivoir. The right of this division, however, was held up by the failure of the 79th Division to take Montfaucon.

The 91st Division rushed through the Bois de Cheppy and the Bois de Very and by 5 p. m. had their patrols in the town of Epinonville, six miles from the jump-off line.

The 35th swept across the abrupt crest of Vauquois, which had been shattered in the bombardment, into the sea of tangled trenches and on to the valley of the Aire, where they ran into a heavy fog which slowed down the first burst of speed and made *liaison* difficult. At Varennes they met resistance in the form of machine-gun cross-fire which practically wiped out the first assaulting waves, and it was not until tanks were brought up that the villages of Varennes and Cheppy were finally taken. The advance continued until Very was taken and the line established on the hill beyond that town.

The 28th Division pushed its right down the Aire valley past Varennes as far as Montblainville; the left (112th Inf.) going along the edge of the Argonne plateau, went too deeply into the sector of the 77th and was held up by machine guns. It did not reach its objective until late in the afternoon; it captured Hill 263, that promontory sticking out from the Argonne from which the Germans had put down such an effective fire on the 35th Division.

The 77th Division jumped off into the dense maze of the Argonne and advanced its right three kilometers (2 miles) while the left advanced slightly less; still it was well into the German lines by night and had captured immense stores.

END OF THE FIRST DAY

Thus, by dusk of that first day, the Americans were on the Army objective on the extreme right, and at all other points except Montfaucon were on the Corps objective. They had met but little resistance from the enemy except in front of Montfaucon and Varennes, and in all other points the line had

rushed forward almost unopposed until it ran into the German *Völker Stellung*, which had been pierced at two points. Meanwhile the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne forest had penetrated into the German positions in the Champagne to an average depth of over three miles, capturing many strong positions and 7,000 prisoners. The Americans had averaged four miles for the first day's advance and had taken 5,000 prisoners.

From the prisoners taken, six German divisions were identified which showed that there were still over 80,000 German troops in the area and that the front positions had been very lightly held. The defenders, stunned by the terrific artillery preparation, had offered very little resistance to the assaulting waves. The American plan of attack was now disclosed and the German Staff did not take long to reorganize their whole position. Fresh units were rushed up from the rear, the line was straightened, and by morning when the attack was renewed, it met with strong German resistance.

CAPTURE OF MONTFAUCON

Montfaucon, the dominating height from which the German Crown Prince used to view Verdun, had to be taken at once, otherwise the Germans could reinforce it. This strong position was holding up the advance in the center. The 4th Division, on the right, and the 37th Division on the left, were far beyond this height on either side of it. To leave it there uncaptured during the day would mean ruin to those troops who had passed it by on either flank. Accordingly at 7 a. m., September 27th, the 313th Infantry of the 79th Division again attacked Montfaucon, creeping up the sides of that steep hill, while the heavy artillery was pounding the top. The Germans stiffened their resistance, but this time the American doughboy would not be denied and before noon had mopped up the entire hill and the town of Montfaucon. Montfaucon was now an American observation post.

The 33rd Division on the 27th had reached their Army objective along the Meuse river. Their front was now the river, and they had to lie there under a fierce fire from the Germans on the east bank.

The 80th Division was able to advance its right flank slightly along the river on this day, but its left flank was stopped in front of Briulles-sur-Meuse. The Germans had fortified this town and it was protected by a cross-fire from the east bank, with the result that assault after assault was mown down before it.

attacks and it was not until the 4th Engineers finished building a complete artillery road with two bridges from Esnes to Malancourt, across No Man's Land, that the artillery was brought forward. In building this road 40,000 sandbags were used.

The 79th Division, after their spectacular storming of Montfaucon in the morning, spent



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Major-General Thomas B. Dugan

He commanded the 35th Division.

The 4th Division also suffered the same fate, and each attack toward Briulles on the river banks was stopped by this galling cross-fire. The left of the 4th Division, however, gained the northern edge of the Bois de Briulles, and the extreme left, 39th Infantry, went even further, but had to pull back to the Briulles-Nantillois road. The 4th Division suffered from lack of artillery in these

the afternoon mopping up the town and the ravines east of it. The 177th Infantry Brigade (313th and 314th Infantry Regiments) were too exhausted after the heroic capture of the hill to continue the attack that night to Nantillois and the Bois de Bruge and accordingly it was arranged to have the 178th Brigade relieve them during the night and attack in the morning.

The 37th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. on the 27th. The left (74th Brigade) by 9 o'clock had penetrated the Völker Stellung, while the right (73rd Brigade) met a swift German counter-attack on its flank which was drawn back to keep in touch with the 79th Division. This was driven off and before noon Ivoiry and the hill east of it were taken. The fire from the Bois de Bruge, however, forced them back and the front retired to the Montfaucon—Ivoiry road.

The 91st Division, on the first day's advance, had pierced the Völker Stellung and on the 27th progressed against Epinonville and Eclisfontaine and while it suffered heavy casualties from machine guns on its front and flanks, and especially on its left flank where it was completely out of touch with the 35th Division, it continued the advance until the front rested on the Eclisfontaine road.

The 35th Division, after its bitter experience on the first day, continued the attack at 5:30 a. m. on the second day and fought its way forward down the eastern side of the valley of the Aire until they reached Charpenry. Here the attack was checked by machine-gun fire, and forced back with severe losses. Tanks were brought up and the assault was tried again, and again the lines were withered before the town, but one battalion of artillery being available for support. The artillery was then brought up and, at 5:30 p. m. the third attack carried Charpenry and the assaulting waves went on until they had passed the town of Baulny. The 28th Division, with its peculiar mission of advancing its right and flanking the forest with its left, again made another spirited advance and forced its right (111th Inf.) 500 meters beyond Montblainville by noon on the 27th, while the left flank was in touch with the right flank of the 77th, which was in the forest itself.

The 77th Division, after its brilliant rush through the forest on the first day, could make but little progress on the succeeding days. The Germans were endeavoring to save some of their materials and the more important gun positions on the plateau, and their rearguards offered stubborn resistance to the thrusts of the 77th.

END OF THE SECOND DAY

Thus at the close of the second day of the attack the line ran from the Meuse, just below Briulles, to just north of Montfaucon. From there it ran through Ivoiry, Epinonville, Eclisfontaine, Baulny, 500 yards north of Montblainville, and thence back along the steep wooded slopes of the Argonne plateau to where the line ran through the forest, two miles from the jump-off line. West of the forest the French Fourth Army had also met determined German resistance on that second day, but had pushed ahead and were equally far advanced as the American First Army. The line held by the Americans was in reality a straight line with two big salients sticking forward into the German lines. One of these was on the extreme right of the line along the Meuse, and the other was where the 91st Division had pushed itself so far ahead at Epinonville and Eclisfontaine. Meanwhile the Argonne forest was still a salient, for the Germans, but one that was lengthening with every day's advance.

The first phase was now almost over, the American divisions were still moving forward, and many of them were on the Army objective or approaching it. The German resistance was very strong, but small gains were being made. The Germans were moving in more artillery, and the fire from the east bank of the Meuse and from that part of the Argonne plateau which faced directly into the flank of the advancing Americans was a galling flank fire which cuts morale ten times as fast as frontal fire. By the night of the second day, September 27th, the line had advanced five miles from the original jump-off line, and there were but twenty miles to go to Sedan.

THE THIRD DAY'S ADVANCE

On the morning of the 28th, the Germans counter-attacked from Briulles, but the assault was stopped by determined fire of the 80th Division. This division then attacked toward Briulles, but it was checked by the intense cross-fire from the east bank of the Meuse. Again and again during the day the division tried to take the town, but each time

it was thrown back. It did, however, extend its front along the river, which so contracted its front to the north that during the night of the 28th, it was relieved by a part of the 33rd Division (Illinois National Guard) who extended their sector to include that of the 80th along the Meuse, and the 4th Division took over the remainder of the front facing

attacked at 7 a. m. from in front of Mont-faucon, pushing their line ahead. By early afternoon the 316th Infantry had fought its way through the Bois de Beuge, capturing machine guns which were used to aid the assault over a kilometer of open lowland up and on to the wooded crest of Hill 268, where the advance troops dug in. The 315th In-



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Major-General Edward F. McGlachlin

He commanded the 1st Division, Army of Occupation.

Brieulles. The 4th was short of artillery ammunition and, being ahead, did not advance that day. A captured German battery was put into service and fired 15,000 rounds of captured ammunition back at the Germans.

The 178th Brigade (316th and 315th Infantry) of the 79th Division, which during the night had relieved the 177th Brigade,

fantry, meanwhile, with the aid of tanks entered Nantillois by 11 a. m., took the town in hand-to-hand fighting, and pushed on towards the woods around the Madeleine Farm. Here the tanks were put out of action and the advance was held up by cross-fire from the guns east of the Meuse and frontal machine-gun fire from the woods. A second attack

V-15

was tried but it was without success, and the lines were withdrawn behind Hill 274, so that by evening the brigade was dug in on either side of the Nantillois-Cunel road.

The 37th Division, which on the evening of the 27th had established its line on the Ivoir-Montfaucon road, attacked with both brigades on the morning of the 28th towards the town of Cierges. By 11 a. m. the Bois de Beuge and the Bois d'Emont were cleared, and the way was open to Cierges, 1,000 yards in front. But here the attack was stopped. The Germans poured a fierce fire from the town on the advancing waves, and filled the woods in rear, where the supports and batteries were coming into position, with mustard and phosgene gas. Despite the gas, the 55th Artillery Brigade came up and fired heavily all afternoon and at 6 p. m. a second attack was launched, but it too was stopped, and the advance halted. The lines were then established at the edge of the woods.

The 91st Division continued on the 28th its phenomenal successes of the preceding two days. The 181st Brigade (361st and 362nd Infantry) on the right smashed forward from Epinonville through the stoutly held Bois des Epinettes, and in the afternoon attack entered the Bois de Cierges and linked their right flank with the left element of the 37th Division in the Bois d'Emont. Meanwhile the 182nd Brigade (363rd and 364th Infantry) to protect its left flank, for it was far in advance of the 35th Division, crossed over into their sector and occupied the Bois Bouleaux and Serieux Farm, and then, driving ahead took Exmorieux Farm. Then later in the day in another great drive it took the Bois de Baulny and Tronsol Farm and the slopes leading down into the Gesnes brook in the Exermont valley.

The 91st Division at the close of the third day, after a skilful advance, found that instead of holding a front of two kilometers, it had a front of eight kilometers.

The 35th Division, which had reached Baulny the night before, withstood a heavy counter-attack on the morning of the 28th, and immediately after this, the division attacked. In spite of heavy cross-fire from the Argonne, the assault was carried until Chaudron Farm and the Bois de Montrebeau were cleared, and

the division was also on the heights overlooking the valley of the Gesnes creek and the strongly fortified town of Exermont which lay at the juncture of two valleys. Here they dug in on a line with the 91st Division, but somewhat to the left of their sector.

28TH DIVISION TAKES APREMONT

The 28th Division during the night of the 27th-28th executed a skilful maneuver. The plateau of the Argonne, as it slopes down to the valley of the Aire, is cut by several deep ravines running east to the river. The big noses which projected between these were the enemy strong points, and to get from one ravine to the next meant either going over the top of the nose which lay between, or going around. During the night, in order to move up and attack the next promontory, the 56th Brigade, less two battalions of the 111th Infantry which remained to hold the line in the old position and keep contact with the troops in the forest, was withdrawn from the front to the valley of the Aire, then marched down the river until they came to the front lines held by the 55th Brigade, and then marched sharply to the left; before daylight it was in position facing the strong promontory called Le Chêne Tendu. In the morning the whole line attacked and by noon the right brigade had taken Apremont, and by evening were pushing forward towards Chatel Chehery, where the attack was stopped. The 56th Brigade was held fast before Le Chêne Tendu, and while it helped the advance of the 55th Brigade, it could not advance itself.

The 77th Division meanwhile was slowly pushing its way forward with the French 1st Division in the Argonne forest itself. Long and bitter work it was in those deep wooded ravines bound with wire where the German rearguard could fight off any force which tried to rush that line. But slowly the line moved forward as the Germans were forced out of one pocket after another by the Americans and French on either side of the forest. The 28th Division was now three miles ahead outside the forest.

END OF THE THIRD DAY

The evening of the 28th of September showed the battle line in a much better posi-

tion. It had stood fast on the Meuse, where it had been so far ahead, and, along the center, it had progressed about a mile. It was slow steady fighting, but it was through the heart of the German defensive system. Each day there was less wire to pass and along the roads across the original No Man's Land the am-

gonne slightly further than the Americans had pushed east of the Meuse, and the evening of the third day showed the line evenly advanced on both sides of the forest, and the Germans in the pocket were in a very poor position in the forest itself.

The 80th Division had been squeezed out on the extreme right by the sharp bend in the Meuse, and the 33rd Division took over its front on the river. The Blue Ridge Division had made a brilliant success in those two days. It had advanced nine kilometers, captured 35 officers, 815 men, 16 pieces of artillery.

THE FOURTH DAY'S ADVANCE

On the 29th of September, the 33rd Division remained in position on the Meuse facing east. Connecting with its left flank was the 8th Brigade of the 4th Division, which during the night had relieved the 7th Brigade and the small front of the 80th Division. All attempts to advance that day were futile, and during the next three days the only advance made on the right was the mopping up of the Bois de Briulles.

The 79th Division, after an all-night preparation by the Corps and Army artillery, moved forward to the assault. The 315th and 316th Infantry Regiments managed to penetrate the Bois des Ogons, but were unable to hold the position and fell back to the jump-off line. That afternoon the 312th and 313th Infantry Regiments took over the front and under the heavy shell-fire they retreated a kilometer to the edge of the Bois de Beuge.

The 37th Division, which had seized the Bois d'Emont on the evening of the 28th, found by that morning the Germans had infiltrated behind their positions. Ten tanks were sent forward along the eastern edge of the Bois d'Emont to clean out these nests, but as they crossed the ridge the Germans directed a heavy artillery fire upon them and the tanks which were not disabled returned. Later in the afternoon a battalion of infantry tried to advance between the Bois d'Emont and the Bois de Cierges. A burst of machine-gun fire killed the Major and the attack halted. That night the few remaining men who had held the far edge of the Bois d'Emont were drawn back and the line was established south of the woods,



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Brigadier-General Edward A. Kreger
General Judge Advocate.

muniton and much needed guns were coming forward, and food, which had been so scarce those first two days, was now coming up in great quantities. Behind Cheppy at the end of the narrow gauge was the beginning of a great dump. The Germans still held Briulles on the Meuse, and from there the line ran to Cierges, which they also held. From Cierges the line ran roughly along the heights above the Exermont valley where the Gesnes creek flows, and then turned back to Apremont, and still further back to where the 77th was engaging the German rearguards in the three-mile-deep pocket of the Argonne. The French Fourth Army had advanced west of the Ar-

The 91st Division held its lines on the crest overlooking the Gesnes creek, and dug in. The 35th Division, which on the evening of the 28th also reached the crest overlooking Gesnes creek, attacked on the morning of the 29th, and carried the line down the deep ravine to the town of Exermont. Here a withering cross-fire caught the waves, and the line began to retreat. Officers were scarce, and on back towards the rear went the small groups. Some sort of a line was formed between Serieux and Chaudron Farms three kilometers back. The 28th held its ground and dug in, while the 77th Division slowly worked their way forward through the forest and gradually shortened the salient which this made into the Allied lines.

The night of the 29th things began to move behind the lines, for the situation at the front was a serious one. Not only had the advance been checked by the Germans all along the line, but three of the six divisions on the actual front had pulled out of their advance positions, and, while they had made a line in rear, there was much doubt as to whether with their shattered morale these divisions could withstand a strong counter-attack.

THE FIFTH DAY

September 30th marked no change in the American lines between the forest of the Argonne and the Meuse. But the French Fourth Army, west of the Argonne, was steadily continuing its advance. The 77th Division was the only American unit which advanced its front during this day. The Allied lines outside the forest were much further advanced than those in the forest proper, which put the Germans in a narrow salient from which they had to retreat. Slowly the 77th followed the German rearguards and each day advanced the line somewhat in the forest. It was very difficult work. The dense foliage, the deep ravines, and the barbed wire made progress extremely slow, but it was not until October 1st, that a definite defensive line was met. This line stretched east and west through the Bois de la Naze, and thence across a ravine to Binarville.

The night of the 30th, however, saw several big changes in the American battle order. The

veteran 3rd Division relieved the 79th Division on the line of the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge. The veteran 32nd Division relieved the 37th Division on the southern edge of the Bois d'Emont. The veteran 1st Division, from Army Reserve, marched up through Very and, four regiments abreast, formed skirmish line and advanced until it was stopped by German machine-gun fire, and thus took the place of the 35th Division. The 327th Regiment of the 82nd Division moved up and reinforced the 28th Division.

No attack was ordered for October 1st. The first phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive was finished. The first position of the German system was penetrated and the Allies on either side of the forest now faced the Kriemhilde Stellung. Much artillery would have to be brought forward before the assault on this formidable and last of the German defensive works might be attempted. The building of roads and light railways to connect this army of 250,000 men who had crossed this battle-worn No Man's Land of four years standing, with the supply bases behind the old front must first be finished. Roads not used and torn to shreds during four years of terrific fighting had to be remade to carry a long procession of 5-ton trucks loaded to full capacity. A small break in these roads meant hours of delay for all. Where roads were very narrow across the old barrier, military police officers at each end regulated the traffic ten minutes north, then ten minutes south, but all the while pioneer and engineer regiments worked unceasingly to keep the huge stream of traffic moving.

During the first three days of October the front was inactive, but sensitive. Each division patrolled well to its front to keep in contact with the enemy, and usually had little trouble in so doing, for the Germans were also busily engaged in bringing up artillery and machine guns to make this last line hold at all costs.

WHERE WHITTLESEY'S BATTALION WAS "LOST"

The only movement in the American lines between October 1st and October 4th was in the Argonne forest. Here on the morning of October 2nd, the 77th Division attacked the strongly fortified and wired position run-

ning through Binarville and the Bois de Naza. The position was a very strong one and no progress was made except at one point. Major Whittlesey with six companies of the 308th Infantry found a gap in the line in the bottom of a deep ravine, one mile east of Binarville. He pushed down this ravine for about 1,000 yards until it emptied into another ravine running west. At Charlevaux mill he was stopped. The remainder of the division did not advance, being held up by the German

of the latter division in the line for the attack next morning. The 91st Division, which had made such a fine record those first five days, was brought back to rest. The 181st Infantry Brigade, however, remained over, and operated under the command of the 1st Division, filling the space between the 1st and the 32nd Division.

This opening attack in the Meuse-Argonne offensive had been entrusted chiefly to National Guard and National Army Divisions for the



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

Raiding a German Trench Near Badonville

rearguards, who put up desperate resistance behind their own wire. Major Whittlesey therefore found his force alone, almost a mile in front of the division, in the bottom of a deep ravine with Germans occupying the high ground on all sides of him. The rescue of this famous "Lost Battalion" by the remainder of the division was a part of the "Second Phase" of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, which began on October 4th.


On the night of October 3rd, the 91st Division was relieved by the 64th Brigade of the 32nd Division. This put both brigades

most part inexperienced. The first two days they had swept over the German defenses with an ardor characteristic of new troops. The attack came as a surprise to the Germans, and at this time dash and enthusiasm were of more value than experience and skill would have been. Then came the 29th of September, when these inexperienced divisions met the full brunt of German resistance. The 4th and the 91st Divisions stood up and held their ground. Four other divisions, due to the lack of training and discipline, and to weak leadership on the part of junior offi-

cers and sergeants, retreated under fire. These four, the 79th, 37th, 35th, and the 368th Infantry of the 92nd (Colored National Army), unable to hold their positions, drew back without much order. Some sort of a line was formed far back from the front and immediately the veteran Regular and National Guard Divisions, the 1st, 3rd, and 32nd, who had proven their skill and discipline in former battles, were hastily rushed up to fill a wide

both at home and in France, was not conducive to the making of efficient fighters. Some units were less fortunate than others, in that their camps, billets, or sectors permitted less training than those of others. Local climatic conditions, too, had a definite bearing on this condition of affairs.

The standard for officers in some of these units was not as high as in others, and as a consequence a few of the units went into bat-



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

Where Thousands of American Heroes Lie Buried "Over There"

The cemetery at Romagne, Argonne, with the graves of American soldiers who fell in the Meuse-Argonne battles. German prisoners were employed in caring for the graves and in erecting crosses.

breach in the line and to take up the Second Phase of the offensive.

There were isolated cases in which a division or a part of a division did not carry out the instructions of higher authority with that dash and vigor so necessary to and so evident throughout our combat operations; but these cases were very rare and no doubt there were certain combinations of unfortunate circumstances to which these rare failures may be attributed.

The short period of training and the unavoidable rapidity with which it was imparted,

tle with officers who were either not capable or insufficiently trained for the all-important and highly psychological duty of leading their fellows in battle.

Whatever may have been the causes for the failure of these units in their baptism of fire, each, without exception, gave proof in succeeding actions and trials that when these causes had been removed or corrected, they could retrieve and regain that enviable place in our victorious Army to which their American blood and associations in the American Expeditionary Force entitled them.

MEUSE-ARGONNE—SECOND PHASE

Day by Day Story of the Fighting (Oct. 4th-14th) Which Pierced the Germans' Lines and Pinched the Enemy Out of the Argonne Forest

BY October 3rd, the Allied offensive which was being pushed on every front from the English Channel to the Holy Land had met with signal success. Bulgaria made peace on October 1st, the British and French Armies entered St. Quentin on October 2nd, the British in Palestine were in Damascus on October 3rd, Armentieres was captured October 3rd, and the Fourth French Army on the same day began the second phase of its attack west of the Argonne. On the morning of the 4th, the First American Army began the Second Phase of its attack in the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The advance of the Fourth French Army west of the Argonne had passed Binarville; the line stretched northwest, with Condé-les-Autry, Marvaux, and Somme-Py well within the French lines, and Reims was almost delivered from its four years' siege. By the night of October 3rd the First American Army, on the eastern side of the Argonne forest, was ready to continue its advance. For four days there had been no forward movement by this army. This was due to no lack of enthusiasm or readiness on the part of the troops in the line, for each day they stayed there gave the Germans another day to dig in and to mass more machine guns. The delay was due to the necessity of building roads across the morass of the old No Man's Land for the transport of artillery and ammunition.

OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME

Of all the Meuse-Argonne fighting, the Second Phase was the hardest, and the fighting there between October 4th and 14th was the hardest which the American Army encountered in this war. The terrain was almost insurmountable. Between the Argonne forest and the Meuse river, a distance of 15 miles, the First American Army had in line on October 4th. from the Meuse river west

toward the forest: the 33rd Division (facing east along the river), 4th, 80th, 3rd, 32nd, 1st, 28th, and 77th Divisions (the latter within the forest). The American Army front stretched in a straight line from Briulles on the Meuse to Apremont on the Aire. In front of it lay the Kriemhilde Stellung, the last of the German lines of defense in this sector. It was ideally sited for defense. The Aire river here ran close in beside the eastern side of the forest, and just west of it lay the valley of Exermont with the Gesnes creek, running west. Immediately behind this was a group of wooded hills and ravines which seemed to have been piled in there together to make this place impassable to any assault. It formed a barrier three miles in depth and three miles in width, and before taking it, the assaulting troops would have to cross a mile of flat wooded plain, push down the Gesnes valley, and then force their way into these wooded heights. It also must be borne in mind that the Germans had spent four days of comparative quiet in siting their machine guns, and in emplacing four crack divisions for the defense. From this position the Germans could overlook the whole Meuse valley to the east and the Aire valley to the west. This group of hills, covering nine square miles in the middle of the Meuse-Argonne battlefield, was the key position commanding the whole American advance. And to the old 1st Regular Division the order was given on October 3rd to capture them.

KEY POSITION HELD BY THE 1ST

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Palmer in *Collier's Weekly*, paid this tribute to the 1st Division, writing from the headquarters of the First Army:

"I think that possibly when the 1st Division went into the Argonne battle it was the most efficient American Division that ever wore shoe leather; if it were not, then perhaps the 2nd

was—as all men of the 2nd will agree. We were all thrilled when the 1st took the place of the 35th and advanced over the ground where the 35th had fought desperately. The dead of the 35th were in groups in the Exermont ravine. When the men of the 1st saw them, they knew how good it was to be veterans under exacting competent direction; for veterans do not bunch under the enemy's fire. This is giving the enemy a target. And Summerall was in command. He had led the 1st in the drive toward Soissons. . . . The 1st, with Summerall in command! We knew it would go through! It always had gone through. This was the part cast for the 1st in the A.E.F."

(In relating the daily activities of the various divisions, the actions of each day of the attack will be treated singly until the main attack is completed and then the treatment will be by divisions or areas. For the main attack, however, the description will begin with the division resting on the Meuse and continue through each division to the west until the Argonne forest is reached. It is impossible at present to obtain the necessary data concerning the French daily advances west of the Argonne other than those relating to the 2nd and 36th American Divisions fighting under French command. But it should be borne in mind that the French were day by day advancing west of the forest, and that, be-



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

A German Dugout Used for a First Aid Station

It was captured in the Argonne offensive and converted into headquarters for the 3rd Battalion, 103rd Infantry, 26th Division.


The German strength in this position was already great, and as every day saw enemy reinforcements being moved into it, the attack was ordered as soon as the artillery could be put in position. Accordingly on the 4th of October at 5:30 a. m., without any artillery preparation, but with as dense a barrage as was possible from the guns which were in position the attack along the entire front of the American Army between the Meuse and the Argonne was launched.

tween October 10th and 13th, the French broke the German lines there, and forced the enemy to retire to the Aisne. This advanced the French lines 15 kilometers (10 miles) beyond where the American lines were east of the forest. At no time after the start of the offensive on September 26th were the French lines not further advanced west of the forest than were the American lines east of the forest. In other words the French Fourth Army was playing at least as big a part in squeezing the enemy out of the Argonne forest as was our own Army—a fact which is often lost sight of in studying the minutiae of the attack of the American Army.)

OPERATIONS FROM DAY TO DAY

THE line on the night of October 3rd ran from the Meuse, just south of Briulles, which the Germans held and had heavily fortified, southwest along the Briulles-Nantillois road to Nantillois, which lay in the American lines. Thence it ran along the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge to the town of Cierges, which the Americans also held. From there

after another until there was left but one officer and seven men, who withdrew under orders on the night of October 3rd, as the assault and barrage would begin the next morning back on the line Serieux Farm-Chaudron Farm, and cover the intervening territory. From Chaudron Farm, the line ran north of Apremont to Binarville, where it joined the line of the French Fourth Army. This was the line from which the First



Within Range of Enemy Guns

During an artillery duel, two nine-inch shells crashed through the same hole in the roof and wall to burst in the mud just beyond the road.

the line ran along the northern edges of the Bois de Cierges and the Bois de Baulny, and ran out to include Tronsol Farm. Here the line dropped sharply back, at a right angle 2,000 yards to Serieux Farm. The effort of the 26th Infantry, the right regiment of the 1st Division, which had been stopped on October 1st at Serieux Farm, to advance its lines by strong patrols to Tronsol Farm, had met with the most deadly fire. One patrol of two officers and fifty men did reach a point just west of this point; here they stayed, surrounded on four sides, fighting off one attack

American Army jumped off at 5:30 a. m. on October 4th in the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

THE FIRST DAY

THE 33rd Division did not attack, as their front was the River Meuse. The 4th Division did not attempt to assault the large town of Briulles, but instead attempted to go around it by the left. Accordingly on the morning of the 4th, the 58th and 59th Infantry Regiments jumped off from the Briulles-Nantillois road. In the first rush,

these two regiments, despite a hail of German machine-gun bullets, swept down the shallow ravine of the Wassieu brook, followed their barrage closely through the Bois de Fays, crossed the Cunel-Briulles road, and entered the Bois de Foret. It was a beautiful operation which carried the line forward three kilometers (2 miles) and pierced the Kriemhilde-Stellung on its eastern end.

The 80th Division, jumping off from in front of Nantillois, was not able to take the Bois des Ogons. This wooded crest offered perfect fire for the German machine guns to cover the gradual approaches from three sides, and with the Madeleine Farm in the center on the Nantillois-Cunel road, this little hill with its wood, just southwest of the Bois de Fays, menaced the flank of the 4th Division on the right, so when all attempts to take the Bois des Ogons failed, the 4th Division was forced to pull back its advanced units to the northern edge of the Bois de Fays, and at that, there was an exposed flank of more than a mile on its left. The 80th Division had advanced over a mile across two flat ravines that day and had made two desperate assaults on the Bois des Ogons, but the 317th and 318th Infantry, failing to take the wood, established the line for the night just to the south of it.

The 3rd Division, attacking from the Nantillois-Cierges road, immediately met intense resistance. They crossed the open and were held up by that part of the Bois des Ogons which lies west of the Nantillois-Cunel road. Here the 7th and 4th Infantry were stopped by a withering fire from the woods.

The 32nd Division, which had taken over the sectors of the 37th and 91st Divisions, attacked with all four infantry regiments in the line towards the Bois de la Morine, which necessitated pushing down the deep ravine of the Gesnes creek and up the other side. The light barrage was insufficient, and the Germans swept the ground with such fire that no advance was made, the line remaining at Tronsol Farm.

HONORS AGAIN TO THE 1ST DIVISION

The 1st Division, in order from right to left, 26th, 28th, 18th, 16th Infantry, attacked across the open plain and into the Bois de Montrebeau on the rising ground, where four

picked German divisions were entrenched. There had been no artillery preparation, and it was here that the Germans had elected to break the attack of the whole American offensive. In speaking of the action of the 1st Division in taking the Bois de Montrebeau on October 4th, the *Stars and Stripes* says: "The attack plans had been carefully prepared and they were carried out with grim precision and unflagging courage in the face of an opposition whose bitterness has seldom been equalled and at a cost of such losses as might well break the stamina of the very best troops." All day long those fast thinning ranks fought their way forward across two miles of rolling wood-dotted plains. Regimental commanders in this division had learned not to rush around the front trying to direct five or six men, but to rely on the lieutenants who were commanding the companies, while they themselves established headquarters along the axis of *liaison* and from there jumped one battalion through another the moment they saw that the leader had temporarily lost its punch. Battalions would thus jump each other three or four times during a day, but without the slightest confusion. The officers and men of these regiments were highly efficient fighters; the troops the bravest that ever wore the uniform. By night the left had reached Fleville, meeting little resistance in the Aire valley, while the center was held up along the crests overlooking the Exermont ravine. The barrage had been thin that day, due to no fault of the gunners who fired with their guns red hot, but the division was on a front of five kilometers, and there were only the 48 "Seventy-fives" to fire a barrage to protect infantry advancing on a front of 5,000 yards. One gun per hundred yards of front is scarcely any barrage at all. All day long those gunners, apparently heedless of the terrible hail of German shells, fired their guns at bursting speed, while the infantry quietly took their staggering losses and went through.

GALLANT WORK OF THE 28TH AND 77TH

The 28th Division also assaulted on the 4th; the 109th and 110th Infantry Regiments drove down the west bank of the Aire river in company with the 1st Division on the east bank, for two kilometers that morning, until they



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The Commander of the "Lost Battalion" and His Rescuer

On the left, Major Charles Whittlesey, commander of the "Lost Battalion"; on the right, Major Kenney of the 3rd Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Division, who was the first to go to the relief of the missing battalion.

were stopped by machine-gun cross-fire from Abbatiale Farm on the east bank and Chatel Chehery on the west bank. Under intense machine-gun fire some elements of the division forded the river and at seven in the evening took Abbatiale Farm, Pleinchamps Farm, and placed the extreme right of the 28th Division on the Gesnes creek at the foot of the Exermont ravine. Meanwhile the left of the division mopped up Le Chêne Tondou, that promontory of the Argonne plateau which had been such a menace to the flank, and that night the line of the 28th ran almost north and south, at right angles to the main battle line, facing Chatel Chehery and the Argonne plateau.

The 77th Division, in the Argonne forest, had on October 2nd begun the assault on the German entrenched and heavily wired line running east from Binarville. In this dense forest the troops became much involved, while the artillery was practically powerless. The battalions on the front had orders to press on, regardless of flanking units, but none were able to make the slightest advance, save one. The 1st Battalion of the 308th Infantry, under Major Charles S. Whittlesey, and a detachment of the 307th Infantry, at about 4 p. m. on the 2nd, found a weak spot in the enemy lines, and pushed through. They advanced down a narrow canyon until it emptied into the deep valley of the Charlevaux creek at the Charlevaux mill. By this time they were over a mile in advance of the remainder of the division. That night the Germans infiltrated on to the plateau which dominated the valley and Whittlesey's detachment found themselves cut off from all communication with the rear. Carrier pigeons were released telling of their plight, and immediately the division began making every possible effort to relieve this force. On the night of October 2nd, the 154th Brigade attacked, and on the 4th the entire division attacked the entrenched line, but made no progress.

THE NIGHT OF THE FIRST DAY

This was the situation, then, on the night of the first day of the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The line ran from just south of Briulles on the Meuse, north

of the Bois de Fays, then back and south of the Bois des Ogons, thence north of Cierges to Tronsol Farm, whence it ran along the crest overlooking the Exermont valley and included Chehery. Here it turned due south-west and included Le Chêne Tondou and ran from there to Binarville in the Argonne forest, where it joined with that of the Fourth French Army. Some ground had been gained almost the whole length of the line, but the big gains were where the German resistance had been greatest, on the fronts of the 1st and 28th Divisions. That night was a strenuous one on that front. Food had to be taken to the front line troops half frozen in the sharp chill of October, and the German artillery was beating the "Devil's Tattoo" over every inch of the country. Telephone line-men went out constantly to repair the wires which the leading battalions had strung out as they went forward, and before dawn the orders for the next day's attack received and sent forward to the leading battalions. Battalion runners, after going forward with the assault and carrying messages as to its progress all day, had to keep going all night with reports and orders for the next day. None but the best men could be runners in such an action.

THE SECOND DAY

ON the morning of October 5th, the attack was resumed. The 4th Division, on the extreme right, did not advance, but held its line which was already a mile ahead of that of the divisions on its left, in the Fond-de-Ville-aux-Bois on the northern edge of the Bois de Fays.


The 80th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. All day long the fighting went on. The artillery played heavily upon the Bois des Ogons and finally at 6 p. m. under cover of dusk, the final assault carried the wood, and the line was established on the northern edge of the Bois des Ogons. The 3rd Division attacked in conjunction with the 80th and by the end of the day had seized that part of the Bois des Ogons which lay on their front. A sergeant and 20 men of the 4th Infantry penetrated the Bois de Cunel, but as the machine-gun fire was so intense that moving forward more men was impossible, this gal-

lant party had to be withdrawn. Madeleine Farm was the center of most of the resistance on that front, and, until this was reduced, no forward movement was possible.

32ND OCCUPIES GESNES

The 32nd Division, which on the 4th had not been able to advance, arranged for artillery preparation on those points which offered the most resistance, and, at dawn, the infantry attacked, and this time smashed through the intense German fire. Down the slopes of the Exermont ravine they rushed, waded the Gesnes creek, and assaulted and took the Bois de la Morine, on the opposite heights a mile west of Gesnes. All this was done before noon, and in the advance of two kilometers they took 200 prisoners. That afternoon, de-

poured a withering storm of metal into the lines. The assaulting troops of the 1st Division came through it all, but with heavy losses. The 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry, 30 officers and 1,000 men, went over the crest, down into the ravine, and up the steep banks on the far side and established the line on the other side of a little clump of woods. When the count was made, there were left of this battalion but 6 officers and 285 men. Here the 1st Battalion jumped through the 2nd and carried the line on to the objective, the southern edge of the Bois de Moncy. Hill 240 in the Bois de Boyon was taken by the 18th and 28th Infantry Regiments in a smashing attack, while the 16th Infantry rushed down the valley of the Aire and seized the town of Fleville. That afternoon the 26th



The Lewis Machine Gun

Used by the Americans in their advance in the Argonne.

spite a terrific hostile fire, they advanced again and took the Bois du Chêne-Sec. This in conjunction with the advance of the 3rd Division on the right, outflanked the town of Gesnes, and it was occupied that night by the 32nd Division.

HALFWAY THROUGH THE KRIEMHILDE STELLUNG

The 1st Division, on the crests south of the Exermont ravine, also resumed the attack on the 5th. The Germans had filled the Exermont ravine with machine guns, but—what was worse—on the hills opposite, not a thousand yards away, they had placed several batteries of three-inch guns which fired directly into the advancing waves. Four German divisions opposed the advance across this deep ravine. Their artillery swept the approaches with a deadly fire, while the machine guns

Infantry fought its way forward through the Petit Bois until it had taken Arietal Farm and was well up on the flank of the Bois de Moncy. That night an order was received for the 26th Infantry to send two companies into the Bois de Moncy and seize Hill 269, which wooded crest dominated the front of the 32nd Division. Companies were not very large after the staggering losses of those two days, but with such as they were, one Captain, a second Lieutenant and 63 men seized and held the wood and the hill in the face of overpowering numbers of the enemy. Three more first-class, rested German divisions were identified on the front of the 1st Division that day, which brought the total to seven German divisions through which the 1st had advanced in two days. That night the line of the 1st formed a big salient sticking out into the German lines and overlapping both at Fle-

ville and Hill 269 the sectors of the divisions on the right and left. They were over half-way through the formidable nine square miles of hills of the Kriemhilde Stellung.

ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE "LOST BATTALION"

The 28th Division did not advance on this day, but mopped up and consolidated its positions. The 77th Division, in the Argonne, made another vain attempt to advance its lines in the forest to rescue Major Whittlesey and his six companies (the "Lost Battalion"), but their lines remained immovable.

Thus on the night of October 5th, the line ran from just south of Briulles on the Meuse, due west, north of the Bois de Fays, thence southwest to the Bois des Ogons, thence south of the Madeleine Farm to the northern outskirts of Gesnes, thence to the Bois du Chêne Sec, thence due north to Hill 289 and west from there to Fleville. From there the line dropped back at right angles along the west bank of the Aire to La Forge (opposite Chatel Chehery), where it crossed the river and entered the Argonne forest immediately north of Le Chêne Tondou, and from there, south of the Bois de Naza, to Binarville. The whole line had advanced on this day except in and alongside the Argonne forest, and the total advance for the two days was five kilometers, where the 1st Division had smashed through the German center of resistance.

GERMANS FORCED INTO THREATENED SALIENT

The French Fourth Army was also making big inroads into the last German line west of the Argonne, and it was on this same day that the 2nd American Division (9th and 23rd Regulars, 5th and 6th Marines), which was operating as a part of General Gouraud's Army, smashed through and took Blanc Mont, an operation which let the whole line advance. By the night of October 5th, therefore, the lines on both sides of the Argonne were advanced five miles beyond Binarville, where the Germans were still standing fast. This meant that the enemy was in a salient already five miles long in the forest, that the Allies were fast approaching the opening in the forest at Grand Pré, where the Aire cuts the Argonne plateau and flows into the Aisne. An advance of three more kilometers on either

side of the forest would cut off those Germans in the salient who were opposing the 77th and they would have to surrender. It was evident that the Germans would therefore speedily pull out of this part of the Argonne forest and evacuate the plateau south of Grand Pré within the next few days.

That night the 82nd Division took over the right half of the 28th Division's sector from Fleville south along the west bank of the Aire as far as La Forge. The swift advance of the 1st Division to Fleville, and the inability of the 77th to advance in the forest had held the 28th Division immobile, as the front had been extended by this time to seven kilometers. The splitting of the sector with the 82nd enabled the 28th to regroup for the attack on Chatel Chehery while the 82nd attacked Cornay. The taking of both of these towns, which nestled close against the steep wall of the Argonne plateau was necessary in order to clear the Aire valley and complete the squeezing of the Germans out of the Argonne.

THE THIRD DAY

OCTOBER 6th, the third day of the Second Phase, witnessed very slight local advances only; here and there the line was straightened out. The 4th Division withstood several determined counter-attacks, being far ahead of the line held by the 80th and the 3rd Divisions, its line formed a salient with Briulles on the right, still held by the Germans, and the Germans still holding Madeleine Farm. For two hours that afternoon a regiment of 6-inch rifles played on this group of small buildings; at 2 p. m. the 80th and the 3rd Divisions attacked, but wave after wave of their troops withered in that galling machine-gun and artillery fire, and the assault was repulsed.


"LOST BATTALION" STILL ISOLATED

The 32nd Division's Artillery Brigade rejoined the division and relieved the 55th Brigade, and the division did not attack on this day. The 1st Division held its front, which was still far in advance of that of the 32nd on its right and of the 82nd on its left, and reorganized in greater depth, placing the 1st Engineers on the reserve line and

moving the artillery up. The 82nd Division spent the day in completing the move into position, while the 28th reorganized for an attack on the next day. The 77th attacked

munition for the guns. Meanwhile the air service was busy locating sensitive points in the enemy's rear for the artillery. That day the French Fourth Army continued their attack; the 2nd American Division delivered its last attack west of the Argonne, and the 36th Division was brought up to relieve it.

AIRPLANES




THE FOURTH DAY

ON October 7th, the right of the line did not attempt to advance. The only divisions which attacked that day were the three on the extreme left, the 82nd, 28th, and the 77th. The French west of the forest and the American right were well up on their objectives, but the Germans in the Argonne were still holding up the American left. Accordingly these three divisions attacked at 5 a. m.

THE 82ND'S INITIAL ASSAULT

The 82nd Division, now participating for the first time in an actual assault, jumped off from the line Fleville-La Forge, across the Aire towards the two dominating hills, 223 and 180, north of Chatel Chehery. The division attacked with one brigade in the line. The 327th Infantry on the right crossed the Aire by fords and assaulted Hill 180. With great dash these fresh troops climbed the steep

BALLOONS



The War with Germany, by Leonard P. Ayres

Aeroplanes and Balloons Brought Down in Action

again to relieve the "Lost Battalion," but failed to advance.

While October 6th saw no change in the front, the rear areas were busily engaged, despite terrific German shell fire, in moving forward once more all the artillery of the Corps and Army, in bringing the tanks together and getting them ready for action, but especially in bringing forward artillery am-

sides of that solitary hill and, taking 44 prisoners, continued northwest across the intervening valley until they were checked on the Cornay-Chatel-Chehery road. The 328th Infantry, however, which was to take Hill 223, became lost in the darkness while coming up to the jump-off line, and did not begin the attack until 10 a. m. Meanwhile the commander of the 28th Division, to protect his

troops from enfilade fire, had rushed a company of infantry and a company of machine gunners to this hill, which they seized and held until 1 p. m., when the 328th Infantry relieved them on its crest. The relief came just in time to ward off a heavy and determined counter-attack.

HONOR TO THE 28TH

The 28th Division attacked at five in the morning, using foot bridges which the 103rd Engineers had built the night before, and assaulted the town of Chatel Chehery. This town lies about one-third of the way up the slope of the Argonne plateau, and consists of one street which clings to the steep hill. Behind the town is the plateau, and flanking the town on either end are Hills 223 (north) and 244 (south). The assault was one of the most difficult missions in the entire offensive, and not only great courage, but also the greatest skill was necessary to seize this town and corner of the great Argonne plateau. Advancing with great dash and gallantry, in 45 minutes the troops were in the town, an hour and a quarter later the entire town was mopped up and the 112th Infantry was in possession. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment was on Hill 244, and Hill 223 was quickly seized to protect from enfilade fire from the north. By this action the pressure on this front was relieved and that afternoon the 28th and 82nd Divisions assaulted the plateau and forced a footing thereon, thereby cutting the narrow gauge line which supplied the Germans further south in the forest. The 111th Infantry of the 28th Division had also attacked that morning, and in *liaison* with the right of the 77th Division had forced their way from Le Chêne Tendu through that part of the woods called La Viergette, to the Bois de Taille l'Abbé, where they met the right flank of the 28th Division which had come down from the north; thus another big promontory was cut off, this time from the rear, and the lines of the 28th were established in the Argonne forest itself.

"LOST BATTALION" RESCUED

The 77th Division, which during the last four days had been vainly trying to push forward its line to the rescue of the "Lost Bat-

talion," succeeded on this day. A point being found where the German lines were weak, troops were rushed in behind the German positions, and by thus infiltrating, they rendered the line untenable, and the enemy gradually retired. About nine that night the advancing Americans (307th Infantry) came upon Major Whittlesey and his much shattered command. They had stuck it out, despite the fact that they had suffered 50 percent. casualties, and were in a state of exhaustion, but still their spirits were high. On the morning of this day the Germans had sent them an offer of surrender; this had been treated with the utmost contempt, and the defenses were strengthened. The rescue of the "Lost Battalion" was not all that the 77th Division accomplished on this day, for in doing this they broke the backbone of the German line in the forest. The 28th and 82nd Divisions were advancing in the forest at Chatel Chehery, where the forest was very narrow, and as this was in rear of the German line, the enemy's retreat out of the Argonne south of Grand Pré was assured. This advance of the left of the American line also relieved the left flank of the 1st Division (16th Infantry) from the galling fire which for three days the Germans had poured from the hills on three sides into the Fleville salient, where, on the flat river bottom the 1st had clung to its position despite a most bitter plunging machine-gun fire.

THE FIFTH DAY

ON October 8th, the success of the day before on the left of the line was exploited, and violent counter-attacks were repulsed on the right, and that night several changes were effected in the American battle order. The 4th Division again withstood a strong counter-attack, the 80th, 3rd, and 32nd held their ground, and the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division was put in the line between the 1st and the 32nd Divisions, and the 32nd was shifted over towards the right and took over part of the front of the 3rd. The 80th Division relieved the 28th, and the 77th, now that the Germans were retreating on its front, maintained a steady but slow advance through the forest towards Grand Pré. The 28th Division in its 13 days of almost continuous

fighting in one of the most difficult positions, had carried its line forward with the greatest gallantry, and had earned a respite from this fierce battle.

THE MEUSE IS CROSSED

On October 8th, the First American Army extended its attack to the east bank of the Meuse. No advance had been made on the right bank of the river and the progress on

Ornes, Regneville. The French Seventeenth Corps held the line on the right bank of the Meuse from Regneville (Samegneux) east almost as far as Beaumont and Ornes, while the 33rd American Division held the line along the Meuse from Regneville almost to Brieculles. For this attack the 33rd was transferred to the Seventeenth French Corps of the First American Army, and the 29th Division was sent from reserve to the First Army to



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

With the 77th Division in the Forest of Argonne

These men are members of Headquarters Co. H, 2nd Battalion, 307th Infantry.

the left bank had made the advance of the First Army a big salient into the German lines. This gave the Germans on the heights east of the Meuse the opportunity to fire into the right flank of the advancing Americans, and also, as the lines went on, exposed an ever increasing flank where the Germans might attack in rear of the American Army. Accordingly it was decided to seize the triangle of hills on the right of the Meuse, included roughly by the three towns, Brieculles,

take part in the attack. The hills were strongly held by the Germans, and accordingly it was planned to deliver a surprise attack. The 33rd was to cross the Meuse on its front, while the two French Divisions (18th and 26th) were to attack on their front. The 58th Brigade of the 29th Division (115th and 116th Infantry) was brought up and put in between the 33rd Division, and the 18th French Division, at Brabant. During the night of the 7th, French and American engi-

V-16

neers built four bridges across the Meuse at Consevoie, Brabant, Regneville, and Samegneux, and at 5 a. m. on the morning of the 8th, without any artillery preparation, but with a dense rolling barrage, the 17th French Corps (two American and two French Divisions) attacked. The Germans were surprised and the assault was pushed rapidly ahead. Little trouble was encountered in crossing the river, and one after another the difficult hills were stormed and taken. The troops converging from two directions maintained perfect *liaison* and by nightfall the attack had reached all its objectives, center resting just west of the Bois de Consevoie.

The line of the First Army by evening of the 8th ran from just west of Ornes, on the right, exclusive of the Bois de Consevoie, to the Meuse at Dannevoux, thence along the river to just south of Briuelles, and from there west to Fleville as it had stood for some days, and from Fleville the line ran just south of Cornay and thence through the Argonne on about the level of Chatel Chehery to where it joined the ever advancing line of the Fourth French Army.

THE SIXTH DAY

ON October 9th, every division on the front from Ornes to the Argonne attacked. By evening the line had swung well forward and the Kriemhilde line was pierced at several points. It will be remembered that the three German lines of defense met at Ornes, and the direction of the attack of the Seventeenth French Corps on the right of the Meuse was almost parallel to these three lines. The Germans had now recovered from their surprise, and it was found necessary to swing the attack to face east, instead of north, so as to face the bitter fire from these powerful lines of defense. This attack therefore on the second day pivoted on the 26th French Division, and the others swung around through a big arc to the left, this movement being skilfully executed under a fierce fire. The advance continued all that day, and by night, despite several strong counter attacks, the line ran from in front of Ornes, exclusive of the Bois du Chaume, to Sivry on the Meuse whence it followed the river to Briuelles which the Germans still held in great force.

HARD TO CATCH UP WITH THE 4TH

The 4th Division did not attack in the morning, as it was still over a mile in advance of the line held by the 80th, 3rd and 32nd Divisions. Accordingly on the morning of the 9th, these three divisions attacked resolutely to their front, and in the face of bitter resistance took Madeleine Farme, the Bois de Cunel, and advanced the line to the outskirts of Romagne, Cunel, and the Cunel-Briuelles road. In the afternoon the 4th and 80th Divisions attempted to advance again, but found the woods soaked with gas, and the attack was abandoned.

The 1st Division and the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division which was attached to the 1st attacked again on this day. There was still one row of hills to be taken, and to make things worse the whole front of seven kilometers was in a dense woods and a fresh German division was identified on the right flank of the 1st, which made eight first-class German divisions on this front. The artillery of the division was much too inadequate to give any protection for an advance. For several days advances had been tried, and now the ranks were thinned so that the drive had not the impetus of new troops. General Summerall then worked out the plan by which the artillery of the whole division concentrated on the front of one infantry regiment at a time. Advancing in succession from left to right, at half hour intervals, the 1st, although weakened to a mere skeleton division, with many of the companies ably commanded by sergeants, and majorities given on the field to battalion commanders who were so skilfully pushing their little commands up the sides of the hills, smashed through the final line of hills in face of a terrific fire, and open country lay before it.

ABANDON HOPE YOU WHO OPPOSE THE 1ST

A German infantry colonel who was captured in this assault, early the next morning made a statement in which he paid a tribute to the 1st Division, which had distinguished itself by its brilliant assaults on positions where the German Command had expected to check the drive of the Americans.

GERMANY'S TRIBUTE TO THE 1ST DIVISION.

G-2

HEADQUARTERS 1ST DIVISION.

American E. F.

October 10, 1918.

Today a captured Colonel of the German Army arrived at our Division cage. He was cold, hungry and broken in spirit. After four years of severe fighting and constant service in his army, he was taken prisoner by the troops of the victorious 1st Division. The following is the substance of his remarks:

"Yesterday I received orders to hold the ground at all costs. The American barrage advanced toward my position and the work of your artillery was marvelous. The barrage was so dense that it was impossible for us to move out of our dugouts. Following this barrage closely were the troops of the 1st Division. I saw them forge ahead and I knew that all was lost. All night I remained in my dugout, hoping vainly that something would happen that would permit me to rejoin my army. This morning your troops found me and I am here, after four years, a prisoner.

"Yesterday I knew that the 1st Division was opposite us, and I knew that we would have to put up the hardest fight of the war. The 1st Division is wonderful, and the German Army knows it. We did not believe that within five years the Americans could develop a division such as the 1st Division. The work of its infantry and artillery is worthy of the best armies in the world."

The above tribute to the 1st Division comes from one of Germany's seasoned field officers. It is with great pleasure that we learn that even our enemies recognize the courage, valor, and efficiency of our troops. The work done by the 1st Division during the past few days will go down in history as one of those memorable events which will live in the hearts of the American people for generations to come.

Every member of this command well deserves the enthusiastic congratulations from, and the high respect in which it is held by our comrades in arms and by the entire American nation.

The above will be published to every member of this command.

By Command of Major General Summerall:

THOS. R. GOWENLOCK,

Captain Infantry, U.S.A.

A.C. of S. G-2.

PERSHING DIVIDES COMMAND

Meanwhile on the right of the 1st, the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division was smashing its way forward through the Bois de Moncy and

the Bois des Gesnes. The patrol which the 26th Infantry had sent out to seize and hold Hill 269, on the front of the advancing 181st Brigade, had been having a hot time on that hill. The 1st Battalion of the 1st Engineers had been sent up to take over the defense. Without automatic rifles, the engineers had dug themselves in in a hollow square, and lay there blazing away with their rifles, until two companies of the 181st Brigade were brought up through the 26th Infantry's sector, relieving the engineers whose gallant defense of the hill made possible the advance of the 181st Brigade through the dense woods.

The 82nd and the 77th Divisions were both heavily engaged in the Argonne. The Germans were retreating, but their rearguards made a stand on the 9th on the line Lancon-Cornay-Fleville, and here the two divisions made small progress but by night had penetrated and made untenable the enemy line.

On October 9th, General Pershing divided his huge command into two armies. To the command of the First Army he appointed Major General (later Lieutenant General) Hunter Liggett, from the First Corps, and set the limits of the First Army between the Argonne forest and the old St. Mihiel sector. The First and Second Armies joined at Fresnes-en-Woevre. To the command of the Second Army he appointed Major General (later Lieutenant General) Robert Lee Bullard, from the Third Corps.

THE SEVENTH DAY

ON October 10th the new line was exploited. On the right of the Meuse, the 29th Division finally worked both of its brigades into the line and that night General Morton took over the command of the sector. The 33rd Division continued the advance, which was necessarily very slow, as the German resistance was intense, and by night the line east of the Meuse was advanced nearer the German triple line of defense. West of the Meuse the 4th Division seized the small woods lying north of the Briulles-Cunel road, and the advance elements entered again the Bois de Foret, and once more had to be withdrawn due to the machine-gun cross-fire. The 80th Division, whose patrol from the 319th Infantry had entered Cunel and surprised and

captured two German battalion staffs, 30 officers and 60 men, tried in vain to assault the town on the 10th, but were everywhere repulsed.

The 3rd Division also attempted to continue the attack on the 10th, and gained but little ground.

The 32nd Division reformed its line in con-

while Chevières was taken by the 77th, and *liaison* was established with the French Fourth Army through the Grand Pré Gap in the Argonne forest.

DIRE STRAITS OF GERMAN ARMY

The 36th Division, in the center of the Fourth French Army west of the Argonne, on



U. S. Signal Corps photo

“Holed-in” On Hill 240

Official photograph of men of the 18th Infantry, 1st Division, advancing a yard at a time towards the German position, near Exermont, Argonne, October 11, 1918.

formity with that of the 181st Brigade of the 91st Division, which continued on to where the 1st was pushing its line of exploitation beyond the Romagne-Sommerance road.

The 82nd and 77th Divisions attacked again on the morning of the 10th, and pushed on through the forest until night, when they emerged in the Grand Pré gap, with everything south of there cleared of the enemy. Marcq and Cornay were seized by the 82nd

the afternoon of the same day also found that the Germans had withdrawn from their front, a new German battle line being established north of the Aisne river. This put the French, west of the forest, again fifteen kilometers further advanced than the Americans east of the forest. It was on this day that the British announced the fall of Cambrai, which with the capture by the French of St. Quentin on October 1st, marked the complete break-

through of the French and British Armies on this section of the Western front. Hard pressed on every front, the Germans could reinforce none; there remained but one line of defense, and if this were pierced by the Allies, the German Army would have to execute a hasty and costly retreat to the Rhine.

THE EIGHTH DAY

ON October 11th, the Seventeenth French Corps on the right bank of the Meuse (from right to left 26th and 18th French Divisions, 29th and 32nd American Divisions) continued their slow hammering of the German positions as they gradually pivoted on the right and swung the line around to face the east.

THE 4TH FORGES AHEAD

The 4th Division, on the left bank of the Meuse, pushed on in the face of strong opposition and cleared the whole of the Bois de Foret, and placed patrols on Hill 299 two kilometers northeast of Cunel. Briulles was by this almost entirely surrounded, and the only line of retreat for the garrison lay in crossing the river.

The 80th Division tried again that morning to take the town of Cunel, but ran into barbed wire of an organized position, and could not advance. This division had fought well, but it had been in the battle since September 26th, and had only been out for a four-day rest during this time. Accordingly the 5th Division was brought up from Army reserve and relieved this division.

The 3rd and 32nd were unable to further exploit their front as they had now reached the barbed wire of the German position in front of Cunel and Romagne. The 32nd sent its reserve brigade to relieve the 181st brigade of the 91st Division that night.

The 1st Division, as its parting shot, took the town of Sommerance, establishing its line on the extreme northern edge of the Bois de Romagne, and before it lay open fields. It had completed its mission. It had gone through. That night the 42nd Division was brought up to relieve the 1st. The 82nd Division crossed the Aire and connected with the 1st Division in Sommerance.

HEAVIEST CASUALTIES IN THE 1ST

During its ten days in the line, the last seven of which had been a succession of attacks, the 1st Division had advanced seven kilometers ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles) against the German 1st and 5th Guard Divisions, the 28th, 37th 41st, 43rd and 52nd Divisions, and the 2nd Landwehr Division, which were defending to the last the most formidable position at this time on the Western front. It captured 1,407 prisoners, and lost 9,387 officers and men, the heaviest casualties suffered by any American division in the Meuse-Argonne offensive. It was the only division in the American Expeditionary Forces accorded the conspicuous honor of having a General Order from G. H. Q. devoted solely to its achievements.

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES.

General Orders

No. 201.

France, Nov. 10, 1918.

1. The Commander-in-Chief desires to make of record in the General Orders of the American Expeditionary Forces, his extreme satisfaction with the conduct of the officers and soldiers of the 1st Division in its advance west of the Meuse, between October 4 and 11, 1918. During this period the division gained a distance of seven kilometers over a country which presented not only remarkable facilities for enemy defense but also great difficulties of terrain for the operation of our troops.

2. The division met with resistance from elements of eight hostile divisions, most of which were first class troops and some of which were completely rested. The enemy chose to defend its position to the death, and the fighting was always of the most desperate kind. Throughout the operations the officers and men of the division displayed the highest type of courage, fortitude and self-sacrificing devotion to duty. In addition to many enemy killed, the division captured one thousand four hundred and seven of the enemy, thirteen 77 mm. field guns, ten trench mortars and numerous machine guns and stores.

3. The success of the division in driving a deep advance into the enemy's territory enabled an assault to be made on the left by the neighboring division against the northeastern portion of the forest of Argonne, and enabled the 1st Division to advance to the right and outflank the enemy's position in front of the division on that flank.



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General Omar Bundy

An American soldier of the widest experience; he fought the Sioux Indians; he fought the Spaniards; he fought the Filipinos; he fought the Mexicans; he fought the Germans.

4. The Commander-in-Chief has noted in this division a special pride of service and a high state of morale, never broken by hardship nor battle.

5. This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formation after its receipt. (14790-A-306)

By Command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Immediately on being withdrawn from this action for its much needed rest and replacements, the 1st Division lost General Summerall, now appointed Commanding General of the Fifth Army Corps. General Bamford, who had commanded the 16th Infantry as Colonel, and as Brigadier General had commanded the 2nd Brigade, became Division Commander, and one by one the officers of the division were promoted to fill the vacancies caused in that action.

THE NINTH DAY

ON October 12th, the drive east of the Meuse continued to nibble away at the German lines, but on the remainder of the front there was no action, except on the extreme left. Here the 77th Division, with the 152nd Artillery Brigade in position, after a dense preparation brilliantly attacked and carried the town of St. Juvin and part of Hill 182 immediately behind it; in this operation 500 prisoners were taken. That night the 3rd Division relieved the 5th and the left brigade of the 4th Divisions. This gave the 3rd Division a front from about one kilometer west of the Meuse to the Cunel-Romagne road, a front of about six kilometers, which necessitated putting all four infantry regiments in line, from right to left, as follows: 38th, 7th, 30th, 4th. The 5th Division was assembled in the Bois des Ogons preparatory for an attack.

THE TENTH DAY

On October 13th, the American Army made no attempt to attack. The enemy, evidently suspecting that a renewed effort was about to be made, began early in the afternoon a heavy

bombardment on the entire front of the 3rd Division and followed this with a determined counter-attack. Again the 3rd Division held its front, as it had done on the Marne, and mowed down the advancing lines, until the counter attack ceased.

THE LAST ATTACKS—SECOND PHASE

THE last attack of the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive was delivered on the morning of October 14th, by the 5th, 32nd, 42nd (Rainbow), 82nd, and the 77th Divisions. The 5th attacked through the 3rd Division with both brigades in the line. On the right the 60th and 61st Infantry Regiments took the town of Cunel and carried the assault on until the Bois de la Pultière was cleared. The 10th Brigade (6th and 11th Infantry Regiments) was stopped soon after the jump-off by the deadly cross-fire from Cunel and Romagne. Meanwhile late in the afternoon the 3rd Division advanced its lines into the Bois de Foret to connect the right of the 5th with the left of the 4th.

32ND TAKES ROMAGNE

The 32nd Division, with the 128th, 126th, and 127th Infantry Regiments in the line from right to left, attacked behind a rolling barrage at 5:30 a. m. and by skilful artillery *liaison*, fire was brought on the needed points and the right of the line smashed through and took the town of Romagne, and in mopping it up, took about 200 prisoners. The left, was advancing in the dense Bois des Gesnes, had more difficult terrain, but by noon, the 127th Infantry forced its way to the top of Hill 258 on the Romagne-Sommerance road, after fighting through a long series of almost impenetrable wooded valleys. That afternoon the 125th Infantry was put in and the whole line straightened and connected through the woods.

ASSAULT OF THE COTE DE CHATILLON

The 42nd Division, with four regiments in the line from right to left as follows: 168th, 167th, 165th, and 166th, attacked the strong position of the Côte de Chatillon, a small wooded hill which was protected by several

belts of barbed wire. This barbed wire was part of the last line of the Kriemhilde Stellung and ran from in front of Landres St. Georges to include the Côte de Chatillon, to Romagne. On the right the 168th encountered stiff resistance in the woods and from the wire of the Côte de Chatillon; the trenches on the

cult slope of the Côte de Chatillon, and by evening had a good foothold on the hill.

The 82nd Division also attacked on the 14th, and in conjunction with the Rainbow Division on the right, the 328th Infantry went up the Ravin aux Pierres, west of St. Georges, and seized the ridge south of that



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Major-General James H. McRae

He commanded the 78th Division at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne.

southern slope were well manned with Germans and the machine-gun fire was bitter. The left swung easily out across the open fields until they came upon the wired and entrenched position south of Landres St. Georges, where the advance was stopped and all further attempts were mown down by the intense fire from those strong defenses. The right continued, however, by a succession of small assaults to work their way forward up the diffi-

town where they made connections with the Rainbow. Here they also were stopped by the wire. The 325th Infantry on the left pushed forward and established the line on the St. Georges-St. Juvin road.

The 77th Division improved their position on the hill north of St. Juvin.

The attack was continued on the 15th. The 3rd and 5th Divisions organized and held their positions. The 32nd continued the straighten-

ing out of the line in the Bois de Gesnes. The 42nd exploited the success of the day before and completed the encircling of the Côte de Chatillon by seizing Tuilerie Farm on the right of it, and on the next day the hill was completely taken by a third assault. The left had worked its way up to within 100 yards of the German wire south of Landres St. Georges, and here the front remained until October 30th when the division was relieved.

FINAL ATTACK A BITTER FIGHT

The 82nd Division advanced slightly the front on the left in conjunction with the 77th Division, which at 7:30 in the morning made its final assault, the 1st Battalion of the 307th Infantry reaching the outskirts of Grand Pré. It was a bitterly contested attack, and it was not until evening that a footing was gained in the town. That night the 78th Division relieved this division, which had fought the Germans through the Argonne forest for twenty consecutive days.

This was the last attack of the Second Phase. In one or two places the line was straightened out to meet local conditions. On the 17th, the 32nd Division, after a heavy bombardment, assaulted the Bois de Bantheville, which had been outflanked by the taking of the Côte de Chatillon, and by the evening of the 18th the woods was cleared of the last of the German rearguards; next day the 32nd was relieved by the 89th Division. On the 20th and 21st, the 5th Division took the Bois des Rappes, and that night was relieved by the 90th Division; General McMahon was relieved of command of the 5th Division, and Major General Hanson E. Ely assumed command. On the 22nd the 90th Division took the town of Bantheville, which was completely outflanked by the Bois des Rappes on the right and the Bois de Bantheville on the left, and the line was extended from the Andon river to the northern tip of the Bois de Bantheville. On the 23rd patrols from the 3rd Division, which had on October 19th completed the relief of the 4th Division, found the town of Brioules was evacuated by the Germans.

THE NEW GERMAN LINE

On the entire front from the Meuse to the Argonne, therefore, the Germans had pulled back to a new line, which roughly followed the valley of the Andon, and included in it Cléry-le-Petit, Cléry-le-Grand, Aincreville, Landres St. Georges, St. Georges, Champigneulle, to Grand Pré. The front was very quiet during the last ten days of October, as compared with the activity of the first ten, and the only actual advance was the long and bitter series of attacks which were delivered every alternate day by the 78th Division, until on the 25th, they finally completed the taking of the town of Grand Pré.

On the right of the Meuse the 33rd Division was relieved on October 15th by a French Division (15th Colonial) and on October 18th, the 26th Division relieved the 18th French Division.

THE 29TH'S FIRST AND LAST BATTLE

On October 23rd, the 29th and the 26th Divisions attacked eastward, after a strong artillery preparation, toward the Bois des Estrayes, which was situated on a ridge of great tactical importance. The ridge was seized and held, and the 26th pushed forward into the maze of trenches in the direction of Crepion, and the Bois de Belleu. The Division was then brought back to the ridge, and consolidated the line there. On the next day General Edwards, who had commanded the 26th Division since its organization, was relieved, and General Bamford was sent up from the 1st Division to assume command. The 29th Division was relieved by the 79th Division and retired from its first and last battle. For twenty days it had fought resolutely in the face of the most galling fire. There was nothing sensational about its advance on the right of the Meuse, but the fact that each day marked an important if small advance against the juncture of the three German lines of defense, gradually opening up the Meuse valley for the main attack, is in itself a glowing tribute to the valor and devotion to duty of the 33rd and the 29th Divisions, who with the French

played such a gallant part in the operations of the First American Army. The 29th Division lost in these twenty days a total of 5,796 casualties, advanced seven kilometers, and took 2,148 prisoners.

SITUATION AT CLOSING OF SECOND PHASE

The Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, begun October 4th, was now closed.



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Major-General Clarence R. Edwards
He commanded the 26th (New England)
Division.

In the latter part of the month the Franco-British drive swept on toward Valenciennes, while on the extreme north of the line the Belgian Army reached the full swing of their offensive and on October 17th, Ostend, Lille, and Douai were regained. Two days later Bruges fell, and on October 20th the Belgian

coast was cleared. Then the Italian Army late in October began its offensive, and on October 26th Austria sued for peace, while on the following morning the Italians crossed the Piave. On the following day the Serbians reached the Danube, and on October 30th an armistice was concluded with Turkey. Germany on November 1st stood alone. On every front the Allies were pressing her hard, and the German Army was regrouping for one last stand. Where this would be no one could say. It was surmised that the Germans were using every moment to withdraw their army from France and Belgium, and to establish a line on the German frontier. Any delay in continuing the American attack would therefore be in Germany's favor. Accordingly the Third Phase of the attack astride the Argonne forest was placed for November 1st.

During October three divisions arrived from the United States—the 38th (Kentucky, West Virginia and Indiana National Guard), 34th (Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North and South Dakota National Guard), and the 86th (Illinois National Army) Divisions. These were immediately ordered upon arrival in France to the Le Mans area, where the personnel was broken up into replacement units for the combat divisions, which enabled divisions to be immediately replaced to full strength, and sent back for the Third Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

On November 1st there were 29 combat divisions in the A.E.F., 23 of which had taken part in the offensive in its first two phases. Of the other six divisions, the 27th (New York National Guard), and the 30th (Blue Ridge National Guard) Divisions were with the British. Of the other four, the 6th (Regulars) was under orders to proceed to the Meuse-Argonne, the 7th (Regulars) was in the line in the old St. Mihiel front on the Moselle, while the 88th Division was ordered to reserve on the right of the Meuse. The 36th (Texas National Guard) Division was with the French west of the Argonne.

XIV

YANKEE TROOPS IN ALLIED ARMIES

Fighting with the French Fourth Army, the 2nd and 36th Divisions Defeat the Germans West of the Argonne

THE end of September, 1918, marked the gradual drawing together of the First American Army. Twenty of the twenty-seven combat divisions then in France were assembled under this command along a front of seventy-two miles, for the First American Army, in addition to the Meuse-Argonne offensive, had also a large front east of the Meuse to hold. There were at this time seven American combat divisions with the British and French Armies. The 27th and 30th Divisions were in Rawlinson's Fourth British Army. The 2d and 36th Divisions were in Gouraud's Fourth French Army, while the 5th, 6th, and 81st Divisions were a part of the French Eighth Army in the Vosges. From June, 1918, until November, when the American Army was actively engaged in the war, American divisions were participating with the British and French, as part of their Armies, on every front from the English Channel to the Swiss border, and especially was this true of the last two months, when the activities of these divisions loaned to the Allies was more or less dimmed by the greater concentration of American divisions in the American First Army fighting down the Meuse valley.

(Separate accounts will be found later in this volume of the fighting on the British front by the 27th and 30th Divisions—that of the 27th by Major General John F. O'Ryan, that of the 30th by Colonel John K. Herr, Chief of Staff).

THE 2ND AND 36TH IN CHAMPAGNE

FIGHTING as a part of General Gouraud's Fourth French Army on the west side of the Argonne forest the 2nd and the 36th Divisions played an important part in the early days of October, in pushing the line forward west of the forest. The Fourth French Army, which, with the First American Army,

was squeezing the Germans out of the Argonne forest, had also a special mission for the advance of its left flank. Every kilometer the right of this army advanced, it made the Argonne more and more uncomfortable for the Germans, while every advance on the left of General Gouraud's Army relieved the pressure on Reims.

The fighting on this side of the Argonne forest also developed into phases. In the first phase, which ended October 1st, the French had in four days broken through a great part of the German defensive system, in some points as far as 12 kilometers (7½ miles). But there were still some very strong defenses on this great plain of Champagne, which had to be taken before the Germans would be forced back from Reims. Of these the strongest were those north of Somme-Py, and it was here that General Gouraud decided to place the 2nd American Division, which had been put at his disposal after the St. Mihiel offensive. There were two very good reasons for this. This division was famous for its reckless daring in attack, and then the moral influence upon the French troops, after four heartbreaking years of war, when they should see these splendid young fighters from America in their own line, he knew would be very great.

The 2nd Division, which had been in the Châlons-sur-Marne area since September 24th, in reserve for the French Fourth Army, was marched to the Souain-Suippes area, and on the night of October 1st-2nd, relieved the 61st French Division just north of Somme-Py. The 2nd Division became the left division of the Twenty-fourth French Corps, with the 170th French Division on its right, and the 21st French Division of the Eleventh French Corps on its left. The front which the division held was the "Essen" trench, one of the German lines of defense which the French had captured and reversed. The 36th Ameri-

can Division was placed in reserve of the 2nd Division.

GERMAN POSITION MOST FORMIDABLE

Immediately in front of the 2nd Division, the sector which it was to assault in the coming attack lay as open ground, dotted here and there with small woods which rose gradually

was dominated by Blanc Mont, the assault against determined resistance promised to be a very costly as well as slow proceeding. It was the center of all German resistance west of the Argonne, therefore the assault had to be carried through to the last of these defenses as speedily as possible. That the Germans would put up a stiff resistance was evidenced by the



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General William W. Hartz

He commanded all American organizations serving with the British Expeditionary Forces.

to the rolling highland of Blanc Mont. Between the long narrow woods which covered this entire plain were belts of barbed wire and trench systems, built about strongly fortified "strong points," which were so laid out as to give the defenders a deadly cross-fire on any advancing troops. Medeah Farm lay just outside the sector to the right, while the Bois de Somme-Py lay just inside the left boundary. The position was a very strong one and, as it

fact that the 2nd Division spent its first day in the line cleaning out the last of the enemy from the Essen trench. The Germans were clinging to every bit of ground in the hope of holding this line.

2ND IN FIRE-SWEPT SALIENT

At dawn on October 3rd, the French Fourth Army attacked, after five minutes' preparation by the artillery, immediately followed by a

rolling barrage. The 2nd Division had the 9th Infantry on the right and the 6th Marines on the left, supported by the 23rd Infantry, and with the 5th Marines in reserve. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of French tanks supported the advancing waves. Under very heavy enemy fire, the assault was pushed to the line of the road from Orfeuil through

5th Marines helped the 21st French Division to clear the one big strong point in the Essen trench which was holding them up. The Germans immediately counter-attacked and retook this ground, however, and it was not until late that night that the French finally succeeded in winning it. But in spite of this threat at their left flank, the Twenty-fourth



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Major-General John A. LeJeune

He commanded the 4th Brigade of Marines (2nd Division) at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne; he commanded the 2nd Division, Army of Occupation.

Medeah Farm and Blanc Mont to St. Hilaire-le-Petit. Medeah Farm was taken by the 67th French Division, which had jumped through the 170th French Division, but on the left the 21st French Division had been unable to advance at all, and the 6th Marines were receiving a heavy fire from their left rear. By this time the Americans had suffered 15 per cent. casualties, but had taken 1,600 prisoners. In the afternoon a detachment of the

French Corps, of which the 2nd Division was the left, continued the attack at four that afternoon. The Americans progressed about a mile, but the French division on the right was this time held up, and this put the 2nd American Division in a long narrow salient with machine-gun nests shooting not only from the front, but also from the right and left rear. That night the 2nd was in a very hot corner of the battlefield. The Germans

moved machine guns in on all three sides of this salient, sweeping the flat country with fire, and meanwhile the artillery fire became more and more intense.

CAPTURE OF BLANC MONT CLEARS THE LEFT

No attack was made by the Americans on the morning of October 4th, while the French tried vainly to advance their front from the Medeah Farm on the right and the Essen trench on the left. That afternoon, however, the Americans attacked again and advanced their lines 500 yards at a heavy loss inflicted by the two strong points which were holding up the French, but more especially by the intense fire from Blanc Mont.

At 6:15 a. m. October 5th, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marines, in conjunction with the 17th French Infantry Regiment, after an hour's artillery preparation, rushed the strong point of Blanc Mont and took it absolutely without loss, capturing 209 prisoners and 75 machine guns. This cleared the whole situation on the left. The 22nd French Division (now on the left) advanced at once to St. Pierre and the edge of St. Etienne, where the Marines joined them about 500 yards short of the town, being stopped by a line of trenches, wired and stoutly held by many machine guns.

On October 6th, after artillery preparation of an hour, the 23rd Infantry and the 6th Marines attacked and carried the German positions before St. Etienne. The town itself, however, was well defended by the Germans. The French on one side and the Marines on the other tried again and again to enter the town, and each time were driven out by the intense fire.

THE 36TH DIVISION IN ACTION

During the night of October 6th-7th, the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division relieved part of the 2nd Division. This was its first experience under fire, and its relief of the 2nd was spread out so as to introduce the new division into one of the bitterest fights of the war in company with the veterans of many battles. The 141st Infantry went in on the right, relieving the 23rd Infantry, and with this regiment the 9th Infantry also went in, the two acting as alternating battalions in the line. In much the same way the 142nd In-

fantry relieved the 5th Marines, and with it the 6th Marines took over the front. All the next day was spent in organizing for the coming attack. The 2nd Artillery Brigade was moved up, as it was to stay in, the 36th Division's Artillery Brigade not having completed its training.

COUNTER-ATTACKS AND FLANK FIRE SWEEP THE 36TH

On the morning of the 8th, the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division assaulted behind a rolling barrage after a heavy artillery preparation. The 2nd Division units stood fast on the jump-off line and became the reserve for the 36th Division, which had taken over the front. Supported by the two battalions of French tanks, and following their barrage closely, the 71st Brigade attacked like veterans. They pushed forward through St. Etienne in spite of a heavy fire, enveloped and took the cemetery and 208 prisoners, and went on a half mile beyond the town to a ravine, where at 10:30 a. m. a wired trench system held them up. The 2nd Division, meanwhile, occupied St. Etienne, mopped up the few remaining Germans in the town and organized it for defense.

On the right the 141st Infantry had not progressed as far, and this put the 142nd in an awkward position, exposed to flank fire; at 4:30 that afternoon when the Germans delivered a strong counter-attack, they were forced to fall back upon the positions of the 2nd Division in front of St. Etienne. These were firmly held, the confusion of the 142nd Infantry was quickly straightened out, and that night the elements of the 2nd Division were withdrawn from the town. The 142nd Infantry Regiment had suffered heavily that day, both in officers and men, but it reorganized and occupied the line in front of the town. All the next day was spent in organizing the positions, and in completing the relief of the remainder of the 2nd Division by the 72nd Brigade; by dawn on the 10th this was completed.

HEAVY CASUALTIES IN THE 2ND

The 2nd Division lost a total of 4,771 officers and men in this action; it captured a total of 48 officers and 1,915 Germans. Its brilliant advance in the face of the most deter-

mined German resistance was a big factor in breaking the last and most formidable of the German lines in the Champagne. The breaking of this line in the centre relieved the city of Reims from a siege of four years, and also moved forward the lines west of the Argonne forest, thereby flanking the Germans out of that stronghold, which made possible the rapid advance of the American Army east of the forest. The 2nd Division retired for a brief rest at Somme-Suippes before moving to the First American Army for the final phase of the attack.

36TH'S ONLY ACTION AN ENVIABLE RECORD

The 36th Division was now alone in the sector, and, on information that the enemy was retiring, attempted to advance on October 10th, but was met with a withering fire. Late that afternoon, in conjunction with the French 73rd Division on the right, the 36th Division was ordered to keep abreast of the advance of the Eleventh French Corps to its left, and the slow advance was begun. That night, while advancing, the 72nd Brigade relieved the 71st Brigade, 143rd Infantry on the right, 144th Infantry on the left, and in the darkness and under enemy fire the units became confused. But the advance continued and slowly the tangle was straightened out. The Germans were evidently retiring towards the Kriemhilde Stellung, which on this side of the Argonne lay north of the river Aisne. For three days the French and Americans followed the retreating Germans. The 36th Division directed its advance on Givry upon the Aisne river and the Ardennes canal which paralleled it, pushing steadily through the light resistance of the German rearguards, until on the evening of October 12th, the line halted on the hills overlooking the Aisne valley. Patrols were pushed forward to the canal, where the Germans were found in force.

On the morning of the 13th, the Germans were found to be in position north of the Aisne, and all bridges across the river destroyed. The Allies established their outpost line along the canal, and the main line on the hills. All attempts to cross the canal and river met with prohibitive fire from the German defenses. Here the 36th Division remained in the line until the evening of Oc-

tober 27th, when the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry and the 3rd Battalion of the 142nd Infantry assaulted and took Forest Farm, two miles east of Attigny, in a loop of the river and canal. This last mission was carried out with marked success in half an hour. That night the division was relieved and moved to the Thiaucourt area of the First American Army.

In this, its only action in the war, the 36th Division made an enviable record. It advanced 21 kilometers (13 miles) through the defenses of the Champagne to the Aisne, captured 549 prisoners from four German divisions, and 9 pieces of artillery, at a total cost of 2,710 officers and men lost, of whom 591 were killed.

AMERICAN DIVISIONS WITH THE FRENCH

THE 32nd Division, after its relief from the Vesle front on August 5th, was assembled in the valley of the Ourcq, where it remained in rest for about ten days, when orders were received to move the division to Soissons and report to General Mangin of the French Tenth Army. Upon its arrival the division was placed in support of the 127th French Division and, on the night of August 27th-28th, it relieved the 127th French Division in front of Juvigny.

STUBBORN RESISTANCE FAILS TO CHECK THE 32ND

The town of Juvigny lies at the head of a ravine five miles north of Soissons, and that night the battle line ran north from Soissons along the railroad just west of Juvigny. The French Tenth Army was attacking due east, and on the morning of August 28th, the 32nd Division attacked with the French and easily captured the railroad track and about 100 prisoners. There was no attack on the 29th, but on the 30th, the French division on the right (south, towards Soissons) advanced its front rapidly, the 32nd also advancing its front in conformity. The division on the north of the 32nd was held up by determined machine-gun fire, and accordingly the American division was forced to make a turning movement and attack Juvigny. As the attack developed, the left flank of the 32nd and the French division on its left (north) were unable to ad-

vance, while the right flank moved forward rapidly despite determined opposition, until the town of Juvigny was practically surrounded on three sides. This clever maneuver took the Germans by surprise, and moppers-up swiftly entered the village from the southwest and after some sharp street fighting, captured three officers and 153 men, and Juvigny was retaken by the Allies.

it was a very delicate operation to attempt in the face of machine-gun fire, but it was highly successful, and by night the front had reached the Soissons-Béthune highway. The casualties this day had not been as heavy as on the day before.

On the night of September 1st-2nd, the 32nd Division was relieved by the 1st Moroccan Division, and the division was moved to



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Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly

Along the River Aisne

This picture shows an American advance post built in the shelter of a ridge.

This put the division in the unpleasant position of being ahead of the division on its right, and part of the 32nd was at the same time too far extended in front of the division on its left, which had been held up. On August 31st a plan of attack was issued to correct this. The attack began with a triple barrage, and those portions which were behind, started forward. That portion which was forward waited until the others came abreast;

Joinville, north of Chaumont, where it remained until early in October. In the attack on the Juvigny plateau the 32nd Division had advanced three miles in the face of determined resistance, and had assisted the French Tenth Army in its attack which outflanked the Germans on the Chemin des Dames and on the Vesle. The battle was brief, but severe. The 32nd in this operation of five days lost 15 officers and 335 men killed, the total casual-

ties being 2,848. Parts of five German divisions were identified among the 937 prisoners which the division took.

RETREATING GERMANS ENTRENCH AT THE AISNE

The German positions on the hills north of the river Vesle were by this stroke outflanked, and the Germans were forced to draw back to the Aisne. On September 5th the Germans withdrew, and the Third American Army Corps, which consisted of the 77th and the veteran 28th Divisions took up the pursuit and followed the Germans to the river Aisne, five miles to the north. Here they found the Germans well entrenched in the ravines south of the river. Major General Robert Alexander was appointed to command the 77th and relieved Major General George B. Duncan during this operation. On September 8th, the 28th Division was relieved by the French, while the 77th continued the attack, pushing forward its front continuously until September 14th when the Italians relieved the New York division. The 28th Division was moved to the east in a support position for the Argonne

offensive, and on September 20th entered the line; the 77th Division followed, and on the same day entered on the left of the 28th Division in the Argonne forest.

THE 33RD WITH THE AUSTRALIANS

The 33rd Division had been training with the British in the Amiens area since June 20th, and had occupied trenches in the Amiens sectors along with various British divisions. On July 4th four companies had been assigned to attack with the Australians. The village of Hamel, one of the crucial positions, was taken, the Americans being complimented greatly by the British for their work in this action. The 33rd Division was chosen to take part in the initial assault which began the British offensive on August 8th in the vicinity of Amiens. Here the 33rd Division fought with great gallantry and broke the German line at Chipilly Ridge and Gressaire Wood. On August 23rd, the 33rd was transferred by rail from the British front to the area of the First American Army, around Toul, and was concentrated in the area of Tronville, between Bar-le-Duc and Toul, until September 5th, when it was sent to Verdun.

XV

MEUSE-ARGONNE—LAST PHASE

The 11 Days' Fighting (Nov. 1st-11th) Leading to the Armistice—
Deluged with Artillery and Harassed by Attack After
Attack the Germans Are Steadily Thrust Back

I

THE third and last phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive by the First American Army began on November 1st, and ended with the signing of the armistice on November 11th. For it a mighty array of artillery was assembled—practically every gun of the American Army was on the line. The barrage was intense, and as the infantry went over, they met very little resistance after the first line was passed. The Germans had pulled out almost the entire garrison, and only here and there were there any very serious engagements. Each day marked big ad-

vances for the Americans, as it did for the British, Belgians and French in other sectors. The Germans were retreating out of France and Belgium to stand on their own border. During these eleven days the enemy of necessity fought a rearguard action. The resistance on a certain line would be very stiff in the afternoon, but the next morning it would be found that the line had been drawn in during the night. It was one of the most skillfully executed retreats in all history, for it cost the Allies dearly to attack those rearguards with their strong artillery supports, but it also cost the Germans much in materials

V—17



(2) The Meuse-Argonne Battle

The American Advance to the Line of November 1st—(The black numbers in the small white squares indicate divisional units.)

which in their haste they were forced to leave behind. And then for the first time the Allies, pursuing without artillery fire, would come upon villages from whose towers white flags were hanging, which showed that civilians were still occupying them, and once more, after forty days of the utmost desolation that can be imagined, the daily advances brought

American Army ran from Ornes, on the right of the Meuse, through Beaumont, then north to a point west of Flabas, and from there, swinging in a great arc, including Estrayes ridge, the line reached the Meuse at Sivry. This put the Germans on the right of the Meuse in a bad salient. From Sivry the American line was the left (west) bank of



U. S. Signal Corps photo

When Americans Stormed and Captured Juvigny

Along this railroad bank, the Germans made a most determined stand in their machine-gun nests before evacuating Juvigny. The position was captured by the 128th Infantry, 32nd Division. The figures of some of our troops can be seen at the top of the embankment.

the lines into towns and pastures where there was no evidence of the visitation of war.

THE NIGHT BEFORE THE DRIVE

On the night of October 31st, there were no indications on the front of the First American Army that the Germans were about to retire along the whole line. Every slightest attempt to advance, every patrol, encountered a sharp fire. Preparations were made on a large scale to break through the formidable wired line of trenches which now faced the American Army from the Meuse to the Argonne. The German lines opposite the First

the Meuse as far as the valley of the Andon river. The Germans still held Cléry-le-Petit, Cléry-le-Grand, Aincreville, Le Grand Carrière Farm, Landres-St. Georges, St. Georges, Champigneulle, to the Argonne just north of Grand Pré. Here the American line joined that of the French Fourth Army, which was holding the left bank of the Aire from Grand Pré to where it emptied into the Aisne, and the left bank of the Aisne from there north as far as Voneq. Thus again the French Fourth Army was fifteen kilometers north of the line of the American First Army, and this time their line on the west of the

Argonne was near the top of the forest. The plan was, therefore, for the French to change direction and attack northeast so as to cut off the top of the Argonne, while the Americans drove up the open plain between the forest and the river.

DISPOSITION OF DIVISIONS ENGAGED

To begin this attack, the American First Army had in line, east of the Meuse three French and two American divisions, the latter being the 26th and the 79th Divisions. No attack was made on this side of the river until November 4th. On the left of the Meuse the divisions in line, from right to left were: the 5th, the 90th, the 89th, the 2nd, the 80th, the 77th, and the 78th. None of these divisions was without battle experience. The 5th, 89th and 90th Divisions, while they had only been in the sector a short time, had been tested at St. Mihiel. This last attack was organized to break through enemy positions in which elements of ten German divisions were identified, and seasoned American divisions were selected to make this final thrust. That night the 1st Division left its rest area and began the long march behind these seven divisions. Once more was it filled to strength, this time by men who had been wounded at Cantigny and Soissons. The 42nd Division also became Army reserve when the 2nd Division, from the Champagne, relieved them the night before the jump-off in front of the difficult position of Landres-St. Georges.

THE FIRST DAY

THE Americans now faced the last belts of wire, the last entrenched positions south of Sedan. This line was the last position of the Kriemhilde Stellung; protected as were its flanks by the Argonne on the left and the high banks of the Meuse on the right, a frontal attack on it was necessary, and for this the artillery was assembled. The policy of relieving only the infantry of a division, which left the artillery brigade to support the succeeding division, had practically doubled the artillery strength on the American front. During the two weeks of inactivity on the front just prior to this last attack, roads, and broad and narrow-gauge railroads had been carried forward until the supply of guns was abun-

dant for all kinds of ammunition. The fire of preparation which this concentration of artillery began on the morning of November 1st, was the most terrific ever witnessed by any American troops. It blasted away the German defensive works, and the defenders, demoralized as they were by the succession of Allied drives on every front, crumpled under the power of this last blow. The enemy's artillery reply was very feeble and at 5:30 a. m., when the infantry assaulted behind a rolling barrage, they smashed through everything to the final objective.

The 5th Division on the right pivoted, under orders, on its right, and advanced its left with the 90th Division, and gradually swung around to front on the Meuse. Cléry-le-Grand was seized by the 60th Infantry and the Bois de Babimont by the 61st Infantry, and by the end of the day the line ran parallel to, but two kilometers back from the river.

The 90th Division attacked with the 359th Infantry on the right and the 360th Infantry on the left, its mission being to swing towards the river on the left of the 5th Division. The advance went rapidly that first day and by night Aincreville and Andevane were taken and the line was advanced almost four kilometers.

The 89th Division, although the line had been pierced on their front and there was no wire for them to break through, had to penetrate a large wood, the Bois de Barricourt. But their advance met with very slight resistance; Remonville was captured early in the day, and by night the line was established on the far side of the woods. The terrific artillery bombardment had wiped out the majority of the defenders.

THE GLORIOUS CHARGE OF THE 2ND DIVISION

The 2nd Division had been given the "place of honor," which usually meant the most costly place to take on the whole front. As the center of the First Army, it had before it the most difficult and heavily wired position in front of Landres-St. Georges, before which the veteran Rainbow Division had been stopped. The 2nd and the 67th Field Artillery Brigades played on this for two hours in preparation, while Company D of the 1st Gas Regiment played on the position with its

big trench mortars. The defenders were stunned, and when the regiments (from right to left) 23rd Infantry, 5th Marines, 6th Marines (the 9th Infantry being in reserve), following closely their barrage, hit that entrenched line, they went through it like an avalanche with that dash of rivalry between the two branches of the service which had made the division so justly famous. They broke through the position, and went on through the town of Landres-St. Georges itself, then up the slopes and into the woods of

line which broke the whole system of his defense.

The left of the 89th and the right of the 80th Divisions had kept up with this enormous smash-through by the 2nd, so the flanks of this great salient were well guarded. The 80th Division, on the left of the 2nd, was in the Meuse-Argonne attack for the third time. The 319th Infantry on the right went through with the 2nd, took the town of Imecourt, and finally established the line just southeast of Sivry-les-Buzancy, but the 320th Infantry



U. S. Signal Corps photo

Scene in Grand Pré, After the American Occupation

Hazois and l'Epassé, then down the slopes into the village of Landreville and up over the hill to take the villages of Bayonville and Chennery, and, never stopping that glorious charge, they swept down the slope, and across the marsh establishing the line two kilometers beyond Chennery. That day these fighting men of the 2nd Division advanced through an organized position eight kilometers (5 miles) and took 1,300 prisoners and 75 pieces of artillery, but what was even greater than this, they drove a flying wedge into the enemy's

on the left, which was advancing with the 77th Division, was stopped just two kilometers from the jump-off line in front of Alliepont. As this left a big gap between the two regiments the reserve brigade of this division was rushed up to fill it.

A SENSATIONAL ADVANCE

The 77th Division was attacking Champigneulle, which lay in a ravine. To approach this from the front would have been a costly enterprise, whereas to move a regiment around

through the sector of the 89th Division and take the upper end of the ravine would insure the fall of the town with fewer casualties. Therefore, when the advance was stopped in the morning just south of the town, the latter plan was decided upon for the following day.

The 78th Division soaked the edge of the Argonne with mustard gas during the two-hour preparation, and then attacked up the open plain, but the failure of the 77th to make any advance prevented this division from taking the Bois de Loges.

The advance of the First American Army that day had been sensational. The right and left ends of the line were still on the jumping-off line, while the center had advanced five miles, making the line a sharp arc on the evening of November 1st.

THE SECOND DAY

ON November 2nd the advance was continued. The 5th Division made up for its slight advance on the 1st; it swept down to the river, taking the towns of Cléry-le-Petit and Doulcon, and mopped up the big "Punch Bowl" which lies on the left bank opposite Dun-sur-Meuse.

The 90th Division, on the left of the 5th, took Villers-devant-Dun, and then turning towards the river, cleared the Bois du Mont until they stood on the bluffs overlooking the Meuse valley.

The 89th Division drove on due north. There was some bitter fighting but still they progressed until at 9 p. m. the towns of Taily and Nouart being taken, another four kilometers were added to the territory taken on this day.

The 2nd Division at first received orders to cross over in front of the 80th Division and seize the big town of Buzancy. These orders were later changed, and the division was ordered to continue on to its own objective. The advance that day was not great, but pushing steadily on all afternoon and until midnight, the line was finally established on the Fosse-Nouart road.

The 80th Division attacked at 6 a. m. on the morning of the 2nd. The 317th Infantry, which had been brought up to fill a gap in the line, attacked due west across the sector of the 77th, and meeting little resistance, took

Verpel north of Champigneulle and Thermonges. The remainder of the division continued on to its objectives and by 6 p. m. Buzancy was taken and the line established north of the town.

The 306th Infantry of the 77th Division executed the outflanking of Champigneulle by going around to the right and entering the ravine above the town. Once this was cleared, the 77th found the way open, and the 80th Division holding the towns on its front, the line was pushed on without meeting any resistance until it rested on the Buzancy-Harricourt road.

ADVANCE LEAVES KITCHENS STRAGGLING

The 78th Division found that during the night all enemy resistance was gone from the Bois des Loges. Advancing rapidly along the edge of the forest, they took the few Germans in Beffu, and continued on to Briquenay, establishing the line a kilometer beyond that village.

By the end of the second day of this Third Phase, the American line was again bowed out in the center, but not so noticeably as it was on the first day. The advance was such that ration carts and rolling kitchens could not keep up with it. There were occasional centers of resistance, but these were outflanked, and the line was connected and established with Fosse as the extreme forward point on the night of the 2nd of November.

THE THIRD DAY

ON November 3rd the 5th Division was ordered to cross the Meuse and form a bridgehead at Dun-sur-Meuse. The 90th Division was ordered to cross the Meuse as soon as the 5th Division established a bridgehead. During the night, a battalion of the 5th Division with a company of engineers hastily threw a footbridge across the river, and amid a hail of machine-gun and artillery fire, they rushed over and took cover under the bank of the canal. Here they remained without support, for it was impossible for a man of either forces to move in the river bottom during daylight, so intense was the fire from the hills on either side.


The 89th Division held a wide front, with the 1st Division close up in support ready to

relieve this division and continue the drive, but General Wright asked to be given one more day in the line. The 89th Division then drove on and took Beauchaire on the right and Bois la Dame on the left.

BRILLIANT STRATEGY OF THE 9TH INFANTRY

The 2nd Division jumped off at 6 a. m. on the 3rd and in spite of stiff opposition on their front, their advance never stopped, and by evening the line was on the southern edge of the Bois de Belval. Here the division faced a dense forest covering rolling hills where the

Beaumont road. They were on the march all night, capturing German machine-gunners asleep at their posts beside their guns, and at La Forge and at Tuilerie Farm they surprised the garrison and captured them. By midnight they were through the woods and a line was formed on the northern edge. It must have been a great surprise to the Germans in the open rolling country around Beaumont when at dawn on the morning of the 4th, they found Americans six kilometers inside the line upon which the German rear-guards were to make a stand. The Germans



Rifle Strength of the Opposing Armies from April 1st to November 1, 1918

Meuse turns to the left. As far as this division was concerned the forest stretched out indefinitely on either flank, and was on an average three miles in depth. Through this forest lay one road, the Belval-Beaumont road, and along the southern edge of the Bois de Belval the Germans were making a stand. With the darkness came a pouring rain, and a plan, novel to this war, but used in many previous wars, was decided upon. A battalion of the 9th Infantry with a battery of the 15th Field Artillery moved out silently, in advance guard formation, into the forest along the

in the forest now retreated with all haste, and the remainder of the 2nd Division marched down the road.

The 80th Division on the 3rd continued to push on without much resistance, and by night came up with the right of the 2nd Division in front of the Bois de Belval.

The 77th Division also found but little resistance on its front and by evening had taken St. Pierremont.

The 79th Division, in *liaison* with the 77th on its right and the French on its left, advanced more readily now that the Argonne

forest was at last passed, and with open country on both flanks, seized Germont and Authe. The last German was now squeezed out of the Argonne forest; that mighty barrier was once more in French hands, while before the advancing French and Americans lay open country to the river Meuse. The French were well up on the left, and there was needed but one more push to reconquer all the ground south and west of the Meuse. Practically all the Germans were on the other bank, where, on the heights, a new line of defense was established.

II

OPERATIONS ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE MEUSE

ON November 4th, the entire front of the First American Army, from Arnes on the right bank where the French and Americans were facing Damvillers, all along the line to where the French Fourth Army joined just east of Le Chesne, moved forward in attack. The operation then split into two distinct attacks, one on the right bank of the Meuse which met with fierce German resistance, and one on the left bank which continued the main assault on to Sedan. The latter, being the main assault, will be treated first, and then the operation on the right of the Meuse will be dealt with, this to be followed in natural sequence by the attack of the Second American Army, between Fresnes and Pont-à-Mousson, on the eve of the armistice.

The 5th and the 90th Divisions were now definitely committed to crossing the Meuse, and thus their operations on the left bank come to an end, and the narrative of their attack belongs to the description of the fighting on the right bank. This left the 89th Division as the right of the advance on the left bank on November 4th. During that day this division gradually extended its lines to include everything from the left flank of the 90th Division at Launeville (opposite Stenay) to the right flank of the 2nd Division at Pouilly, on the left. This was practically the big wooded point around which the Meuse swung, and while there was little resistance, still the area was large and the progress was necessarily slow. By the night of the 4th, Launeville

and Beaufort were taken and the line connected to that of the 2nd opposite Pouilly, but the point of woods was not entirely cleared.

HONORS TO EACH DIVISION

The 2nd Division, after its sensational capture of the Bois de Belval during the night, spent the 4th in bringing up the remainder of the division and waiting until the divisions on the flanks came up, before assaulting the town of Beaumont, which lay before them across the rolling country of the open river bottom.

The 80th Division pushed on all that day through the difficult woods of the Bois de Four and the Bois de Gerache, where *liaison* was finally established with the 2nd Division on the right.


The 77th Division took the town of Oches, and by night had pushed on to the outskirts of la Berlière. They were still behind the division on either flank, and the lines of these were bent back to maintain *liaison*.

The 78th Division went along rapidly with the French on its left, through the villages of Briulles-sur-Bar, Verrières, and on down the Bar valley until they took Les Petites Armoises. On the hill beyond, however, they ran into stiff resistance in the Bois de Sty, and here the division was still engaged when darkness fell on the 4th of November.

On the 5th, the 89th Division finished its attack and reached the river Meuse at all points along its front from Launeville to Pouilly, but not in time to prevent the Germans from destroying the bridges. The patrols which reached the river drew such a hot fire from the hills across the river that there was no doubt of the German strength on that line.

THE CAPTURE OF BEAUMONT

The 2nd Division, on the 5th, sent the 5th Marines to assist the 89th Division in mopping up the woods, and to reconnoiter the bridges at Pouilly and Inor. Meanwhile the remainder of the division attacked with the 80th Division, and in one great rush, in the face of terrible flanking fire from the hills across the Meuse, Beaumont was captured. This was the last assault for the 80th division; with the line resting on the Yoncq-Beau-



U. S. Signal Corps photo

First American Troops Into Alsace

Men of Co. A, 125th Infantry, 32nd Division, marching across the border at Senthheim, May 27, 1918.

mont road, it was relieved that night by the 1st Division. The 80th Division left the field with conscious pride in its battle record. Three times, in each of the three phases, it had smashed its way forward in the Meuse-Argonne battle, and its fighting was in the open rolling country where the German resistance was greatest. It advanced during those fourteen days 37 kilometers (24 miles) and cap-

west of Yoncq. On its right the 78th Division also fought its last battle of the war on this day. Pushing on through resistance in the Bois de Sy, it finally cleared these woods and pressed on, taking the towns of Tannay and Sy, and established the line a kilometer and a half beyond on the road to Chemery, where during the night the 42nd Division relieved them. On October 16th the 78th Divi-



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Colored Fighters Receiving the D.S.C.

Major-General Eli Helmick is decorating the men at Finisterre, France. Admiral Moreau of the French Navy is just behind the General.

tured 103 officers, 1,710 men, and 88 pieces of artillery, and lost a total of 210 officers and 5,464 men.

78TH'S LAST OFFENSIVE—26 DAYS OF FIGHTING

The 77th Division continued its advance on the 5th with the taking of Stonne, and connected its right with the 80th Division just

sion had begun its first offensive operation, and from that day fought continuously until relieved. It established for itself a record that will never grow dim, which cost, however, a total of almost 5,000 casualties.

On November 6th, the 89th Division, with its line now definitely along the Meuse, reached its objective. On its left, the famous 1st and 2nd Divisions, now for the first time

side by side in an attack, jumped off to clear the last bit of enemy ground south of the Meuse river. On they swept towards their goal in a mad race which the spirit of rivalry between the two best divisions of the A.E.F. had engendered. Within two hours the left bank of the Meuse was cleared. The 2nd, on the right, did not have so far to go to reach the river as did the 1st on the left, but each went equally fast, and by 10 a. m. the line of the 1st lay along the Meuse opposite Muzon, and a long string of prisoners was going to the rear.

The 77th Division on the left of the 1st kept up with the swift advance and established the right of their line on the Meuse at Autrecourt, while the left was three kilometers south of the Meuse, where it joined with the 42nd Division, which also had made a mighty advance that day and had taken the villages of Chemery and Bulson. The left of their line, where it joined that of the French Fourth Army, lay six kilometers south of the river. That afternoon the 1st Division received orders for the 1st Brigade (16th and 18th Infantry Regiments) to attack along the road running parallel to the Meuse river and continue until they reached Sedan; while the 2nd Brigade (26th and 28th Infantry Regiments) were to immediately leave the front they were then holding, and to march so as to take Sedan at dawn. Tired after the long march in reserve, these troops were assembled back on the Beaumont-Stonne road as soon as it was dusk, and the long, bitter, forced march was begun.

On the 7th, the 89th and the 2nd Divisions maintained the line on the river, while the latter took over the sector which the 1st had left open by its hasty withdrawal for the march on Sedan. The 77th Division on the left of the 2nd, made its final attack and reached with its entire front the banks of the Meuse, 6 miles east of Sedan.

The 42nd also made its last attack and they too reached the Meuse, with the extreme left but two miles east of Sedan.

THE 1ST DIVISION'S RECORD MARCH TO SEDAN

Meanwhile the 1st Division wrote the last page in its full book of battle experiences. After five days of continuous marching in

reserve in support of the whole line, which meant making two marches a day, the division had marched on the night of the 5th-6th 20 kilometers (12½ miles) to the point where they leap-frogged the 80th Division. In the assault on Muzon on the 6th, the 1st Division advanced seven kilometers. Then that afternoon under rush orders the 2nd Brigade came back to the Stonne road, and began at dusk a forced march of 33 kilometers to Sedan; while the 16th Infantry was fighting its way up the open Meuse valley across the front of two American divisions and one French. All night they marched—those troops who had not slept for two days. The artillery went ahead while the troops were being brought back and given a hot meal just before starting. During the night, the infantry passed the 1st Artillery Brigade standing on the road where the Germans in their retreat had blown up a big bridge. In spite of their fatigue, General Summerall, then commanding the Corps, chose his old 1st Division to make this long march because he knew that they would surely get there. Across the sectors of the 77th and the 42nd Divisions, they marched along the road from Beaumont, through Stonne to Chemery, where the regiments split, taking either side of the valley; dawn broke with them advancing rapidly towards Sedan. The 16th Infantry reached a point just south of Sedan, the 28th was on the hills between Wadelincourt and Chevenges, and the 26th Infantry on the hill north of St. Aignan. Here a French Division, the personnel of which were natives of Sedan, and to whom the city meant more than the capture of the greatest German base on that whole front, came up. The advanced elements of the 1st Division were just approaching Sedan when the halt came.

Aside from the glory of taking the town which was denied them, the tired troops of the 1st Division were glad to rest. In thirty hours they had marched 61 kilometers (38¼ miles) and fought two engagements. The sheer grit of those troops was unbelievable. Several officers and men fell unconscious from fatigue. Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who was commanding the 26th Infantry, although suffering from a machine-gun bullet wound in the leg which he had received

at Soissons, and which the surgeons decided made him unfit for active service, left his car where the artillery stopped, and continued the rest of the way, 12 kilometers, on foot. That march of 38 miles in 30 hours, which included two engagements, while it is not the military record, stands as the record for the A.E.F., and forms a suitable closing for the gallant battle record of the famous 1st American Division, and entitled it to its place in the center of the Rhine Bridgehead of the American Army.

42ND DIVISION RELIEVED BY 77TH

During November 7th, the right flank of the Fourth French Army was moved to the right, which forced the 83rd Brigade of the Rainbow Division out of line. The 84th Brigade remained in line on the river until the night of November 9th, when the 77th Division relieved the 42nd and the latter left the front with a record full of bright pages of a succession of victories with never a check or a defeat among them. The 77th Division, which had been in the attack in the Meuse-Argonne continuously, except for a 10-day rest in the latter part of October, remained in the line until the signing of the armistice, and held the line along the southern bank of the Meuse. Here this division, on November 11th, witnessed the laying down of arms of the German army.

The 2nd Division held the sector along the southern bank of the Meuse from the left of the 77th as far as Pouilly, until the night of the 10th of November. On that night, as soon as it was dark, the 2nd Engineers threw over two bridges, just south of Villemontry, and two battalions of the 5th Marines, with two machine-gun companies, followed by the 2nd Battalion of the 356th Infantry of the 89th Division crossed the river under heavy fire. Meanwhile at Pouilly, the remainder of the 356th Infantry, and the 355th Infantry of the 89th Division crossed by using pontoons as ferries, while the 353rd Infantry of the 89th Division crossed at Stenay with the 90th Division. These crossings form a part of the action on the right bank of the Meuse, and it is necessary to go back six days to November 4th, and follow the operations on that side of the Meuse which led up to the armistice.

III

OPERATIONS ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE MEUSE

ON the right bank of the Meuse on November 4th, between Ornes and Sivry-sur-Meuse, the line was bowed out to include Estrayes ridge. On the right of this line was the 10th French Colonial Division, on its left the 26th and left of this the 79th American Divisions, while the extreme left was held on the Meuse by the 15th French Colonial Division. Just across the Meuse on the left bank was the 5th Division, whose front stretched along the Meuse from Sivry-sur-Meuse, to above Dun-sur-Meuse. On the night of the 3rd, a battalion of the 5th had forced a crossing between Briulles and Sivry and lay all day behind the canal bank. On the left of the 5th was the 90th Division, which was also ordered to cross the Meuse on the 3rd, but was unable to do so. The front held along the Meuse by this division reached from above Dun to Stenay.

5TH ESTABLISHES THE BRIDGEHEAD


On November 4th, the right of the line stood fast. The 26th Division did not attack. The 79th, after a heavy preparation and under cover of a rolling barrage and a dense fog, attacked at 6 a. m. in conjunction with the 15th French Colonial Division on its left. The attack failed. The western spur of the Grande Montagne and Villeneuve farm still remained in German hands and the line rested on the Meuse at the same point. German resistance was very strong at this point, and fierce counter-attacks drove back every assault. The 5th Division did not attempt to send over any more troops during the day, but that night on rafts made of telegraph poles, other detachments of the 60th Infantry managed to cross and joined the battalion which had crossed the night before. They then crossed the canal and entered the Bois de Chatillon. This established the bridgehead.

On November 5th, the 79th Division attacked again. Despite desperate resistance, the 315th and 316th Infantry Regiments stormed Hill 378 and held it against furious counter-attacks. That night, the 5th Division pushed over the river the remainder of

the 60th and 61st Infantry Regiments. The Bois de Chatillon and the village of Vilosnes-sur-Meuse were taken by the 60th, which allowed the 15th French Colonial Division to advance and join its left with the right of the 5th. Meanwhile the 11th Infantry took Liny-devant-Dun, and the 61st took Dun-sur-Meuse, which gave the 5th Division a front of eight kilometers across the Meuse.

On November 6th, the 79th Division attempted vainly to push on towards the north-west, but each attempt was stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire. Meanwhile the 5th Division, meeting very little resistance

went along easily. The 79th Division, on the right of the 26th also met with weak resistance. In *liaison* with the 15th Colonial French Division, the 79th by evening carried the enemy's works and wire on the ridge Les Clairs-Chenes near Solferino farm, which swung the line around to face more to the east. The 15th French Colonial Division in *liaison* with the 5th Division on its left, swung around to the north in continuation of this forward movement and occupied Villeneuve and Sillon-Fontaine farms. The 5th Division pushed due east on its front, mopping up the wooded hills against light resistance,



Official Government Statistics

Comparative Strength of Allied Armies at the Signing of the Armistice and Comparative Expenditures of Ammunition During 1918

once it had forced a crossing of the river, pushed on through the wooded heights with the 15th French Colonial Division.

THE WHOLE LINE ADVANCES

On November 7th, the whole line advanced. The 26th Division on the right, on a front of five kilometers, with its regiments in the line in order from right to left; 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, attacked between Beaumont and the Bois d'Ormont (where it connected with the right of the 79th Division). Directly ahead lay the town of Flabas. The resistance, which had been very strong on this front, appeared to have broken that morning, and the advance while contested in places

and by evening occupied Brandeville. Thus on the evening of the 7th of November, the line on the right bank of the Meuse ran from Beaumont in almost a straight line north to include Brandeville, and from there it ran west to the Meuse at Sassey, including the towns of Lion-devant-Dun and Milly-devant-Dun, which the 5th Division had taken in extending the front of their bridgehead.

On the 8th, the advance was pushed further. The 26th Division took Flabas, and the ridge facing northeast which dominated the road and railroad from Damvillers to Azannes.

The 79th Division this day changed its direction under orders to due east. This neces-

sitated a skilful action, which was cleverly carried out, and under cover of a barrage the division assaulted and carried the last of the ridges and spurs on their front of that long line of hills which separates the Meuse from the flat plains of the Woevre. By evening the line of the heights was assured, and the Germans were in full retreat across the plains.

The 5th Division with the 15th French Colonials, continued their progress across the hills and by night had also cleared the remaining spurs, taken the towns of Etraye and Reville, Ecurey, Lissey, Breheville. The 5th also extended its line to the north in front of the 90th Division. As this extended the line too much, the 32nd Division, which after its gallant breaking of the Kriemhilde line had been rested and replaced, went into the line that night between the 15th French Colonials and the 5th Division, between Le Petit Lissey and Breheville.

OPERATIONS JUST BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

On November 10th, the general attack along the whole front of the First American Army on the right of the Meuse was resumed. The 26th Division swept down from the heights into the valley of the Thinte, and, after a bitter struggle, the town of Ville-devant-Chaumont was taken, which brought the line in a position to assault Ornes, where the three German lines of defense met.

The 79th Division, in conjunction with the 26th, swept down into the valley of the Thinte. This was in continuation of an attack which started the day before, and by the evening of the 10th, the 79th Division had reached the Germans' strongly wired and entrenched positions. The towns of Wavrille, Gibercy, Etraye, and Moirey were taken on the 9th and held by this Division, and on the 10th, and the line included Chaumont-devant-Damvillers. The 15th French Colonial Division, swinging its front also so as to face due east, advanced its line and took, before night, the town of Damvillers, and crossed the Thinte.

The 32nd Division moved down from the hills into the Thinte valley and in the face of bitter fire from the German rearguards, the 128th Infantry took Peuvillers and pushed on beyond it into the Bois de Dombras, but

being unable to maintain the line there, pulled back into the town. The 127th Infantry on the left cleared all the woods to the west of the Jametz-Damvillers road and established the line there for the night.

The 5th Division took Jametz and Louppy, and connected on the left with the 90th Division. This division had remained on the left bank of the Meuse waiting for the 5th Division to establish a bridgehead. When the 5th took the town of Mouzay, the bridgehead was finally secured. The 358th Infantry at once crossed and occupied the town, and the 90th Division continued the advance northward towards Stenay; after taking this town they advanced the line to Baâlon.

That night the 89th and the 2nd Divisions, in the face of bitter fire, crossed the Meuse.

THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 11TH

In accordance with orders on November 11th the attack was resumed under cover of a dense fog. Following a heavy preparation fire, the 26th Division attacked at 9:30 a. m. and had seized Ornes and Azannes, when at 11 a. m. the order to cease firing brought hostilities to an end. The key to the German line of defense in front of Etain and Brie, north of Metz, had been taken in 26 days of continuous fighting at a cost of 965 officers and men. The 26th, which had seen over nine months of vigorous combat, in which it had acquitted itself with great honor, here witnessed the end of the war.

The 79th Division, attacking at 9:30, was making good progress up the western slope of the Côte de Moirmont, the last stronghold of the Germans, when the order came to cease fire. The division had advanced in this attack $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers to the north, and then had executed under fire the most difficult of military maneuvers, that of changing direction under fire, after which it advanced five kilometers, a total of $9\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers (6 miles) in fourteen days.

The 32nd Division had begun the attack on the wooded heights when the news of the armistice reached them. This veteran division then marked its line and waited patiently to see if the war were really over.

The 5th Division had attacked towards Montmédy, and were going rapidly towards

that large railroad center when the order to halt and cease firing was given.

The 90th Division on the 11th, had finished mopping up Stenay and Baâlon, and were progressing towards the railroad in the valley of the Chiers, when the war came to an end.

The 89th Division in conjunction with the 90th on its right and the 2nd Division on its left had crossed the Meuse on the night of the 10th-11th, and by 11 in the morning had seven battalions across on the right bank of the Meuse. Here ended the gallant battle record of this division, and, in recognition of its record, the 89th, along with the 90th and the 5th Divisions, was chosen to compose the Army of Occupation.

The 2nd Division, which had rushed the 5th regiment of Marines across the Meuse during the night, lost no time in wresting from the Germans the big point on the Meuse between Muzon and Inor, and by 11 a. m. it had a bridgehead established, four kilometers in width and three kilometers deep. Here this division, so famous for its dash and gallantry, saw the fulfillment of their ambition, when at 11 a. m. the Germans laid down their arms. On their left the 77th Division was holding the line along the Meuse.

IV

THE SECOND ARMY

ON October 9th, General Pershing divided his command of 72 miles of front into two armies. To command the First Army he called General Liggett from the First Corps, and to the Second Army he called General Bullard from the Third Corps. The First Army sector extended from the Argonne to Fresnes-en-Woevre, and that of the Second Army extended from there to Clemery, north of Nancy. From October 9th, when General Bullard assumed command, or in fact ever since the closing of the St. Mihiel offensive, the sector of the Second American Army was very quiet and remained so until November 10th. The history of the Second Army is interesting not so much for what it achieved, as for what it might have achieved had not the armistice come when it did.

From September 26th until November 10th, this sector was used as a rest sector where divisions which had seen hard service in the

Argonne were sent to rest and reorganize. The 35th, the 79th, the 28th, the 4th, the 33rd and the 92nd Divisions were among those sent there after the Argonne, while the 7th, the 81st and the 88th Divisions saw in these sectors their only action of the war.

FOCH DETERMINES UPON CAPTURE OF METZ

By the first week in November the great Allied offensive, from the English Channel to Metz, was advancing rapidly except in front of Metz itself. The extreme right of the Allied attack was in front of the town of Ornes. Between this town and the Moselle the lines were very quiet. Marshal Foch then decided that with the Germans using all their energies to pull their army out of France and Belgium, and establish their defense on the Liège-Metz line, the time was ripe to take Metz. To do this a double attack which would envelop the fortress, was decided upon. The Second American Army was to strike in conjunction with the rapid advance of the First American Army, and drive toward Briey, north of Metz, while General Mangin's Tenth French Army was to drive for Château-Salins, southwest of Metz. For this joint attack seven American and nineteen French divisions were assembled. According to the orders, the Second American Army was to begin the attack on November 10th, and the Tenth French Army a few days later. The Second American Army was to drive towards Conflans, while the Tenth French Army drove towards the Saar and Rhine valleys. The Second American Army had four divisions in line, the 33rd, 28th, 7th, 92nd, along a front of 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Fresnes-en-Woevre to Port-sur-Seille (8 kilometers east of the Moselle), while in reserve for this attack were the 4th, 35th, 88th and 82nd Divisions. These were to initiate the attack as they stood, while on the 14th of November, it was planned that General Mangin's Tenth French Army would attack through the French Eighth Army, with ten Divisions in line, and nine in reserve.

DISPOSITION OF ATTACKING DIVISIONS

The extreme right of the First American Army was the Second Colonial French Corps, with the 10th French Colonial Division on

the left, in *liaison* with the 26th Division, and the 81st Division on the right. At Fresnoy-Woevre the right of the 81st Division and the left of the 33rd met and this was the left of the Second American Army. The left of this division touched the right of the 28th Division at Seigneulles brook, north of Hatton-Chatel. The latter division extended to

the 88th, 4th, 35th and the 82nd. Operating under the Second Army were three corps, the Fourth and Sixth American and the 17th French. The latter had the 33rd Division in line, the Fourth U. S. Corps had the 28th Division and the 7th in line, and the Sixth U. S. Corps had the 92nd Division in the line. The Divisions were on a wide front and as



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Major-General C. J. Bailey

He commanded the 81st Division in the Vosges and in the Argonne.

the Rupt de Mad, where it joined the left of the 7th Division. From there the 7th held the line as far as Preny, where the 92nd Division formed the right of the Second American Army. This was the front which had been made on September 15th at the close of the St. Mihiel operation. Behind these four divisions in line were the four divisions in reserve,

the operation developed, the plan was to put the reserve divisions in and thus give each corps two divisions in line.

Opposite the Second Army the Germans had eleven divisions from left to right—the 3rd Bavarian, 13th Landwehr, 65th and 94th Reserve, 5th, 7th and 224th Landwehr Divisions of von Gallwitz's Army, and the 245th

Division and the 31st and 84th Landwehr Brigades of the Army of the Duke of Wurtemberg.

On November 1st, an order was issued by the Second Army covering the action to be taken in case the enemy retired on the Liège-Metz line. The Seventeenth French Corps was to advance on Conflans, in conjunction with the advance of the First Army on Briey.

Marshal Foch directed that vigorous local operations should be begun to discover what operations the enemy intended on this front. The Austrian armistice had withdrawn one division from the front of the Second Army, and there was every belief that the Germans who saw them leaving might suffer greatly in morale. General Pershing then ordered the First American Army to push its offensive



U. S. Signal Corps photo.

The Last Shot in the War

This gun is believed to have fired the last shot on the American front, at 11.05 A. M. actual time, or 10.59, official time (Meuse), November 11, 1918.

The Fourth Corps was to advance on Vionville, and the Sixth Corps was to hold the pivot, and maintain *liaison* with the enemy by means of strong patrols. All that was needed to put this order in operation was the announcement of "D" day.

LOCAL OPERATIONS ORDERED BEGUN

On November 4th, as the Austro-Hungarian divisions had been withdrawn from the front upon the signing of the Austrian armistice,

north to the Meuse, and also to clear the right bank so that the First and Second Armies could move abreast towards their goal. Meanwhile orders were given to the Second Army which led to the selection of one brigade from the 28th Division and one brigade from the 7th Division to move through the hilly country along the Rupt de Mad in the direction of Chambley, with a limited objective of the Michel Stellung and the eastern edge of the Bois du Grand Fontaine. This attack was

v-13

originally planned for the 11th of November, but, as the German retirement from all fronts became so rapid, it was ordered ahead to the 10th, and a greater front was covered than was at first contemplated.

OFFENSIVE OF FIRST ARMY A GREAT HELP

While the Second American Army was making preparations for this attack, the right of the First American Army (the 2nd French Colonial Corps with the 10th French Colonial Division on the left and the 81st Division on the right) began offensive operations between Ornes, where the 26th Division was advancing, and Fresnes-en-Woevre, where the 33rd Division of the Second Army was about to advance. The 81st attacked on November 9th on a front of 13 kilometers, from Eix to Fresnes, with the 322nd Infantry on the left and the 324th Infantry on the right. The attack began at 8 a. m. after artillery preparation. The flanks advanced against heavy resistance, and the 322nd took the fortified village of Moranville, while the 324th broke through the German first and second entrenched lines and took the woods behind the latter. This greatly helped the left of the Second American Army in its attack next morning, and in reality forms more a part of the attack of the Second Army than of that of the First, and will therefore be treated with it.

GERMANS COUNTER-ATTACK

On the morning of the 10th of November the 322nd Infantry of the 81st Division took Grimancourt, and by 11 a. m. reached Aboucourt, on the Verdun-Etain railroad, and in *liaison* with the 10th Colonial Division on its left, began the assault of the German main line of resistance. In accordance with the plan, the 33rd Division attacked that morning on the right of the 81st Division towards Conflans. The 130th Infantry on the left carried all the German defenses from Saulxen-Woevre to Marcheville. Here they met bitter resistance. The town was taken, but strong German counter-attacks threw out the 130th Infantry, and that night it was relieved by the 129th Infantry. On the right, the 131st Infantry moved forward and they attacked the Bois de Harville. They pene-

trated to the center, but were also thrown out by counter-attacks.

On the right of this division, the 28th Division, which had won immortal glory on the Marne, the Vesle, and in the Argonne, was making its last drive. In all its fighting this division had never seen a quiet sector, and that morning of the 10th it moved to the assault with its usual dash. It encountered heavy resistance, but managed to reach the Bois de Dommartin. A second assault that afternoon after artillery preparation failed to give them the woods, and the line rested there for the night.

7TH AND 81ST DIVISIONS' FIRST OFFENSIVE

The 7th Division began its first offensive action on the 10th of November with all four infantry regiments in line, from left to right, 34th Infantry, 64th Infantry, 55th Infantry, 56th Infantry. The 34th Infantry assaulted and took the stone quarry near Rembercourt in the hills just west of the Rupt de Mad, and pushed on until within a kilometer of Charey, where they ran into a dense belt of wire. On the right the 56th Infantry assaulted Preny ridge, but were unable to hold it, and were forced back with heavy losses.

On the extreme right of the First Army, the 92nd Division had on its left the 367th Infantry. The assault by this regiment failed because the 7th Division on its left did not hold Preny Ridge. Across the Moselle, the 365th Infantry advanced behind a rolling barage, and drove back the enemy's outposts to a depth of about two kilometers, occupying the Bois Frehaut, near the river, the Bois Voivrotte, and the Bois de Cheminot, further east. In the morning the enemy resistance was light, but in the afternoon it stiffened, and the Bois de Voivrotte was abandoned. About midnight, however, it was reoccupied by the 365th Infantry.

On the right of the Second Army the French did not advance, as this was to be a turning movement until the direction had become almost due east. It was like a door swinging open, with each advance the hinge, which on September 26th was on the Meuse, and on October 8th was at Ornes, was now on the Moselle, and the plan was, on November 14th, to move the hinge of the entire at-

tack of the Allies further east, when the Tenth French Army attacked.

On November 11th, to go back to the junction of the First and Second American Armies, the 81st Division continued its advance with the 321st Infantry on the left, capturing two woods and then assaulting the strongly fortified village of Hautecourt, where

DIVISIONS HOLD TRUE TO FORMER RECORD

The 33rd Division also resumed the assault. The 129th Infantry, which during the night had relieved the 130th Infantry on the left, attacked the German main line of resistance at Labeuville, while on the right, the 131st Infantry was coöperating in the assault. In



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Major-General William H. Hay

He commanded the 184th Brigade in the Argonne, and the 28th Division in the Thiaucourt sector and in the Argonne.

they were when at 11 a. m. came the news of the armistice. The right regiment, 323rd Infantry, continued the advance in spite of severe losses, to the Bois de Manheulles. Here the armistice stopped the action. In this their first action, this division had advanced 5½ kilometers against resistance, in two and a half days' battle, at a total cost of 46 officers and 986 men.

this, its final action, this division held true to its previous good record and was smashing through when the armistice halted the attack. In these two days the division lost a total of 614 casualties.

The 28th Division, now under the command of Major General William H. Hay, had passed through the outer zones of the German defenses and was in the midst of the as-

sault on the main line in front of the Bois de Bonseil, when the armistice went into effect. Veteran of many attacks, this division was setting the pace for the newer divisions in this last offensive, and as they had entered the line for the first time in the midst of furious battle, so it seemed proper that when the war closed, it should see them leading the way towards Germany in the last battle.

The 7th Division improved its positions on the following day, and assaulted the main German line, which by 11 a. m. they were slowly piercing. The division had been in this sector just a month, and the last two days of this had seen its only active engagement of the war, but in that short time it demonstrated an aggressive spirit, and in the month lost a total of 1,818 casualties.

The 92nd Division recovered the prestige it had lost in the Argonne, and its advance made in the closing hours of the war was held.

In these two days' battle, the Second Army found the Germans making a determined stand with all the force left at their command, but the progress made gave evidence of what two more days would have developed, and with more and more American divisions coming up in reserve, the success of the breakthrough was assured.

As it was, the Second Army wrested from the enemy 58 square kilometers, at a total cost of 1,380 casualties, which was just slightly more than the cost of the taking of Cantigny, where the Americans began their offensive action.

V

The 37th and 91st Divisions in Belgium

TOWARDS the close of the Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, two divisions, the 37th and the 91st, were withdrawn from the front, and on October 18th were dispatched to assist the French Army operating in Belgium.

Detraining at Ypres, these two divisions began their long march across that world famous battle-field of four years and, on October 22nd, became a part of Degoutte's Sixth French Army, operating under the command of the King of the Belgians, being assigned to the Thirtieth French Corps. Continuing their march by short stages, on the night of October 28th they began the relief of two French Divisions, and entered the line along the Ghent-Courtrai railroad, just across the Lys river. The Allies there were occupying the second German line of defense which they had taken, and the ensuing attack was planned to drive the Germans back to the third and last line, running from Ghent through Tournai to Valenciennes, and eventually to break through this line. This last line was the Scarpe river, and therefore the object of the first attack was to drive the Germans back from the Lys to the Scarpe, and then to force

the crossing of the Scarpe, which would throw open the road to Brussels. The general direction of the attack was southeast over the low rolling watershed, 15 kilometers (10 miles) towards the city of Audenarde.

ENEMY RETREATS ACROSS THE SCARPE

At 5:30 a. m. October 31st, after an artillery preparation of five minutes, the attack was launched. The Germans met this with all fire power at their command, but the defenders were quickly overrun, so swiftly did the troops advance. The Germans were forced to retreat to the Cruyshautem ridge, the Allies in pursuit. Spitaals-Bosschen, a difficult wood, was taken by the 91st in a clever flanking movement. The attack was pushed with great vigor, the artillery kept close behind the infantry, and by a series of successful assaults, the Germans were pushed back across the Scarpe river by November 2nd, Audenarde being seized by the 91st. Preparations were immediately made to cross the river. Some soldiers had already swam the river, and at seven that night, a completed bridge was built by the 37th Division and, by the evening of the 3rd, despite the heaviest

opposition, this division had over nine companies of infantry across the river. Here they remained until the night of November 4th, when both divisions were relieved and returned to Thielt, and Vive St. Eloï, for rest.

The German last line of defense along the Scheldt being still unbroken, on November 8th these two divisions were ordered to again take over the line for the attack on November 11th. This was to be the final Allied attack along the whole line. Everywhere the Germans were clinging on desperately to the last line of defense and there were not sufficient German reserves to reinforce all fronts. The Allies planned on this day to attack this last line from the Dutch border to the Moselle river, with the full knowledge that in one or more places the line would crumble, and the German Army in France and Belgium would be faced with capture. This attack of November 11th was to decide the war.

Entering the sector on the night of November 10th, patrols again crossed the Scheldt river and working their way forward established a covering party on the east bank in anticipation of the attack on the 11th. Here they remained despite furious counter fire by the Germans. The attack on the 11th never came, however. The Germans signed the armistice and the attack was canceled. The 37th Division suffered in this operation a total of 1,612 casualties and the 91st Division suffered about the same number. The war was

over for these two divisions which had so gallantly aided the Belgians in the reconquering of their country.

THE ARMY OF OCCUPATION

The active operations of the war closed on November 11th, but the long sought rest for the weary doughboy was not yet in sight. On November 14th, the Army of Occupation, the Third American Army, under General Dickman, was formed, with the 1st, the 2nd and the 32nd Divisions forming the Third Corps, with orders to cross the Rhine. Behind them, in their long weary march through France, Luxemburg and Germany, came the 3rd, the 4th and the 42nd Divisions, forming the Fourth Corps, with orders to occupy the west bank of the Rhine, while behind them marched the 89th and the 90th Divisions, forming the Seventh Corps, to occupy the Moselle valley. Behind these moving into position in Luxemburg and France as supports, and guarding the lines of communication, were the 28th, the 33rd, the 5th, the 7th and the 79th Divisions.

For over a month the Third Army, led by the 1st Division, followed the Germans out of France, through Luxemburg, and finally into Germany, and across the Rhine; once more the honor went to the 1st Division—the first American force to enter Germany and the first to cross the Rhine—where it occupied, with the 2nd Division on its left, and the 32nd on its right, the Coblenz bridgehead.

FOCH SALUTES THE AMERICAN LEGION

(The message from the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the first anniversary of the signing of the armistice.)

My Valiant War Companions—The 11th of November, 1918, saw the capitulation of the enemy; vanquished Germany was craving for mercy and she delivered over to us such trophies as history has never known.

This was indeed the victory of the Allied armies, who ardently fighting had united in a supreme, continuous and violent effort all their energies as they had united all their hopes.

With head erect, the valiant American fighters of the Argonne, of the Meuse, of the Somme, of Flanders, after hard days, resumed once more, by the side of the Allies, the march toward the Rhine.

In this day, when for the first time we celebrate the anniversary of the armistice, I want to be with you to commemorate the past and to tell you that with our eyes ever raised toward the same ideal of justice and liberty, we must remain united as we have been in the days of trial and the days of triumph.

Proud to have been at your head, I send my most cordial greetings to the veterans of the great war, illustrious by their immortal deeds, and to those who, in the camps of America, were preparing with ardour to come and take their part in the battle.

Lastly, I wish to salute, as ever living in a memory of the past and on the threshold of a future common to us, the tombs of those who lie in the soil of France, resting there as a symbol of our indissoluble union.

THE 27th DIVISION IN FRANCE

BY MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. O'RYAN

I

THE record of the 27th Division was characterized by the fact that its entire period of active service in the great war was with the British Army. The division itself was unique in that it was the only division in the American Army which existed as a fully organized and complete tactical division, prior to the war. The Pennsylvania or 28th Division existed prior to the war, but was not complete in its auxiliary units. Similar comment applies to the 1st Division, which was commanded by General Pershing on the Mexican border in 1916.

The 27th or New York Division was originally organized in 1898 by the State of New York and its first commander was Major General Charles F. Roe. Lacking in many of its component parts, it was gradually developed until in answer to the call for the Mexican border service in 1916 it went to the Rio Grande River in the vicinity of McAllen, Texas, a complete division with every element present. It was commanded by Major General John F. O'Ryan, who had been its commander since May 1st, 1912. On the Mexican border the division was kept together for a possible drive into Mexico. The long months of the border service were occupied with tactical exercises, the result of which was that upon the completion of that service the division was an exceptionally efficient organization with considerable experience in the coördination of effort necessary between its infantry and the auxiliary arms.

Hardly had the division returned from the Mexican border service in the spring of 1917, when its mobilization was ordered for service in the World War. At the time of the Mexican border service and at the outbreak of the great war the Tables of Organization of the United States Army provided that the infantry of a division should consist of nine regiments each an approximate strength of

1,900 officers and men. This was the organization of the division at the time of the mobilization in 1917, except that the units were at peace strength. The orders for mobilization included not only units of the tactical division but all units of the National Guard throughout the country, including the Coast Artillery and organizations in excess of tactical divisions. All organizations of the New York National Guard, whether part of the tactical division or not, were therefore included in the mobilization order. The organizations were mobilized in the armories which were used as barracks, recruits were enlisted and units drilled and exercised in public parks and other available places, very much as was the practice in the European armies. Meanwhile mobilization camps were being prepared by the War Department for the reception of the Guard divisions. In August the troops of New York, including the tactical division, were ordered to Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, S. C. Orders were then received to reorganize the tactical division upon the basis of four regiments of infantry instead of nine, but to increase the strength of the regiments from 1,900 officers and men to approximately 3,600 officers and men. This change was a result of recommendations based upon the experience of foreign armies in the class of warfare that had up to that time characterized the operations abroad. On the Mexican border the division was known officially as the 6th Division, United States Army. In the reorganization the division was given a new number, that of 27.

As the organizations began to arrive at Camp Wadsworth, Major General O'Ryan, Colonel H. H. Bandholtz, who was Chief of Staff of the Division, and Captain Charles P. Franchot, Aides-de-Camp to the Division Commander, were ordered with other Division Commanders and members of their Staffs from other camps to proceed to Europe for a tour of observation and study of for-

eign methods. These officers left Camp Wadsworth on September 20, 1917, and proceeded to the port of embarkation, Hoboken, New Jersey, where they embarked on the transport *Antilles*, arriving at St. Nazaire, France, fourteen days later. The transport was sunk the first day out on its return trip. The officers mentioned were ordered to the British area. They were first assigned to

General Sir William Robertson, G.C.B. The officers of the 27th Division then were relieved for rest and later were sent to another part of the British line for experience in trench warfare. This service was with the 31st British Division commanded by Major General Wanless O'Gowan, C.B. That division held a part of the line east of Vimy Ridge near Arras. After a week with this



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Major-General John F. O'Ryan

He commanded the 27th Division with the British Army.

the 29th British Division, commanded by Major General Sir Henry DeBauvoir DeLisle, K.C.B. The Headquarters was at Elverdigne, Belgium. They arrived in time to take part with the division in the British offensive which was to begin on the following morning, October 13th. After two days of severe fighting this division was relieved by the 17th British Division, commanded by Major

division the officers visited British Corps and Army schools and observed the British methods of training. The party then returned to Paris and from there were ordered to the French area, arriving at Soissons on October 21st. A few days later began the great French offensive of 1917 against the German positions along the Chemin des Dames. The 27th Division party was attached to the 38th

Algerian Division and took part in the attack with that division. Upon the completion of the attack, which was eminently successful, the officers visited French Army schools. Thereafter they were ordered to American General Headquarters at Chaumont, where a series of conferences took place, after which

THE DIVISION REORGANIZED

Returning to Camp Wadsworth it was found that the reorganization of the division had been completed. This reorganization caused much sadness among the officers and enlisted men of long service, because it elimi-



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Lending a Helping Hand

At Camp Wadsworth, Spartanburg, S. C., where the New York National Guard after an experience on the Mexican border received several more months of training before going overseas.

all officers who had been acting as observers were ordered to the States to rejoin their divisions. The 27th Division party left for New York by the French steamer *Rochambeau* from Bordeaux, arriving in New York on November 26th.

nated the identity and affected the historic traditions of many of the old regiments. The famous 7th Infantry Regiment became the 107th Infantry Regiment, its strength being augmented by the transfer of officers and men from other units, but largely from the 1st

Infantry. The 23rd Infantry Regiment of Brooklyn became the 106th Infantry Regiment and was augmented by the transfer of officers and men from the other Brooklyn regiments, the 14th and 47th Infantry Regiments. The 3rd Infantry Regiment became the 108th Infantry, its strength being augmented by similar transfers from other units, but mainly from the 74th Infantry Regiment. The 2nd Infantry Regiment became the 105th, its strength being augmented in like manner by transfers from the 71st Infantry Regiment. The 12th Infantry Regiment also contributed its strength in the manner described. Prior to the departure of the division for Camp Wadsworth, the 69th Infantry Regiment, known as the "Irish Regiment," was detached from the division and assigned for service with the 42nd or "Rainbow" Division. At the time of this transfer much ill feeling was caused, not only because this regiment was taken by direct order of the War Department, from the New York Division, but because it was arbitrarily filled up to war strength by similar orders requiring drafts of men to be furnished from the Guard regiments stationed in the City of New York. Loyalty which men bear to the regiment of their choice and in which they have enlisted has always in other armies been a sentiment to be fostered and a military asset to be valued.

The 1st Cavalry and Squadron "A" were organized into the 104th, 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions and the 102nd Trench Mortar Battery. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Artillery became the 104th, 105th and 106th Field Artillery Regiments respectively. There was no change in the Signal Battalion, the Engineer Regiment, the Sanitary Units or the Trains, except as to numerical designation. Division Headquarters Troop and the Military Police, being new units, were not affected. The regiments from which transfers were made during the organization of the tactical division were brought to strength by drafted men and were reorganized as pioneer units and anti-aircraft machine gun battalions.

The winter of 1917 was very severe and although the troops at Camp Wadsworth were living in tents they remained at the camp throughout the winter. Physical and bayonet

training exercises were features of the training. At Glassy Rock in South Carolina, combined arms exercises were held, all troops using service ammunition. At the same place the infantry was required to attack outlined positions, advancing under actual barrages fired by the Field Artillery Brigade. Finally late in April confidential orders were received for the division to prepare for embarkation.

II

IN TRAINING IN FRANCE

THE division with the exception of the 106th Infantry sailed from Newport News, Virginia, about the middle of May. The 106th Infantry sailed from Hoboken. The Division Commander and an advance party sailed from New York City earlier in the month. The ports of debarkation were Brest and St. Nazaire, France. All units of the division were transported safely, although some of the convoys were attacked by submarines upon nearing the French coast. The Field Artillery Brigade was held at Newport News for some weeks in order to enable the prior shipment of infantry units of other divisions.

In order to understand this priority for infantry troops, it will be necessary to mention some of the consequences which led up to the so-called Abbeville agreement, and the consequent rushing of American infantry troops to France. From the time of our entry into the war in the spring of 1917, until the spring of 1918, the movement of American troops to France had been slow. Well trained National Guard divisions were kept in the States while wholly new divisions of drafted men with no previous training or experience were sent overseas, there to undergo months of training and instruction in training areas in rear of the advance zone, under conditions of mud and extended dispersion of their units due to the necessities of billeting. On March 21st the German Army in Flanders began its great thrust which shattered the 5th British Army, and almost broke through to the sea, establishing a great salient in the British Line. Perhaps this period was the darkest hour of the war. It is now generally understood that earnest representations were made to the American Government by both the

British and the French that if disaster to the Allies' cause were to be avoided, America must hurry men to replace the great losses sustained by the Allies in their resistance to the recent German offensives. America was short of arms, clothing, and war equipment of all kinds, but possessed unlimited man-power. The Allies were short of man-power, but possessed vast stores of arms and equipment. An

it was that American troops began to cross the sea in great numbers, more than half of them being transported in British bottoms and priority being given the infantry. Arriving in France they were railroaded north into the British area in the vicinity of Abbeville, St. Omer and other areas in rear of the British line, which then ran generally north and south. Truly it was said that the British



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine

Studying a Problem in Strategy

Some of America's future officers stop on a practice march to reason out a problem with the aid of their instructor.

agreement known as the Abbeville agreement was made between British and American representatives, whereby American soldiers were to be rushed to the British area, and there armed and equipped by the British authorities, the British also making available for their transportation as many transports as possible. As the British had developed a vast force of artillery and as their losses had been for the most part in the infantry, it was infantry that was imperatively needed. Then

were fighting with their backs to the sea—and not far from the sea.

IN THE BRITISH AREA

Thus it was that the 27th Division upon its arrival in France was sent north of the Somme near Abbeville, with Division Headquarters at St. Riquier. This movement was completed during the first week of June. It is interesting to relate that Memorial Day was observed as is usual on May 30th. Two

companies of the old 7th Regiment billeted with regimental headquarters in the little coast town of Rue, north of the Somme, paraded and were reviewed by Major General O'Ryan and Colonel Fisk, as they marched behind the band in the streets of the town. Similar parades were held in other towns in the area. The area occupied by the division included the ancient forest of Crécy, in which at that time a large number of German prisoners were employed in cutting timber. During this period Field Marshal Haig visited the division and reviewed a detachment composed of the 107th Infantry and the fourteen machine gun companies of the division. The remarkable physical fitness, discipline and precision of these fine troops made a deep impression upon the Field Marshal, who freely indicated his satisfaction.

The division remained in this area until June 17th, when it began its movement to what was known as the St. Valery area, immediately south of the Somme. The time spent in the Rue area was occupied in receiving from the British and issuing to the units of the division, animals, wagons, moving kitchens, motor trucks, cars and cycles, gas masks, steel helmets and supplies of all kinds. The American rifles and machine guns were turned in and British rifles and machine guns substituted. When the transfer was complete the only American property remaining were the packs, slickers, coats and overseas caps. A great amount of practical training was carried out during the same period. The specialists, such as machine gunners, Stokes mortar and one-pounder detachments, signal and engineer troops, received finishing courses at British Corps and Divisional schools. Many divisional field exercises were held and every company sent several enlisted men into the line with the British companies for three days and nights. All during this period the German bombing planes were very active at night and bombed the area relentlessly. The American casualties from this cause, however, were not considerable.

DIVISION MOVEMENTS

In the St. Valery area the division headquarters were at Escarbotin, but the division after three days was ordered to the vicinity of

Doullens in support of the Third Army under General Byng. On Saturday, June 22nd, Division Headquarters moved to Beauval in the new area, and General O'Ryan conferred with General Byng at his headquarters at Hedin, in relation to the mission of the 27th Division in the defensive scheme. While in this area the enemy night bombing activities continued and many miraculous escapes occurred. The division was practiced in the occupation of a second defensive position known as the G.H.Q. line. This line was a system of trenches partially constructed, which were to be held in the event that the first defensive position was penetrated. Special training was continued during this period.

On July 1st the division was ordered for service with the Second Army under General Sir Herbert Plumer in Flanders. On the following day while the troops were entraining for the new station General Pershing visited the area, lunched with General O'Ryan and inspected some of the commands. On July 3rd, Division Headquarters moved to Nieurlet, where it remained until July 7th, on which date, after a conference with General Plumer, General O'Ryan proceeded to Ouderzeele, five miles northeast of Cassel and established Division Headquarters. Here it was learned that ten American divisions had arrived in the British area and been armed and equipped as had the 27th Division, but that all except two had been taken from the British by the supreme command and sent to the Franco-American sector, carrying with them the animals, wagons, harness and much other property supplied by the British. The British were allowed to choose the two divisions they would keep and selected the 27th and 30th. The 27th Division when it moved into the area in front of Mt. Kemmel, Belgium, found the 30th Division in the area immediately north of it. This was the beginning of a remarkably close comradeship between the officers and men of these two divisions. From that time on they were side by side in all the hard fighting of their war service.

The two divisions had been moved to the Dickebusch-Mt. Kemmel sector because of information received that a renewal of the German drive to the sea would be made there.

In preparation for the expected drive the British had partially constructed a second defensive line known as the Poperinghe line and it was the plan in the event of an early attack in this sector to hold this second line with parts of the American divisions, using the remainder for counter-attack purposes. Accordingly the line was promptly occupied by detachments of the leading regiments, and these detachments under the technical leadership of the 102nd Engineer Regiment of the 27th Division engaged in strengthening the defenses, constructing shelters and dug-outs, burying wire communications and installing telephone stations. Much cutting away in front of the fire trenches was necessary in order that the fields of fire might be effective.

A NEW PLAN FOR DEFENSE

From observation and report the effectiveness of masked light machine gun fire was appreciated, and General O'Ryan featured preparation for such fire in the defense of his sector. This was accomplished in the following manner: More than fifty yards in front of the defensive wire there were dug at intervals of about 150 yards along the front, two-men-standing-pits for the use of two men with a Lewis gun. All the earth excavated was carefully removed, and the top

provided with a sheet metal cover, covered with stained burlap with weeds set in the top. These pits could not be observed from the air. They were invisible from the front as they were masked by weeds and tall grass, through which the observers looked. The expected attack would come either as a continuation of a penetration through the first defensive position and without an artillery barrage, or as a second phase of the attack and after an artillery bombardment upon the second position. In the former event the assaulting troops would follow quickly upon the heels of those retiring from the first line position, and would support their advance largely by pushing light machine guns forward as was done by them in their March drive. These enemy machine guns would concentrate their fire upon the second position fire trenches, which they could see, with a view to keeping down the fire therefrom. But the Lewis gunners well in front in their concealed positions would be quite free from such fire and would have a great advantage over the enemy machine gunners, as they advanced in the open. In the latter event, that is to say, in case of a preliminary bombardment, the pits would offer a small target to shell fire, so small that a direct hit would be necessary to knock them out. Unless dis-



The 27th Division's Tank Unit in Training in the Beauquesne Area, France

covered and made the targets for artillery fire, they would escape, for the ordinary bombardment would be directed at the trenches behind them. The pit device for advanced Lewis guns might not have application to the ordinary first line defensive positions, because the foreground prior to attack is under the close scrutiny of the enemy and their existence would probably be detected. Its application, however, to a second defensive position, where time is the essence of the enemy's thrust, must be apparent. The accurate surprise fire of light machine guns at close range is always demoralizing.

FIRST SERVICE WITH THE BRITISH

Much of the work of strengthening the second defensive position was done in the daytime, and was under observation of the enemy balloons. The working parties were therefore daily subjected to harassing shell fire and gas bombardment, which resulted in a daily casualty list. While this work was going on, companies and battalions were detailed to serve with British brigades in the front line, and the reader may be assured that their appearance was a welcome sight to the "Tommys," who knew in a vague way at least that they were in a critical position, and that any German drive to hope for success must be predicated upon the power at least to smash through the position which they held. For many weeks the two British divisions, the 6th and 41st, holding the front of the 27th Division sector, had lived in the mud and gas, hourly expecting the crash to fall upon them, but with never a whine about their lot or any evidence of an unwillingness to die at their posts. It was this dogged fortitude and bold courage, often heard of in song and story, that the men of the 27th American Division witnessed with their own senses and witnessing, gallantly and generously acclaimed. And strangely enough the largest percentage of them were of Irish and German descent.

Many incidents might be related of this joint occupation of the front line of the Dickebusch-Mt. Kemmel Sector, but lack of space forbids. In general it may be said that four years of war had disillusioned "Tommy" of the glamour of war. He was as he himself

daily expressed it, "fed up on war." He was not unwilling, but certainly was not desirous of "starting anything." The American soldier on the other hand was "fed up" on accounts of the war and wanted what he termed a "look in." In the 27th Division he had been trained and trained until he assumed to be skeptical about the existence of the German soldier and the opportunity to do battle with him. His plaint was, "Lead me to it." When he reached the trenches his first concern was to have a look over the top, and seeing nothing, his impulse was to go over and look. Next he studied "Tommy" in the trenches. He found "Tommy" a good pal, rather unimaginative, quite matter of fact, very dependent upon his superiors, surprisingly short in stature and slight in frame, but wiry and soldierly. Soon he assumed towards him an unconscious attitude of big brother, not based of course upon a greater experience or demonstrated battle efficiency, but apparently upon his greater stature and native assurance.

Hand in hand with the development of the Poperinghe Line and of the front line service with British battalions, regiments were detailed for a week at a time for rifle practice at Tilques, a short distance west of St. Omer. This was the work of the division for weeks during July and August. Nightly there were aerial bombing raids and night and day there was shelling and gas concentration. American battalions took over battalion sectors of the front line. Superior officers making inspections of forward positions and of detachments holding them, necessarily made these visits by day in order to have daylight for their observations. But their movements in the forward area from place to place were subject to observation from Mt. Kemmel and always involved great personal risk. Troops, reliefs, ration parties and even small detachments were not moved about except under cover of darkness. Every day offered its toll of casualties, small but regrettable.

III

GOING INTO ACTION

ON the 23rd day of August the 27th Division "took over," that is to say, relieved the 6th British Division in the Dicke-

busch Sector, Division Headquarters moving forward from Ouderzeele to a hut camp known as Douglas Camp, northwest of Abeele, Belgium. The 6th British Divisional Artillery was attached as the divisional artillery, the artillery brigade of the 27th Division having been sent to the American area upon its arrival in France and assigned to another division.

and one in support. The lieutenant colonel of the 105th Infantry, Morris N. Liebmann, had been killed by shell fire shortly before this. The 108th Infantry, Colonel Edgar S. Jennings, and the 105th Machine Gun Battalion, Major Kenneth Gardiner, were in reserve. The 6th British Divisional Artillery was the field artillery support. The 54th In-



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Kemmel Hill Before the Germans Attacked

This is the French Commander's post on Mt. Kemmel as it looked before the battle of April 24th, 1918, when the Germans stormed and captured part of the hill. The fight there was one of the bitterest of the last great German offensive.

The Dickebusch Sector had a front of 3,500 yards. The 53rd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel James M. Andrews, took over the front and support positions, with the 105th Infantry, commanded by Major Charles W. Berry, on the left, and the 106th Infantry, commanded by Colonel William A. Taylor, on the right, each with two battalions in front

fantry Brigade, Brigadier General Palmer E. Pierce, less the 108th Infantry, took over the defenses of the Poperinghe Line. The troops in the line immediately began vigorous night patrolling with the result that there were many local combats and severe fighting along the front, resulting in the division acquiring almost undisputed possession of "No Man's

Land." The Alsatian Division opposing the 27th was relieved and the 8th Prussian Division, a crack organization, substituted.

During the evening of August 30th an order was received from the Nineteenth Corps (British), Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Watts commanding, to the effect that the enemy was believed to be retiring, and that the 27th Division and the 34th British Division on its right would send out patrols to verify the information. Patrols were sent out the same night. The enemy was found to be inactive, but machine gun resistance was made.

Brigadier General Albert H. Blanding, having reported for duty on this day, was placed in command of the 53rd Infantry Brigade.

VIERSTAAT RIDGE CAPTURED

At 10 A.M., on August 31st, the Nineteenth Corps informed the Division Commander that the enemy had retired from Mt. Kemmel in front of the 34th British Division and directed an advance for the purpose of occupying Vierstaat Ridge, about a thousand yards in front of the existing line. This was done. The enemy's front line trenches were occupied with little resistance. A further advance was met by heavy machine gun fire all along the front. With the assistance of supporting artillery, machine gun and one-pounder fire, enemy machine gun nests were neutralized or reduced and the advance continued, so that by 6:30 P.M. on August 31st, the objective prescribed by Corps orders had been reached and consolidation began. Supporting battalions were moved up into the old front line trenches. Orders were then received from the Nineteenth Corps for the right regiment to continue its advance at 7 A.M. on the morning of September 1st. This advance was directed to be made by moving its right flank forward, pivoting its left flank on the remains of Vierstaat village. This movement was successfully completed during the morning of September 1st and the whole line was then ordered to advance to the crest of Vierstaat Ridge. This advance brought on a heavy engagement. The right flank was heavily counter-attacked and driven back. The position, however, was later regained by

a battalion of the 106th Infantry. Fighting continued throughout the day and the following morning a further attack was made all along the front. Vierstaat Ridge was gained and a line forward of the crest selected and consolidated, the enemy being driven back to Wyttschaete Ridge. On the night of September 2-3, the 27th Division was relieved by the 41st British Division and moved to a rear area for rest, after which it was ordered into G.H.Q. reserve, taking station in the Beauquesne Area near Doullens.

While in the Beauquesne area the division was given a great deal of special training in attack formations in conjunction with tanks. This was in preparation for the great effort to be made for the breaking of the Hindenburg line between Cambrai and St. Quentin.

ON THE HINDENBURG LINE

On September 22-24, the division was moved from the G.H.Q. reserve and transferred to the Fourth British Army, commanded by General Sir Henry Rawlinson. On the night of September 24-25, the division relieved the 18th and 74th British Divisions in the front line. This was opposite the left half of the so-called "tunnel sector" of the Hindenburg line defenses between Bellicourt and Vendhuile. The 53rd Infantry Brigade was again placed in the front line for the purpose of attacking on the entire front with the 106th Infantry. The 105th Infantry was held in support. The 105th Machine Gun Battalion relieved the British machine gun unit on the night of September 25-26. The remainder of the division was held in reserve. The front line taken over was about a thousand yards distant from the outer defenses of the Hindenburg line west of the Bellicourt Tunnel. The division held about 4,500 yards of front, the 30th Division being on the right of the 27th Division. Both divisions at this time were in the Second American Corps, commanded by Major General George W. Read, but were affiliated with and received orders direct from the Australian Corps.

The enemy's outer defensive system was strengthened by strong points. These were known as the Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. Previous attacks against these positions made by the British Army had

failed. As an early attack against the main position was contemplated, it was believed desirable by the Fourth British Army to capture the outer defenses in a preliminary operation. On the right of the 27th Division and in the 30th Divisional area most of these outer defenses had been taken by the British and in that area the line needed only to be

enemy held a very strong position at Vendhuile on the left of the 27th Division front, which position had successfully defied previous assault, it constituted a serious threat against the flank of the 106th Infantry as it went forward. Accordingly one battalion of the 105th Infantry was detailed to cover this flank, while the remainder of that regiment was held in



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Brigadier-General Robert C. Davis

Adjutant General, A.E.F.

straightened out. In the 27th Divisional area, however, the British had taken none of the outer defenses. Accordingly it was planned that these outer defenses would be attacked at 5:30 A.M. on the morning of September 27th by the 106th Infantry, assisted by a heavy barrage and tanks, the regiment being disposed with all three battalions in the line. The barrage was to move at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes. As the

support. Each battalion of the 106th Infantry was disposed in depth, having two companies in the attacking line and two in support. Mopping-up parties were provided for and featured, as it was known that the enemy's complicated maze of trenches and dug-outs would provide many opportunities for cutting off advance detachments of the attacking force. The 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions fired a machine gun

barrage in support of the attack. Corps and Army artillery fired upon the enemy artillery positions and selected targets to the east of the objective while nine brigades of British field artillery fired the barrage.

THE BATTLE OF SEPT. 27TH

The attack was launched as directed. The tanks generally were unsuccessful. Many of them were promptly destroyed. The enemy defense featured machine guns. Light machine guns were numerous and well placed, while heavy machine guns further to the rear fired a defensive machine gun barrage throughout the entire engagement. To neutralize to some extent the enemy fire efficiency, the British artillery fired a great number of smoke bombs; in fact fifteen per cent. of the barrage projectiles were smoke bombs. In consequence the battle was fought in a heavy pall of smoke, platoon and company commanders moving towards the objective with the aid of luminous compasses. The air was literally full of artillery and minnenwerfer projectiles and machine gun bullets, throughout the entire day of September 27th. A flame thrower was used at Quennemont Farm. The casualties were heavy, but detachments of the leading companies reached the objective line. They gained footholds in the strong points and completely occupied the Knoll. A heavy counter-attack dislodged the 106th men from the Knoll, but a counter-attack by two companies of the 105th and detachments of the 106th Infantry regained the major part of the Knoll. Due to the wide front, 4,500 yards, over which the regiment attacked and the great number of casualties inflicted by the terrific enemy fire, the survivors of the mopping-up parties were unable to cover the many places from which enemy forces appeared in the rear of the leading detachments of the 106th Infantry, and fired upon them from the rear. Some of the leading detachments were forced into shell holes and enemy trenches. In these places desperate fighting resulted. The 106th Infantry lost so many of its officers that many companies were in command of Sergeants. In view of previous successes the enemy were confident in their belief that the Hindenburg line was impregnable and they fought with great desperation and courage. On the even-

ing of September 27th, due to the great losses of officers and the heavy casualties generally, the situation was obscure.

That night in accordance with the plan laid down by the Fourth Army, the 54th Infantry Brigade took over the front line, from which the 106th Infantry had made its attack, all three machine-gun battalions remaining in the line. This was in preparation for the main attack to take place early on the morning of September 29th. The 54th Infantry Brigade took over the line with the 108th Infantry on the right half of the divisional sector and the 107th Infantry on the left. The instructions to the 54th Infantry Brigade Commander were to patrol forward as far as practicable throughout September 28th, in order to make good the gains of the 106th Infantry and to establish a practical jumping off line for the big attack on September 29th. When the 106th Infantry was relieved by the taking over of the line by the 54th Infantry Brigade, it was found that of its personnel of more than 3,000 officers and men there remained but 9 officers and 252 men, present for duty, and those were exhausted.

THE ATTACK OF SEPT. 29TH

On September 29th the entire Fourth Army was to attack on a wide front, but the real attack designed to be a great thrust through the German line was to take place in the tunnel sector of the St. Quentin Canal between Bellicourt and Vendhuille. To make this thrust effective the 27th and 30th American Divisions were to constitute the spear-head of the shaft and to be immediately followed by the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions, which were to "leap-frog" the American Divisions when the latter had gained the main enemy positions. In turn the Australian Divisions were to be followed by British Divisions. The attack along the entire Army front was ordered to take place at 5:30 A.M. on the morning of September 29th, beginning at a prescribed line which assumed that the 106th Infantry would have gained complete possession of the outer defenses. This required that the 54th Infantry Brigade, if its regiments were to have the full advantage of the supporting barrage, would have to gain

possession of the points which the 106th Infantry had been unable to hold. The plan of attack called for the advance of the 107th and 108th Infantry to be followed by the remnants of the 106th Infantry as additional mopping-up parties, these to be followed by the 105th Infantry, whose mission it was to cross the tunnel after that line had been gained and attack to the north in order to relieve the enemy resistance in that direction and

and of the lack of time to check a modification of the prescribed barrage, decided that there would be no change, and that the 54th Brigade would on the 28th of September fight its way forward for the purpose of gaining a line as close to the prescribed start as possible.

HINDENBURG LINE BROKEN

At 5:50 a.m. on the morning of September 29th the great attack began. As in the



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Starting Over the Top at Night

This flashlight photo taken in a British trench shows a working party leaving the trenches at night, carrying duck-boards called trench mats.

enable the British division on the left to get forward. The Division Commander took up with the Corps the question of modification of the barrage start line for the morning of September 29th, so as to draw it in closer to the actual front of the 54th Brigade. The Corps, however, in view of the fact that the attack on the Corps front was to be synchronized with other attacks on the right and left,

previous attack smoke was included in the barrage, but the amount of smoke was cut down. Twenty tanks accompanied the advance of the 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments. Again the tanks failed, for the most part being destroyed within the first half hour of the attack. From the flank position at Vandhuille the enemy poured a deluge of fire against the 107th Infantry. These two

highly disciplined regiments advanced with great dash. The 2nd Battalion of the 107th Infantry inclined toward the north in the direction of Vendhuille to protect the flank against enemy counter-attack. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, supported by a provisional battalion composed of the survivors of the 106th Infantry, moved forward through the outer defenses to the main defenses based on the tunnel and the remains of the village of Bony organized as a strong point. As in

battalion of the 107th Infantry in holding this flank.

The 3rd Battalion of the 107th Infantry gained the tunnel, but so heavy were their losses that they were compelled to fall back a short distance and establish their line in front of the enemy strong point at Bony. Here they dug in and held on with their left refused, so as to join with the 1st Battalion of the same regiment on the left. On the right half of the tunnel sector, the 108th In-



Tunnel Entrance, Hindenburg Line Defenses

This tunnel, held by the Germans, was the key position of their line. After a desperate battle, in which the 27th Division took part, the enemy surrendered it.

the preceding attack the fire on both sides was terrific, and desperate fighting continued throughout the day. From the strong position at Vendhuille the enemy launched repeated counter-attacks, with a view to rolling up the entire attacking line. The 1st Battalion of the 107th Infantry, suffering great losses, succeeded during the morning in repulsing these counter-attacks, although the Knoll at one time was retaken by the enemy. The 105th Infantry was used to support the

fantry broke through all the defenses particularly on the right where the resistance was not as strong as it was on the left, and secured and held positions in the main system. One battalion of the 108th Infantry, or rather the survivors of that battalion, which gained the main defenses, engaged in very heavy fighting with the defenders who greatly outnumbered them. The result of this fierce struggle was the surrender of the enemy survivors, the prisoners taken exceeding in number the

strength of the survivors of the battalion. Throughout the rest of the day the remnants of this battalion held this position against repeated counter-attacks and artillery bombardment, at the same time keeping in subjection the prisoners taken by them and whose numbers as stated were greater than their own. The 3rd Australian Division began its advance the same morning and late that evening joined the advance battalion of the 108th Infantry. During the night this battalion of the 108th Infantry was relieved and succeeded in evacuating its prisoners.

The attack was continued on September 30th and October 1st by the 3rd and 5th Australian Divisions, assisted by approximately 2,000 men of the 27th Division, who joined in with them as the Australians gained their advanced positions. As the great enemy strong point at Vendhuille on the left of the 27th Division sector still held out, it was necessary that continued attacks be made in a northeasterly direction in order to flank it. When the position was threatened from the rear the survivors withdrew, enabling the British Division in its front to advance. On October 1st the 27th Division was relieved for rest in the Tincourt area.

LOSSES OF THE 27TH

In this battle of the Hindenburg line the 27th Division captured 17 officers and 792 enlisted men. It inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy. The German dead were found in great numbers about the Knoll, in shell craters, trenches and in the open. These had been killed in the heavy attack made against the flank of the 106th Infantry on September 27th and in counter-attacks made by the left battalion of that regiment and by one battalion of the 105th Infantry. A substantial number of them were killed by the left battalion of the 107th Infantry and by the 105th Infantry as well, on September 28th and 29th. The 108th Infantry made a shambles of part of the main defenses at the tunnel when they broke in and before they could organize to accept the surrender of the prisoners mentioned above. The casualties of the 27th Division were also severe, necessarily so from the character of the defenses and the tenacity and courage with which they were held. The

casualties, killed and wounded, were 110 officers and 4,720 enlisted men.

With the smashing of the Hindenburg line, which the Germans believed to be impregnable, the enemy morale waned. This was noticeable in later battles. General Sir John Monash, the Australian Corps Commander gave it as his opinion on July 4th, 1919, that this smashing of the Hindenburg defense system was accomplished at its most strongly defended point, and that the American part in it was "probably the greatest single American feat of arms achieved in the whole war."

As a result of his fine battle leadership Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise, commanding the 107th Infantry, was made Brigadier General and later relieved Brigadier General Albert L. Blanding, of the 53rd Infantry Brigade, ordered to another division. His leadership, also, had, like that of Brigadier General Pierce of the 54th Brigade, been of a high order. Quite generally the leadership of the officers of the division was remarkable for its skill, determination and almost reckless courage. The Commanding General of the 3rd Australian Division which followed the 27th Division in the attack, stated to Major General O'Ryan that from his observations the soldiers of the 27th Division seemed possessed of limitless confidence in their officers and would go anywhere or attempt anything they directed.

IV

THE GERMANS IN RETREAT

ON October 8th, the division having rested, was again ordered forward. The march was taken up through Joncourt, Montebrehain and Premont, over the trail of the retreating enemy. The enemy in his retreat finally reached the LaSelle river, where reserve troops had been engaged in preparing a defensive position. The Division Commander established Division Headquarters at Busigny, which had just been evacuated by the enemy, who had retired to the river with outposts on its western side. The division took over a wide front extending from Vaux Andigny on the south to St. Benin on the north. The 6th British Division was on the right and the 50th British Division on the left. This relief was affected on the night of Octo-



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British Engineers Building a Railway


ber 11th-12th. The front of the division was approximately 9,000 yards. The enemy maintained heavy shell fire against the villages of Escafour, St. Souplet and Busigny. On Monday, October 13th, the Division Commander directed the 108th Infantry to make a raid for the purpose of securing identifications and reconnoitering the river to be crossed. The manner of conducting this raid was out of the ordinary. The raid was directed to be made by three squads on a front of 500 yards, one squad on the right, one on the left and one in the center, these squads to follow a barrage falling on a front of 1,500 yards, the barrage to be supplemented by a smoke screen to hide the size of the force following the barrage. The raid was to be made by daylight on the afternoon of October 14th. At 4 o'clock the barrage fell according to plan, and the three small groups immediately went forward behind it and crossed the river by wading. All along the front the smoke was dense; the enemy believed that an attack in force was being made. The return fire was heavy, but the defensive barrage fell behind the attacking squads. Each squad gained access to the enemy's lines, and the result was the taking of 27 prisoners with no loss to the attacking force. The river had also been reconnoitered during the attack by men wading the stream along the divisional front. On the evening of October 15th preparatory to an assault scheduled to take place on the 17th the divisional front was reduced, the 30th Division taking over the right half of the sector.

On October 17th the Fourth Army again attacked along the line of the LaSelle River. The divisional sector was divided in half, the 53rd Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Blanding, attacked in the right half of the sector, the 105th Infantry, Colonel James M. Andrews in the lead, the 106th Infantry, Colonel Franklin W. Ward, in support. The 54th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Palmer E. Pierce, attacked in the left half of the sector, the 108th Infantry, Colonel Edgar S. Jennings in the lead and the 107th Infantry, Colonel Charles I. DeBevoise in support. Colonel DeBevoise, in order to continue with his regiment until after the LaSelle River Battle, had not qualified as Brigadier General, although

notified of his appointment and eligibility. After the relief of his regiment he qualified and assumed command of the 53rd Infantry Brigade. The attack was successful, the heights on the east side of the river were assaulted and taken. A great number of the enemy were killed along this line. Later inspection showed their dead bodies in machine gun pits, trenches and along hedges and in sunken roads. Bandival Farm was taken in dashing style and numerous prisoners captured there. The 105th Infantry attacked and took the village of Abre Guernon, closely supported by the 106th Infantry. The following day the attack was continued, being launched against the enemy's outpost line on the road from Abre Guernon to Le Cateau. Again the enemy was driven back, and Jone De Mer Ridge and La Rue Farm captured and held. The following day, October 19th, the attack was continued; the next ridge, known as the St. Maurice Ridge, was taken, and the enemy's main forces driven behind the Canal de la Sambre, which was another prepared position.

THE 27TH RELIEVED

On the night of October 20-21 the division, greatly reduced in strength and much worn out, was relieved by the 6th British Division and ordered for rest and recuperation to the vicinity of Corbie and Villers Bretonneux on the Somme. Units of the division began to arrive in this new area on October 23rd. The villages in this area were all partially or wholly demolished. The weather was cold and wet, and it was difficult to make the men comfortable. While in this area the division received its first replacements. All of its fighting had been carried on with the original personnel of the division. On Sunday, November 10th, the entire division was paraded near Corbie in honor of its dead. The following day the armistice was signed. On November 13th the Division Commander left for London to visit the wounded of the division, of whom there were about 4,000 in and about London. It was found that all the wounded who were at all convalescent had but one thought, namely to get back to their division. This feeling was so strong that it was commented upon at all the hospi-



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New York Heroes Home on the Leviathan

The giant transport passing up the North River. More than 9,000 troops of New York's own Division—the 27th—returned on her.

tals where men of the 27th Division were located.

On November 25th, the division received orders to entrain for the Le Mans area, situated between Paris and the coast, and its movement there soon followed. During the first week of December, the division arrived in the new area and established Division Headquarters at Montfort. From this period until the division left for Brest for the transportation movement home, it was occupied in training the drafted men it had received as replacements in target practice and field exercises. This long period of more than three months was naturally tiresome to both officers and men. While in this area the division was reviewed by General Pershing, who commented most favorably upon its soldierly appearance. The war was over, and their preference now was for home. However, it should be said that at no time was there any restlessness or lack of keenness in relation to discipline and the efficiency of the division.

Upon leaving the Le Mans area the last week in February, 1919, the division proceeded by rail to Brest and there embarked for home, 11,000 of the division moving on the great transport *Leviathan*. The trip across was without incident.

One of the features of the service of the division in France was its theatrical troupe. It really played an important role, not only in what might be termed entertainment, but in the development of *esprit* and the stimulation of the spirits of the exhausted men. The members of the theatrical company were employed during battles at casualty clearing stations. At other times they gave entertainments and skits in unused buildings behind the lines or in village halls when the division was in rest areas.

With the arrival of the division in New York City it was learned that a great welcome awaited them. The people of New York with the authority of the Secretary of War had planned for a parade of the division. This parade was held on March 25th in the City of New York with perfect weather conditions. It was estimated that the greatest crowd of people ever gotten together anywhere witnessed this parade. Shortly there-

after the division was mustered out of the Federal service.

LETTER FROM SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K. T.,
G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E., FIELD
MARSHAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
BRITISH ARMIES IN FRANCE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
BRITISH ARMIES IN THE FIELD

12th February, 1919.

To the General Officer and the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men of the 27th American Division:

You are returning in victory from the first campaign in which American troops have fought on European soil. Secure in the strength and limitless resources of your own great country on the other side of the Atlantic, the call of outraged humanity which from the outset of the war sounded so loudly and so closely in British ears was heard from afar by the manhood of our sister nation. A people less far-sighted, less imbued with the lofty ideals of liberty, might never have heeded that call. You heard it, you gave it heed, and when the time was ripe and every city, township, village, hamlet and farm in your mighty land knew the full meaning of the desperate conflict raging beyond the seas, you flung yourselves into the fray, ardent and impetuous on the side of Right.

Right triumphed. You who now return to the homes that sent you forth in faith and hope, to make if need be the supreme sacrifice for the belief that is in you, can say to those who greet you that in that triumph you have had your share. You can point to a proud record of achievement, to the months of patient earnest training, to the incessant strain and watchfulness of the trenches, to the fury of great battles. You can point also to your sacrifices, made with a courage and devotion unsurpassed in all the dread story of this war—abundant in heroism—sacrifices which were the price of world liberty and peace which you have helped so powerfully to build up anew.

Returning, you and all ranks of the American Expeditionary Force carry back with you the pride, affection and esteem of all who fought beside you, and not least of these with whom you share a common language and a common outlook upon life. The memory of our great attack upon the Hindenburg Line on the 29th of September, 1918, in which the 27th American Division along with the troops from all parts of the British Empire took so gallant and glorious a part, will never die, and the service then rendered by American troops will be recalled with gratitude and admiration throughout the British Empire. I rejoice to think that in the greater knowledge and understanding born of perils and hardships shared together, we have learnt at last to look beyond old jealousies and past quarrels to the essential quali-

ties which unite the great English-speaking nations.

In bidding God speed to you whom for a time I was privileged to have under my command, I feel confident that the new era opened out before us by the appearance of American troops on the battlefields of the Old World will see the

sympathy and friendship now established between our two nations constantly deepened and strengthened, to the lasting advantage of both peoples.

(signed) D. HAIG,
Field Marshal,
Commanding-in-Chief,
British Armies in France.

THE 30th DIVISION IN FRANCE

By COL. JOHN K. HERR, Chief-of-Staff

THE 30th Division is a distinctively American division. More than 95 per cent. of its personnel is of American-born parents. The division was constituted of National Guard troops of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, augmented by many thousands of selective draft troops from the states of Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee.

The division was dubbed "Old Hickory," after the warrior and statesman Andrew Jackson, who was so closely identified with the history of the states furnishing the major portion of its personnel.

The Old Hickory Division landed at the port of Calais, France, on the 24th day of May, 1918, and was billeted in the Eperlecques Training Area. While in this area the officers of the division reconnoitered the Terdeggen Switch Line, south of Cassel, and complete plans were formulated for the occupation of this line by forced marches in case of emergency.

Before the completion of its training period, the division was transferred to the Second British Corps, Second Army, in the Ypres sector, to be in close support in case of the expected German offensive. This division, the first American division to enter that kingdom, marched into Belgium on July 4th with Division Headquarters at Watou, to be in close support of the 33rd and 49th British Divisions, and was employed in completing the construction of the East and West Poperinghe Defense Systems immediately in rear of these two divisions. An immense amount of trench and wire construction was done. Complete plans and orders were issued for the occupa-

tion of the East and West Poperinghe Systems by the 30th Division in the event of a German attack and a forced withdrawal of the British divisions in the front. The division received training in the front line with the 33rd and 49th Divisions, first as individuals, then by platoons, and lastly by entire battalions.

On August 17, 1918, the division took over the entire sector occupied by the 33rd British Division, 60th Brigade being in the front line, 59th Brigade in support. This was known as the Canal Sector, and extended from the southern outskirts of Ypres to the vicinity of Voormezele, a distance of 2,400 meters.

THE FIRST OFFENSIVE

On August 31st and September 1st the division engaged in an offensive in conjunction with the 14th British Division on the left and 27th American Division on the right. The 30th Division captured all its objectives, including Lock No. 8, Lankhof Farm and the City of Voormezele, advancing fifteen hundred yards, capturing fifteen prisoners, two machine guns and thirty-five rifles. As a result of this advance the 236th Division, which was considered an average German division, was identified. During the six weeks previous to this advance, many attempts had been made by the British and our own troops to identify this German division.

On September 4th-5th the division was withdrawn from the Canal Sector and placed in British G.H.Q. reserve, with Division Headquarters at Roellecourt, France. While in this area the entire division was trained in attacking in conjunction with British tanks.

On September 17th the division was again moved farther south with Division Headquarters at Herissart, and on September 22nd was moved to the British Fourth Army, with Division Headquarters at Bois de Buire, near Tincourt, taking over a front line sector from the 1st Australian Division, on the night of 23rd-24th.

HINDENBURG LINE (BELLICOURT)

On September 29th this division with the 27th American Division on the left and the

little by artillery fire. The dominating ground enabled them to bring devastating machine-gun fire on all approaches. The lines had been strengthened with concrete machine-gun emplacements. It contained at this point a large number of dugouts, lined with mining timbers, with wooden steps leading down to a depth of about 30 feet, with small rooms capable of holding from four to six men each. In many cases these dugouts were wired for electric lights. The large tunnel through which the canal ran was of sufficient capacity



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Fort McPherson, Georgia

Here, and at Fort Oglethorpe, in the same state, many Southern officers trained for their commissions.

46th British Division on the right assaulted the Hindenburg line. The Hindenburg line at this point curves in front of the Tunnel St. Quentin. This was considered impregnable by the Germans for the following reasons: The Hindenburg line curving west of the tunnel consisted of three main trench systems protected by vast fields of heavy barbed-wire entanglements skillfully placed; this wire was very heavy and had been damaged very

to shelter a division. This tunnel was electrically lighted and filled with barges. Connecting it with the Hindenburg trench system were numerous tunnels. In one case a direct tunnel ran from the main tunnel to the basement of a large stone building, which the enemy used for headquarters. Other tunnels ran from the main tunnel eastward to the city of Bellicourt and other places. This complete subterranean system with its

hidden exits and entrances, unknown to us, formed a most complete and safe subterranean method of communication and reinforcement for the German sector.

The 30th Division, the 60th Brigade, augmented by units of the 117th Infantry, attacking, assaulted this line at 5:10 A.M., September 29th on a front of three thousand yards, captured the entire Hindenburg System of that sector and advanced farther, capturing the tunnel system with the German troops therein, and took the cities of Belli-

moved to the back area with Division Headquarters at Herbecourt. The division scarcely reached this area when it was marched back and took over the front line in the same sector from the 2nd Australian Division near Montbrehain on the night of 4th-5th.

BRANCOURT, PREMONT, BUSIGNY, ESCAUFORT, VAUX ANDIGNY

On October 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th, the 30th Division attacked each day, advancing 17,500 yards, and capturing le Tilleul



A Supply Train Going Toward the Front

This picture shows what a task it was to supply food and other necessities to the fighting forces.

court, Nauroy, Riqueval, Carrière, Etrécourt, Guillaîne Farm and Farm de Riqueval, advancing four thousand two hundred yards, defeating two enemy divisions of average quality (the 75th Reserve Division and the 185th Division), taking as prisoners 47 officers and 1,434 men.

On October 1st-2nd the 30th Division was relieved by the 5th Australian Division and

d'Archies, le Petit Cambrésis, Becquigny, Mont Sarasin, le Trou-aux-Soldats, Busigny, Gloriette, le Vert Donjon, Escaufort, le Rond Pont, Vaux Andigny, Vallée Hasard, le Haie Menneresse, la Rochelle, le Vent de Bise, St. Souplet, St. Benin, Malassise, Genève, half of Montbrehain, Brancourt, Premont, Vaux le Prêtre, Brancoucourt, Fraicourt Farm, Bois Mirand, Butry Farm, la Sablière Bois,

Becquignette Farm, Bois de Malmaison, Malmaison Farm, Bois de Busigny, Bois L'Ermitage, Bois Proyard, Imberfayt and Du Guet Fassiaux Farms, taking prisoners 45 officers and 1,889 men. The 59th Brigade began this attack on October 8th and captured all their objectives, including Premont and Brancourt. During this operation from October 8th to 11th the 30th Division encountered units from fourteen German divisions, classified by the British High Command as follows: 34th Division, average; 20th Division, very good; 24th Division, very good; 21st Division, average; 21st Reserve Division, average; 38th Division, very good; 119th Division, average; 121st Division, average; 187th Sharpshooting Section, very good; 204th Division, average; 208th Division, average; 3rd Naval Division, very good; 15th Reserve Division, average.

The 30th Division was relieved by the 27th Division on October 11th-12th, but returned on October 16th and took over a part of the same line at the same place, being the right half of the sector temporarily held by the 27th. The next attack was launched on October 17th, 18th and 19th against the 221st Division, average; 243rd Division, average; 29th Division, very good, advancing nine thousand yards and capturing 6 officers and 412 men, and the towns of Molain, St. Martin Rivière,

Ribeauville, Ecaillon, Mazinghein and Ribeaucourt Ferme.

(For complete figures of casualties see the chapter on Division Histories in this volume.)

During much of the fighting from October 8th to 11th and from 17th to 19th, difficulties of the terrain were very great, with the country greatly broken by small patches of woods, and villages, with uneven terrain and occasional large towns admirably added to the machine-gun defense of which the Germans took every advantage. The La Selle River with high banks beyond was obstinately defended. In spite of these difficulties the advance continued, often without artillery support, and was made possible only by the determination of the men and the skillful use of all arms combined with clever utilization of the diversified terrain. The 3rd German Naval Division of the crack German divisions was hastily thrown in in an attempt to stop the advance.

The division was then withdrawn to the Heilly Training Area, near Amiens, for replacements and a well-earned rest; Division headquarters at Querrieu. Two weeks later, when orders for an immediate return to the front were expected daily, the armistice with Germany was signed, November 11th, 1918.

AMERICA'S BIG GUNS AT THE FRONT

How the Heavy Artillery, Built Around Our Coast Defense, Was Taken to France, and How It Helped to Bring Victory

WHEN the United States entered the war, the Coast Artillery Corps, finding that the coast it was assigned to defend had moved over into France, packed up and followed it. Until that time there was no American big gun corps, but, before the armistice was signed, American regiments of heavy artillery had fought on every front where Americans were engaged. Working sometimes with the American Army, and sometimes with the British and French Armies, it had

supported the attacks on almost every front from Alsace to the sea. The railway guns and big howitzers had helped wipe out the St. Mihiel salient, they had pushed forward in the Argonne, and had supported the final offensive by heavy firing about Verdun. More than this, trench mortar batteries and anti-aircraft units, drawn from coast artillery personnel, had done their special work at many points. Coast artillery ammunition trains had lunched over thousands of miles of shell-scarred roads, and 75,000 officers and men had received the special technical training

NOTE.—Certain paragraphs of this article were taken directly from *Liaison*, copyright by the *Journal of the U. S. Artillery*, Fortress Monroe, Va.

to form the reserve and active nucleus of a greater big gun corps, should the need ever arise again.

Making a big gun corps, while entirely new to the Army, would have been an impossible task without years of intensive training in the handling of heavy guns on the

with the Austrian Skodas and the other pieces which shattered the "impregnable" fortifications of Belgium, trenches had become deeper and deeper, dugouts had penetrated further into the ground, concrete had replaced earth works and the defensive had regained the advantage. This advantage could be overcome



Courtesy of *Leslies' Weekly*

Marines Show Their Skill on Shore Duty

Detachments of the 4th U. S. Marines at a field-artillery contest at San Diego, Cal. Marines form the landing parties when men are sent ashore from warships.

part of the Coast Artillery Corps. The use of heavy mobile artillery is one of the most striking innovations which have come out of this war. Toward the end of the war heavy artillery fire as an integral part of any large infantry offensive was a necessity not to be dispensed with except in extraordinary cases. Since the Germans had startled the Allies

only by massing greater and more powerful artillery on the offensive. It had been demonstrated that the army with the greatest weight in artillery, properly manned, would win. The American Expeditionary Forces, it was evident, must have heavy artillery. But there was no heavy artillery in the American Army except the coast artillery and that was not

mobile. The task before the American Army then was twofold: to build around the Coast Artillery Corps a trained force of officers and men for service with heavy guns in the field, and to get American heavy guns to France.

The first step in providing American guns for use in France was obviously to ship "over there" what guns we had. So fort after fort along the coast was quietly stripped of its heavy guns, which were taken to be fitted with mobile mounts. This was just what the French did when they dismounted from their seacoast forts guns of all sizes and models, some of them as much as thirty-five years old, and put them on railway and road carriages. Fortunately, however, it was possible to secure guns from the French and British which could be used at once. These the big gun corps manned while new mounts were being made for the American guns. In practice, the 8-inch howitzers of British design and make, many of which were taken over by the Americans after having been built originally for the Russians, and French railway guns of from 19 to 40 centimeters caliber, were the main reliance of the coast artillery in France.

THE FIRST COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE

During the latter part of July, 1917, Brigadier General Bartlett organized at Fort Adams, Rhode Island, the "Expeditionary Brigade, Coast Artillery Corps." This consisted of Brigade Headquarters and the 6th, 7th, and 8th Provisional Regiments of Regular Army Coast Artillery companies from the forts and defenses of the harbors of the Atlantic coast. It was later to become the nucleus of the Railway Artillery Reserve. Each regiment of three battalions, totalling twelve batteries of 132 men and three officers, was organized to man twelve 10-inch railroad guns, one per battery. The brigade began leaving Fort Adams August 13th, and thence, by way of New York, Liverpool, Southampton, and Le Havre, went to camp at Mailly-le-Camp, near Troyes, early in September. General Bartlett was detached soon after and Colonel Coe was made a brigadier and took command. The name was changed to the "First Separate Brigade (CAC)," and the 6th, 7th, and 8th provisional Regiments became respectively, the 51st, 52nd, and 53rd

Artillery Regiments (CAC), and later, in March, 1918, the brigade became "30th Artillery Brigade (CAC-Railway)." The last change of name came on April 3rd, when this brigade and all other railway artillery and attached technical units became the "Railway Artillery Reserve, First Army, American Expeditionary Forces," and on June 24th Brigadier General William Chamberlaine was assigned to the command.

THE UNITS

The normal rôle of these guns of major caliber is as Army Artillery—that is, as units directly under the command of an Army Commander, and disposed by him wherever in the field of operations of the entire Army they are most needed. Battalions were shifted daily along the front, one day with the Americans, the next with the French. In general it may be said that the American heavy artillery was first massed for coördinated action in the St. Mihiel drive. From a small Brigade Headquarters, and three regiments, the command gradually grew larger as its activities grew broader, until, at the time of demobilization, it consisted of the following organizations: Railway Artillery Reserve A.E.F. Headquarters Staff.

- Railway Artillery Supply Depot.
- Military Police Detachment.
- Motor Transport Corps Detachment.
- Railway Artillery Repair Shop.
- 1st Provisional High Burst Ranging Section.
- 1st Railway Artillery Operation Battalion.
- 1st Railway Artillery Construction Battalion.
- Organization Training Center No. 6, including School.
- Railway Artillery Replacement Battalion.
- 30th Artillery Brigade (66 guns and howitzers).
- 42nd Regiment of Artillery, at Front after April 1, 1918.
- 52nd Regiment of Artillery, at Front after April 1, 1918.
- 53rd Regiment of Artillery, at Front after April 1, 1918.
- 43rd Regiment of Artillery, at Front after April 1, 1918.
- 40th Artillery Brigade (No guns available).
- 73rd Regiment of Artillery.
- 74th Regiment of Artillery.
- 75th Regiment of Artillery.

In effect, the Railway Artillery Reserve was a "pool" of powerful railway guns held at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief in a central base just back of the line of bat-

tle—Mailly-le-Camp—where they were available for assignment to any army, French or American, for use in battle. When their particular mission was over they were returned to the "base" where they were refitted, repaired, provided with replacements of material and men, and generally made ready for another assignment. There were in all, in this "pool," 66 heavy railway guns, which were operated by the 30th Brigade; and five 14-inch naval railway guns which were operated by five Naval Batteries under Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, U.S.N. These latter operated as an integral part of

main line of the railroad passes through a cut about one and a half kilometers from the firing position. Batteries H and I, 53rd Artillery, went to work on the night of the eleventh and in three hours were ready to emplace the guns. Each of these guns has a name and "La Franchette II" or "La Franchette Twice" as her crew called her, belonging to Battery I, was the first gun of the big gun corps in position for firing on the morning of Lincoln's birthday. No firing was ordered for that day, however, but on the next day the guns were given a target, a concrete dug-out, observation post, and telephone central



Courtesy of The Baldwin Locomotive Works, Philadelphia, Pa.

United States Naval Gun on Caterpillar Mount

the Railway Artillery Reserve, under the tactical control of General Chamberlaine.

FIGHTING THE FOE WITH BIG GUNS

The honor of firing the first shot from a railroad gun goes to Battery H of the 53rd Artillery Regiment at 1:18 p. m. on February 13, 1918. Batteries H, I, and K, of the 52nd Regiment, along with Batteries H and I of the 53rd Regiment, had left the camp on February 10th by the Chemin de Fer de l'Est. They were loaned for the time being to the Fourth French Army, commanded by General Gouraud, and were therefore operating under French command. Four months training had fitted them for any task which might be presented them. Near Somme-Suippe, northeast of Châlons-sur-Marne, that part of the train in which the batteries lived was cut off and put on a switch, where the

close to the Butte de Mesnil. On the next day, February 13th, the French were going to attack, to drive the Germans off the Chemin des Dames. The attack was commenced about noon by the artillery and two salvos were fired. If Battery I had won the honors of being the first in position, Battery H was fully repaid by being the first American heavy battery to fire.

The Railway Artillery Reserve took an important part in the following major operations: Defense of Paris in May and June, 1918; the defense of Reims and the decisive defeat of the Germans by General Gouraud in the Champagne sector in July, 1918; and the grand Allied Offensive during the fall of 1918, which finally defeated the German Army. In this offensive they supported the Fourth French Army in Champagne, the First American Army in the St. Mihiel and Ar-

gonne-Meuse operations, and the Seventh and Eighth French Armies in the Vosges mountains.

POUNDING THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT

The St. Mihiel attack was the first action of the First American Army, and for this the entire R.A.R. was concentrated and there were fired over 2,100 rounds or nearly

tained upon roundhouses, bridges, trains and cars, which contributed largely in preventing the Germans rushing supplies and reinforcements to the salient. Important results were also obtained by fire delivered on the railway bridge in the immediate vicinity of Metz. While this bridge was an extremely small target, traffic was seriously disturbed. This was the only time throughout the entire war



Courtesy of Leslie's Weekly

A Disappearing Gun

The gun in the foreground is shown in the recoil position after firing. The one further over is just in the act of firing.

1,000,000 pounds of projectiles. These were all directed on traffic centers more than 15 miles behind the front lines, which were the nerve centers and important junction points of the German railway system, supplying the St. Mihiel salient. Conflans en Jarny was the most important of these points and the fire directed against this railway center was perhaps the most effective delivered against any important German railway center during the entire war. Many direct hits were ob-

that artillery fired upon the immediate vicinity of Metz.

OTHER OPERATIONS

In addition to this extremely long range fire, many important strong points, cities, traffic centers, etc., which were either beyond the power or beyond the range of any other artillery of the Allies, were attended to by the railway guns. The inhabitants of the town of St. Maurice-sous-les-Cotes, nearly ten

miles behind the front lines, were pathetically grateful because these guns had bombarded their town and thus caused the Germans to decamp before they could complete their arrangements to send all of the young men and young women of the town into slavery in Germany.

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the railway artillery fired over 13,150 rounds, an aggregate weight of over 5,700,000 pounds of projectiles, and, aside from the counter-battery, and interdiction firing on roads, the interruption of German Railway traffic caused by this fire was an extremely important factor in the success of the Armies which finally won the war.

CORPS AND ARMY ARTILLERY

But the Railroad Artillery was not the sole function of the Coast Artillery Corps in France. The War Department policy provided that this corps, which before the war had been charged with the sea coast defenses, should provide the personnel for all howitzers and mortars above 6 inches in caliber, all guns of 5 inches and upward, organized as Army Artillery, and the trench mortar and anti-aircraft units assigned to Corps and Army Artillery.

The 55th Regiment and the 56th Regiment were equipped with French 155 millimeter (6-inch) G.P.F. These were the new long barreled 6-inch rifles, mounted on carriages with rubber tires, pulled by a tractor capable of doing fifteen miles per hour. This put them almost in the class of field artillery from the point of view of mobility, but heavy artillery they were from the standpoint of range and damage done. On August 4, 1918, these two regiments went to the front, where they remained until the armistice. The 57th Regiment was similarly armed and went to the front September 5th, while the 60th Regiment, also 155mm. G.P.F. went to the front September 9th.

The 58th and 59th Regiments had 8-inch howitzers, as did the 44th Regiment. This latter regiment went to the front April 1, 1918. Two battalions of the 51st Regiment also had 8-inch howitzers, while one battalion had 240mm. howitzers. To the 65th Regi-

ment, however, belong the "Old Dutch Cleansers," 9.2-inch British howitzers.

This made a total of 285 guns on the line as Corps and Army heavy artillery, to support the Field Artillery Brigades of lighter calibers in places where a little pounding by something heavier than the 6-inch field howitzer was able to accomplish the desired result. In the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne, these regiments won high praise for the accuracy and constancy with which they fired into the enemy.

SHOOTING AT THE SKY

Then there were the anti-aircraft batteries, the First and Second Battalions, and the first to twentieth batteries, armed with 3-inch special rifle on a motor mount, which shoot at airplanes whose average speed is 54 yards per second. This calls for the finest calculation. No longer is it a matter of one plane in figuring firing data, but, from the time the projectile leaves the gun until the thirty seconds have elapsed to carry it to the target, the target may at that time be at any point within a sphere of 1,500 meter radius, whose volume is 5,000,000,000 cubic meters. The danger sphere of a high explosive shell is 5,000 meters. Thus the chance of the airplane coming into the danger zone is one in a million. But as airplanes do not go straight up or straight down, the chance of hitting the airplane becomes about one in one hundred thousand. It must not be thought, however, that the number of airplanes brought down is the true measure of effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. The most important service is to keep the aviator well up in the air and constantly dodging, and thus spoil his observation.

OTHER CORPS ACTIVITIES

Two Trench Mortar Battalions, each armed with 240mm. trench mortars were also supplied by the coast artillery, and there also were Corps Artillery, with 24 mortars per battalion, while all the Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries—those jolly little "Fifty-eight Two's" of the "Suicide Club"—were manned by the Coast Artillery Corps and complete with the Ammunition Trains, the total of the corps activities in the A.E.F.



Drawn by Joseph Cummings Chase

Major-General William Weigel

Commanded 56th Brigade at Château-Thierry and Fismes; commanded 88th Division in Alsace and the Toul sector.

THE AIR SERVICE OF THE A.E.F.

An Efficient Fighting Unit Which Took Part in All Our Big Offensives
and Brought Down 755 Enemy Planes and 71 Balloons

LIKE many other parts of the American Army, the Air Service was just coming into its own when the armistice was signed. Like the infantry it got its first taste of quiet work in the Toul sector. At Château-Thierry it had its first taste of real fighting. The whole American air service and some British and French squadrons were assembled for the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, with the result that the First American Army had under its command the largest aerial concentration gathered in any sector on the front at any time during the war. Again in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, the American Air Service continued its mastery of the air. On the Marne, at St. Mihiel, in the Argonne, the American air forces met the best German air forces. American pilots shot down 755 enemy planes and 71 balloons, suffering a loss of only 357 planes and 34 balloons. When the hostilities ceased on November 11th, there had been assigned to the armies taking part in the great final sweep of the Germans from French soil, 45 American air squadrons, manned by 744 pilots, 457 observers, 23 aerial gunners and the necessary complement of other soldiers. These squadrons had 740 planes fully armed and equipped.

Twelve of these squadrons were equipped with machines made in America, and with the Liberty engine, which in actual service fulfilled all that was claimed for it, and proved to be America's best single contribution to war aviation.

VICTORY IN THE CLOUDS

The personnel of the air service, which was trained in the American schools, demonstrated in actual combat that it was second to none in the world for aggressiveness and skill. Our air squadron took part in 150 bombing raids, and dropped over 275,000 pounds of explosives on the enemy. They flew 35,000 hours over

the line, and took 18,000 pictures of enemy positions. On innumerable occasions they regulated the firing of our artillery, flew in contact with our advancing forces, and from a height of only a few yards from the ground, machine-gunned and bombed enemy batteries, convoys, and troops on the march.

The first American Observation Group, after a short period of service in the Toul sector, reported for duty with the First American Army Corps holding the front from a short distance west of Château-Thierry to Courchamps. This group occupied the air-drome of Saints, some 55 kilometers behind the lines. It rendered splendid service, both during the checking of the German drive and in preparation for the counter-drive of July 18th. The staff was kept advised of every move behind the German lines, valuable pictures were secured, and many artillery adjustments made.

When the Third Army Corps came into line on the Vesle in August, where the enemy had stopped and clung tenaciously to the heights north of the river, a group composed of one American and two French squadrons was furnished for its use. Our First Pursuit Group, after a preliminary service in the Toul sector, took the field in July as part of the Sixth French Army.

AMERICAN FLIERS AT ST. MIHIEL

Great preparations were made for a campaign by air during the St. Mihiel drive. The French command, realizing the importance of the first projected American offensive, placed at the disposal of the American Army heavy aerial reinforcements. An observation group made up of French and American squadrons was assigned to each corps. Long day reconnaissance missions were to be taken care of by the 91st Aero Squadron.

The regulation of our artillery, which included several batteries of long range guns capable of pounding the Metz forts, was cared for by four French squadrons organized into a group for this purpose. The French Aerial Division, comprised of about 300 pursuit and 200 day bombardment planes, was placed un-

drawing his suspicions by increased aerial activity.

On the four days it took to wipe out the sector, September 12th-15th, there was only one good day for flying, the 14th, and yet our observation planes penetrated 60 kilometers within the enemy's lines in downpours of rain



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Brigadier-General Benjamin D. Foulois

Assistant Chief of the Air Service, A.E.F.

der American command. Aside from our two squadrons with the British, all of the American pursuit planes were available.

During the days of intensive preparation, the massing of troops and material and placing of guns, our air forces with great cunning succeeded in shielding our own movements, at the same time keeping our command fully informed as to the enemy's, and all without

that prevented them from rising to a height of over 1,000 meters; our bombing pilots swooped low and made of the forced passages of enemy retreat, avenues of fire; our machines charged with *liaison* between infantry and artillery did their work in a gale of wind and water.

At night, the British Independent Force and a French night bombardment group, in-

cluding one Italian squadron, all receiving their orders from the American Army, made expeditions over Longuyon, Conflans, Metz-Sablons and other points along the railroad line which the Germans were using to bring up their reserves.

The principal work of our air forces at the front during the Argonne drive was the screening of movements during the period from September 14th to 26th. The weather was also bad for the flyers during this of-

the lead, got the brunt of the attack. The formation closed in and held the enemy at a distance. Two other bombardment squadrons, the 20th and the 11th, attacked the enemy from the rear, shooting down two of them.

A general fight ensued. At the hottest part of the battle, 30 squads of the American Second Pursuit Group arrived on schedule time. The enemy, trapped, vainly struggled to escape. When the smoke of battle cleared



Photo by Du Puy

An Aviator True-ing His Plane

This is done by testing it with a spirit-level, and tightening or loosening the supports.

fensive, and it was necessary to confine photographs to the most important points.

Some of the most brilliant work done by our airmen, however, was during this time. On October 4th, our day bombardment planes were sent to bomb Dun-sur-Meuse and Landres-St. Georges, and succeeded in dropping a ton and a half of bombs on each objective.

The low hanging clouds were filled with enemy pursuit planes and a group of 30 Fokkers and Pfalz planes swerved down on our formation. Our 90th Squadron, being in

away, 13 German planes lay shattered within a space of 1,000 feet on the ground. We lost one plane.

THE AMAZING WORK OF BALLOONS

The work of American balloons at the front forms a bright chapter in our aerial history. Of the 35 balloon companies in France at the time of the armistice, with 446 officers and 6,365 enlisted men, 23 companies had been assigned to the Armies which were actively engaged on the front.

Our balloon personnel, trained in the A.E.F., acquitted itself in a highly creditable manner. They made 1,642 ascensions and were in the air a total of 3,111 hours. They made 316 artillery adjustments, each comprising all the shots fired at one target; they reported 12,018 shell bursts; sighted 11,856 enemy planes; reported 2,649 enemy balloon ascensions; enemy batteries 400 times, enemy traffic and railroads 1,113 times, and explosions and destructions 597 times.

American balloons were attacked by the enemy on 89 occasions; 34 of them were burned during such attacks, and nine others destroyed by shell fire. Our observers jumped from the baskets 116 times, and in no case did the parachute fail to open properly. One observer lost his life when pieces of his burning balloon fell on his descending parachute.

The actual accomplishment of the Air Service at the front was all the result of a much more tremendous accomplishment—not so spectacular, but infinitely necessary—in one of the most remarkable organizations ever put together, an organization that within a year's time sprang from a little branch of the Signal Corps, with 65 officers, and 1,110 men to a service of the army with 20,000 officers and 170,000 enlisted men.

When the war began, this organization had 200 frail training planes and fewer trained pilots. Before the war ended, it had received in the A.E.F. alone, 6,364 airplanes, and 4,996 trained men of the flying personnel had had either been graduated or were in training in the A.E.F.

AMERICA'S MARVELOUS RECORD

Not half of the Air Service ever reached France, or the A.E.F. There were in the Air Service, in the A.E.F., 7,726 officers and 70,769 enlisted men. Of these, 6,861 officers and 51,229 enlisted men were in France, 765 officers and 19,317 enlisted men in England, and the remainder were training and fighting in Italy.

On November 11, 1918, the personnel of the Air Service in France was divided as follows: Zone of Advance, 24,512; S. O. S., 32,996; with the A.E.F. in France, 574; with the French, eight.

This personnel was stationed as follows at the time of the armistice:

Zone of Advance—G.H.Q., 55; schools, 1,056; depots, 3,946; French armies, 4,339; stations, 6,810; airdromes, 8,306.

S.O.S.—Warehouses, 293; base ports, 397; Headquarters, Paris, 505; French Army, 514; concentration barracks, 1,971; depots, 4,268; production center, 7,942; stations, 11,400; schools, 15,966.

At this same time our flying personnel was scattered as follows:

Zone of advance, 1,490; fields, 2,141; instructors and test pilots, 821; with Allies, 94.


The American Air Service in France was fully prepared to take care of the great flotilla of planes which America was just getting ready to send across when the war was stopped. To man and maintain these machines, there were being operated in the A.E.F. 16 large training schools, and eight other school detachments, in which 1,674 fully trained pilots and 851 observers had already been trained. They had actually put on the front 1,402 pilots and 769 observers.

That quantity production of flying personnel was just about ready to be obtained is shown by the fact that between the time of the armistice and the first of the year, these schools graduated 675 fully trained pilots and 357 observers. Nor had the Balloon Service been neglected. Trained in every detail of balloon warfare, 199 officers and 623 enlisted men had been graduated from these schools.

HOW GREAT SCHOOLS WERE BUILT

The A.E.F. had the largest flying school in the world at Issoudun which grew from a mud hole to the most gigantic aviation training undertaking of the war, with 11 separate aviation fields in active operation, covering 50 square miles in the heart of France. Its first class began October 24, 1917. One year from that date it housed 1,030 officers and 5,125 soldiers, sheltered 1,022 planes, 560 of which were put to daily use; and numbered 150 barracks buildings and 91 hangars. During that year it sent out 1,751 fully trained men.

The two other most important training schools for the A.E.F. Air Service were at

*U. S. Signal Corps photo*

Assembling Liberty Planes at Romorantin

Tours and Clermont-Ferrand. Tours trained 555 observers and a large number of candidates in preliminary flying, as well as special classes in aerial gunnery, photographic, radio and medical research work. Clermont-Ferrand was our school for bombers, 447 of whom were completely trained here, among whose number were the personnel of our three bombing squadrons at the front.

There remain two names that will forever be associated with America's air program in France: Romorantin, the cradle and grave of our own American-made machines, and Orly, where were nursed into healthy fighting trim practically all of the machines procured from our Allies.

Romorantin began to get ready to receive American planes, January 17, 1918. The first plane arrived May 11, 1918, a red letter day for Romorantin, which, in the meantime, had become one of the most impressive accomplishments of the S.O.S. with its great

machine shops, fabricating plants, storage warehouses, armament shops and ranges, hangars, balloon work shops and artificially drained flying field.

The total floor space of the buildings at Romorantin was 3,459,000 square feet. There were eight miles of highway and ten miles of railway in the camp itself. Here, before November 11, 1918, were received the 1,213 planes and 2,083 engines sent over from America. Here the planes were assembled and tested and completely equipped with the necessary armament, radio and photographic apparatus.

Orly actually handled more machines than Romorantin, for, of the 4,874 planes and 1,446 engines received from the French, the 258 airplanes and 36 engines received from the British, and the 19 planes and 150 engines received from the Italians, Orly put the finishing touches on 3,244, before sending them to the front.

Hundreds of lives would have been lost in the battle of Verdun had it not been for the field sections of the American ambulance stationed at Verdun. Equipped with small, light, speedy cars, the "rush" surgical cases were transferred to these American drivers. They were not given a place with the regular traffic, but were allowed to dart between the larger cars, and then make their way forward as best they could. When an open field offered, they left the road entirely, and, driving across, would come back in line when they could go no further, and await another chance for getting ahead.

THE TANK CORPS

A Valuable Auxiliary Which Was of Great Service to the Army in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Offensives

THE progress of the war by the winter of 1917 had shown several facts. Of these, the first was that the formidable artillery preparations assured, in a certain degree, the success in attaining a limited objective. But the days of limited objectives were passing, and deep penetration was being sought for by all the combatants. But deep penetrations were not possible by the use of artillery alone. The uncertainty of being able to pass the artillery over destroyed country in time to be of continual assistance to the infantry had been shown in several attacks, whereas the brief use of tanks had demonstrated their great service in continuing an attack once started, and the facility with which supplies might be brought up for the tanks in comparison with the enormous difficulty of bringing up artillery.

The purpose of tanks, therefore, was to break down passive obstacles and active resistance on the battlefield. The tank became an active arm in the offensive because of its ability to fight over any ground; because of its armor, which could withstand rifle and machine-gun bullets; because it could penetrate barbed-wire entanglements; because it could destroy enemy machine-gun nests, and because of its distinct value in counter-attacks.

Tanks were first used by both the British and French. The British built their tanks with the offensive idea, whereas the French built their first tanks more with the idea of the Horse of Troy. In other words, the British tank was to carry a few men, and the tank itself was to fight, whereas the French tank was to carry a large number of men through the enemy's first position, where the men would get out of the tank and fight in the open. Both kinds were tried. The French used theirs first and failed, then the British tried theirs, and in the big test at Cambrai in the fall of 1917, the offensive type of tank was proven a success.

During the winter of 1917, various kinds of tanks were made and tried. The chief duties of tanks are as follows:

1. To crush and bury the strongest wire entanglements.
2. To cross all trenches and any kind of ground.
3. To carry fire power into the enemy's line.
4. To advance with speed.
5. To be independent as to supplies.
6. To retain *liaison* with the rear.
7. To be used in counter-attacks.

AMERICAN TANK SCHOOLS

With these purposes in mind the Tank Corps was organized in January, 1918, in the A.E.F. by Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach. The organization consisted of three types of tanks: the heavy tank for breaking through, the light tanks for exploitation, and the medium tanks to do, more or less perfectly, the mission of the heavy or light tanks. The organization was in platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and centers.

A platoon is a fighting unit of five tanks and accompanies the infantry battalion. A company consists of three platoons, and a battalion of three companies. Usually a battalion was assigned to a division. A brigade was to be composed of two light battalions, and one heavy battalion was to be assigned to an army corps.

Two tank schools were formed, one at Langres, France, where all the training was done by American officers using the small Renault tanks; the other at Bovington, England, where British tanks and British training centers were utilized.

At the same time, Colonel Wellborn was appointed director of the Tank Corps in the United States, and began recruiting and training both officers and men for service overseas.

AMERICAN TANKS IN ACTION

At the training center at Langres, the 1st Brigade of the Tank Corps was organized. This consisted of men who had already been in the A.E.F. and were volunteered for the tank service. This brigade participated in the St. Mihiel offensive, operating in front of the 1st and 42nd Divisions, and had an active part in the capture of the following

quently would make as many as five attacks in one day. During all these attacks, however, although there was much mechanical trouble with the tanks, no tank was ever abandoned to the enemy. On November 1st, there remained only 16 tanks out of the 144 which had begun the operation. This does not mean that 128 had been destroyed by German fire, for only 17 had been so destroyed, but it does mean that through minor acci-



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Brigadier-General Samuel D. Rockenbach

Chief of Tank Corps, A.E.F.

towns: Essey, Pannes, Nonsard, Venigulles, Woel, and Jonville. The same tanks, comprising the 1st Brigade, participated also in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, operating in front of seven divisions, and remaining constantly in the line from September 26th until November 4th. During this time the brigade made eighteen separate assaults, that is, attacked on eighteen separate days, and fre-

dents of battle caused by shell splinters, rifle bullets, and armor piercing bullets, but chiefly due to the terrific wear and tear on the machinery in a most difficult country, only 16 out of 144 tanks were fit to enter the last fight.

Meanwhile a battalion of heavy tanks recruited in the same manner as the 1st Brigade were trained at the training center in Eng-

land. This 301st Tank Battalion began its active operations on the British front on September 29th in front of the Second American Army Corps, which was on that day fighting in the sector of General Rawlinson, Fourth British Army.

The second attack of this battalion was on October 8th and again on the 17th, 23rd and November 4th, successful and uniformly successful attacks were made, and a number of the men and officers received British decorations in addition to American decorations.

Like many another service in the A.E.F. the Tank Corps had just reached its stride when the armistice was signed. The value of the tanks in the A.E.F., however, was great, considering the small numbers engaged.



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Tank Dragging a Camouflaged Gun

A CHANT OF LOVE FOR ENGLAND

By HELEN GRAY CONE

A song of hate is a song of Hell;
Some there be that sing it well.
Let them sing it loud and long,
We lift our hearts in a loftier song;
We lift our hearts to Heaven above,
Singing the glory of her we love,—
England!

Glory of thought and glory of deed,
Glory of Hampden and Runnymede;
Glory of ships that sought far goals,
Glory of swords and glory of souls!
Glory of songs mounting as birds,
Glory immortal of magical words;
Glory of Milton, glory of Nelson,
Tragical glory of Gordon and Scott;
Glory of Shelley, glory of Sidney,
Glory transcendent that perishes not,—
Hers is the story, hers be the glory,
England!

Shatter her beauteous breast ye may;
The spirit of England none can slay!
Dash the bomb on the dome of Paul's—
Deem ye the fame of the Admiral falls?
Pry the stone from the chancel floor,—
Dream ye that Shakespeare shall live no more?
Where is the giant shot that kills
Wordsworth walking the old green hills?
Trample the red rose on the ground,—
Keats is Beauty while earth spins round!
Bind her, grind her, burn her with fire,
Cast her ashes into the sea,—
She shall escape, she shall aspire,
She shall arise to make men free:
She shall arise in a sacred scorn,
Lighting the lives that are yet unborn;
Spirit supernal, Splendour eternal,
ENGLAND!

Taken by permission from *A Chant of Love for England and Other Poems*, published by E. P. Dutton & Company, New York.

THE SIGNAL CORPS IN FRANCE

Its Work, Nobly Performed Under the Most Dangerous Conditions,
Was Indispensable to the Success of Our Armies

THE Signal Corps in the A.E.F. provided the great network of wires which stretched from the front line trenches back through general headquarters and connected in one great system every organization in the A.E.F. This in reality became the nerve system through which the brains of the army received its information and sent out commands to the centers of action. The Signal Corps in the A.E.F. was charged with two special fields of action: in the S.O.S., it constructed, operated and maintained a general system of communication by telephone, telegraph and radio; and with the fighting troops it had charge of every possible means of communication between fighting units.

To measure the work of the Signal Corps in the A.E.F. is almost impossible; to say that \$6,650,000 would represent the cost to transmit the equivalent number of commercial messages in the United States gives little suggestion of the usefulness and diversity of the service; to say that 202,500 kilometers of lines were operated, of which 62,500 were combat lines maintained under the most dangerous conditions, and of which only 32,800 kilometers were leased from the French, gives only an imperfect picture of the work of the Signal Corps.

SAVING THE INFANTRY AT ST. MIHIEL

There were in France 396 big central offices and 14,854 telephone stations, 198 telegraph offices. But these figures mean practically nothing. One small instance of the work of the radio section will give a clearer picture. By a clever device, the radio sending stations of the enemy could be accurately located, and in the St. Mihiel attack the information was given by Signal Corps that the Germans had not withdrawn their wireless stations, consequently had not withdrawn their posts of command. At this time it had

been seriously considered to send the infantry forward without any artillery preparation, as many thought the Germans had withdrawn. However, on this information, heavy artillery preparation was planned. In a letter to the Chief Signal Officer of the A.E.F. dated February 19, 1919, General Pershing stated "Each army, corps, and division has had its full quota of field signal battalions, which, in supplying the reserve lines in battle, accomplished their work; and it is not too much to say that without their faithful and brilliant efforts and communications which they installed, operated and maintained, the success of our armies would not have been achieved."

THE FIRST STEPS

Three-quarters of the Signal Corps were with the combat organizations, while one-quarter maintained lines in the S.O.S. At the time of the armistice there were 809 officers and 24,403 men of the Signal Corps with the armies at the front, and only 167 officers and 7,925 men of the Signal Corps in the S.O.S. In addition there were 233 American women who came over from the United States as Signal Corps operators.

The units of the field Signal Corps on the front was a field signal battalion which consisted of 14 officers and 459 men; one of these was attached to each army, corps or division, and in addition there were two telegraph battalions of 10 officers and 212 men, one of which was on duty with each of the American armies. These field signal battalions were composed of headquarters and supply section, a radio company and a wire and outpost company.

The telegraph battalions were provided with motorcycles, trailers and trucks and all the implements and material for constructing and repairing telephone and telegraph lines.

When the American Army entered the war, in small units along with the British and French, trench warfare was still in existence and the work of the Signal Corps was merely to take over and keep in repair the existing lines.

HOLDING OUR OWN

It was not until the St. Mihiel drive that the first American Army was formed and General Pershing again took the tactical command of this army. Trench warfare had been abandoned, the divisions were fighting in the

for the efficiency of the Signal Corps personnel in the field.

It was estimated by the Signal Corps from the French figures, that where the French Army used 1,000 kilometers of wire for each kilometer of front, the American Army of three corps would need a daily allotment supply of 2,500 miles of wire of all types, 500 lbs. of tape, 800 dry batteries, and a proportionate amount of all other materials.

Beside the telephone, however, there were many varied auxiliary means of communica-



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Brigadier-General Edgar Russell

Chief of Signal Corps, A.E.F.

open, and the work of the signal battalion became much more varied as well as valuable. Signal Corps troops strung lines with the advancing headquarters, and at all times the telephone was the only means of communication forward and back, which speaks highly

tion for use in case telephone wires were cut by enemy shell fire. In trench warfare, the buzzer phone was used so that the enemy could not listen in on messages to platoon leaders in the front line. Then there was the dependable T.P.S., or ground wireless

with which any commander forward, could drive his pin in the ground and send messages back to the rear. Blinkers, those little search lights which winked back letters of the code, were used with great effect. Above all, were the Very Pistol, which shot up star shells in various numbers of stars and colors, giving information to those in the rear of just what was needed or what was going on at the front; the carrier pigeon, which was used so effectively by the "Lost Battalion" in communicating their plight to the high com-

code into effect. On March 13th, one of these intercept stations picked up a message from some irate German commander who apparently had misplaced his new code, requesting that a message be repeated in the old code. The old code was well known to the Americans and thus when the long message was repeated from the new code into the old code, the key to the new code was discovered.

Another interesting service that had often passed unnoticed, was performed by the Sig-



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Via "Wireless"

Several methods of signalling were used in the Army. The Morse code of dots and dashes and the semaphore code were taught to enlisted men of the Signal Corps.

manders. All these were supplied and in many instances operated by the Signal Corps.

DETECTING GERMAN CODES

The unit furthest forward to have a complete wireless sending and receiving station was the infantry regimental headquarters and the artillery battalion headquarters. Along the American front there were six radio stations whose sole duty it was to pick up the German wireless messages, and incidentally to pick up American messages, to see that all American messages were sent in the proper code. German messages were always in code, and it usually took about three weeks to decipher the accumulated messages before the American experts had totally deciphered a new German code. For their offensive in March, the Germans on March 11th put still another

nal Corps. Out in "No Man's Land" in the days of trench warfare the Signal Corps used to bury what looked like a piece of copper screening, with a couple of wires hitched to it. These ran back to a little dugout in the front line where there were a lot of boxes and a couple of men with head phones, and pad and paper. These men were taking down in shorthand all the German telephone conversations which were going on across the way. This was the listening-in service which made it necessary that all telephone conversations at the front be spoken in guarded codes.

TAKING MOVIES OF THE WAR

Another activity of the Signal Corps, which, in one way, was the most dangerous of all its activities, consisted in taking pictures of the

battles. The most advantageous place to take a picture was from the top of the highest piece of ground in the surrounding country and as



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Major-General Ernest Hinds

Commander of Field Artillery schools; Chief of Artillery, A.E.F.

near the front as possible. This spot was also most usually the place chosen by the infantry and artillery observers to watch an action. By the time there were on this hill several big telescopes mounted on tripods, four or five

men with telephones and three or four men with a moving picture camera, the place usually received the concentrated attention of a large number of the German guns. In eleven months this photographic section exposed and developed in the field 383,149 feet of actual war movies.

CONNECTING CONTINENTS

In the S.O.S. the Signal Corps operated at Tours the largest military telephone and telegraph office in the world, and two others nearly as large at Paris and Chaumont. In the fall of 1917, it became apparent that the existing cable lines between France and the United States, but more especially between France and England would be incapable of the service required when the A.E.F. was developed to full strength. Accordingly, in January, 1918, a four-conductor cable was laid between Le Havre and the southern coast of England. This connected directly with London, where the Signal Corps established a large central connecting to the various ports and camps which the A.E.F. were using in England.

The equipment of the Signal Corps was an enormous task. Each of the 30 combat divisions required 14 little portable wireless sending and receiving stations, and as there was no such equipment manufactured in America, it had to be bought in Europe.

The work of the Signal Corps did not stop with the signing of the armistice. That branch of the Signal Corps which devises new codes to be put into effect every two weeks, maintained their high average of efficiency, and meanwhile the lines of communication were vastly extended by the Army of Occupation, going hundreds of miles into Germany, and included Rotterdam and Antwerp in the huge system of the A.E.F.

MAIL FOR WAR PRISONERS

Switzerland handled all mail to and from prisoners of war free of cost. In April, 1918, the Swiss Post Office forwarded to prisoners of war 326,241 letters daily and 102,209 parcels, weighing up to twelve pounds; it also handled an average of 7,994 money orders a day. From the beginning of the war to the end of 1915 the Berne Transit Bureau forwarded to the belligerent countries 74,256,858 letters and postcards addressed to prisoners of war, besides 19,028,192 large and small parcels. During the same period the Swiss Post Office transmitted 3,066,597 money orders aggregating \$8,654,336. All this was done free of charge and cost the Swiss Government over \$2,000,000. Letters and parcels from prisoners to correspondents in the United States were handled by our Post Office free of charge, but postage was required for forwarding from this country.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

Extraordinary Expansion and Success of American Methods of Giving the Enemy a Taste of His Own Frightfulness

POISON gas was first used by the Germans in 1915 when they released a cloud of chlorine gas against a trench occupied by unprotected troops. Fortunately, the Germans failed thoroughly to exploit the advantage.

Obviously the use of gas presents many advantages for particular purposes, combining accuracy with large killing area. Owing to its ability to go around corners and filter into dugouts and trenches, it is effective against certain targets which high-explosive cannot reach.

New gases and methods of using them were frequently introduced, including the use of projector drums, mortar bombs, hand grenades, and artillery shell. While the name "gas" is still used, the most used "gases" are, in fact, liquids until the shell or bomb is exploded. Few persons, outside the members of the Chemical Warfare Service know the variety and extent of the duties of this service. They had to deal with a weapon which made very rapid progress and which bid fair to revolutionize the science of warfare. The work was exceedingly diversified, including offense and defense training and discipline; the collection and dissemination of intelligence on new developments; the collection and examination of new enemy weapons, projectiles, fuses, defensive equipment, etc., and finally the offensive use of gas, smoke, etc.

Gas staff officers had a great variety of duties, dealing with supply, intelligence, training, gas defense, and gas offense; G.H.Q. orders required that their aid be utilized in planning artillery gas shoots. This involved suggestions as to the selection of targets, the kinds of gas, the number of shells required, and the best rate of fire. They had also to take steps to safeguard our own troops who

might be subject to danger from gas thrown at the enemy and which might be blown back upon us. Thus, the gas officers came in contact in one way or another with practically all staff departments and arms of the service.

MATERIALS AND USES

Chemical warfare materials had not been made before the war outside of laboratories, and little was known concerning the amounts necessary to disable a soldier. A tremendous amount of work is required to produce a new gas, and in developing it, hundreds of substances were made in a laboratory and tested on animals. After a promising substance was found, much work had to be done before it could be used against the enemy. It if proved to be poisonous and easy to manufacture in large quantities, and if it would withstand the shock of explosion, the shells, grenades, etc., had to be studied and tactical methods of use developed.

These tactical uses vary according to the properties of the gas, and include its killing power, the time during which it remains effective, etc. For example, the deadly phosgene remains effective in any one locality for only a few minutes. Knowing this, our infantry could be taught how soon to advance over ground upon which it had been thrown. On the other hand, they were taught that when the advance was to be made promptly it was best to avoid areas drenched with a persistent poison such as "mustard gas."

VARIOUS NEW GASES

As examples of what are now commonly used gases, may be mentioned *phosgene*, a frightfully poisonous gas; *chlorpicrin*, intensely irritating to the eyes, and very poisonous; *mustard gas*, which terribly burns the skin, eats up the lungs even when only a few parts of gas in ten million parts of air

NOTE—The information in this section is taken from articles which appeared in the *Stars and Stripes*.

are inhaled, is very slowly dissipated, and will even burn a man's foot through his field shoe; *diphenylchlorarsine*, whose tactical possibilities are very great because it penetrates the gas mask, causing intense suffering and



Courtesy of Scientific American

Charging the Tanks With Phosgene

vomiting; it thus compels the removing of the mask, when phosgene may be fired for killing effect.

Strenuous efforts to develop new devices resulted in trials of numberless substances including new ointments, protective or curative, degassing methods and apparatus, gas dispersing devices, mask canisters, and new gases, too new sometimes to have assigned to it a short name in place of its scientific name, such as *dimethyl-trithiocarbonate*, familiarly called "skunk gas."

AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

An investigation of German gas factories was made after the war by the Chemical Warfare Service, and details of Boche methods and apparatus were secured. In spite of their boasted superiority as chemists, the Germans had been excelled in methods used and quantities produced in the United States. In the case of mustard gas, the Boche admitted having been surprised at the quantities thrown back at them. By patient study of some "duds" they had guessed the process, and in order to increase their output they had a plant partially constructed to produce the gas according to the Allied methods.

Several new and deadly offensive devices had been completely developed which might have exercised a very great effect upon the results of a 1919 campaign. They were in course of production in America in quantities which would have permitted effective use thereof by March of 1919. One device, about as large as the familiar meat can, which could be easily carried forward by the infantry, would produce a gas which at a distance of a mile would penetrate a Boche's mask and make him a casualty. To prevent any effect on our own troops due to a change of wind or other causes, a special mask, proof against the gas, had been developed. Another convenient mechanism which could be carried knapsack fashion by one man, would produce a dense smoke obscuring everything over a length of 500 yards for a period of thirty-five minutes. A spherical bomb with a range of more than 3,000 yards had been developed for use with Livens projectors, when a longer range than that obtainable with the elongated drum (2,000 yards) was desired.


In fact, at the signing of the armistice, in addition to the influences which had already been wielded, nearly every problem of importance connected with chemical warfare investigation and development had reached a solution, and the results would have had a very considerable effect had the war continued another year.

ORGANIZATION OF A HITHERTO UNKNOWN SERVICE

When the United States entered the war, our Allies were devoting a great deal of study to gas warfare. As our Army was entirely without this experience, having had no chemical warfare service, an organization was provided in France with great difficulty since personnel had to be obtained from other branches of the A.E.F. In fact, until July, 1918, only four months before the armistice,

perience had been so far removed from the field of chemistry.

Liaison was established through the Inter-Allied Secretariat for Chemical Warfare. This involved the translation and compilation, etc., of reports of all the Allies, and this information was forwarded to the other branches of the A.E.F., to gas officers in the field and to the United States. The *Weekly Summary of Information on Chemical Warfare* at the signing of the armistice had a weekly circulation of 2,200.



Courtesy of Scientific American

Filling 75-mm. Shells With Mustard Gas

the organization in America was under several different heads, frequently changed. The later growth was rapid, but due to the late organization there was always a shortage of personnel in France.

The problem was to obtain from the other services officers who could quickly review the information available and efficiently advise in the use of gas. The trained chemist found it difficult to adapt his experience with respect to the various uses to which the gases could be put. Much more was therefore demanded of other officers whose previous ex-

GAS RESEARCH AND TECHNICAL FACILITIES

Superiority in gas warfare depended upon solving quickly any new problem connected therewith. A Laboratory and Experimental Field were established in France to solve emergency problems which would not admit of the delay incident to referring them to the United States.

The Laboratory was located near Paris, where work was commenced in February, 1918. Later this became the best equipped laboratory of its kind in Europe. Its activi-

ties soon included work for the Air Service, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps, Sanitary Corps, Camouflage Service, and even special researches to detect secret writing for the Base Censor.

"Sag Paste," to protect the skin against mustard gas, was developed at the Laboratory and a million tubes of it were made in France. In developing this many chemists subjected themselves intentionally to frightful burns.

Respirator canisters withdrawn from the front were constantly being tested to be sure that those in service were efficient. The contents of enemy gas shells of all kinds and calibers, earth samples and samples of water and food suspected of gas contamination were examined. This work was of a continuously dangerous nature.

The Experimental Field at Chaumont was for large scale development and testing. Field trials of all chemical materials were made; mechanical equipment including mortars and projectors, and their transporting appliances were also designed and tested, and range tables were compiled. The emergency work concerned material for gas troops including the alteration of Stokes mortar bombs filled with thermite, and the filling of Livens drums with high-explosives.

MEDICAL LABORATION

On duty with the medical gas research laboratory at the Field were several teams of pathologists, whose duty it was to visit promptly scenes of gas attacks and there to conduct post-mortems on men killed by gas.

Early in 1918, the Chemical Warfare Service undertook the demustardizing of contaminated clothing in the field. Two large collapsible tunnels, air-tight, and fitted with revolving doors at the ends, were constructed. These were kept on motor trucks ready for immediate movement to the scene of gas attack, where they were erected and all contaminated troops (in their gas masks) were passed through the tunnel containing chlorine, thus neutralizing the mustard gas.

Later, due to the alarming increase in the number of mustard gas casualties, and the fact that prompt bathing was an essential of treatment, a motorized hot-water bathing plant carrying shelter, clean clothing, water,

neutralizing solution, etc., for 700 men was devised and perfected. The complete organization and equipment was then transferred to the Medical Department where it was placed on tables of organization and 160 similar units ordered.

SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME

In spite of the non-arrival of the needed special weapons and ammunition the C.W.S., American E.F., managed to secure enough combat supplies for all the special gas troops which had arrived up to November 11, 1918. However, the first supply problem was to secure sufficient respirators and other gas defense material for the first combat divisions.

Up to November 11, 1918, the C.W.S. obtained and issued in France, 2,600,000 respirators; 375,000 spare canisters; 145,000 yards of anti-gas dugout cloth; 360,000 horse respirators; 280,000 tubes of anti-dim compound; 160,000 police rattles; 11,000 gas alarm horns; 212,000 protective gloves; 1,100 tons chloride of lime. In all, some 4,300,000 respirators and about 7,800 tons of other defensive supplies had been received from the United States, and additional large quantities from England and France.

Of the masks received 1,430,000 were defective and had to be modified before issue. A gas mask factory was quickly established for this purpose at Châteauroux, where the needed alterations were made at the rate of more than 10,000 per day. The total number thus modified was 1,250,000.

All American troops were well supplied with gas defense equipment, and at the time of the armistice 42,000 respirators were being manufactured daily in the United States.

A new American mask was developed according to requests and suggestions from the C.W.S., A.E.F., and had just reached quantity production when the armistice was signed. During the month of December, 1918, the rate of production would have reached 600,000 per month, and issues were to have been made to all combat units by the spring of 1919. This new "fighting" mask was more durable and easier to adjust. It had no nose clip or mouth piece, and the entering air passed over the eye pieces ensured clear vision.

Some 400,000 American gas shells were received in France prior to the signing of the armistice, the shells having been made by the Ordnance Department, and the contents by the C.W.S. Enough American-made gas to fill about 5,000,000 75 mm. shells was furnished in bulk to England and France to be loaded into gas shells for use by Allied troops. In addition, the C.W.S. had on hand in the United States at the close of hostilities, enough gas to fill 4,000,000 shells of 75 mm.

where all gas officers were trained. In all, gas instruction was given at the schools to 4,000 officers and 32,000 men.

A gas officer and assistants were placed on the staff of each division, corps, and army commander. It soon became apparent that an efficient gas officer must become a versatile man. Not only had he to know the details of our own gas defense and offense, but be familiar with all the methods of the enemy. An efficient gas officer became a walking ency-



Committee on Public Information

Testing an American Gas Mask in a Trench

caliber, and the daily production had reached enormous proportions—many times more than that of Germany.

There were C.W.S. depots at Montoir, St. Sulpice, Gièvres, Poinson and Châteauroux. Several additional depots for the supply of troops in the army areas were also installed.

GAS DEFENSE TRAINING AND METHODS

A course of gas defense training was established at the First, Second and Third Corps Schools; at the Army School at Langres; and at the Gas Field near Chaumont,

clopedia on the characteristics of German battle gases. He studied their methods of firing, investigated their ordnance in order to know how far behind our lines to expect their projectiles to fall. He could not forget their hand-grenades, for the Hun even filled these weapons with poisonous gases and smoke-producing materials. In short, it was his job to know everything about every piece of equipment issued in the German Army for gas warfare purposes. In all there were found and deloaded 68 different types of German shell filled with 14 different gases

and having 35 different types of fuses. Other devilish devices handled and studied included 11 different kinds of explosive devices used for traps and to explode munition dumps.

THE DELOADING SHOP

And thereby hangs the tale of the "dud"! A muddy and treacherous menace,—a synonym for sudden death or mutilation—it had to be avoided by all—except the gas officer! Not



American "Model 1919" Gas Mask

only must he not avoid it, but he must actually hunt for it, because one of the best methods we had for detecting new enemy gases was to examine unexploded shells. (These shells were opened and deloaded and the gases sent to the C.W.S. Laboratory). This treacherous missile armed with a delicate complicated and sensitive fuse, could not be carefully disposed of by gently lowering it into a hole, and burying it. It had to be carried out of the lines—often long distances by hand, and then hurried in a jolting side-car back to the deloading shop, a transport problem for which there was often a scarcity of motorcycle drivers. And not without a

reason, for if the "dud" came to life and happened to be a gas shell, it was a question of fractions of a second in the adjustment of the gas mask provided he wasn't killed by the large fragments or stunned by the explosion. If, on the other hand, it happened to be a high-explosive shell, and something of an unfortunate nature happened to the delicate fuse,—well, there was no need for a gas mask, at least.

Not alone projectiles, but hand grenades of all characters, bombs, or anything of a suspected explosive nature, became the recognized prey of the gas officer. One instance of particular interest is the now famous delayed-action-acid fuse found first by the Yanks in the Argonne. The action of this fuse is controlled by an acid solution of various strengths so that it can be set for any time between one hour to three days.

All of this goes to show that much of the work of the gas personnel at the front was different from that of teaching the best method of putting on a gas mask. The deloading shop, for instance, at a Division or Corps Headquarters, was an example of the work which was at times highly dangerous and which had very little in common with the issuing of anti-gas supplies.

HUN TASTES HIS OWN HELLISHNESS

In at least three cases, during operations, the artillery made an especially effective use of gas shell. During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne operations, while the right of the Army was flanked by enemy artillery on the heights east of the Meuse, mustard gas was effectively used in counter-battery work. Not only was the gas used in counter-battery work, but it was also used very effectively against enemy units in reserve. Mustard gas was used to protect the flank of the Army again during the operation of November 1st. Areas in the Bois de Bourgogne on the left flank of the 78th Division, were heavily shelled with this gas, and made untenable for enemy troops.

Chemical warfare infantry weapons (gas and smoke grenades, smoke candles, etc.) were used by our forces in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operations. The 2nd Battalion of the 319th Infantry used the smoke

rifle grenade with great success in the attack which began November 1st. Just previous to going over the top, this battalion very quickly put out of action and captured complete several machine guns which had crept up inside our barrage and were inflicting heavy damage upon our men. Again, north of Imecourt, a machine-gun nest was cleaned out by the use of phosphorus grenades, after all other means had failed. Over 200 prisoners and 8 to 10 machine guns were captured at this point.

The first battalion of gas troops arrived in France in January, 1918, and received its preliminary training with the British. It was sandwiched into the British units by platoons, and for seven weeks assisted them in launching gas attacks with Stokes mortars and projectors. The Americans participated with the British in nineteen operations which are known to have caused large casualties and destruction of morale and fighting efficiency in the enemy ranks. Among these was the largest projector operation carried out by the Allies up to that time,—an attack on Lens, when 2,500 projector drums were fired, hurling 75,000 pounds of gas on the German troops.

The regiment carried out its first independent operation on June 18, 1918, on the front held by a French division. This consisted of a projector bombardment against enemy troop concentrations, followed by shrapnel and high explosive. Eight other operations were carried out on stabilized fronts, using projectors reinforced by Stokes mortars. During the Marne-Vesle offensive,

ten Stokes mortar shoots were carried out, in four cases supplemented with projector bombardments. The chemicals used were mainly smoke, and thermite (a white hot liquid metal which, exploded above the Boches, sprayed them with the so-called liquid fire).

During the St. Mihiel offensive, five companies of gas troops were used to neutralize the enemy defense, by the use of smoke, thermite, and high explosive, in assisting infantry attacks. During the progress of the battle, smoke screens were established under cover of which the assaulting infantry advanced to attack machine-gun positions. A total of twenty-two Stokes mortar shoots and eight projector attacks were carried out by gas troops in that offensive.

For the Meuse-Argonne offensive, six companies of the 1st Gas Regiment were assigned to the First Army. These units assisted the infantry at the "jump-off" on September 26th, by the use of smoke screens, of thermite on enemy machine-gun nests and by the placing of concentrations of high explosive bombs from Livens projectors on enemy strong points. On the first day of the offensive, twenty-four Stokes mortar shoots and two projector attacks were delivered. During the subsequent phases of the advance, fifty-two mortar and seven projector operations took place, including the use of gas, smoke, thermite and high explosive.

In all, 152 gas regiment operations were carried out, involving actions on the British and French fronts, in the Vosges sector, in the Marne-Vesle operations, and in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives.

THE GEOLOGIST IN THE WORLD WAR

The geologist, in common with other men of science, came to play an important part in the war on the purely military side. In fact, one of the wonderful features of this wonderful war is the way it commandeered the special knowledge of non-soldiers for the benefit of the soldiers themselves. The geologist located the sources of water supply in the British firing zone, but he was especially useful in mining operations under the enemy's fortified positions. It was his business to determine the ground water level, that point beneath the surface where the earth becomes impregnated with water. Below this point mining cannot be carried on without resort to pumping, and pumping stations in military mining are quite out of the question. The Germans, on the other hand, drove their mines by guesswork. As the purpose of military mining is to blow up the enemy, it is necessary to dig down far enough to be sure of getting below him. But the Germans often drove their mines so deep that they penetrated the water-soaked earth with the result that Fritz was forced to get out in great hurry or drown, and the work had to be begun over again. American geologists accompanied Pershing's army.

THE WONDERFUL S.O.S.

A Prodigious Effort of Super-Organization Behind the Lines Which Was a Big Factor in the Victory

I

THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS

WHEN General Pershing landed at Liverpool, on June 8, 1917, there accompanied him 53 officers and 146 men, of whom 16 officers and 22 men were quartermasters. These became the nucleus of the enormous Quartermaster Corps which fed and clothed the A.E.F. On December 15, 1918, it had a personnel of 4,229 officers and 9,641 enlisted men. Previous to this, when the Motor Transport Corps was organized as a separate corps, 600 officers and 18,000 men had been transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the Motor Transport Corps, and in much the same way, 300 officers and 1,300 men had been transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the Transportation Corps.

When these quartermasters first landed in France, they were confronted with an unprecedented problem. Upon them fell the responsibility of feeding, clothing, and housing the army which was to follow. Everything had to be organized not for the four divisions which would arrive in the fall of 1917, but for the two million men who would be in France before 1919. Temporary measures, therefore, were from the first discouraged; a definite system was laid out which was capable of expanding as the Army grew.

Starting with the initial personnel of 16 officers and 22 men, and one medium sized building at St. Nazaire on June 26, 1917, the covered storage grew to more than 8,000,000 square feet, with 844 different quartermaster activities distributed over 267 localities on November 11, 1918.

The scope of the duties of the Quartermaster Corps in the A.E.F. was laid down in the General Order of July 6, 1917, wherein transportation, personnel, supplies, supply of

transportation, repairs, clothing, equipment, subsistence, fuel, forage, lights, quarters, camp sites, officers' pay disbursements, laundries, baths, remounts, claims, salvage, cemeteries, burials, labor battalion, and labor troops' work shops, and store-houses were assigned as the duties of the Quartermaster Corps.

Subsequently, however, these duties were slightly modified when on February 16, 1918, the old "Lines of Communication" became the "Service of Supply"; and under this the quartermaster functions covered pay, subsistence, fuel, forage, transportation of water, remounts service, laundries, baths, disinfecting, delousing, cold storage, and refrigeration, and graves registration. Later were added commissaries, both stationary and traveling, the effects depot, the garden service, bathing and delousing, the baggage service system of the Octroi tolls, and the railroad units.


Immediately upon arrival in France several big fundamental questions had to be settled:

- 1—The location of the central office.
- 2—The location of source of local supply, source of information and French assistants.
- 3—Arrangements for the reception, debarkation and care of the first American troops.
- 4—Procurement immediately of motor transportation.
- 5—A careful study of the most economical method of procuring local supplies.
- 6—The accumulation of a number of reserve supplies.

The methods of procurement of supplies were, primarily, from the United States by requisition; second by local purchase from the French merchants, and third, by purchase from the Allied Governments. It became apparent at once that the needs of an enormous army could never be met unless a system of saving and restriction be at once inaugurated. There were begun, very early, the elements which later became the salvage

services which developed into one of the commercial features of the Quartermaster's Corps activities in the A.E.F. The excellent results it obtained were not only felt in the A.E.F. but will have a remarkable effect in the future, upon the methods of supply for an army.

ability of supplies, inspected the packing and shipment of all purchases. The supplies from the United States were discharged at the several base ports in France, depending upon their classification, facilities for handling and storing, and proximity to the main depots in France.



From Drawing by U. S. Signal Corps Artist

The Docks at Brest

This gives an idea of the amount of stores which accumulated daily from newly arrived ships from America.

In order to coördinate and regulate the local purchase of supplies of all kinds, a purchasing office was established in Paris, and representatives of this office were located in all the large industrial centers of France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Switzerland; later the activities extended to Algeria and Morocco. These offices kept in constant touch with the industrial and agricultural resources of their sections and reported to the central office the quantity, quality and avail-


WAREHOUSING OF SUPPLIES

The warehousing of this vast daily supply and of the reserve supply necessitated a division of the amounts held in each of the three sections or zones of the S.O.S. It was decided that a ninety days' reserve should always be maintained, and of this the base section maintained 45 days' supply, the intermediate section 30 days' supply and the advance section 15 days' supply.

These warehouses were built in great groups, or quartermaster depots of which six became the base depots, the main system of supply for the American Army. These were at Gièvres, St. Sulpice, Montoir, Montierchaume, Paris, Is-sur-Tille. The space cov-

advancing troops could handle the materials readily, and the study and experimentation of new materials of this character.

Bread alone, for the American Army in November, 1918, was an enormous problem. In August, 1917, 12,000 pounds of bread a



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The Busy Bureau of Supplies

A battleship at a navy yard taking on provisions and water. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts developed scientific management in the conduct of its affairs. The total cargo shipment overseas was 7,452,000 tons.

ered by these depots aggregated 6,500,000 square feet, out of a grand total of 8,250,000 square feet available on November 11, 1918.

In the storing of supplies other problems entered; for example, protection from mustard, from poisonous gas, rats, and other vermin, the use of suitable containers so that

day supplied the Army, while in November, 1,830,000 pounds were needed every day.

The Garden Service raised, by soldier labor, 75,000,000 pounds of green vegetables to augment and give variety to the enlisted man's bill of fare. These gardens were located at 58 different points.

On November 11 the A.E.F. had 17 cold storage plants with an aggregate capacity of 10,374 tons.

The supply of forage for the large number of animals was always a serious problem, requiring unremitting watchfulness, conservation and "push." The local supply in France was always limited, and, under control of the French Government, afforded but temporary relief at any time.

Gasoline and oil, including all grades of gasoline, lubricating oils and grease, was procured and handled in bulk, so far as was possible. The monthly consumption had grown enormously until during October, 1918, it amounted to:

Gasoline (Motor)	9,675,500 Gallons
" (Aviation)	1,458,600 "
Kerosene	374,900 "

There was a total of 27 storage and distributing stations in operation when the armistice was signed, and 66 projected.

A total of 1,016,622 tons of coal was imported from England between October 1, 1917, and October 31, 1918. There were eight storage yards in operation. The wood supply was always serious, because of the scarcity of forests in France.

DIVISIONAL SERVICES OTHER THAN SUPPLY

The Salvage Service began operations at St. Pierre-de-Corps with four officers, five enlisted men and six French women employées. On February 18, 1919, the total Salvage Services personnel exceeded 11,000 besides a field force varying from 2,000 to 12,000 enlisted men, according to the exigency of the service.

The total value of salvaged supplies up to January 31, 1919, was \$85,469,573.41. The total value to the government by salvage in the A.E.F. from January 1, 1918, to March 31, 1919, was \$111,515,072.96.

The Salvage Service clothed and equipped approximately 47,000 German prisoners at a saving to the government of about \$2,820,000. The recoveries of the Kitchen Economics Branch alone up to December 31, 1918, amounted to \$474,515.12.

Bathing and Delousing. The bathing and delousing of troops in the A.E.F. was a function of the Quartermaster Corps conducted

by the Salvage Service. This section of salvage activities was accomplished by the operation of the following apparatus:

Mobile disinfectors	134
Stationary "	40
Improvised "	257
Hot air "	79
Stationary baths	545
Portable "	517
Mobile "	21

The personnel required in the operation of the above plants consists of:

Commissioned officers	282
Enlisted men	1,398

The bathing and delousing treatment of the A.E.F. personnel extended from the Rhine to the United States through the advanced and intermediate sections, embarkation and leave areas, ports of embarkation and aboard the transports, homeward bound. Especially in the embarkation area and at the ports of embarkation, large plants were constructed whereby all returning troops could embark with bodies and clothes free from vermin. Inspection at sea, and improvised steam sterilizing chests built on all troop ships was the last parting effort to prevent vermin from being carried into the home country.

Baggage Service. This service was responsible for all baggage from the time it came into the possession of the Baggage Service A.E.F. until it was delivered to the owner in France, or in the United States, or to the D.G.T. at the port of embarkation. Up to March 6, 1919, this service had found 10,125 pieces of lost baggage. This was another salvage operation.

Graves Registration Service. This service had control of and was charged with the care of graves of American dead in more than 200 military cemeteries in France, 85 in England, Italy, and Belgium, and a few in northern Russia on the Murmansk coast.

Accurate and complete records as to location and identification of all known graves of officers and men of the American Expeditionary Force was in constant process of compilation. Isolated bodies were removed to larger groups, until such time as the policy of the Allies as to caring for their dead is definitely fixed upon.

Effects Depot. This was established at St. Nazaire, April 9, 1918. Up to March 1,

1919, approximately 40,000 packages of effects of deceased officers and men were received. Approximately 37,000 final statements were prepared and forwarded to The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, and a total of \$521,079.00 was received with the effects of deceased members of the American Expeditionary Force and disposed of according to orders. Approximately 1,100 letters were received daily in this division.

Octroi Service. The Octroi toll is of ancient origin and constitutes one of the principal sources of revenue for French municipal expenses. It is a toll upon commodities brought within the municipal limits for barter, exchange or consumption. If applied to U. S. Government supplies in occupied towns, the expense would amount to a large amount. Only ten towns collected the octroi toll from the A.E.F. Forty-three cancelled the contract or exonerated the A.E.F. from payment, while seven were still undecided.

Finance. For the services and supplies referred to above, the Quartermaster Corps up to and including February 28, 1919, disbursed in the A.E.F. approximately \$568,000,000.

In order to pay returning troops in U. S. currency, and exchange any French money to U. S. currency, there was bought in France \$11,286,983 and \$12,000,000 was sent from the United States. The estimated monthly requirements from the United States was \$10,000,000.

Major General H. L. Rogers, Quartermaster General of the Army, was made Chief Quartermaster of the A.E.F. on August 13, 1917, and remained until January 31, 1918, when he was appointed Quartermaster General of the Army. He realized the close connection between filling the physical needs of the troops and building up of their morale and efficiency. He foresaw their needs, even to the simplest items, and cut red tape wherever it was necessary to keep the Army properly fed and clothed.

II

THE ENGINEER CORPS

THE Engineer Corps organization, in the form it had assumed when hostilities ceased, consisted essentially of operating four main branches or divisions under the

Chief Engineer, A.E.F., whose headquarters were at Headquarters, S.O.S., Tours.

Of all the technical services of the American Expeditionary Forces, the Engineer Department was the largest. On November 11, 1918, there were under the direct command or the technical supervision of the Chief Engineer, A.E.F., 190,000 engineer troops which were distributed as follows: with the armies, 86,400; miscellaneous, including troops in training, at schools, shops, etc., 18,500; in the Service of Supply under the Division of Construction and Forestry, 43,000; forestry, 18,500; supplies, 7,600; additional engineer troops, mainly under the supervision of the Division of Construction and Forestry, about 34,500 troops of other arms of the service; 34,000 civilians, and 15,000 German prisoners.

In addition to the work of the engineer troops operating with the armies, who maintained lines of communication, built bridges, fought as infantry, conducted camouflage, searchlight, flash and sound ranging, water supply activities, and many other special functions, the engineers up to the end of the year 1918 accomplished the following results:

DIVISION OF CONSTRUCTION AND FORESTRY

This division provided shelter for the troops, and by the close of the year 1918 it had constructed a total of 15,039 barracks. If placed end to end these barracks would stretch out over 285 miles. This division also had charge of the building of new hospitals, and of the remodeling of old buildings for this purpose. In doing this space was provided for 280,000 beds, of which 145,913 beds were put in buildings of new construction. In other words, this new construction was equivalent to 7,700 hospital barracks, 20 x 100 feet, which represented 146 miles in wards.

In the various ports which were used by the A.E.F., this department did the construction. At Bassens, docks were made for ten vessels. These were 410 feet long, and were equipped with switching facilities, warehouses, etc., and for three months the average daily tonnage discharged here was 3,700 tons. This is just one example of the work done at many ports. Docks at the other ports for use of

sea-going ships were completed or partially completed when the work was stopped by the armistice. Eighty-nine berths were either built or acquired from the French. At St. Loubes a dock 750 feet long was completed, and eighty-four lighters and seven derrick barges were constructed.

Railroad construction also came under this department, and in the A.E.F., 947 miles of standard guage railroad was completed, most of which was in the yards. However, at

water supply of many large cities was chlorinated under the direction of the engineers. In the Bordeaux region, it was found necessary to sink artesian wells, and four million gallons per day were developed here. Sewerage pipe and sewerage systems, especially in the hospitals and hospital areas, constituted a big problem. In the Mesves hospital group alone, 28 miles of water pipe were laid, while at Brest and at St. Nazaire a municipal water supply was installed and developed. At Gièv-



U. S. Signal Corps photo

Auto Trucks for the S.O.S.

This vast field, filled with machines for transporting supplies in France, suggests the tremendous effort exerted in winning the war by the wonderful Service of Supply.

Nevers a six-mile cut-off was built, which required a bridge across the River Loire, 219 feet in length. Storage depot warehouses were built for Quartermaster Corps, which covered storage space of 500 acres, and provided a covered storage for 90 days reserve supplies for an army or over two million men.

Remount depots and veterinary hospitals were constructed. In the remount depots space was provided for 39,000 animals, and in the veterinary hospitals for 23,000 animals. This division also had charge of water supply and sewerage. Every effort was made to give pure water to the troops. The entire

res a refrigeration plant was built with a capacity of 5,300 tons of meat, and 375 tons of ice daily. This was one of three plants in the A.E.F.

This department also built the great municipal bakeries for the Quartermaster Corps, capable of producing 50,000 pounds of bread every twenty-four hours. This group of bakeries was constructed at Is-sur-Tille, and the construction of bakeries in three other cities was stopped by the armistice.

Electric power plants were built wherever the local plant of the French was unable to meet the American demands, central stations

and transmission lines connecting the whole into one great system. By the construction of tanks on the sea-coast, storage was provided for 150,000 barrels of oil and gasoline. Sixty-nine 300-barrel tanks, and one hundred and fifty 150-barrel tanks were manufactured for the distributing stations. Seventeen complete oil and gasoline storage stations, including pumps, were put into operation.

In the Forestry Division, 81 mills were put into operation by October, 1918. The total

States, and the total received from all sources was over 3,000,000 tons. Repair shops were operated to care for engineer supplies, and other shops were created which built firing platforms for 75mm. guns, pontoon wagons and water tanks. Seven cement mills, operated by engineer troops, produced 55,000 tons or 315 barrels of cement during the five months of operation; the cement section made more than 100 miles of sewerage pipe for use in the A.E.F.



New War Material for Old

Salvage at ration dump "H" of the 77th Division and some of the men from Salvage Unit 18 Q.N.C. who handled this material in France.

production was 189,000,000 feet of lumber, 2,000,000,000 standard gauge railroad ties, 1,000,000 narrow gauge ties, and the fuel wood, if corded, would extend 375 miles. In the S.O.S. 300 miles of road were maintained and repaired, and 90 miles of new road completed. This is exclusive of the work done in the advance section of the S.O.S. and of the roads built and repaired with combat troops.

DIVISION OF MILITARY ENGINEERING AND ENGINEER SUPPLIES

During 1918, almost 1,500,000 tons of engineer supplies were received from the United


DIVISION OF LIGHT RAILWAYS AND ROADS

The light railways of the A.E.F. were chiefly used for handling food and artillery ammunition at the front, as they could be laid very quickly and thereby could move those requisites up closer to the advancing troops. In one week on these light railways over 10,000 tons of ammunition were handled, and in six nights 23,135 soldiers were carried. In one week 10,700 tons of rations were handled, and at the time of the armistice 1,400 miles of light railway were in operation. Not all of this had been built by Americans, however, as 109 miles had been taken from the

Germans in the swift advances, and being of the same gauge, was connected on the existing lines and used. The balance, however, was constructed or rebuilt.

At the signing of the armistice there were available for use 165 locomotives, an average of about ten cars to every locomotive. As

chiefly in the Service of Supply. The 86,400 officers and men of the Engineer Corps, who were serving with combat divisions and with the corps and armies, performed all the duties of engineer troops in the field. With every combat division there was one regiment of sapper engineers, who maintained roads,



Committee on Public Information

Assembling Yards in France

Here American locomotives were assembled preparatory to being sent out to relieve the congestion on French railway lines.

these narrow-gauge lines ran close to the front, they were greatly damaged by shell fire, and at Abainville, near Gondrecourt, ten shop buildings were erected, covering 125 acres, to take care of the damage done to light railways in the A.E.F.

This is the summary of the work done by the engineer troops and the Engineer Corps

dug trenches, erected barbed wire, built bridges, and fought as infantry.

The 2nd Regiment of engineers, with the 2nd Division, on the night of November 10th, in the face of heavy artillery and withering machine-gun fire, threw two foot bridges across the Meuse, which permitted the 5th Marines to cross to the east bank. On No-

vember 11, 1918, 54 percent. of the U. S. Army was in the Expeditionary Forces, as compared with 80 percent. of the Engineer Corps on the same date.

An appreciation of the services of the engineers is contained in the following letter from the Commander-in-Chief:

February 20, 1919.

Major General Wm. C. Langfitt,
Chief Engineer, A.E.F.

My Dear General Langfitt:

As the activities of our army in France draw to a close, I desire to express to you, and through you to the officers, enlisted men and civilian personnel of the Engineer Department, my appreciation of their loyal and energetic work, which contributed so greatly to our success.

The various units attached to combat troops distinguished themselves at all times in the assistance which they rendered. The Division of Construction and Forestry, with limited resources at its disposal and under conditions of extreme severity, more than met the many demands made upon it. The Department of Light Railways and Roads, furnished the indispensable link between the railroads and the front lines for the transportation of troops and supplies, and for the evacuation of sick and wounded. Its record in the construction and operation of light railways and roads has seldom been equalled.

In many other services of the Engineer Department, connected with the acquisition and distribution of engineer supplies, particularly those needed for combat operations, were so conducted that our forces never lacked for any essential.

The Engineer Department has made a proud record for itself, and it gives me pleasure to express to you my sincere thanks and admiration, and that of your comrades of the American Expeditionary Forces, for its splendid achievements.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

III

THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

ARMIES are provided with an organized Medical Department, including all necessary personnel and material, chiefly for the purposes of combating disease agencies—keeping soldiers well through the application of the modern principles of sanitary medicine, or, failing in this, to so surround those who become sick and wounded with such aid in the

form of modern hospitalization and evacuation facilities as will speedily restore them to health and fighting efficiency, provided that happy end can possibly be accomplished.

Many other duties devolved upon the Medical Department of an army. It can safely be asserted that in no department or activity has the age of or necessity for specialism been more keenly recognized and vigorously followed. However, as above stated, the principle aims of the Medical Department were to strive to keep the soldier well, but if he does become sick or wounded to put forth every effort to make him well again.

In the World War those charged with the sanitation of our armies accomplished wonders. The deaths from disease, even under a statistical handicap of the most fatal epidemic of disease (influenza) the world has ever known, fell below the number killed in action. This is in marked contrast to our experience in all previous wars in which the United States has been engaged, when the ratio of deaths from disease greatly exceeded that of deaths in battle. No longer is typhoid fever the scourge of an army, thanks to preventative medicine. Great strides were also made in the standardization of curative methods, particularly as concerns the treatment of the wounded. Of all the men wounded in France over eighty-five percent. of them were eventually restored to a physical condition that enabled them to again perform the full duties of a soldier. Of course fire arms have not lost their potency. In battle immediate deaths on the field occur in the proportion of about one death to every five men hit—practically the same as has been found to be true in former wars.

The limited space assigned for this chapter will not permit the introduction of the many details so essential to give the reader a clear conception of the situation which confronted the Medical Department of the A.E.F. prior to and during hostilities. It may be helpful, however, to digress for a moment and briefly describe how it functions in the field.

To all organizations were assigned the requisite quota of Medical Department personnel and equipment, in the way of making them more or less independent of the sani-

NOTE—For the material in this chapter, acknowledgment is made to Colonel Sanford H. Wadhams and Col. Arnold B. Tuttle, of the Medical Corps, both of whom served as members of the General Staff, A.E.F., and fully developed the plans for the hospitalization of the overseas forces.

tary echelons of the rear. When the troops moved this personnel and equipment went with them. Broadly, we use the term "hospitalization" as defining the shelter, care, and treatment with which a sick or wounded soldier must be provided in an effort to restore him to full health. Hospitalization was divided into "mobile" and "fixed" types. The mobile accompanied the troops in the field and changed station with them. The fixed, or, as its name implies, stationary hospitalization was permanently established and operated on one site as long as it remained accessible to the troops it had been designated to serve. The mobile and fixed formations functioned many miles apart. They were linked up through the use of hospital trains, or in rare occasions by the use of ambulances. As a rule the distance separating them was too great to be negotiated by motor vehicles.

MEDICAL WORK AT THE FRONT

In order that the reader may obtain a mental picture of the aid echelons through which a sick or wounded soldier passed from front to rear, let us start with the division in line at the front as an example. The division was the great tactical and administrative unit of our army. They were designated in a consecutive numerical series, but were more familiarly known in the press under their nicknames, such as the Rainbow, the Yankee, and the Wildcat Divisions. A division numbered approximately 25,000 men. Comprising part of it was a Medical Department organization aggregating 100 officers and 1,300 enlisted men, under a supreme head known as the Division Surgeon who usually possessed the rank of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel. (When divisions were grouped to form an army a Chief Surgeon was appointed for that army. In the latter case he had supreme charge over all medical personnel and equipment in the army and corps as well as divisions.)

The sanitary train of a division comprised four ambulance companies, four field hospitals, a medical supply unit, and a laboratory unit. Each ambulance company had twelve ambulances, and personnel and equipment for the establishment of dressing stations. The field hospital companies were hospital formations provided with tentage and material suf-

ficient to care for approximately 200 patients each. As mobility had to be preserved, the equipment was limited to the barest necessities that could be easily transported on a reasonable number of trucks or wagons, and once taken down, could quickly be set up again whenever the division changed its location.


Excepting the very slightly wounded who were sometimes hospitalized in formations near the front until they could be returned to duty on the line, a soldier who fell wounded far out in No Man's Land was destined for a base hospital, perhaps hundreds of miles to the rear, at the very moment he was picked up and placed on a litter. Transporting and giving him all necessary care and treatment while en route there was one of the Medical Department's biggest problems. The gap was wide and beset with difficulties. Dependent upon the character of his injury, and the way in which he was bearing up under it, he might bridge the gap, in so short a time as a day or two—or, on the other hand, a month might elapse before he reached the haven of a comfortable white bed in a busy base hospital situated perhaps in some picturesque French valley far beyond the sound of the boom of the big guns at the front. In getting there he was always under the watchful eyes of the Medical Department and passed through successive hospital echelons, or relay stations, which became more commodious and complete in equipment as the rear was approached.

QUICK RELIEF FOR THE WOUNDED

Wounded, he first fell into the hands of the Medical Department personnel, attached to his own unit. By them, on the field under fire or in one of the aid stations, "first aid" was rendered. Largely, this consisted in arresting hemorrhage, treating shock, applying an occlusive dressing, and, in the cases of fracture, a splint. If the wounded man was unable to walk he was carried back to the dressing or assembly station by litter where his dressings were examined and antitetanic serum administered and from there quickly sent on by ambulance to the divisional field hospital. Here hasty examinations of his dressings and condition were made.

In France one field hospital had to be utilized almost exclusively for the treatment of "gas" cases. One field hospital had special surgical equipment added to it in order that the more severely wounded could be operated upon close to the place where they fell—this to avoid subjecting them to a long trip to the rear which probably would have robbed them of any chance they might have had to recover. Another field hospital of the division was used for ordinary sick cases and as a sorting or

very near railheads in order that they could be promptly evacuated by hospital trains. The allowance was two evacuation hospitals for each division at the front. In capacity they varied from 500 to 1,000 beds. If buildings were available, as they frequently were in France (particularly French hut hospital formations), they were established in them or, in the absence of such buildings, in tents which are provided these hospitals for purposes of shelter.



Courtesy of Scientific American

Upper and Lower Sides of an American Stretcher

Upper—center seam locked; coupling rods in place. Lower—seam open; coupling rods removed, showing method of separating canvas and sides.

classification station for the steady stream of wounded coming in from the front. The other field hospital was held in reserve to meet emergencies so constantly arising. When able to withstand further transportation to the rear, as soon as they had received attention all cases were quickly passed through the field hospitals, out of divisional control to the evacuation hospitals further to the rear, which in France were under Army control. These evacuation hospitals were established on or

Very expert work on the wounded was performed in these hospitals. They had well equipped operating and X-ray rooms, good beds and messing facilities, a large staff of trained surgeons, female nurses, and enlisted men of the Medical Department. Needless to say, these, as well as all other hospitals in France during the height of our activities worked at all hours of the day and night, the personnel, as far as possible being divided into shifts for tours of duty. If need be, definitive

treatment might be given in these hospitals, but normally they functioned only as one of the relay stations in the hospitalization chain of an army. The wounded man's objective was still the base hospital in the rear where he would be safely out of way of war's turmoil. At times patients passed through them very quickly, in order that the evacuation stream from front to rear could be kept open.

The mobile hospitals used in France were provided with personnel and equipment similar to the evacuation hospitals, but were smaller units (about 125 beds) possessing great mobility. In intensive fighting they

hospital trains were rolling hospitals. A patient being transported on them was provided with a comfortable bunk, good food, careful nursing, and even additional operating attention en route should an emergency arise. The standard train had a capacity of 360 lying or 600 sitting. These trains were directly under the control of General Headquarters and were operated through regulating stations or railway junctions established by these headquarters at strategic points. On these hospital trains a patient was sent to the large base hospitals in the rear, sometimes as far down as the base ports.



When Our Men Were Sick

Reading to the sick soldier was a restful form of recreation for him. Sometimes, as a diversion, moving pictures were thrown on a screen placed on the ceiling.

were established very close to the front to give expert surgical aid to the more severely wounded. For these hospitals establishment on or near a railroad was not as important as it was in the case of evacuation hospitals.

HOSPITAL TRAINS

Evacuation hospitals may be characterized as the backbone of front-line hospitalization. The connecting link between the mobile formations accompanying the troops in the field and the stationary formations in the rear was large vestibuled hospital trains which the American Army purchased in England and France. To all intents and purposes these

When it was decided to dispatch an American Expeditionary Force to Europe what was the situation that confronted the Medical Department? For a considerable period of time prior to the entrance of the United States into the war the government had been represented in Paris by a Military Mission, composed of seven officers from different branches of the service. Two of these officers were of the Medical Department of the United States Army. Shortly after the declaration of war between Germany and the United States, the Chief of the Military Mission received instructions from the War Department to make a survey of the different Atlantic ports with

a view to reporting upon the facilities offered for debarkation of both troops and supplies. Officers representing different services of the French Army were detailed to assist the American Military Mission in the preliminary survey.

This joint Franco-American Commission made a preliminary survey of the French ports on the west coast of France, including Bordeaux, the mouth of the Gironde, La Rochelle, St. Nazaire, Nantes, Rochefort and Brest. It was the consensus of opinion of this joint commission that the early debarkation of troops should take place at St. Nazaire; but it was also realized that La Rochelle should also be used to the maximum of its limited possibilities and that Bordeaux must be developed on a very extensive scale, if the necessary number of troops and supplies required for them were to be handled expeditiously. It was also decided that Bordeaux should not be encumbered by the passage of troops and supplies while the installation of the necessary docks and railroad facilities was in progress.

HOSPITAL FACILITIES AT THE PORTS

It being settled, therefore, that St. Nazaire was to be the principal port of entrance for the first phase of debarkation of American troops, it followed that the necessary arrangements should be made for the reception and shelter of arriving Americans. Work was begun immediately upon a large camp in close proximity to the port. In the limited time available this was a task of great difficulty. The engineers of the French Army, however, pushed the work rapidly and the camp was well under way when the first ships arrived. It had been necessary to lay several miles of water pipes, to increase the capacity of the St. Nazaire water plant, and to augment the local supply by placing water boats in service between Nantes and St. Nazaire.

It was foreseen that with the arrival of the first convoy, there would be immediate need for hospital facilities for the sick which would inevitably be present. The plan for the camp comprised a barrack camp hospital, which was erected and equipped by the French Service de Santé. This camp hospital was designed to care for the more trivial cases which would

not need elaborate hospital facilities. To provide for more serious cases the French also turned over to American control such of the French hospitals in the vicinity as might be required. The first hospital so placed at the disposal of the American Expeditionary Forces was one located in a school building in the city of St. Nazaire. This was vacated by the French, but all of the equipment was left in place and it remained only for the Americans to furnish the necessary personnel to carry on the hospital. This was the first A.E.F. hospital established in France, and its acquisition was the beginning of an A.E.F. hospitalization program which was well under way and aiming at a provision of over half a million beds for American sick and wounded when the armistice was signed.

THE BASE HOSPITALS

As above stated, the mobile hospital formations accompanying troops during combat activities were auxiliary institutions not devised to give definitive treatment. They were provided with tentage for sheltering their patients which permitted them to be freely moved about without destroying their efficiency. For the base hospitals to be established in the rear along the lines of communication an entirely different problem was presented. To install these base hospital units, which were dispatched overseas, with a personnel and sufficient equipment to care for a 1,000 bed hospital in normal times and a 2,000 bed hospital during critical periods, it became necessary to do one of two things; either find suitable buildings for them, or build new hospitals with such material as would become available. Obviously it was impossible to construct hospitals in time to meet the immediate needs. Therefore, the French were called upon and willingly relinquished hospitals such as they had, wherever needed. Many of the hospitals or buildings taken over from the French required alterations, additions and repairs, before they could be rendered suitable for occupancy as hospitals. Before long it was realized that a limit of relinquishment would be reached beyond which the French could not safely go without seriously jeopardizing the sufficiency of their own hospital service. Available buildings in France at this time

which could answer the purpose of providing hospital facilities were very limited. The French Government had had first choice in the early days of the war; later the British, Belgian and Italian Governments had established hospitals in France. There were also a large number of hospitals maintained by volunteer aid societies from different parts

hospitals of a standard and simple design; the larger one designed for base hospital units at a normal capacity in buildings of 1,000 beds which in emergencies could be increased to 2,000 beds by erecting tents alongside the ward huts. The smaller unit was a 300-bed camp hospital designed for isolated commands and the use of divisions in training areas. Its



Copyright by Joseph Cummings Chase

Brigadier-General George V. H. Mosley

Ordnance Section G.H.Q.; Assistant Chief of Staff, Supplies Section G.H.Q.

of the world. The result was that when the United States embarked on its hospitalization program the available resources had been almost completely exhausted. Hospitalization acquired through the French comprised their own hospitals taken over intact, hotels, barracks and schools.

In its construction program the A.E.F. Medical Department adopted two types of

capacity could also be doubled in emergencies without any increase in overhead personnel. These standardized units of our own construction were complete in every respect. They were grouped in units of from five to twenty, forming "Hospital Centers." Thus were created in the virgin fields of France, veritable American hospital cities with their wide streets and central water, sewage and lighting

systems, the railroad sidings being laid to the very center of the hospital group.

CAPACITY FOR 541,000 BEDS

Through the acquisition of French hospitals, the leasing of public buildings for hospital purposes, and the construction of barrack hospitals, the number of beds available for the A.E.F. increased rapidly from the small beginning detailed above. In the figures which follow only the hospitals of the interior (base and camp) are considered. The hospitals of the armies being temporary institutions are not included in any figures showing hospital resources of the A.E.F. The greatest number of patients in A.E.F. hospitals occurred in the week ending November 7, 1918, when a total of 190,888 beds were occupied. On the day the Armistice was signed, there was a total of 283,553 beds in the hospitals of the interior. On the same date there were in operation 153 base hospitals, 66 camp hospitals and 12 convalescent camps.

Between November 11, 1918, and December 5, 1918, the total number of beds was increased to 296,835. Either in hospitals actually operating at the time of signing the armistice or in buildings leased for hospital purposes or provided for in new hospital buildings authorized or under construction there was an eventual normal bed capacity of 423,722, with an emergency expansion up to 541,000 beds.

When it is recalled that the number of available buildings in France suitable for hospitals had been almost exhausted in meeting the needs of the French and Allied Armies, before the entry of the United States in the war, and that by construction only could this lack be made up, the magnitude of the task confronting the Medical Department, A.E.F. can be imagined. However, it can be confidently stated that even had the war gone on into 1919 the Medical Department would have been prepared to hospitalize the very large number of casualties which might be reasonably expected from the very rapidly growing combat strength of the A.E.F.

OUR WOUNDED IN FRENCH HOSPITALS

The preceding remarks have referred entirely to hospitalization in the interior as dis-

tinguished from hospitals serving directly with combat troops. As the training of the American troops progressed and as units began to appear in the line the necessity for hospitalization in the zone of the Army became more pressing. The Commander-in-Chief of the A.E.F. had been informed that when American troops took over a sector of the line all existing French formations would be placed at the disposition of the troops of the Americans. This was the theory upon which the hospitals for the accommodation of casualties was based. In practice there were certain difficulties encountered, created by the fact that owing to the enemy offensive of March, 1918, it was necessary to put American troops into line by divisions with the French at different parts of the front. It was, therefore, impossible to provide American evacuation hospitals and hospital trains for the service of isolated divisions constituting an element of a French army. Under these circumstances it was found necessary to receive in the French evacuation hospitals the battle casualties occurring among the American troops and to evacuate them on French hospital trains to French hospitals in the interior. In order that the American soldiers might be gathered together under American control at the earliest possible moment it was mutually agreed that French hospitals receiving American patients should arrange to evacuate such patients to the nearest American hospital as early as the patient's condition would permit. The converse of this agreement was that American hospitals receiving French patients should evacuate them to French hospitals under the same conditions. (Less than 2 percent. of all American sick and wounded were treated in French hospitals.)

HARMONY OF MUTUAL COÖPERATION

Barring the minor difficulties created by the difference in language and customs and the confusion in records, the arrangement on the whole worked satisfactorily. It was desirable, however, that the Americans should begin to hospitalize and evacuate their own patients as soon as a definite sector was turned over to the A.E.F. This did not occur until the St. Mihiel offensive took place in September, 1918. From that time on the Americans hospitalized, cared for and evacuated their own

sick and battle casualties, although on certain occasions it had been possible to establish A.E.F. evacuation hospitals with divisions serving under French command. This was the case at Château-Thierry, in the Champagne and later in Flanders. Owing to the very great difficulty in securing hospital trains

the number of such French trains in the American service was 45. Of approximately 250,000 sick or wounded Americans evacuated from the front to base hospitals in the rear on these trains under American control and through regulating stations manned by American personnel, over 98 per cent. passed



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Major-General W. C. Langfitt

Chief of the Engineer Corps, A.E.F.

the American Medical Department had been able to purchase only two such trains in France; and late in the summer of 1918 this number was increased by 19 trains from England. The A.E.F. hospital trains were never sufficient in number to meet the needs of the battle activities of the summer and fall. It was, therefore, necessary for the French Government to place at the disposition of the A.E.F. a very considerable number of hospital trains. In the latter period of the war

exclusively through American hands into American hospital formations.

16,407 MEDICAL OFFICERS, 8,593 NURSES

So much for the development of the Medical Department, A.E.F., in France. What was the situation in the United States at the time of the declaration of war with Germany? The magnitude of the task which confronted the Medical Department of the U. S. Army when war was declared is difficult to con-

ceive. The entire Department at that time comprised 444 medical officers and approximately 4,300 nurses and soldiers. At the time of the armistice this organization had grown so that in France with the A.E.F. alone there were 16,407 medical officers, 8,593 nurses, and 126,231 soldiers of the Medical Department. Moreover there were in addition nearly as many more in the United States caring for the sick and wounded there or awaiting transportation to France. There being no compulsory military training in the United States, every one of these officers and men had to pass through a training camp or school prior to being sent over seas.

EQUIPMENT OBTAINED IN EUROPE

The equipment for hospitals and other sanitary units not being on hand had to be purchased and much of it manufactured. The



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An American Evacuation Hospital

more bulky classes of equipment, in fact all classes which could be purchased in Europe, was necessarily so purchased in order to reduce to the minimum the demands on the limited amount of tonnage available. The one item of hospital trains may be cited as an example of the difficulty of supply. The sanitary formations could have been procured without difficulty in the U. S. but because of the amount of ship space they would require it was decided to attempt to purchase them in Europe. Fifty complete trains were ordered in France and England, but only 21 had been delivered up to the cessation of hostilities.

Property aggregating many millions of francs in value was purchased in France. The markets of every Allied and neutral country

in Europe were investigated in this effort to economize shipping space by purchasing in Europe. This necessity of procuring equipment in Europe added to the difficulties of the Medical Department, but it was more than justified by the relief afforded to the shipping situation. Where purchase of the finished product was impossible it was necessary to erect factories and manufacture it. Take for instance the thousands of bulky leg and arm splints required for immobilizing leg and arm fractures. These could not be purchased and it was, therefore, necessary either to ship them from the United States, or manufacture them in France. The latter procedure was decided upon and through the American Red Cross the manufacture of this class of apparatus was undertaken and successfully carried out.

Modern warfare requires immense quantities of oxygen and nitrous oxide gasses. The tanks are very bulky and therefore difficult to transport. Consequently the machinery was purchased and a factory for the manufacture of the gasses installed in France.

It is not necessary to go into detail further to set forth the difficulties to be surmounted by a country which goes to war without adequate preparation and separated by 3,000 miles of ocean from its scene of active operations. Suffice it to say that, in spite of the many difficulties created by the necessity of organizing a medical service and transporting both personnel and material to Europe, the character of aid rendered to battle casualties, the rapidity and comfort of transportation to hospital and the quality of surgical work done compares favorably with the results obtained by our Allies. Of the 195,000 Americans wounded, the lives of 182,000 were saved. Ninety-four percent. of the A.E.F. were effective for duty at all times and of the 5.7 percent. of the non-effective list only 3.4 percent. were so incapacitated by sickness. Our army was the healthiest in the history of the war. It had the lowest venereal rate of any of the Allied or enemy Armies.

THE VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

The above sketches very briefly the development of the American medical service. It does not mention the volunteer organizations such as the American Ambulance at Neuilly

and the generous assistance given it by the late Colonel Robert Bacon and other eminent Americans; or the Morgan-Harjes Ambulance Service; or the United States Army Ambulance Service under Colonel Percy L. Jones of the Medical Corps, U. S. A., or the American Surgical Dressings Association under the able guidance of Mrs. C. J. Austin of Paris—all of which were so efficiently maintained for the assistance of either the French or American Armies or for use by them jointly. Also no mention is made of the excellent work performed by the American Red Cross, which is an intimate part of the Medical Department in time of war, and is so well known by the American public as not to need recital here. The fact that the "cream" of the civil medical profession donned their uniforms at the outbreak of the war and went overseas with the troops should also not be lost sight of in this brief narrative. Leaving to one side the question as to how much real help this volunteer American assistance constituted in the early period of the war, it was nevertheless a real and tangible evidence that the great majority of the Americans were in the fullest sympathy with the Allied cause. When America did come in, the condition was reversed and it was largely due to the hearty coöperation of the French that the American Medical Department was enabled to meet its responsibilities. No reasonable request was ever refused. The two services have worked from the beginning in the most complete harmony. The war offers no finer example of the subordination of personal or even national aims and ambitions than has been produced by these two services working together in an effort to mitigate the sufferings of the wounded and to preserve the health of the well.

MEDICAL ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE

With the stage set up and events well under way in the theater of operations, the following is the scheme of organization under which the Medical Department functioned in France: When the first elements of the American Expeditionary Forces arrived General Headquarters were established in Paris. The Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, immediately announced his Staff, among which as Chief Surgeon he appointed Colonel (later

Brigadier General) Alfred E. Bradley, Medical Corps.

In August, 1917, the organization known as the Lines of Communication was formed with Headquarters at Paris. These headquarters were subsequently moved to Tours, and with the formation of the advance, intermediate and base sections, the Chief Surgeon of the L.O.C. and surgeons of the various sub-divisions of the L.O.C. were announced.

In September, 1917, G.H.Q., with the Chief of the Administrative and Technical Services, including the Chief Surgeon (General Bradley), moved to Chaumont from Paris.



Official Government Statistics

Where the Army Dollar Went

In February, 1918, the reorganization of the General Staff of the A.E.F. transferred the Chief of the Administrative and Technical Staff Services to the newly created Headquarters of the Services of Supply, at Tours. Headquarters, S.O.S. absorbed the duties then devolving upon the Headquarters L.O.C. When the Chief Surgeon of the American Expeditionary Forces established in Tours, where he continued to function throughout the war, he left behind at G.H.Q. a Deputy and Assistant Deputy (Colonels S. H. Wadhams and A. D. Tuttle, Medical Corps), both of whom were eventually detailed as General Staff officers, and functioned under G-4, G.H.Q., which had supervision over and coördinated all hospitalization and evacu-

ation. Thus was created the organization under which the combat operations of the American Expeditionary Forces were conducted.

To recapitulate, Medical Department activities were supervised by the following officers: At Headquarters, S.O.S., Tours, Major General M. W. Ireland, Medical Corps, subsequently appointed Surgeon General, United States Army, and succeeded as Chief Surgeon by Brigadier General Walter D. McCaw, Medical Corps—conducted broad executive and supply functions of his department from that busy center. His principal efforts were of course directed toward the procurement of personnel and supplies and the establishment of fixed hospitalization for the sick and wounded received from the front and from all points throughout Europe. In each base, intermediate and advance section, was stationed a medical officer who represented him and had immediate supervision over all medical department matters within his area. While the Chief Surgeon of the A.E.F. at Tours had control over all Medical Department formations in Europe his great distance from the front necessitated the placing of the conduct of the hospitalization and evacuation of battle casualties in the hands of his deputy, Colonel S. H. Wadhams, Medical Corps at G.H.Q. This Deputy being a General Staff officer and a member of G-4, at G.H.Q., co-ordinated all the medical activities at the front in the name of the C-in-C. through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

The first A.E.F. attempt at an organization larger than the division was during the Marne operations in June, when what was known as the "Paris Group" was established. There in supreme control of the Medical Department was the "Chief Surgeon of the Paris Group," Colonel P. C. Hutton, M.C. Later that group was dissolved and the First American Army, in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive, was formed with Colonel Alexander N. Stark, M.C., as Chief Surgeon. Following our success at St. Mihiel, the First American Army was greatly augmented and prepared for the final Meuse-Argonne offensive with Colonel Stark still continuing to function as Chief Surgeon of that Army—in strength of numbers the largest ever formed

in history. Later there were formed the Second and Third American Armies, the latter for occupation duty in Germany. A Chief Surgeon was appointed for each—Colonel C. R. Reynolds, M.C., being assigned to the former, and Colonel J. W. Grissinger, M.C., to the latter.

DIVERSITY OF ACTIVITIES

The following will illustrate the diversity of Medical Department activities in the A.E.F. The Chief Surgeon, in supreme control of all Medical Department activities, had at his disposition in the rear: base hospitals, camp hospitals, American Red Cross military hospitals, convalescent camps, medical supply depots and storage stations, sanitary squads, medical laboratories, sanitary inspectors, casual camps for sanitary troops, sanitary schools for medical officers, surgical repair shops, orthopedic training camps, voluntary aid societies, specialists in the professional services, dental schools, hospital trains, motor ambulance assembly parks, and the veterinary service.

His deputy at General Headquarters, in cooperation with the Army Surgeon at the front, had at their disposition all corps, division and regimental personnel and equipment, medical groups at regulating stations, department of specialists and Medical Department concentration area, evacuation hospitals, mobile hospitals, mobile surgical units, evacuation ambulance companies, sections of the U.S.A.A.S., convalescent depots, medical supply parks and dumps, field medical laboratories, sanitary squad, specialists operating shock and gas cases, mobile degassing units, hospital trains, sanitary inspectors, etc.

It seems eminently fitting that this chapter be concluded by quoting a commendation from the C-in-C., A.E.F., on the work performed by the Medical Department.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
France, February 20, 1919.

Colonel Walter D. McCaw, M.C.,
Chief Surgeon, A.E.F.

My dear Colonel McCaw:

Now that active operations are at an end, and many officers and enlisted personnel are preparing to sever their connection with the military

forces and return to civil life, I desire to express my personal appreciation and thanks and that of your fellow-members of the American Expeditionary Forces to you, and through you to the members of your department, for the splendid services they have rendered.

At the front and in the long chain of hospitals extending down to the base ports, I have watched the fine and unselfish character of their work, and the achievements which have added new glory to the noble professions they have so ably represented. Many of them have shared with the line troops the hardships of campaign conditions and have sustained casualties and privations with fortitude that is beyond praise. No labor has been too exhausting and no danger too great to prevent their full discharge of duty.

A special word of thanks is due to those members who were attached to and served continuously with the Armies of our Allies. Their efficiency and high ideals have called for the highest praise of the Allied Governments under whom they have served.

Before they leave France, will you convey to all ranks under your command the deep sense of my personal appreciation of their splendid services and my regret at the impracticability of sending each and every one of them a letter of thanks.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) JOHN J. PERSHING.

IV

THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

THE problem that faced the Ordnance Department at the declaration of war was to arm the manhood of the nation called to the service in its defense. Ordnance comprised almost exclusively non-commercial articles, material things, which have no place at all in the peace-time life of the nation, and the greatest problem was to develop the industry of the nation into these lines. The feeding, housing, clothing, transporting of men is exercised in the nation's daily life in peace times, but to arm a nation calls upon entirely new development.

At the outbreak of the war, the total commissioned personnel of the Ordnance Department was 97 officers, whose collective knowledge of this subject was the sum total of ordnance knowledge available to the War Department, and but ten of this number could be spared for the technical work of design and development in the office of the Chief of Ordnance.

In May, 1917, one of the big questions which confronted the Ordnance Department was which rifle should be adopted by the American Army. At this time the caliber .30 Springfield rifle was used in the Army. The United States had 600,000 of these weapons on hand, but only three arsenals were able to make these rifles, and their capacity was very limited. On the other hand the British Government was having manufactured in the United States the .303 caliber Enfield rifle at a rate of 7,000 rifles per day. The United States could only produce 300,000 Springfield rifles per annum, which was insufficient for the great army plan.

It was decided, therefore, to use the British Enfields rechambered, to use the American ammunition, and these plants in the United States, which were making British Enfields, began immediately to manufacture United States Enfields.

If this plan had not been adopted, it would have been physically impossible for the United States troops in France to be equipped with rifles. The changing of the British Enfield to use United States ammunition was a small matter in the making of the rifle, but a very large matter in the use of the rifle in the field, for this .30 caliber standard ammunition was used in the American army for all rifles, machine guns, and automatic rifles, making one type of small arms ammunition for the infantry arms.

The situation which brought this about was due to the policy of the United States in both the Army and Navy, which was to maintain in the government employ a small group of technically trained officers to make the design and production of implements of war their life profession. The European method differs from this entirely in that the government supports private industry in the manufacture of war material and encourages it to seek foreign markets for its product. This method automatically creates and develops a technical and industrial personnel with a definite means of livelihood, and when war comes, gives the nation a large field in which to recruit the makers of ordnance.

BRITISH AND FRENCH GUNS FOR AMERICANS

Another great question came in the equipping of the field artillery. This was a problem of supplying thousands of guns ranging in caliber from 3 inches to 6 inches. The few guns there were in the United States Army at the declaration of war were almost negligible as compared with the enormous quantity that were needed to equip a National Army of millions. We might have begun at once the manufacture in the United States of the guns which were the Army models at that time, but there were three great objections to this, namely: First, only two arsenals were equipped to make these and it would be many months before American factories could have the necessary machinery made to make these guns and the rate of production would be very slow. Secondly, the transporting of these guns to France would cut down the available tonnage for troops, and, thirdly, these guns would entail a totally different ammunition supply which would mean changing all the ammunition in a sector every time the Americans relieved the French, which might have disastrous results in a fast-moving operation.

The British and French, in the spring of 1917, were making guns and ammunition faster than their armies could use them. The one great cry was for men. And, to solve the three great difficulties enumerated above, the British and French offered to supply all American divisions which arrived in France prior to 1919 with the best British and French artillery and ammunition. All available shipping would therefore be used for men, raw materials, and food. This was agreed upon in the fall of 1917 by the mission headed by Colonel House and General Bliss and Admiral Benson. This was of great value in speedily putting American troops into the line in France; and as, in America, large amounts of French and British artillery ammunition had been made in 1915 and 1916, there was available to the United States Government a large field of trained experts in the manufacture of the ammunition which the United States Army was to use in France.

The adoption of the French 75 millimeter gun, 155 millimeter howitzer, and British 8-

inch howitzer by the United States Army was one of the most brilliant feats of the war, for it enabled the Americans to be thrown in on any front at a moment's notice and gave a fighting army of two million men in the field eighteen months after war had been declared, an unprecedented record for a country so ill prepared as was the United States at the declaration of war.

In accordance with much the same principles, aeroplanes, grenades and tanks, as well as many other kinds of supplies were purchased from the Allies. As a general policy the United States shipped raw material in great bulk, because it could be handled in much smaller spaces than the finished products; the question of available space on ships and that of speed were the two greatest problems of the United States in the war.

BIG GUNS AND SMALL ARMS GALORE

The Ordnance Department of the Army is charged with supplying all the fighting equipment; and in the A.E.F. this department had an enormous problem, for it had to keep supplied, by purchase from the Allies or Neutrals as well as by shipment from the United States, an enormous and ever growing American Army in France. This meant the procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance, and repair of thousands of different classes of articles, ranging all the way from the great lumbering caterpillar tank to the well-known mess kit, and including all offensive and defensive arms and ammunition, from the great guns and howitzers hurling shells of nearly a ton in weight down to the small trench knife.

Modern warfare called not only for machine guns, automatic rifles, and small arms, but for tanks, tractors, and mobile repair shops, and a new list of unfamiliar ordnance devices such as aeroplane bombs, incendiary darts, grenades, and fireworks.

The Ordnance Department in France had one other problem which was not apparent at first, but soon became so when American troops began holding sectors on the front, namely, that the American troops expended ammunition much more freely than the French and British had done; and this made useless



Behind the American Lines

Heavy French guns of the "Foilloux" type being hauled towards the front.

the tables of ammunition supply on which the Ordnance Department was working.

On November 11th the Ordnance Department had actually placed on the American lines, 3,500 cannon of all caliber, which during periods of great artillery activity fired on an average of 6,000 tons of projectiles every 24 hours. These guns fired 7,000,000 shots at the enemy. There were also on that day, 2,000 trench mortars, 2,000,000 hand grenades, and 100,000 machine guns and automatic rifles ready on the front, while in the storehouses along the lines of communication and back to the base ports were 4,500,000 shells for the guns, and 640,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.

To keep the artillery moving in the advance of the Army during the last two months of the war, 7,000 tractors and artillery repair and supply trucks were put into service. By motorizing the 75's and 155 millimeter howitzers the artillery was able to keep apace with the infantry. Fourteen-inch naval rifles, mounted on railroad cars, one to a train, were able to shoot up the enemy's rear areas and railroad junctions. The Ordnance Department also put into operation on the front 3,000 armored tanks.

These are a few of the activities of the Ordnance Department, but the outstanding accomplishment of this department was the motorizing of the artillery, the system of mobile repair shops maintained with divisions and armies, and the keeping of the guns at the front in perfect condition.

MOBILE REPAIR SHOPS

At the time of the armistice there were 25 heavy, mobile repair shops operating with the Armies. They rendered first aid to the guns. On the Soissons front the second mobile ordnance repair shop, in addition to their other duties, put into action against the retreating Germans, 28 pieces of their own artillery. These repair shops took care of all ordnance material and many other things besides, such as water carts, rolling kitchens, bicycles, typewriters, shower-baths, watches, meat grinders, steam rollers, trench pumps, captured German baths, and delousing plants.

Back of the lines, the other great problem that confronted the Ordnance Department

was the storage and heavy repair in the S.O.S. The base section of the A.E.F. was the great reservoir of ordnance materials; the intermediate section was the regulating mechanism which took up fluctuation of supply and demand, while the advance section supplied the Armies from day to day. For the purpose of maintaining service it was planned to keep 45 days' supply in the base section, 30 days' supply in the intermediate, and 15 days' supply in the advance section. Thus, at the coast were the great general storage depots of St. Sulpice and Montoir; in the intermediate section, Gièvres, with its greatest of buildings; and in the advance zone, Is-sur-Tille became the great basis of Ordnance for the A.E.F.

EFFICIENCY OF ORGANIZATION

The ammunition storage loaned for the A.E.F., covered enough of France to make a good sized county in New England. To make the repairs for guns and ordnance, great workshops were established throughout S.O.S. The greatest of these was at Melum. It was so designed as to handle repairs of all artillery and ordnance equipment for an army of two million men. It covered 50 acres of ground, was manned by 6,000 technically trained soldiers, and could remake anything from a tank or a piece of heavy artillery to a mess kit.

In addition to their work in supplying the fighting weapons for the A.E.F., the Ordnance Department operated six great schools, and in these trained 5,000 men for ordnance work.

Some idea of the extent of the Ordnance Department in the A.E.F. can be gained from the fact that it handled more than one half million tons of material at a cost of \$50,000,000. There were in France, 1,803 officers and 12,205 enlisted men; and the history of the Ordnance Department is the history of success in the race between the brains of supply and the knowledge of expenditure in the American Army.

The highest praise for the officers and enlisted men of the Ordnance Department of the American Expeditionary Forces is expressed in a letter from General Pershing to Brigadier General John H. Rice, Chief Ordnance Officer of the A.E.F.

General Pershing stated that "during the active operations extending from January, 1918, when our 1st Division entered the line, until the close of hostilities on November 11th, our troops were supplied with the equipment and ammunition necessary to carry their work to a successful conclusion.

"I realize the tremendous difficulties of organization and administration which had to be overcome for your department to properly fulfill the functions in this respect," says Pershing. "The repair and maintenance system that you established was a great success, and the results obtained under existing circumstances reflect great credit upon the officers and enlisted men of your department."

V

THE MOTOR TRANSPORT CORPS

WHEN the United States entered the war the Army Regulations prescribed that all means of transportation were supplied by the Quartermaster Corps. But as soon as the emergency arose, and the Army commenced to expand, the time-honored custom of ignoring the regulations went into effect, authority being sought and obtained for the various departments to go into the market and obtain by purchase the much needed truck trains and motor transportation. The 1st Division when it was organized in France had to obtain immediately motor trucks to feed the troops; these the British were able to supply. It was soon found, however, that there were five different departments of the Army bidding against each other in the market for trucks; so once more was it put under one head.

By this time the experience of the British and French was taken into account. In the United States distances are great and the experience with truck trains in the punitive expedition into Mexico gave but little basis for the organization of a system which could cope with all the problems arising in an army of millions, in a country of comparatively short hauls. Placing this all under one head did not solve the problem. A general would requisition a car, it would be sent him, and from that time on it was his car. It was his lookout to find a trained driver, to keep the car in repair, to get spare parts; in the same

way the division had its motor transport assigned to it, and, as soon as it was turned over, the burden of responsibility for keeping it in repair and always ready was shifted from the supplying agency to the division or other unit. This caused endless trouble until the solution was found.

UNDER ARMY DISCIPLINE

On July 11th the Motor Transport Corps was created by general order, and all motor transportation, with the exception of artillery tractors, etc., was placed under the control of this Corps. The Motor Transport Corps did not furnish transportation, but it furnished a delivery service. All motor transportation and all drivers were a part now of the Corps and no longer belonged to the unit with which they were serving. It was its duty to see that all motor vehicles were kept in the best condition, to furnish the required amount of delivery service to whosoever needed it. The general no longer owned his car, the M.T.C. furnished him the service, car and driver and kept the car going all the time. The division no longer owned its trucks and wondered when and where it would get spare parts; the M.T.C. was charged with furnishing so much service, so many trucks, drivers, and officers. This placed all the responsibility under one head and made possible the handling of almost 200,000 motor vehicles of 27 different makes. Drivers and mechanics were trained; and, taking into consideration the peculiar temperament of truck drivers, with the aid of the border experience—for many of the truck drivers of the punitive expedition were now officers in the M.T.C.—a transport discipline was evolved, which, while very different from the usual army discipline, produced results comparable to that of a Cadet Corps.

Spare parts was the great cry of the A.E.F., and yet apparently every precaution was taken to insure an ample supply. The manufacturers made up a list of the spare parts needed for six months' hard service and these were purchased with the shipment; but the manufacturers did not know what hard service was. Driving at night, without lights, over shell-torn roads, now running at top speed, then suddenly stopping, bouncing in and out

of unseen shell holes, sliding into hub-deep ditches of mud, pulling the next truck out, the engine idling in congested traffic—all this and much more, day in and day out, put a parts, and charts made of the military machine under maximum strain. In France the M.T.C. operated almost 110,000 motor vehicles; thousands of repair shops, from the lit-



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Brigadier-General Meriweather I. Walker

Chief of the Motor Transport Corps.

test to these trucks to which they had never been put before—in a word, the maximum endurance. The experience gained was quickly utilized. An Experience Table was organized in which careful record was kept of the 274 different kinds of vehicles, with their 7,500

tle shop with the division down to the great machine shops in the rear, and schools of instruction where the great lesson of the war in motor transport was taught: Intelligent direction can offset inefficient operation. It was a case of American organization seen at its best.

Army hospitals in the United States cared for 1,407,191 patients during the war; those with the American Expeditionary Force cared for 755,354, a total of 2,162,545.

PERSHING'S MESSAGE TO THE DOUGHBOY

EVERY soldier in the A.E.F.—combatants and non-combatants—received, duly signed by his company commander the following personal message from the Commander-in-Chief:

G. H. Q.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 38-A.

FRANCE, *February 28, 1919.*

MY FELLOW SOLDIERS:

Now that your service with the American Expeditionary Forces is about to terminate, I can not let you go without a personal word. At the call to arms, the patriotic young manhood of America eagerly responded and became the formidable army whose decisive victories testify to its efficiency and its valor. With the support of the nation firmly united to defend the cause of liberty, our army has executed the will of the people with resolute purpose. Our democracy has been tested, and the forces of autocracy have been defeated. To the glory of the citizen-soldier, our troops have faithfully fulfilled their trust, and in a succession of brilliant offensives have overcome the menace to our civilization.

As an individual, your part in the world war has been an important one in the sum total of our achievements. Whether keeping lonely vigil in the trenches, or gallantly storming the enemy's stronghold; whether enduring monotonous drudgery at the rear, or sustaining the fighting line at the front, each has bravely and efficiently played his part. By willing sacrifice of personal rights; by cheerful endurance of hardship and privation; by vigor, strength and indomitable will, made effective by thorough organization and cordial coöperation, you inspired the war-worn Allies with new life and turned the tide of threatened defeat into overwhelming victory.

With a consecrated devotion to duty and a will to conquer, you have loyally served your country. By your exemplary conduct a standard has been established and maintained never before attained by any army. With mind and body as clean and strong as the decisive blows you delivered against the foe, you are soon to return to the pursuits of peace. In leaving the scenes of your victories, may I ask that you carry home your high ideals and continue to live as you have served—an honor to the principles for which you have fought and to the fallen comrades you leave behind.

It is with pride in our success that I extend to you my sincere thanks for your splendid service to the army and to the nation.

Faithfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
Commander-in-Chief.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DAVIS,
Adjutant General.

Copy furnished to.....

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Commanding.

DIVISION HISTORIES

Official List of the Overseas Divisions, Their Nicknames, Insignia, Commanders, Organization, and Casualties

(The military activities of each of the combat divisions after their arrival in the fighting zone are dealt with in the general account of the Expeditionary Forces elsewhere in this volume.)

COMBAT DIVISIONS OF THE A. E. F.

1st. Regular Army.	"The First"	77th. New York City National Army.	
2nd. Regular Army and Marines.			"Metropolitan"
	"The Second"	78th. New Jersey } National Army.	
3rd. Regular Army.	"The Marne"		"Lightning"
4th. Regular Army.	"The Fourth"	79th. Pennsylvania National Army.	
5th. Regular Army.	"Red Diamond"		"Liberty"
6th. Regular Army.	"Sight-Seeing Sixth"	80th. Blue Ridge Mts. National Army.	
7th. Regular Army.	"The Seventh"		"Blue Ridge"
26th. New England National Guard.		North Carolina }	
	"Yankee"	81st. South Carolina }	National Army.
27th. New York National Guard.		Tennessee }	"Wildcat"
	"New York"	82nd. All American National Army.	
28th. Pennsylvania National Guard.			"All American"
	"Keystone"	North Dakota }	
29th. New Jersey } National Guard.		South Dakota }	
Virginia }	"Blue and Gray"	Minnesota }	
30th. Blue Ridge National Guard.		38th. Nebraska }	National Army.
	"Old Hickory"	Iowa }	
32nd. Michigan } National Guard.		Illinois }	
Wisconsin }	"Red Arrow"	89th. Middle West National Army.	
33rd. Illinois National Guard.			"Middle West"
	"Yellow Cross"	90th. Texas }	National Army.
35th. Kansas }		Oklahoma }	"T. O."
Missouri }	"Santa Fe Cross"	91st. West Coast National Army.	
Texas }			"Wild West"
36th. Oklahoma }	"Lone Star"	92nd. Colored National Army.	
37th. Ohio National Guard.			"Buffaloes"
	"Buckeye"	93rd. Colored National Guard.	
42nd. National Guard from all States.			"Red Hand"
	"Rainbow"		

DEPOT, REPLACEMENT, AND LABOR DIVISIONS

8th. Regular Army.	76th. National Army Drafts—New England States.
31st. National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, Florida.	83rd. National Army Drafts—Ohio and West Virginia.
34th. National Guard of Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska.	84th. National Army Drafts—Indiana and Kentucky.
38th. National Guard of Kentucky, West Virginia, Indiana.	85th. National Army Drafts—Michigan and Wisconsin.
39th. National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas.	86th. National Army Drafts—Illinois.
40th. National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico.	87th. National Army Drafts—Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi.
41st. National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming.	

A Day in the Life of a Soldier

Painted by Sidney H. Rosenberg



Painting by Sidney H. Rosenberg

Reveille—Everybody Up

THE FIRST DIVISION

THE 1st Division was organized from troops of the United States Regular Army in France. The first of these units left the United States on June 14, 1917, and the last arrived in France on July 2, 1917. The division was assembled in the Gondrecourt training area in July, 1917, training with a division of French Chasseurs Alpins.

The division insignia is a crimson figure "1" on a khaki background. This insignia not only represents the number of the division, and many of its subsidiary organizations, but it is further appropriate in that this was the first division in France, the first in a sector, the first to fire a shot at the Germans, the first to attack, the first to attempt a raid, the first to be raided, the first to capture prisoners, the first to inflict and to suffer casualties, the first to be cited singly in general orders, the first to capture enemy cannon and first in the number of division corps and army commanders and general staff officers produced from its personnel.

The command of the division changed on December 12th from Major General William L. Seibert to Major General Robert L. Bullard. On the night of July 17th, just before it entered the line for the Allied counter-attack southwest of Soissons, General Bullard was promoted to the command of the Third Army Corps, and Brigadier General Charles P. Summerall, who until that time had commanded the 1st Field Artillery Brigade, took command of the division. On October 14, 1918, General Summerall was made Corps Commander; General Bamford was in command of the division until ordered to command the 26th Division, when Brigadier General Frank Parker took command of the division.

The 1st Division suffered 26,332 casualties,* the greatest number suffered by any division in the American Army. Of these 4,899 were killed in action. One hundred and fifty-one men of the 1st Division were taken prisoner by the enemy. The 1st captured 6,469 prisoners of war, 119 pieces of artillery, advanced against resistance 51 kilometers, and received 30,206 replacements.

* Casualties in the American Army include not only killed and wounded in action, but missing in action and taken prisoner by the enemy.

The following units composed the 1st Division:

- 1st Infantry Brigade—the 16th and 18th Regiments.
- 2nd Infantry Brigade—the 26th and 28th Regiments.
- 1st Field Artillery Brigade—the 5th, 6th and 7th Artillery Regiments.
- The 1st Regiment U. S. Engineers and train.
- 2nd Field Signal Battalion.
- 1st, 2nd and 3rd Machine Gun Battalion.
- 1st Ammunition Train.
- 1st Sanitary Train—2nd, 3rd, 12th and 13th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.
- 1st Headquarters Train and Military Police.
- 1st Supply Train.

THE SECOND DIVISION

THE 2nd Division was organized in France from elements of the Regular Army and the U. S. Marine Corps during the latter months of 1917. The division insignia is an Indian head on a star background, superimposed upon a shield with various colors and shapes to designate the various units. Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, U. S. Marine Corps, was in command of the division until November 7, 1917, when Major General Omar Bundy took command. On July 14, 1918, Major General Omar Bundy relinquished command of the 2nd Division to assume command of an Army Corps, his successor being General J. G. Harbord. Major General J. E. LeJeune, U. S. Marine Corps, took command of the division when General Harbord was placed in command of the Service of Supply.

The division captured 228 officers, 11,738 men, 343 pieces of artillery, 1,350 machine guns, and made a total advance of 60 kilometers against resistance. To include May 10, 1919, the casualties of the 2nd Division were 4,478 battle deaths, 17,752 wounded, or total battle casualties of 25,076. This division received 35,343 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, 4 officers and 152 enlisted men, a total of 156.

The 2nd Division was composed of the:

- 3rd Infantry Brigade, 9th and 23rd Regiments.
- 4th Infantry Brigade, 5th and 6th Regiments, U. S. Marine Corps.
- 2nd Artillery Brigade, 12th, 15th and 17th Artiller Regiments.
- Second Regiment U. S. Engineers.

4th and 5th Machine Gun Battalions.
 Marine Machine Gun Battalion.
 2nd Trench Mortar Battery.
 1st Field Signal Battalion.
 2nd Supply and Second Ammunition trains.
 2nd Sanitary Train—1st, 15th, 16th, and 23rd
 Field Hospitals and Ambulance Companies.

THE 3RD DIVISION

THE 3rd Division was organized at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, from units of the Regular Army. The division insignia consists of three white stripes, diagonally on a blue field, which stand for the three operations in which the 3rd Division took part, the Marne, St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. The blue field stands for the loyalty of those who placed their lives on the altar of self-sacrifice in defense of American ideals of liberty and democracy. This division is known as the "Marne Division." Major General Joseph F. Dickman commanded the division from its organization until August 31, 1918, when he became a corps commander, and Major General Beaumont B. Buck, who commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division at Soissons took command of the 3rd until October 17th, when Brigadier General Preston Brown was in command until the armistice. The overseas movement began April 4, 1918, and the last units arrived in France May 30, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the total casualties of the 3rd Division were 18,154, of whom 3,102 were killed in action. Eight officers and 306 men were taken prisoner by the enemy. The division captured 2,240 prisoners, and 51 pieces of artillery. It advanced against resistance, 41 kilometers (25 miles).

The following organizations comprise the 3rd Division:

5th Infantry Brigade—4th and 7th Regiments.
 6th Infantry Brigade—30th and 38th Regiments.
 3rd Field Artillery Brigade—10th, 76th, 18th Artillery Regiments.
 3rd Trench Mortar Battery.
 6th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 5th Field Signal Battalion.
 3rd Train Headquarters and Military police.
 3rd Ammunition Train.
 3rd Supply Train.
 3rd Sanitary Train—5th, 7th, 26th and 27th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 4TH DIVISION

THE 4th Division was organized at Camp Greene, Charlotte, North Carolina, on December 10, 1917, by Major General George H. Cameron. It was made up of units of the old Regular Army, which was brought up to strength by drafted men. Its shoulder insignia is a green four leaf ivy about a circle in cross shape, superimposed upon a square olive drab diamond. The division left Camp Greene April 18, 1918, and the overseas movement was begun May 1st. The majority of the division landed in England and proceeded to Calais, and by June 3rd, all organizations, with the exception of the 4th Artillery Brigade, were sent to the Sammer area for training with the British. The 4th Field Artillery Brigade was sent to Camp De Souge.

General Cameron, who had organized and originally commanded the division up to this time, was placed in command of the Fifth American Army Corps. Brigadier General B. A. Poore was in temporary command of the division until Major General John L. Hines arrived to take command. On October 11th General Cameron resumed command of the 4th Division, while General Hines went to command the Third Army Corps.

To include May 15, 1919, the division had suffered 2,986 major casualties, had captured 2,756 prisoners, 44 field pieces, and had advanced, in the face of resistance, 24½ kilometers (15 miles). The division received, during this period, 19,599 replacements, and had total casualties (killed, wounded and missing) of 14,183, of whom two officers and 68 men were captured by the Germans.

The 4th Division was composed of the following organizations:

7th Infantry Brigade—39th and 47th Regiments
 8th Infantry Brigade—58th and 59th Regiments.
 10th, 11th and 12th Machine Gun Battalions.
 4th Field Artillery Brigade—13th, 16th and 17th Artillery Regiments.
 4th Regiment of Engineers.
 4th Field Signal Battalion.
 4th Sanitary Train.
 4th Ammunition and Supply Train.

THE 5TH DIVISION

THE 5th Division was organized at Camp Logan, Texas, from units of the Regular Army, under command of Major General James E. McMann, who commanded the division until October 24, 1918, when he was succeeded by Major General Hanson E. Ely, formerly of the 1st Division. The division insignia is a red diamond. The overseas movement began on March 1st, and the last unit arrived in France in May, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the 5th Division suffered a total of 9,883 casualties, of whom 1,908 were battle deaths; 98 men were captured by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy 2,405 men, and 98 pieces of artillery. It advanced 29 kilometers (18½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 5th Division:

- 9th Infantry Brigade—6th and 11th Regiments.
- 10th Infantry Brigade—60th and 61st Regiments.
- 13th, 14th and 15th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 5th Field Artillery Brigade—19th, 20th and 21st Artillery Regiments.
- 7th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 9th Field Signal Battalion.
- 5th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 5th Train Headquarters and Military police.
- 5th Ammunition Train.
- 5th Supply Train.
- 5th Sanitary Train—17th, 25th, 29th and 30th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 6TH DIVISION

THE 6th Division was organized at Camp Forrest, Georgia, and Camp McClellan, Alabama, from units of the Regular Army. The division insignia is a six-pointed red star, with the numeral six in blue, superimposed. The division is generally known as the "Sight-Seeing Sixth," inasmuch as it marched in reserve of the First Army for one month without going into the line. The overseas movement began on May 8th, and the last units arrived in France on August 28, 1918. Many of the units arrived and were trained in England. Preceding the division, the 318th Engineer Regiment arrived at Brest in May, and were engaged in construction work. The artillery landed at Le Havre and went to Valdahon for its training.

Brigadier General James B. Erwin commanded the division until August 31, 1918,

when Major General Walter P. Gordon assumed command.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 576 casualties, of whom 97 were killed in action, and three were taken prisoner by the enemy. The division received a total of 2,784 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 6th Division:

- 11th Infantry Brigade—51st and 52nd Regiments.
- 12th Infantry Brigade—53rd and 54th Regiments.
- 16th, 17th and 18th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 6th Field Artillery Brigade—3rd, 11th and 78th Artillery Regiments.
- 318th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 6th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 6th Field Signal Battalion.
- 6th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 6th Supply Train.
- 6th Ammunition Train.
- 6th Sanitary Train—20th, 37th, 38th and 40th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 7TH DIVISION

THE 7th Division was organized January 1, 1918, at Chickamauga Park, Georgia. The divisional insignia consists of two triangles, with apexes touching, in black, on a red circular base. The division was trained at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, beginning February 5, 1918. The overseas movement began on July 31st, and the last units arrived in France September 3rd. On August 19th the division arrived in the 15th training area with headquarters at Ancy-le-Franc. Here the entire division, less the 7th Artillery Brigade, continued its preliminary training until September 30th, when the division moved to the Toul area, with headquarters at Gondreville. The 7th Field Artillery Brigade which trained at Camp Meucon did not join the division until February, 1919.

Brigadier General C. H. Barth commanded the division until Oct. 24th, 1918, when Major General E. Wittenmeyer took command.

To include May 15, 1919, the 7th Division lost a total of 1,818 casualties, of whom 302 were battle deaths, and one officer and 19 men were taken prisoners by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy 68 prisoners, and advanced ¾ kilometer (½ mile).

The following organizations compose the 7th Division:

13th Infantry Brigade—55th and 56th Regiments.
 14th Infantry Brigade—34th and 64th Regiments.
 19th, 20th and 21st Machine Gun Battalions.
 7th Artillery Brigade—8th, 79th and 80th Artillery Regiments.
 7th Trench Mortar Battery.
 5th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 10th Field Signal Battalion.
 7th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 7th Supply Train.
 7th Ammunition Train.
 7th Sanitary Train—22nd, 34th, 35th and 36th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 26TH DIVISION

THE 26th Division was organized in Boston, Massachusetts, from units of the New England National Guard, and filled to strength by a contingent of National Army troops from Camp Devens. Its shoulder insignia is a blue monogram of the letters "Y. D." (Yankee Division) superimposed upon a khaki diamond. The overseas movement began September 7, 1917, and headquarters were established at Neufchateau, France, October 31, 1917.

Major General Clarence R. Edwards commanded the 26th Division until October 24, 1918, when Brigadier General Frank E. Bamford (formerly of the 1st Division) was placed in command.

To include May 15, 1919, the 26th Division lost a total of 15,168 casualties, of whom 2,168 were killed in action and 19 officers and 432 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 14,411 replacements; captured from the enemy 3,148 prisoners and 16 pieces of artillery, and advanced a total of 37 kilometers (23 miles).

The following organizations composed the 26th Division:

51st Infantry Brigade—101st and 102nd Regiments.
 52nd Infantry Brigade—103rd and 104th Regiments.
 101st, 102nd and 103rd Machine Gun Battalions.
 51st Field Artillery Brigade—101st, 102nd and 103rd Artillery Regiments.
 101st Trench Mortar Battery.
 101st Field Signal Battalion.
 101st Engineer Regiment and Train.
 101st Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 101st Supply Train.
 101st Ammunition Train.

101st Sanitary Train—101st, 102nd, 103rd and 104th, Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 27TH DIVISION

THE 27th Division was organized at Camp Wadsworth, South Carolina, from the New York National Guard. The divisional insignia is a black circle with a red arrow head, in which are the letters "N. Y. D." in monogram, surrounded by seven stars of the constellation "Orion." Major General John O'Ryan, of the New York National Guard, commanded the division from its organization until it was mustered out. General O'Ryan is the only National Guard Division Commander who retained the command of his division, and fought with it throughout the action. The overseas movement began on May 8, 1918, and the last unit arrived in France on July 7, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 11,218 casualties, of whom 1,791 were killed in action, and three officers and 225 men were captured by the enemy. The 27th Division captured from the enemy 2,358 prisoners, and advanced against resistance, 11 kilometers (7 miles).

The following organizations composed the 27th Division:

53rd Infantry Brigade—105th and 106th Regiments.
 54th Infantry Brigade—107th and 108th Regiments.
 104th, 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions.
 52nd Artillery Brigade—104th, 105th and 106th Artillery Regiments.
 102nd Trench Mortar Battery.
 102nd Engineer Regiment and Train.
 102nd Field Signal Battalion.
 102nd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 102nd Ammunition Train.
 102nd Supply Train.
 102nd Sanitary Train—105th, 106th, 107th and 108th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 28TH DIVISION

THE 28th Division was organized at Camp Hancock, Georgia, from the Pennsylvania National Guard. The division is known as the "Keystone Division," and has for its shoulder insignia, a red keystone. The overseas movement began April 21, 1918. On May 18th the division landed at Calais.



Painting by Sidney H. Riesenberg

Morning—Parade and Inspection

The commanding generals of the division were: Major General C. M. Clement, until December 11, 1917; Major General Charles H. Muir, until October 24, 1918; Major General William H. Hay, until the signing of the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered 2,531 battle deaths, a total of 16,277 battle casualties. This division stands fourth in casualties suffered, a grim tribute to its heroic accomplishments. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions, in order named, alone exceeded its total. Nine hundred and twenty-one officers and men were captured from the enemy; 16 cannon were also captured, and the division advanced 10 kilometers, ($6\frac{1}{4}$ miles) in the face of the most bitter resistance. The division lost, taken prisoner by the enemy, 18 officers and 708 men.

The following units composed the 28th Division:

- 55th Infantry Brigade—109th and 110th Regiments.
- 56th Infantry Brigade—111th and 112th Regiments.
- 107th, 108th and 109th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 53rd Artillery Brigade—107th, 108th and 109th Artillery Regiments.
- 103rd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 103rd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 103rd Field Signal Battalion.
- 103rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 103rd Supply Train.
- 103rd Ammunition Train.
- 103rd Sanitary Train—109th, 110th, 111th and 112th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 29TH DIVISION

THE 29th Division was organized at Camp McClellan, Alabama, and originally consisted of men from the National Guard of New Jersey, Virginia and Maryland, and the District of Columbia. Due to the fact that the North and the South were both represented in this division, the name "Blue and Gray Division" was adopted, and came into general use. The divisional insignia is the Korean symbol of good luck in blue and gray.

The overseas movement began in June, 1918, and the units arrived at Brest and St. Nazaire at the end of June, 1918. Major General Charles G. Morton commanded the division.

To include May 15, 1919, the 29th Division suffered 6,159 casualties, of whom 940 were killed in action and four officers and 63 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 4,977 replacements. It captured from the enemy 2,148 prisoners, and 21 pieces of artillery; the division advanced 7 kilometers ($4\frac{1}{2}$ miles).

The following organizations composed the 29th Division:

- 57th Infantry Brigade—113th and 114th Regiments.
- 58th Infantry Brigade—115th and 116th Regiments.
- 110th, 111th and 112th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 54th Field Artillery Brigade—110th, 111th and 112th Artillery Regiments.
- 104th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 104th Field Signal Battalion.
- 104th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 104th Supply Train.
- 104th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 104th Ammunition Train.
- 104th Sanitary Train—113th, 114th, 115th and 116th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 30TH DIVISION

THE 30th Division was organized at Camp Sevier, South Carolina, from the old 9th National Guard Division (National Guard of Tennessee, North and South Carolina), and was augmented by men drawn from North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota. The divisional insignia is a monogram in blue of the letters "O. H." standing for Old Hickory, the nickname of Andrew Jackson. The cross bar of the "H" contains a triple "X," the Roman numerals for thirty. The whole is on a maroon background.

Major General George W. Read commanded the division from April 27, 1918, until August 10, 1918, when he assumed command of the Second U. S. Army Corps, and command of the division passed to General Edward M. Lewis, who retained command until the armistice. The overseas movement began on May 7, 1918, and the last units landed at Calais, France, on June 24, 1918.

To include May 15, 1918, the 30th Division suffered a total of 11,081 battle casualties, of whom 1,652 were killed, six officers and 71 men were taken prisoner by the Ger-

mans. The division received 2,384 replacements; it captured from the enemy 3,848 prisoners, 81 pieces of artillery, and made a total advance of 29½ kilometers (18½ miles) against resistance.

The following organizations composed the 30th Division:

59th Infantry Brigade—117th and 118th Regiments.
 60th Infantry Brigade—119th and 120th Regiments.
 113th, 114th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions.
 53rd Artillery Brigade—113th, 114th and 115th Artillery Regiments.
 105th Trench Mortar Battery.
 105th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 105th Field Signal Battalion.
 105th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 105th Supply Train.
 105th Ammunition Train.
 105th Sanitary Train—117th, 118th, 119th and 120th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 32ND DIVISION

THE 32nd Division was organized at Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, from the National Guard of Wisconsin and Michigan. The division insignia is a flying red arrow with a red cross bar in the middle. Major General James Parker commanded the division until September 19, 1917, when Brigadier General W. G. Haan, afterwards Major General, took command of the division and remained in command until the signing of the armistice.

The division remained in training at Camp MacArthur until January, 1918, and on January 19th the first units of the division embarked for overseas. The last units of this division reached France on March 12, 1918. The division was sent to the 10th training area, with headquarters at Prauthoy, Haute-Marne, and was designated as a replacement division. For two months it functioned as such, one regiment of infantry being sent as labor troops to the S.O.S., while the others lost over 50 percent. of the officers and men as replacements to the combat divisions. On May 15, 1918, the status of the division was changed to a combat division, and after a brief period of training, the division moved into a sector in Alsace, near Belfort.

For its gallant record, the 32nd Division was chosen, with the 1st (Regular) and 2nd

(Regular and Marine) Divisions, to occupy the bridgehead across the Rhine in the Army of Occupation. This was the only National Guard Division to receive this great honor.

To include May 15, 1919, the 32nd Division suffered 2,898 battle deaths, and a total of 13,884 battle casualties. It received 20,140 replacements, captured from the enemy a total of 2,153 men and 21 cannon, and advanced 36 kilometers (21 miles). It lost one officer and 155 men taken prisoner by the enemy.

The 32nd Division was composed of the following organizations:

63rd Infantry Brigade—125th and 126th Regiments.
 64th Infantry Brigade—127th and 128th Regiments.
 119th, 120th and 121st Machine Gun Battalions.
 57th Field Artillery Brigade—119th, 120th and 121st Artillery Regiments.
 107th Trench Mortar Battery.
 107th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 107th Field Signal Battalion.
 107th Headquarters Train and Military Police.
 107th Ammunition Train.
 107th Supply Train.
 107th Sanitary Train—125th, 126th, 127th and 128th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 33RD DIVISION

THE 33rd Division (Illinois National Guard) was organized at Camp Logan, Houston, Texas, in August, 1917, by Major General George Bell, Jr. The shoulder insignia of this division is a yellow cross on a round black patch. The first organization to start for France was the 108th Engineers and the last units arrived in France June 11, 1918.

To include May 15th, the 33rd Division suffered a total of 9,253 casualties, of whom 1,002 were battle deaths, and one officer and 125 men were taken prisoner by the Germans. This division captured 2,153 prisoners and 21 pieces of field artillery and advanced 36 kilometers (22½ miles) during this time. The division received 20,140 replacements.

The following organizations composed the 33rd Division:

65th Infantry Brigade—129th and 130th Regiments.
 66th Infantry Brigade—131st and 132nd Regiments.
 122nd, 123rd and 124th Machine Gun Battalions.

58th Artillery Brigade—122nd, 123rd and 124th Artillery Regiments.
 108th Trench Mortar Battery.
 108th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 108th Field Signal Battalion.
 108th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 108th Supply Train.
 108th Ammunition Train.
 108th Sanitary Train—129th, 130th, 131st and 132nd Ambulance Corps and Field Hospitals.

THE 35TH DIVISION

THE 35th Division was organized at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, from the National Guard of Missouri and Kansas. The shoulder insignia of this division is the Santa Fe Cross. Major General William M. Wright commanded the division from the time of organization until June 15, 1918, when Major General Peter M. Traub took command, General Wright going to command the Army Corps.

The overseas movement began April 25, 1918, and the division arrived in France *via* Liverpool and West Winchester, England, on May 11th.

To include May 15, 1919, the 35th Division lost a total of 7,854 battle casualties, of whom 960 officers and men were killed. It received 10,605 replacements, captured 781 prisoners, 24 pieces of artillery and 85 machine guns, and advanced 12½ kilometers (7½ miles) in the face of resistance. It lost, captured by the enemy, four officers and 165 men.

The 35th Division was composed of the following organizations:

69th Infantry Brigade—137th and 138th Regiments.
 70th Infantry Brigade—139th and 140th Regiments.
 128th, 129th and 130th Machine Gun Battalion.
 60th Artillery Brigade—128th, 129th and 130th Artillery Regiments.
 110th Trench Mortar Battery.
 110th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 110th Field Signal Battalion.
 110th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 110th Supply Train.
 110th Ammunition Train.
 110th Sanitary Train—137th, 138th, 139th and 140th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 36TH DIVISION

THE 36th Division was organized at Camp Bowie, Texas, from the National Guard of the states of Texas and Oklahoma. The divisional insignia is a light blue Indian arrow head on a round khaki patch, with a khaki "T" superimposed. The division is sometimes popularly known as the "Lone Star," or "Panther" Division. Major John E. St. John Greble organized and commanded the division for some time. Major General W. R. Smith was in command of the division during its active operations, including the armistice.

The overseas movement began on July 18, 1918, and the division landed in France on July 30th, and was immediately ordered to the 13th training area in the vicinity of Bar-sur-Aube.

To include May 15, 1919, the 36th Division suffered a total of 2,710 casualties, of whom 1,591 were killed in action, and one officer and 24 men were captured by the enemy. The division captured from the enemy, 549 prisoners and 9 pieces of artillery, and advanced 21 kilometers (13 miles).

The following organizations composed the 36th Division:

71st Infantry Brigade—141st and 143rd Regiments.
 72nd Infantry Brigade—143rd and 144th Regiments.
 131st, 132nd and 133rd Machine Gun Battalions.
 61st Artillery Brigade—131st, 132nd and 133rd Artillery Regiments.
 111th Trench Mortar Battery.
 111th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 111th Field Signal Battalion.
 111th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 111th Ammunition Train.
 111th Supply Train.
 111th Sanitary Train—141st, 142nd, 143rd and 144th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 37TH DIVISION

THE 37th Division was organized at Camp Sheridan, Montgomery, Alabama, from the Ohio National Guard. The division insignia is a white circle upon which is a smaller red circle. This is the "Buckeye," by which name the division was known.

The division was built around the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 10th Ohio Infantry Regiments, the 1st Ohio Field Artillery, 1st Ohio Cavalry, 1st Ohio Engineers, 1st Ohio Field Signal Battalion.

On May 20th, the division, less the artillery, was sent to Camp Lee, Virginia, where it was filled to war strength, and began overseas movement on June 15th.

To include May 15, 1919, the 37th Division suffered a total of 5,923 casualties, of whom 992 were battle deaths. It captured 1,495 prisoners, 34 pieces of artillery, and advanced $30\frac{3}{4}$ kilometers ($19\frac{1}{4}$ miles). The division received 6,282 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, 23 men.

The following organizations composed the 37th Division:

- 73rd Infantry Brigade—145th and 146th Regiments.
- 74th Infantry Brigade—147th and 148th Regiments.
- 134th, 135th and 136th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 62nd Artillery Brigade—134th, 135th and 136th Artillery Regiments.
- 112th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 112th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 112th Field Signal Battalion.
- 112th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 112th Supply Train.
- 112th Ammunition Train.
- 112th Sanitary Train—145th, 146th, 147th and 148th Ambulance Company and Field Hospitals.

THE 42ND DIVISION

THE 42nd Division was organized at Camp Mills from the National Guard of every section of the United States. The following states were represented as shown:

New York (69th Infantry); Iowa (3rd Infantry); Wisconsin (Companies E. F. & G., 2nd Infantry); Indiana (1st Field Artillery); Maryland (3rd & 4th Companies C. A. C.); Kansas (1st Ammunition Train); Oklahoma (Ambulance Company No. 1); District of Columbia (Field Hospital No. 1); Ohio (4th Infantry); Pennsylvania (3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry); Illinois (1st Field Artillery); Minnesota (1st Field Artillery); California (1st Battalion of Engineers); New Jersey (Ambulance Co. No. 1); Michigan (1st Ambulance Company); Nebraska (Field Hospital No. 1); Colorado (Field Hospital No. 1); Oregon (Field Hospital No. 1); Alabama (Fourth Infantry); Georgia (Companies B. C. & F. 2nd Infantry); Louisiana (1st Separate Troop of Cavalry); South Carolina (1st Bat-

talion of Engineers); North Carolina (Engineer Train); Texas (Supply Train); Virginia (1st and 2nd C. A. C.); Tennessee (Ambulance Company No. 1); Missouri (First Battalion Signal Corps).

The division was known as the "Rainbow Division," and the shoulder insignia is a rainbow on a field of black. General William A. Mann organized the division and commanded it until December 14, 1917, when Major General Charles T. Menoher took command of the division, until November 7, 1918, when Major General Charles D. Rhodes succeeded him. The overseas movement began on October 18, 1917, and the last units arrived in France December 7th, 1917.

To include May 15, 1919, the 42nd Division suffered a total of 16,005 casualties, of whom 2,713 were battle deaths, and three officers and 99 men were taken prisoners by the Germans. The division received a total of 17,253 replacements. It captured from the enemy 1,317 prisoners, and 25 pieces artillery; it advanced 55 kilometers (35 miles).

The following organizations composed the 42nd Division:

- 83rd Infantry Brigade—165th and 166th Regiments.
- 84th Infantry Brigade—167th, 168th Regiments.
- 149th, 150th and 151st Machine Gun Battalions.
- 67th Artillery Brigade—149th, 150th, 151st Artillery Regiments.
- 117th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 117th Field Signal Battalion.
- 117th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 117th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 117th Supply Train.
- 117th Ammunition Train.
- 117th Sanitary Train—165th, 166th, 167th and 168th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 77TH DIVISION

THE 77th Division was organized at Camp Upton, New York, with officers and men chiefly from New York City. The division was popularly known as the "Metropolitan Division," and has for its insignia a gold Statute of Liberty on a truncated triangle of flag blue.

The overseas movement began on March 28, 1918, and, with the exception of the artillery, all units proceeded through Liverpool across England and landed at Calais. The artillery sailed from New York in April and



Painting by Sidney H. Riesenberg

Afternoon—Visitors' Day

went direct to Brest. Major General J. Franklin Bell was relieved of command of the division on May 18, 1918, and Major General G. B. Duncan, formerly of the 1st Division, took command of the division until August 24, 1918. Major General Robert Alexander was in command of the division from August 31, 1918, until the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the 77th Division suffered 11,956 casualties, of whom 1,990 were battle deaths, 11 officers and 394 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 12,728 replacements, and captured from the enemy 750 men, and 44 pieces of artillery; it advanced a total of 71.5 kilometers (44½ miles). The famous "Lost Battalion" consisted of six companies of the 308th Infantry, commanded by Major Charles Whittlesey (now Lieutenant Colonel).

The following organizations composed the 77th Division:

- 153rd Infantry Brigade—305th and 306th Regiments.
- 154th Infantry Brigade—307th and 308th Regiments.
- 304th, 305th and 306th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 152nd Artillery Brigade—304th, 305th and 306th Artillery Regiments.
- 302nd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 302nd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 302nd Field Signal Battalion.
- 302nd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 302nd Supply Train.
- 302nd Ammunition Train.
- 302nd Sanitary Train—305th, 306th, 307th and 308th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 78TH DIVISION

THE 78th Division was organized at Camp Dix, New Jersey, with men drawn from Northern New York State, New Jersey and Delaware. The shoulder insignia consists of a red semi-circle, with a flash of lightning in white. The overseas movement began on May 8, 1918. The last unit of the division arrived in France June 11th.

Major General Charles W. Kennedy organized the division and Major General James H. McRae commanded it from April 20, 1918, throughout its actions until the armistice.

To include May 15, 1919, the 78th Division suffered 8,159 total casualties, of whom 1,359 were killed in action, and three officers and 120 men were captured by the Germans. The division received 3,190 replacements, and captured from the enemy, 398 prisoners, and four pieces of artillery. It advanced through the Argonne forest 21 kilometers (13 miles).

The following organizations composed the 78th Division.

- 155th Infantry Brigade—309th and 310th Regiments.
- 156th Infantry Brigade—311th and 312th Regiments.
- 307th, 308th and 309th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 153rd Artillery Brigade—307th, 308th and 309th Artillery Regiments.
- 303rd Trench Mortar Battery.
- 303rd Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 303rd Field Signal Battalion.
- 303rd Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 303rd Supply Train.
- 303rd Ammunition Train.
- 303rd Sanitary Train—309th, 310th, 311th and 312th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 79TH DIVISION

THE 79th Division was organized at Camp Meade, Maryland, from men from Pennsylvania, Maryland and District of Columbia. As soon as the division was organized, large numbers of the men were transferred to southern divisions and to special units throughout the United States. This continued until June, 1918. Approximately 80,000 men were trained in this division, and only about 25,000 retained. The increments came from New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia. The division was known as the "Liberty Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a gray Lorraine cross on a blue shaped field, outlined in gray. Major General J. E. Kuhn commanded the division until the date of the armistice. The overseas movement began July 9, 1918. The last unit arrived in France August 3rd.

To include May 15, 1919, the 79th Division lost a total of 7,590 casualties, of whom 1,396 were battle deaths, and two officers and 78 men captured by the enemy. The division received 6,246 replacements. It cap-

tured from the enemy 392 men, 32 pieces of artillery and advanced 19½ kilometers (12 miles).

The following organizations composed the 79th Division:

157th Infantry Brigade—313th and 314th Regiments.
 158th Infantry Brigade—315th and 316th Regiments.
 310th, 311th and 312th Machine Gun Battalions.
 154th Field Artillery Brigade—310th, 311th and 312th Artillery Regiments.
 304th Trench Mortar Battery.
 304th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 304th Field Signal Battalion.
 304th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 304th Supply Train.
 304th Ammunition Train.
 304th Sanitary Train—313th, 314th, 315th and 316th Ambulance Companies and field Hospitals.

THE 80TH DIVISION

THE 80th Division was organized at Camp Lee, Virginia. The majority of the officers were from New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia, and the enlisted men from Western Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. The division was named the "Blue Ridge Division," and has for its shoulder insignia a shield outlined in white on a khaki background with three blue mountains superimposed.

Major General Adelbert Cronkhite was assigned to the command of the division on September 9, 1917, and remained in command until the armistice. The division began leaving Camp Lee May 17, 1918, and was embarked at Newport News for France, where it arrived through St. Nazaire, Bordeaux and Brest. The last of the division arrived in France on the 19th of June, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the total casualties of the 80th Division were 6,763, of whom 1,141 were battle deaths; it captured from the enemy 1,813 men. It also took 88 pieces of artillery, and made a total advance of 37 kilometers (24 miles). It received 4,495 replacements, and lost, captured by the enemy, one officer and 100 men.

The 80th Division was composed of the following organizations:

159th Infantry Brigade—317th and 318th Regiments.

160th Infantry Brigade—319th and 320th Regiments.

155th Field Artillery Brigade—313th, 314th and 315th Artillery Regiments.

313th, 314th and 315th Machine Gun Battalions.

305th Engineer Regiment.

305th Field Signal Battalion.

305th Trench Mortar Battery.

305th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

305th Supply Train.

305th Ammunition Train.

305th Sanitary Train.

THE 81ST DIVISION

THE 81st Division was organized at Camp Jackson, South Carolina, from men drawn from North and South Carolina and Tennessee. The shoulder insignia of this division is a wild cat on a khaki circle. The color of the wild cat varies according to the different arms of the service. The division was better known as the "Wild Cat Division." Brigadier General Charles H. Barth organized the division and remained in command until October 8, 1917, when Major General Charles J. Bartley assumed command. The overseas movement began July 30, 1918. The last units arrived in France *via* England, August 26, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the division suffered a total of 1,051 casualties, of whom 250 were killed in action, and 51 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 1,984 replacements, and captured from the enemy five officers and 96 men, and advanced, against resistance, 5½ kilometers (3½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 81st Division:

161st Infantry Brigade—321st and 322nd Regiments.

162nd Infantry Brigade—323rd and 324th Regiments.

316th, 317th and 318th Machine Gun Battalions.

156th Field Artillery Brigade—316th, 317th and 318th Artillery Regiments.

306th Trench Mortar Battery.

306th Field Signal Battalion.

306th Engineer Regiment and Train.

306th Train Headquarters and Military Police.

306th Supply Train.

306th Ammunition Train.

306th Sanitary Train—321st, 322nd, 323rd and 324th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 82ND DIVISION

THE 82nd Division was organized at Camp Gordon, Georgia, from men drawn from Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee. On October 10, 1917, however, the majority of the men were transferred out of this division to other divisions, and newly drafted men were sent from Camps Devens, Upton, Dix, Meade and Lee. In this division there were men from every state in the Union, but principally from the Eastern States. The division was known as the "All American Division." Its shoulder insignia consists of the letters "A.A." in gold on a circle of blue, the whole superimposed upon a red square. The overseas movement began April 25th and the last units arrived in France June 1st.

Major General Eben Swift commanded the Division from its organization until May, 1918, when Brigadier General William P. Burnham took command, and remained in command until October 10, 1918, when Major General George B. Duncan succeeded him. On October 17th, Major General William P. Burnham again took command until November 7th, when Major General G. B. Duncan returned to command it.

To include May 15, 1919, the 82nd Division suffered a total of 8,228 casualties, of whom 1,338 were killed in action and seven officers and 232 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 8,402 replacements. It captured from the enemy 845 prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery and advanced 17 kilometers (10½ miles).

The following units composed the 82nd Division:

- 163rd Infantry Brigade—325th and 326th Regiments.
- 164th Infantry Brigade—327th and 328th Regiments.
- 319th, 320th and 321st Machine Gun Battalions.
- 157th Artillery Brigade—319th, 320th and 321st Artillery Regiments.
- 307th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 307th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 307th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 307th Field Signal Battalion.
- 307th Supply Train.
- 307th Ammunition Train.
- 307th Sanitary Train—325th, 326th, 327th and 328th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 88TH DIVISION

THE 88th Division was organized at Camp Dodge, Iowa, from men drawn from North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois. The divisional insignia is two figures "8" in blue, crossed at right angles. The overseas movement began August 8, 1918, and the last units arrived in France September 9th. Major General Edward H. Plummer organized the division and Major General William Weigel commanded the division in action.

To include May 15, 1919, the 88th Division suffered a total of 90 casualties, of whom 27 were killed and two officers and seven men were taken prisoner by the enemy. The division received 731 replacements.

The 88th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 156th Infantry Brigade—349th and 350th Regiments.
- 157th Infantry Brigade—351st and 352nd Regiments.
- 337th, 338th and 339th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 163rd Artillery Brigade—337th, 338th and 339th Artillery Regiments.
- 313th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 313th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 313th Field Signal Battalion.
- 313th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 313th Supply Train.
- 313th Ammunition Train.
- 313th Sanitary Train—349th, 350th, 351st and 352nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 89TH DIVISION

THE 89th Division was organized at Camp Funston, Kansas, from men drawn from Missouri, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico and Arizona. The division was called the "Middle West Division." The shoulder insignia is a black "W" in a black circle. The division was organized and trained by Major General Leonard Wood, who remained in command until the regiment was embarked for overseas, when Brigadier General Frank L. Winn took command. The overseas movement began on May 24th and in June the division arrived in France. On October 24th, Major General William M. Wright was placed in command of the Division.

As a reward for its work during the Meuse-Argonne offensive the 89th Division was chosen to become a part of the Army of Occupation.

To include May 15, 1919, the 89th Division suffered total casualties of 8,813, of whom 1,419 were killed and one officer and 24 men captured by the enemy. The division received 7,669 replacements. It captured from the enemy 5,061 prisoners, and 127 pieces of artillery. It advanced a total of 36 kilometers (22½ miles).

The following organizations composed the 89th Division:

177th Infantry Brigade—353rd and 354th Regiments.
 178th Infantry Brigade—355th and 356th Regiments.
 340th, 341st and 342nd Machine Gun Battalions.
 164th Artillery Brigade—340th, 341st, 342nd and 343rd Artillery Regiments.
 314th Trench Mortar Battery.
 314th Field Signal Battalion.
 314th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 314th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 314th Supply Train.
 314th Ammunition Train.
 314th Sanitary Train—353rd, 354th, 355th and 356th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 90TH DIVISION

THE 90th Division was organized at Camp Travis, Texas, under command of Major General Henry T. Allen, from men drawn from Texas and Oklahoma. The men from Texas were put into the 180th Brigade, and the men from Oklahoma in the 179th Brigade. The divisional insignia is a monogram "T.O." in red.

The overseas movement began in June, 1918. The 358th Infantry landed in England, and on July 4th, paraded before the Lord Mayor of Liverpool.

On August 27th Brigadier General Johnston was promoted to Major General, and took command of the 91st Division, and Brigadier General V. G. McAlexander, who so gallantly commanded the 38th Infantry of the Third Division on the Marne, took command of the 180th Brigade.

As a reward for its brilliant work in the St. Mihiel offensive and in the Argonne, the 90th Division was chosen as one of the nine

divisions of the Army of Occupation, of which only one other, the 89th, was a National Army Division. The division moved to Rhenish Prussia, and took up its position along the Moselle River. Here it was joined by the 165th Field Artillery Brigade, which had just completed its training.

To include May 15, 1919, the 90th Division suffered a total of 8,010 casualties, of whom 1,387 were killed in action, and four officers and 76 men were captured by the enemy. The division received 4,437 replacements. The division captured from the enemy 32 officers and 1,844 men, and 42 pieces of artillery; it advanced a total of 28½ kilometers (18 miles).

The following organizations composed the 90th Division:

179th (Oklahoma) Infantry Brigade—357th and 358th Regiments.
 180th (Texas) Infantry Brigade—359th and 360th Regiments.
 343rd, 344th and 345th Machine Gun Battalions.
 165th Field Artillery Brigade—343rd, 344th and 345th Artillery Regiments.
 315th Trench Mortar Battery.
 315th Field Signal Battalion.
 315th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 315th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 315th Supply Train.
 315th Ammunition Train.
 315th Sanitary Train—357th, 358th, 359th, 360th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 91ST DIVISION

THE 91st Division was organized at Camp Lewis, Washington. The majority of the officers were from California, Washington, Oregon and the enlisted men from California, Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Montana and Alaska. The shoulder insignia of this division is the green fir tree of the Far West. The division was known as the "Wild West Division."

The overseas movement began early in July, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on July 26, 1918. With the exception of the artillery brigade, the division was concentrated in the eighth training area, with the division headquarters at Montigny-le-Roi, Haute-Marne. The artillery brigade was trained at Clermont-Ferrand.

The commanding generals of this division from its organization until the armistice were



Painting by Sidney H. Riesenberg

Taps—The End of a Day

as follows: Major General Harry A. Greene, August 25, 1917, to November 24, 1917; Brigadier General James A. Irons, until December 23, 1917; Brigadier General Frederick S. Foltz, until March 2, 1918; Major General Harry A. Greene, until June 19, 1918; Brigadier General Frederick S. Foltz until August 31, 1918; Major General William H. Johnston, until November 11, 1918.

To include May 15, 1919, the 91st Division suffered 1,390 battle deaths, 6,496 battle casualties, and received 12,530 replacements. The division captured 2,412 German prisoners and 33 German cannon; it advanced a total of 34 kilometers (21½ miles). The division lost, captured by the enemy, 28 men.

The 91st Division is composed of the following organizations:

- 181st Infantry Brigade—361st and 362nd Regiments.
- 182nd Infantry Brigade—363rd and 364th Regiments.
- 346th, 347th and 348th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 166th Artillery Brigade—346th, 347th and 348th Artillery Regiments.
- 316th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 316th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 316th Field Signal Battalion.
- 316th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 316th Supply Train.
- 316th Ammunition Train.
- 316th Sanitary Train—361st, 362nd and 363rd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 92ND DIVISION

THE 92nd Division was organized at Camps Funston, Grant, Dodge, Upton, Mead, and Dix, from colored National Army officers and men from all parts of the United States. The division was known as the "Buffalo Division," and the shoulder insignia is a buffalo in black on a khaki patch. On August 29th, after a period of training, the division entered the line in the St. Dié sector, in the Vosges mountains. Brigadier General, afterwards Major General Charles C. Ballou, commanded the division during most of its career.

To include May 15, 1919, the 92nd Division suffered a total of 1,680 casualties, of whom 185 were battle deaths and 17 men were captured by the enemy. The division

received 2,920 replacements. It advanced 3 kilometers (2 miles).

The following organizations composed the 92nd Division:

- 183rd Infantry Brigade—365th, 366th Regiments.
- 184th Infantry Brigade—367th and 368th Regiments.
- 349th, 350th and 351st Machine Gun Battalions.
- 167th Field Artillery Brigade—349th, 350th and 351st Artillery Regiments.
- 317th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 317th Field Signal Battalion.
- 317th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 317th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 317th Supply Train.
- 317th Ammunition Train.
- 317th Sanitary Train—365th, 366th, 367th and 368th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 93RD DIVISION

THIS, the 30th (combat) Division of the A.E.F., never functioned as a division, but as four separate infantry regiments; it saw much service with various French armies. As the 93rd Division (Colored National Guard) it was filled to strength from National Army drafts. The overseas movement began on April 7, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on April 22nd. Upon arrival in France the two infantry brigades were broken up, and the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372nd Infantry Regiments were brigaded with the French, and served as parts of French armies as follows:

July 1st to July 21st—369th Infantry, with the Fourth French Army in the line between Aisne and Ville-sur-Tourbe; 370th Infantry, with the Second French Army; 371st Infantry, with Thirteenth French Army Corps in the line west of Avocourt; 372nd Infantry, with the Thirteenth French Army Corps in the line east of Four-de-Taris.

August 1st—369th Infantry, with the Eighth French Corps in the Cienne la Ville region; 370th Infantry, with the 36th French Division; 371st Infantry, with the 156th French Division; 372nd Infantry, with the 157th French Division.

On September 28th, the 370th Infantry advanced across the Chemin des Dames.

On October 24th—369th Infantry, with the Fourth French Army at Wesserling; 370th Infantry, with the Tenth French Army at

Euly; 371st Infantry and 372nd, with the Second French Army at Tlainfaing.

The division suffered 2,587 casualties during these operations, of whom 574 were killed.

One officer and three men were captured by the enemy.

The division shoulder insignia is a French helmet in blue, superimposed on a black disc.

Depot & Replacement Divisions

THE 8TH DIVISION

THE 8th Division was organized from elements of the Regular Army at Camp Fremont, California. On August 3, 1918, this division received its most serious loss when Major General Graves, his staff, 5,000 men and 100 officers were transferred to the A.E.F. in Siberia.

The overseas movement began October 30, 1918. The 8th Artillery Brigade and the 8th Infantry Brigade, with the 16th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, and the 319th Engineers, were the only organizations of this division that crossed overseas.

These troops became the garrison of Brest, and assisted in maintaining the huge camp where troops were embarked, after the armistice, for the United States. With the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation, the 8th Infantry Regiment along with the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Field Artillery and the 2nd Field Signal Battalion took over the Coblenz bridgehead and became "The American Forces in Germany."

The following units composed the 8th Division:

- 15th Infantry Brigade—12th and 62nd Regiments.
- 16th Infantry Brigade—8th and 13th Regiments.
- 22nd, 23rd and 24th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 8th Field Artillery Brigade—2nd, 81st and 83rd Artillery Regiments.
- 8th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 319th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 320th Field Signal Battalion.
- 8th Ammunition Train.
- 8th Supply Train.
- 8th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 8th Sanitary Train—11th, 31st, 32nd and 43rd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 31ST DIVISION

THE 31st Division was made up from National Guard of Georgia, Alabama, Florida at Camp Walter, Georgia. The overseas movement began September 16, 1918,

and the last units arrived in France November 9, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a replacement division, and ordered to Le Mans area. The personnel of most of the units were withdrawn from the division and sent to other divisions as replacements, and the 31st Division existed only as a skeleton division.

The commanding generals of the division were Major General Francis J. Kernan, Brigadier General John L. Hayden, Major General Francis H. French, Major General Le Roy S. Lyon. The divisional insignia is the letters "D.D.," back to back embroidered in red on a khaki circle. It was known as the "Dixie Division."

The following units composed the 31st Division:

- 61st Infantry Brigade—121st and 122nd Regiments.
- 62nd Infantry Brigade—123rd and 124th Regiments.
- 116th, 117th and 118th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 56th Field Artillery Brigade—116th, 117th and 118th Artillery Regiments.
- 106th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 106th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 106th Field Signal Battalion.
- 106th Ammunition Train.
- 106th Supply Train.
- 106th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 106th Sanitary Train—121st, 122nd, 123rd and 124th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 34TH DIVISION

THE 34th Division was made up of National Guard of Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota at Camp Cody, New Mexico. The overseas movement began September 16, 1918, and the last unit arrived in France October 24, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to Le Mans area, where it was broken up and ceased to function as a division.

The commanding generals of the division were Major General A. P. Blockson, Major General William R. Smith, Major General Beaumont B. Buck, and Brigadier General John A. Johnson. The divisional insignia is a black wolf encircling a bovine skull.

The 34th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 67th Infantry Brigade—133rd and 134th Regiments.
- 68th Infantry Brigade—135th and 136th Regiments.
- 125th, 126th, 127th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 69th Field Artillery Brigade—125th, 126th and 127th Artillery Regiments.
- 109th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 109th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 109th Field Signal Battalion.
- 109th Ammunition Train.
- 109th Supply Train.
- 109th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 109th Sanitary Train—133rd, 134th, 135th and 136th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 38TH DIVISION

THE 38th Division was made up from National Guard of Kentucky, West Virginia and Indiana, at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The overseas movement was completed about the middle of October. The division was ordered to Le Mans area, where it was broken up and ceased to function further as a combat division. The division was commanded successively by Major General William H. Saye, Brigadier General Edwin M. Lewis, Brigadier General Henry H. Whitney, and Brigadier General William V. Judson. The divisional insignia is a shield, the right half of which is blue the left half red, the "C.Y." in white superimposed on the shield, standing for "Cyclone Division."

The following organizations composed the 38th Division:

- 75th Infantry Brigade—149th and 150th Regiments.
- 76th Infantry Brigade—151st and 152nd Regiments.
- 137th, 138th and 139th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 63rd Field Artillery Brigade—137th, 138th and 139th Artillery Regiments.
- 113th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 113th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 113th Field Signal Battalion.
- 113th Ammunition Train.
- 113th Supply Train.

- 113th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 113th Sanitary Train—149th, 150th, 151st and 152nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 39TH DIVISION

THE 40th Division was made up from the the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. The overseas movement was completed on September 7, 1918, and upon arrival in France, the division was ordered to the St. Florent area (Sur-Cher) and was designated as the 5th Depot Division.

The division remained in this area, training a personnel to be used as replacements until about November 1st. The training cadres were then transferred to the 1st Depot Division at St. Aignan. The division was commanded by Major General Henry C. Hodges. The divisional insignia is a bull's eye on a khaki square. The inner circle is red, the middle is white, and the outer circle black.

The 39th Division was composed of the following organizations:

- 77th Infantry Brigade—153rd and 154th Regiments.
- 78th Infantry Brigade—155th and 156th Regiments.
- 140th, 141st and 142nd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 64th Field Artillery Brigade—140th, 141st and 142nd Artillery Regiments.
- 114th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 114th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 114th Field Signal Battalion.
- 114th Ammunition Train.
- 114th Supply Train.
- 114th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 114th Sanitary Train—153rd, 154th, 155th and 156th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 40TH DIVISION

THE 40th Division was made up from the National Guard of California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico, at Camp Kearny, California. The overseas movement began August 7th. The last units arrived in France, August 28, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was made a replacement division, and was ordered to the La Querche (Cher) area, and became the 6th Depot Division. The division was then broken up and is personnel was used as re-

placements for the combat divisions at the front. Major General Frederick S. Strong commanded the division. The division was popular known as the "Sunshine Division," and its insignia is a golden sun superimposed upon a blue square.

The 40th division was composed of the following organizations:

- 79th Infantry Brigade—157th and 158th Regiments.
- 80th Infantry Brigade—159th and 160th Regiments.
- 143rd, 144th and 145th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 65th Field Artillery Brigade—143rd, 144th and 145th Artillery Regiments.
- 115th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 115th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 115th Field Signal Battalion.
- 115th Ammunition Train.
- 115th Supply Train.
- 115th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 115th Sanitary Train—157th, 158th, 159th and 160th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 41ST DIVISION

THE 41st Division was made up from the National Guard of Washington, Oregon, Montana, Utah and Wyoming at Camp Greene, North Carolina. The overseas movement began October 18, 1917, and the last units arrived in France December 7, 1917. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as the 1st Depot Division, and ordered to the St. Aignan training area. The division was then broken up and formed into training cadres for the instruction of replacements of combat divisions at the front. The 66th Artillery Brigade was left intact, and after a period of training was attached to the First Corps on July 1st as corps artillery. This brigade served as corps and army artillery throughout its service in France, and was engaged in active operations in the Marne-Aisne, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. The 41st Division while serving as the 1st Depot Division from January 1, 1918, to December 31, 1918, forwarded from its area 263,395 replacements and casualties.

The general officers who commanded this division were Major General Hunter Liggett, Brigadier General Henry Jervey, Brigadier General George LeRoy Irwin, Brigadier General Robert Coulter, Brigadier General

Robert Alexander, Brigadier General William S. Scott, Major General J. E. McMann and Brigadier General Eli Cole.

The division was popularly known as the "Sunset Division," and the shoulder insignia is a setting sun in red, blue and gold.

The following organizations compose the 41st Division:

- 81st Infantry Brigade—161st and 162nd Regiments.
- 82nd Infantry Brigade—163rd and 164th Regiments.
- 146th, 147th and 148th Machine Gun Battalions.
- 66th Field Artillery Brigade—146th, 147th and 148th Artillery Regiments.
- 116th Trench Mortar Battery.
- 116th Engineer Regiment and Train.
- 116th Field Signal Battalion.
- 116th Ammunition Train.
- 116th Supply Train.
- 116th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
- 116th Sanitary Train—161st, 162nd, 163rd and 164th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 76TH DIVISION

THE 76th Division was made up from National Army drafts from Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, at Camp Devens, Massachusetts. The overseas movement began July 5, 1918, and the last units arrived in France July 31, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a depot division, and ordered to St. Aignan area. Here the division was broken up and training cadres were formed, the personnel being used as replacements for the combat divisions at the front. The specialized units were sent forward as Corps and Army troops. Major General Henry F. Hodges commanded the division. The division was popularly known as the "Liberty Bell Division," and its shoulder insignia is a blue liberty bell superimposed upon a khaki square.

The 76th Division was composed of the following units:

- 151st Infantry Brigade—301st and 302nd Regiments.
- 152nd Infantry Brigade—303rd and 304th Regiments.
- 301st, 302nd and 303rd Machine Gun Battalions.
- 151st Artillery Brigade—301st, 302nd and 303rd Artillery Regiments.
- 301st Trench Mortar Battery.
- 301st Engineer Regiment and Train.

301st Field Signal Battalion.
 301st Ammunition Train.
 301st Supply Train.
 301st Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 301st Sanitary Train—301st, 302nd, 303rd and
 304th Ambulance Companies and Field
 Hospitals.

THE 83RD DIVISION

THE 83rd Division was made up of National Army drafts from Ohio and West Virginia, at Camp Sherman, Ohio. The overseas movement began June 4, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on June 21st. Upon arrival in France, the division was designated as a depot division and ordered to Le Mans area. Here the division was broken up and artillery brigades and special units, such as engineer and signal troops, were sent forward as corps and army charges.

The other organizations of the division were held in the area, and trained as replacements for the combat divisions at the front. Major General Edwin F. Gland commanded the division. The divisional insignia is a black triangle on which is superimposed a black monogram of the letters "OHIO."

The 83rd Division was composed of the following organizations:

155th Infantry Brigade—329th and 330th Regiments.
 156th Infantry Brigade—331st and 332nd Regiments.
 322nd, 323rd and 324th Machine Gun Battalions.
 158th Artillery Brigade—322nd, 323rd and 324th Artillery Regiments.
 308th Trench Mortar Battery.
 308th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 308th Field Signal Battalion.
 308th Ammunition Train.
 308th Supply Train.
 308th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 308th Sanitary Train—329th, 330th, 331st and 332nd Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 84TH DIVISION

THE 84th Division was composed of National Army drafts from Indiana and Kentucky. The overseas movement was completed in September, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as a Depot Division, and ordered to Le Mans area. Here the division was broken up and cadres were formed for training the personnel as replacements for combat divisions at the front.

The commanding generals of the division were Brigadier General Wilbur E. Wilder and Major General Harry C. Hall. The division was popularly known as the "Lincoln Division," and its shoulder insignia is a white disc surrounded by red circle on which is superimposed "Lincoln 84" in blue, and an axe with a red head, and blue handle.

The 84th Division was composed of the following organizations:

167th Infantry Brigade—333rd and 334th Regiments.
 168th Infantry Brigade—335th and 336th Regiments.
 325th, 326th and 327th Machine Gun Battalions.
 159th Field Artillery Brigade—325th, 326th and 327th Artillery Regiments.
 309th Trench Mortar Battery.
 309th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 309th Field Signal Battalion.
 309th Ammunition Train.
 309th Supply Train.
 309th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 309th Sanitary Train—333rd, 334th, 335th and 336th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 85TH DIVISION

THE 85th Division was composed of National Army drafts from Michigan and Wisconsin at Camp Custer, Michigan. The first units embarked for overseas on July 21, 1918, and the last units arrived in France on August 12, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was designated as a depot division and ordered to Ponilly (Nievre). The division was then broken up and special units were sent forward as corps and army troops. The infantry units were formed into cadres for training, and sending forward of replacements for combat divisions at the front. The commanding generals of this division were Major General J. T. Dickson, Brigadier General S. Miller, Major General James Parker and Brigadier General C. W. Kennedy.

The division was popularly known as the "Custer Division," and its insignia is a khaki circle on which is superimposed the letter "C.D." in red.

The 85th Division was composed of the following organizations:

169th Infantry Brigade—337th and 338th Regiments.

170th Infantry Brigade—339th and 340th Regiments.
 328th, 329th and 330th Machine Gun Battalions.
 160th Field Artillery Brigade—328th, 329th and 330th Artillery Regiments.
 310th Trench Mortar Battery.
 310th Engineer Train and Regiment.
 310th Field Signal Battalion.
 310th Ammunition Train.
 310th Supply Train.
 310th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 310th Sanitary Train—337th, 338th, 339th and 340th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 86TH DIVISION

THE 86th Division was composed of National Army drafts from Illinois, and was organized at Camp Grant, Illinois. The first units embarked for overseas on September 8, 1918. Upon arrival in France the division was ordered to the Le Mans area, where it was broken up and cadres formed for training replacements for combat divisions at the front. The commanding generals of the division were Major General Thomas H. Barry, Brigadier General L. W. V. Kennon and Major General Charles H. Martin. This division was popularly known as the "Black Hawk Division." Its shoulder insignia is a black hawk and monogram "B.H." superimposed on a red shield.

The division was composed of the following organizations:

171st Infantry Brigade—341st and 342nd Regiments.
 172nd Infantry Brigade—343rd and 344th Regiments.
 341st, 342nd and 343rd Machine Gun Battalions.
 161st Artillery Brigade—331st, 332nd and 333rd Artillery Regiments.
 311th Trench Mortar Battery.
 311th Engineer Train and Regiment.

311th Field Signal Battalion.
 311th Ammunition Train.
 311th Supply Train.
 311th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 311th Sanitary Train—341st, 342nd, 343rd and 344th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

THE 87TH DIVISION

THE 87th Division was made up of National Army drafts from Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi. It was organized at Camp Pike, Arkansas. The overseas movement began August 23rd, and the last units arrived in France September 13, 1918. Upon arrival in France, the division was turned over to the Service of Supply and ordered to Pons (Charente-Inferieure), where it was broken up and units placed in the intermediate section. The commanding general of this division was Major General Samuel D. Sturgis. The division was popularly known as the "Acorn Division," and the shoulder insignia is a brown acorn on a green circle.

The 87th Division was composed of the following organizations:

173rd Infantry Brigade—345th and 346th Regiments.
 174th Infantry Brigade—347th and 348th Regiments.
 334th, 335th and 336th Machine Gun Battalions.
 162nd Field Artillery Brigade—334th, 335th and 336th Field Regiments.
 312th Trench Mortar Battery.
 312th Engineer Regiment and Train.
 312th Field Signal Battalion.
 312th Ammunition Train.
 312th Supply Train.
 312th Train Headquarters and Military Police.
 312th Sanitary Train—345th, 346th, 347th and 348th Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals.

"TOO PROUD TO FIGHT"

The occasion when President Wilson used these now celebrated words in an address in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, May 10, 1915 before 4,000 newly naturalized citizens. It was the President's first public address after the sinking of the Lusitania, three days before. After speaking of the ideals of America, in special reference to the coming of aliens to be American citizens, the President said: "The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."



(From statistics prepared by the Statistical Staff of the War Department)

Where the American Doughboys Fought with the Allies on the Western Front

GENERAL PERSHING'S FINAL REPORT TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT ON AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD WAR

THE War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, 1918, twenty-one divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men. Beginning with October, six divisions were to be sent during that quarter, seven during the first quarter of 1918, and eight the second quarter. While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food.

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department, with the following recommendation:

"Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the Allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army Corps of twenty-four divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon General Bliss and other American members of the conference. Generals Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

"Paragraph 4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May, in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak, and we must come to their relief this year (1918). The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919 unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate. Further details of these requirements will be sent later."

Again on Dec. 20, 1917:

"Understood here that a shipping programme based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire First Corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, and that an additional programme for December, January, and February contemplates that the shipment of the Second Corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a programme be carried out as per schedule and

should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of army troops and auxiliaries, in France by the end of May. The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions (the 1st, 42nd, 2nd, and 26th Divisions had arrived; but not the Replacement and the Depot Divisions), and many corps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of the fact that as the number of our troops here increases, a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by General Bliss."

THE SIX-DIVISION PLAN

During January, 1918, discussions were held with the British authorities that resulted in an agreement which became known as the subdivision plan and which provided for the transportation of six entire divisions in British tonnage, without interference with our own shipping programme. High commanders, staff, infantry, and auxiliary troops were to be given experience with British divisions, beginning with battalions, the artillery to be trained under American direction, using French matériel. It was agreed that when sufficiently trained these battalions were to be re-formed into regiments and that when the artillery was fully trained all of the units comprising each division were to be united for service under their own officers. It was planned that the period of training with the British should cover about ten weeks.

In the latter part of January joint note No. 12, presented by the military representatives with the Supreme War Council, was approved by the council. This note concluded that France would be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

"(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength and that they receive the expected reinforcements of not less than two American divisions per month."

GERMAN 1918 OFFENSIVES AND ALLIED AGREEMENTS

The first German offensive of 1918, beginning March 21, overran all resistance during the initial period of the attack. Within eight days the enemy had completely crossed the old Somme battlefield and had swept everything before him to a depth of some fifty-six kilometers. For



Painting by Lucian Jonas

Courtesy of Town and Country

America in France—A Debt Repaid

America won her independence as the result of the Revolutionary War, in which France became our ally, furnishing troops, a fleet and money. In 1917 America repaid the debt by sending an army overseas at a time when the French were exhausted.

a few days the loss of the railroad center of Amiens appeared imminent. The offensive made such inroads upon French and British reserves that defeat stared them in the face unless the new American troops should prove more immediately available than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. On March 27 the military representatives with the Supreme War Council prepared their joint note No. 18. This note repeated the previously quoted statement from joint note No. 12, and continued:

"The battle which is developing at the present moment in France, and which can extend to the other theatres of operations, may very quickly place the Allied armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the military representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condition can no longer be maintained, and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

"The military representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American government should assist the Allied armies as soon as possible by permitting in principle the temporary service of American units in Allied Army Corps and divisions. Such reinforcements must, however, be obtained from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American Army.

"The military representatives are of the opinion that from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine-gun units, organized as that government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly."

INFANTRY TO GO ABROAD FIRST

The Secretary of War, who was in France at this time, General Bliss, the American military representative with the Supreme War Council, and I at once conferred on the terms of this note, with the result that the secretary recommended to the President that joint note No. 18 be approved in the following sense:

"The purpose of the American government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the military representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine-gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units, when transported, will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, and will be assigned for training and use by him in his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation permit, into an independent American Army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view."

While note No. 18 was general in its terms, the priority of shipments of infantry more especially pertained to those divisions that were to be trained in the British area, as that gov-

ernment was to provide the additional shipping according to the six-division plan agreed upon even before the beginning of the March 21 offensive.

On April 2 the War Department cabled that preferential transportation would be given to American infantry and machine-gun units during the existing emergency. Preliminary arrangements were made for training and early employment with the French of such infantry units as might be sent over by our own transportation. As for the British agreement, the six-division plan was to be modified to give priority to the infantry of those divisions. However, all the Allies were now urging the indefinite con-




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Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War

tinuation of priority for the shipment of infantry and its complete incorporation in their units, which fact was cabled to the War Department on April 3, with the specific recommendation that the total immediate priority of infantry be limited to four divisions, plus 45,500 replacements, and that the necessity for future priority be determined later.

The Secretary of War and I held a conference with British authorities on April 7, during which it developed that the British had erroneously assumed that the preferential shipment of infantry was to be continuous. It was agreed at this meeting that 60,000 infantry and machine-gun troops, with certain auxiliary units to be brought over by British tonnage during April, should go to the British area as part of the six-division plan, but that there should be a further agreement as to subsequent troops to be brought



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The Doughboy Off Duty

America's fighting men could play as well as win battles. When off duty they were a happy, care-free lot, with a song on their lips, and good nature shining in their faces.

over by the British. Consequently, a readjustment of the priority schedule was undertaken on the basis of postponing "shipment of all non-combatant troops to the utmost possible to meet present situation, and at the same time not to make it impossible to build up our own army."

FOE ATTACKS ON THE LYS

The battle line in the vicinity of Amiens had hardly stabilized when, on April 9, the Germans made another successful attack against the British lines on a front of some forty kilometers in the vicinity of Armentières and along the Lys River. As a result of its being included in a salient formed by the German advance, Passchendaele Ridge, the capture of which had cost so dearly in 1917, was evacuated by the British on April 17.

The losses had been heavy and the British were unable to replace them entirely. They were, therefore, making extraordinary efforts to increase the shipping available for our troops. On April 21 I went to London to clear up certain questions concerning the rate of shipment and to reach the further agreement provided for in the April 7 conference. The result of this London agreement was cabled to Washington April 24, as follows:

"(a) That only the infantry, machine guns, engineers, and signal troops of American divisions and the headquarters of divisions and brigades be sent over in British and American shipping during May for training and service with the British army in France up to six divisions, and that any shipping in excess of that required for these troops be utilized to

transport troops necessary to make these divisions complete. The training and service of these troops will be carried out in accordance with plans already agreed upon between Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, with a view at an early date of building up American divisions.

"(b) That the American personnel of the artillery of these divisions and such corps troops as may be required to build up American corps organizations follow immediately thereafter, and that American artillery personnel be trained with French *matériel* and join its proper divisions as soon as thoroughly trained.

"(c) If, when the programme outlined in paragraphs (a) and (b) is completed, the military situation makes advisable the further shipment of infantry, etc., of American divisions, then all the British and American shipping available for transport of troops shall be used for that purpose under such arrangement as will insure immediate aid to the Allies, and at the same time provide at the earliest moment for bringing over American artillery and other necessary units to complete the organization of American divisions and corps. Provided that the combatant troops mentioned in (a) and (b) be followed by such Service of the Rear and other troops as may be considered necessary by the American Commander-in-Chief.

"(d) That it is contemplated American divisions and corps when trained and organized shall be utilized under the American Commander-in-Chief in an American group.

"(e) That the American Commander-in-Chief shall allot American troops to the French or British for training them with American



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Farewell to Civilian Life

Ten thousand of Chicago's young men, led by student officers trained at Fort Sheridan, received a rousing farewell prior to donning the khaki for the duration of the war.

units at his discretion, with the understanding that troops already transported by British shipping or included in the six divisions mentioned in paragraph (a) are to be trained with the British army, details as to rations, equipment, and transport to be determined by special agreement."

AGREEMENT FOR AN INDEPENDENT AMERICAN ARMY

At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville May 1 and 2, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements or units to serve with their armies. After prolonged discussion regarding this question and that of priority generally, the following agreement was reached, committing the council to an independent American Army and providing for the immediate shipment of certain troops:

"It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that, in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag. In order to meet the present emergency it is agreed that American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as Allied transportation facilities will permit, and that as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American Army, preference will be given to infantry and machine-gun units for training and service with French and British armies; with the understanding that such infantry and machine-gun units are to be withdrawn and united with its own artillery and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the direction of the American Commander-in-Chief after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in France.

"Subparagraph A. It is also agreed that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine-gun units of six divisions, and that any excess tonnage shall be devoted to bringing over such other units as may be determined by the American Commander-in-Chief.

"Subparagraph B. It is further agreed that this programme shall be continued during the month of June upon condition that the British government shall furnish transportation for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 men in June, with the understanding that the first six divisions of infantry shall go to the British for training and service, and that troops sent over in June shall be allocated for training and service as the American Commander-in-Chief may determine.

"Subparagraph C. It is also further agreed that if the British government shall transport an excess of 150,000 men in June, such excess shall be infantry and machine-gun units, and that early in June there shall be a new review of the situation to determine further action."

The gravity of the situation had brought the Allies to a full realization of the necessity of providing all possible tonnage for the transportation of American troops. Although their views were accepted to the extent of giving a considerable priority to infantry and machine-gunners, the priority agreed upon as to this class of troops was not as extensive as some of them deemed necessary, and the Abbeville conference was adjourned with the understanding that the question of further priority would be discussed at a conference to be held about the end of May.

The next offensive of the enemy was made between the Olse and Berry-au-Bac against the French instead of against the British, as was generally expected, and it came as a complete surprise. The initial Aisne attack, covering a front of thirty-five kilometers, met with remarkable success, as the German armies advanced no less than fifty kilometers in four days. On reaching the Marne that river was used as a defensive flank and the German advance was directed toward Paris. During the first days of June something akin to a panic seized the city and it was estimated that 1,000,000 people left during the spring of 1918.

PRIME MINISTERS SEND JOINT MESSAGE TO WILSON

The further conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2. The opinion of our Allies as to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon further priority for infantry and machine-gunners are shown by the following message prepared by the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and agreed to by General Foch:

"The prime ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting at Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the United States:

"We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up) there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He, therefore, urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine-gunners, in which respect the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places the total American force required for this at no less than one hundred divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of one hundred divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

"We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not overestimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising

of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies regards as essential to ultimate victory.

"A separate telegram contains the arrangements which General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner have agreed to recommend to the United States government with regard to the despatch of American troops for the months of June and July.

(Signed)


D. LLOYD GEORGE,
CLEMENCEAU,
ORLANDO."

TRAINED FORCES EXHAUSTED

Such extensive priority had already been given to the transport of American infantry and machine-gunners that the troops of those categories which had received even partial training in the

"(a) For the month of June: (1) Absolute priority shall be given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz. six divisions without artillery, ammunition trains, or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacements for combat troops); (2) 25,400 men for the service of the railways, of which 13,400 have been asked for by the French Minister of Transportation; (3) the balance to be troops of categories to be determined by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

"(b) For the month of July: (1) Absolute priority for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (four divisions minus artillery 'et cetera' amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacements); (2) the balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine

Paris in Time of War

American soldiers getting their first view from the Pavillon de Bellevue near St. Cloud.

United States were practically exhausted. Moreover, the strain on our services of supply made it essential that early relief be afforded by increasing its personnel. At the same time, the corresponding services of our Allies had in certain departments been equally overtaxed, and their responsible heads were urgent in their representations that their needs must be relieved by bringing over American specialists. The final agreement was cabled to the War Department on June 5, as follows:

"The following agreement has been concluded between General Foch, Lord Milner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American troops in the months of June and July:

"The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the employment of combined British and American tonnage. We recommend:

"(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage will be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

"(d) We recognize that the combatant troops to be despatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain.

(Signed)

FOCH,
MILNER,
PERSHING."

The various proposals during these conferences regarding priority of shipment, often very

insistent, raised questions that were not only most difficult but most delicate. On the one hand, there was a critical situation which must be met by immediate action, while on the other hand, any priority accorded a particular arm necessarily postponed the formation of a distinctive American fighting force and the means to supply it. Such a force was, in my opinion, absolutely necessary to win the war. A few of the Allied representatives became convinced that the American services of supply should not be neglected but should be developed in the common interest. The success of our divisions during May and June demonstrated fully that it was not necessary to draft Americans under foreign flags in order to utilize American manhood most effectively.

GERMANY'S SUPREME EFFORT BEGINS MARCH 21, 1918

When, on March 21, 1918, the German army on the Western front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armies and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies were being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was to end the war before America's effort could be brought to bear. Germany's best troops, her most successful generals, and all the experience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort.

TIDE IS STEMMED

The first blow fell on the right of the British armies, including the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt coöperation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the tide. The reason for this objective was obvious and strikingly illustrated the necessity for having some one with sufficient authority over all the Allied armies to meet such an emergency. The lack of complete coöperation among the Allies on the Western front had been appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention by the Supreme War Council. A plan had been adopted by which each of the Allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction of the military representatives of the Supreme War Council, of which General Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found available and the plan failed.

FOCH APPOINTED AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

This situation resulted in a conference for the immediate consideration of the question of having an Allied Commander-in-Chief. After much discussion, during which my view favoring such action was clearly stated, an agreement was reached and General Foch was selected. His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United States by the President on April 16. The terms of the agreement under which General Foch exercised his authority were as follows:

"Beauvais, April 3, 1918.

"General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American governments with the coördination of the action of the Allied armies on the Western front; to this end there is con-

ferred on him all the powers necessary for its effective realization. To the same end, the British, French, and American governments confide in General Foch the strategic direction of military operations.

"The Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and American armies will exercise to the fullest extent the tactical direction of their armies. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his government, if in his opinion his army is placed in danger by the instructions received from General Foch.

(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU
 PETAIN.
 F. FOCH.
 LLOYD GEORGE.
 D. HAIG, F. M.
 HENRY WILSON,
 General, 3, 4.18.
 TASKER H. BLISS,
 General and Chief of Staff.
 JOHN J. PERSHING,
 General, U. S. A."

EMPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS, MARCH TO SEPTEMBER, 1918

The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to General Foch's headquarters at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the Allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the Allies demanded this divergence from our plans.

On March 21 approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available—the 1st and 2nd then in line, and the 26th and 42nd just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. The last two divisions at once began taking over quiet sectors to release divisions for the battle; the 26th relieved the 1st Division, which was sent to northwest of Paris in reserve; the 42nd relieved two French divisions from quiet sectors. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the 93rd Division was with the French in the Argonne, the 41st Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions (3rd, 32nd, and 5th) were arriving.

THE 1ST DIVISION AT CANTIGNY


On April 25 the 1st Division relieved two French divisions on the front near Montdidier and on May 28 captured the important observations stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks, and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 toward Château-Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibres were concentrated on our new position and counter-attack succeeded counter-attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seemingly tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

Of the three divisions arriving in France when the first German offensive began, the 32nd,

intended for replacements, had been temporarily employed in the Services of Supply to meet a shortage of personnel, but the critical situation caused it to be reassembled, and by May 21st it was entering the line in the Vosges. At this time the 5th Division, though still incomplete, was also ordered into the line in the same region. The 3rd Division was assembling in its training area and the Third Corps staff had just been organized to administer these three divisions. In addition to the eight divisions already mentioned, the 28th and 77th had arrived in the British area, and the 4th, 27th, 30th, 33rd, 35th, and 82nd were arriving there. Following the agreements as to British shipping,

our troops came so rapidly that by the end of May we had a force of 600,000 in France.

The third German offensive on May 27, against the French on the Alsne, soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The 2nd Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the 1st Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of June 1, was deployed across the Château-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained 3rd Division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motor-



Drawing by Hornby in *Harper's Magazine*

Traffic Congestion Near the Front

The "M. P." is standing near the gas alarm at the right, wearing on his arm a black brassard and ready to blow his whistle at the first sight of a suspicious wagon.

ized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Château-Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river crossing.

BELLEAU WOODS

The enemy having been halted, the 2nd Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4, which resulted in the capture of Belleau Woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured. In these operations the 2nd Division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.

To meet the March offensive, the French had extended their front from the Oise to Amiens, about sixty kilometers, and during the German drive along the Lys had also sent reinforcements to assist the British. The French lines had been further lengthened about forty-five kilometers as a result of the Marne pocket made by the Aisne offensive. This increased frontage and the heavy fighting had reduced French reserves to an extremely low point.

Our Second Corps, under Major-General George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the ten divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3, five American divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French. The 77th and 82nd Divisions were removed south to release the 42nd and 26th for employment on a more active portion of the front; the 35th Division entered the line in the Vosges, and the 4th and 28th Divisions were moved to the region of Meaux and Château-Thierry as reserves.

On June 9 the Germans attacked the Montdidier-Noyon front in an effort to widen the Marne pocket and bring their lines nearer to Paris, but were stubbornly held by the French with comparatively little loss of ground. In view of the unexpected results of the three preceding attacks by the enemy, this successful defense proved beneficial to the Allied morale, particularly as it was believed that the German losses were unusually heavy.

On July 15, the date of the last German offensive, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 26th Divisions were on the Château-Thierry front with the 4th and 28th in support, some small units of the last two divisions gaining front-line experience with our troops or with the French; the 42nd Division was in support of the French east of Reims; and four colored regiments were with the French in the Argonne. On the Alsace-Lorraine front we had five divisions in line with the French. Five were with the British army, three having elements in the line. In our training areas four divisions were assembled and four were in the process of arrival.

THE MARNE FIGHTING

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter-offensive that was obvious.

If successful, such an operation would afford immediate relief to the Allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris, and free the Paris-Nancy Railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the Allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing. Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early

as June 23 and again on July 10 at Bombon, I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among the Allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and that at all events they could be used to better advantage under Allied command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 attack would conclude the war with a German peace. Although he made elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions, and the front of attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known and the enemy was checked with heavy losses. The 42nd Division entered the line near Somme Py immediately, and five of its infantry battalions and all its artillery became engaged. Southwest of Reims and along the Marne to the east of Château-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of eight kilometers beyond the river being effected against the French immediately to the right of our 3rd Division. The following quotation from the report of the commanding general 3rd Division gives the result of the fighting on his front:

"Although the rush of the German troops overwhelmed some of the front line positions, causing the infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer, in some cases a 50 per cent. loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day (July 16) there were no Germans in the foreground of the 3rd Division sector except the dead."

On this occasion a single regiment of the 3rd Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

THE COUNTER-ATTACK TOWARD SOISSONS

The selection by the Germans of the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it favored the launching of the counter-attack already planned. There were now over 1,200,000 American troops in France, which provided a considerable force of reserves. Every American division with any sort of training was made available for use in a counter-offensive.

General Pétain's initial plan for the counter-attack involved the entire western face of the Marne salient. The 1st and 2nd American Divisions, with the 1st French Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18, without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three divisions at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was imme-

diately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster.

The 1st Division, throughout four days of constant fighting, advanced 11 kilometers, capturing Berzy-le-Sec and the heights above Soissons and taking some 3,500 prisoners and 68 field guns from the seven German divisions employed against it. It was relieved by a British division. The 2nd Division advanced 8 kilometers in the first twenty-six hours, and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. It was relieved the night of the 19th by a French division.

The result of this counter-offensive was of decisive importance. Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed on the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2nd Divisions the tide of the war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.

Other American divisions participated in the Marne counter-offensive. A little to the south

elements of the 28th Division participated in the advance.

Farther to the east the 3rd Division forced the enemy back to Roncheres Wood, where it was relieved on July 30 by the 32nd Division from the Vosges front. The 32nd, after relieving the 3rd and some elements of the 28th on the line of the Ourcq River, advanced abreast of the 42nd toward the Vesle. On Aug. 3 it passed under control of our Third Corps, Major-General Robert L. Bullard commanding, which made its first appearance in battle at this time, while the 4th Division took up the task of the 42nd Division and advanced with the 32nd to the Vesle River, where, on Aug. 6, the operation for the reduction of the Marne salient terminated.

In the hard fighting from July 18 to Aug. 6, the Germans were not only halted in their advance, but were driven back from the Marne to the Vesle and committed wholly to the defensive. The force of American arms had been



King George Decorating an American Soldier

of the 2nd Division, the 4th was in line with the French and was engaged until July 22. The First American Corps, Major-General Hunter Liggett commanding, with the 26th Division and a French division, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons, capturing Torcy on the 18th and reaching the Château-Thierry-Soissons road on the 21st. At the same time the 3rd Division crossed the Marne and took the heights of Mont Saint Pere and the villages of Chartèves and Jaulgonne.

42ND CROSSES THE OURCQ

In the First Corps, the 42nd Division relieved the 26th on July 25 and extended its front, on the 26th relieving the French division. From this time until Aug. 2 it fought its way through the Forest de Fere and across the Ourcq, advancing toward the Vesle until relieved by the 4th Division on Aug. 3. Early in this period

brought to bear in time to enable the last offensive of the enemy to be crushed.

AMERICANS HOLD THE LINE OF THE VESLE

The First and Third Corps now held a continuous front of eleven kilometers along the Vesle. On Aug. 12 the 77th Division relieved the 4th Division on the First Corps front, and the following day the 28th relieved the 32nd Division in the Third Corps, while from Aug. 6 to Aug. 10 the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division held a sector on the river line. The transfer of the First Corps to the Woevre was ordered at this time, and the control of its front was turned over to the Third Corps.

On Aug. 18 General Pétain began an offensive between Reims and the Oise. Our Third Corps participated in this operation, crossing the Vesle on Sept. 4 with the 28th and 77th Divisions and overcoming stubborn opposition on the

plateau south of the Aisne, which was reached by the 77th on Sept. 6. The 28th was withdrawn from the line on Sept. 7. Two days later the Third Corps was transferred to the region of Verdun, the 77th Division remaining in line on the Aisne River until Sept. 17.

The 32nd Division, upon its relief from the battle on the Vesle, joined a French corps north of Soissons and attacked from Aug. 29 to 31, capturing Juvigny after some particularly desperate fighting and reaching the Chauny-Soissons road.

On the British front two regiments of the 33rd Division participated in an attack on Hamel July 4, and again on Aug. 9 as an incident of the Allied offensive against the Amiens salient. One of these regiments took Gressaire Wood and Chipilly Ridge, capturing 700 prisoners and considerable material.

ASSEMBLING OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

In conference with General Pétain at Chantilly on May 19 it had been agreed that the American Army would soon take complete charge of the sector of the Woëvre. The 26th Division was already in line in the Woëvre north of Toul and was to be followed by other American divisions as they became available, with the understanding that the sector was to pass to our control when four divisions were in the line. But demands of the battle then going on farther west required the presence of our troops, and the agreement had no immediate result. Due to the presence of a number of our divisions northeast of Paris, the organization of an American Corps Sector in the Château-Thierry region was taken up with General Pétain, and on July 4 the First Corps assumed tactical control of a sector in that region. This was an important step, but it was by no means satisfactory, as only one American division at the moment was operating under the control of the First Corps, while we had at this time eight American divisions in the front line serving in French corps.

The counter-offensives against the Marne salient in July, and against the Amiens salient in August, had gained such an advantage that it was apparent that the emergency, which justified the dispersion of our divisions, had passed. The moment was propitious for assembling our divisions. Scattered as they were along the Allied front, their supply had become very difficult. From every point of view the immediate organization of an independent American force was indicated. The formation of the army in the Château-Thierry region and its early transfer to the sector of the Woëvre, which was to extend from Nomeny, east of the Moselle, to north of St. Mihiel, was therefore decided upon by Marshal Foch and myself on Aug. 9, and the details were arranged with General Pétain later on the same day.

AMERICANS IN THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION

At Bombon on July 24 there was a conference of all the Commanders-in-Chief for the purpose of considering Allied operations. Each presented proposals for the employment of the armies under his command, and these formed the basis of future coöperation of the Allies. It was emphatically determined that the Allied attitude should be to maintain the offensive. At the first operation of the American Army the reduction of the salient of St. Mihiel was to be undertaken as soon as the necessary troops and material could be made available. On account of the swampy nature of the country it was especially important that the movement be un-

dertaken and finished before the fall rains should begin, which was usually about the middle of September.

Arrangements were concluded for successive relief of American divisions, and the organization of the First American Army under my personal command was announced on Aug. 10, with La Ferte-sous-Jouarre as headquarters. This army nominally assumed control of a portion of the Vesle front, although at the same time directions were given for its secret concentration in the St. Mihiel sector.

SECRET CONCENTRATION

The force of American soldiers in France at that moment was sufficient to carry out this offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. The three Army Corps headquarters to participate in the St. Mihiel attack were the First, Fourth, and Fifth. The First was on the Vesle, the Fourth at Toul, and the Fifth not yet completely organized. To assemble combat divisions and service troops and undertake a major operation, within the short period available and with staffs so recently organized, was an extremely difficult task. Our deficiencies in artillery, aviation, and special troops, caused by the shipment of an undue proportion of infantry and machine guns during the summer, were largely met by the French.

The reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was important, as it would prevent the enemy from interrupting traffic on the Paris-Nancy Railroad by artillery fire and would free the railroad leading north through St. Mihiel to Verdun. It would also provide us with an advantageous base of departure for an attack against the Metz-Sedan Railroad system which was vital to the German armies west of Verdun, and against the Briey Iron Basin which was necessary for the production of German armament and munitions.

The general plan was to make simultaneous attacks against the flanks of the salient. The ultimate objective was tentatively fixed as the general line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)—heights south of Gorze-Mars la Tour-Etain. The operation contemplated the use of the western face of three or four American divisions, supported by the attack of six divisions of the Second French Army on their left, while seven American divisions would attack on the southern face, and three French divisions would press the enemy at the tip of the salient. As the part to be taken by the Second French Army would be closely related to the attack of the First American Army, General Pétain placed all the French troops involved under my personal command.


By Aug. 20 the concentration of the scattered divisions, corps, and army troops, of the quantities of supplies and munitions required, and the necessary construction of light railways and roads were well under way.

In accordance with the previous general consideration of operations at Bombon on July 24, an Allied offensive extending practically along the entire active front was eventually to be carried out. After the reduction of the St. Mihiel sector the Americans were to coöperate in the concerted effort of the Allied armies. It was the sense of the conference of July 24 that the extent to which the different operations already planned might carry us could not be then foreseen, especially if the results expected were achieved before the season was far advanced. It seemed reasonable at that time to look forward to a combined offensive for the autumn, which would give no respite to the

enemy and would increase our advantage for the inauguration of succeeding operations extending into 1919.

FOCH'S PLANS FOR THE NEXT ALLIED OFFENSIVE

On Aug. 30 a further discussion with Marshal Foch was held at my headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In view of the new successes of the French and British near Amiens and the continued favorable results toward the Chemin des Dames on the French front, it was now believed that the limited Allied offensive, which was to prepare for the campaign of 1919, might be carried further before the end of the year.



Sketch Map of the St. Mihiel Salient

At this meeting it was proposed by Marshal Foch that the general operations as far as the American Army was concerned should be carried out in detail by:

- (a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the Second French Army, reinforced by from four to six American divisions.
- (b) A French-American attack, extending from the Argonne west to the Souain road, to be executed on the right by an American Army astride the Aisne and on the left by the Fourth French Army.

To carry out these attacks the ten to eleven American divisions suggested for the St. Mihiel operation and the four to six for the Second French Army would leave eight to ten divisions for an American Army on the Aisne. It was proposed that the St. Mihiel operation should be initiated on Sept. 10, and the other two on Sept. 15 and 20, respectively.

The plan suggested for the American participation in these operations was not acceptable to me because it would require the immediate separation of the recently formed First American Army into several groups, mainly to assist French armies. This was directly contrary to the principle of forming a distinct American Army, for which my contention had been insistent. An enormous amount of preparation had already been made in construction of roads, railroads, regulating stations, and other installations looking to the use and supply of our armies on a particular front. The inherent dis-

inclination of our troops to serve under Allied commanders would have grown and American morale would have suffered. My position was stated quite clearly that the strategical employment of the First Army as a unit would be undertaken where desired, but its disruption to carry out these proposals would not be entertained.

PERSHING WINS HIS POINT

A further conference at Marshal Foch's headquarters was held on Sept. 2, at which General Pétain was present. After discussion the question of employing the American Army as a unit was conceded. The essentials of the strategical decision previously arrived at provided that the advantageous situation of the Allies should be exploited to the utmost by vigorously continuing the general battle and extending it eastward to the Meuse. All the Allied armies were to be employed in a converging action. The British armies, supported by the left of the French armies, were to pursue the attack in the direction of Cambrai; the center of the French armies, west of Reims, would continue the actions already begun to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne; and the American Army, supported by the right of the French armies, would direct its attack on Sedan and Mézières.

It should be recorded that although this general offensive was fully outlined at the conference, no one present expressed the opinion that the final victory could be won in 1918. In fact, it was believed by the French high command that the Meuse-Argonne attack could not be pushed much beyond Montfaucon before the arrival of winter would force a cessation of operations.

The choice between the two sectors, that east of the Aisne including the Argonne Forest, or the Champagne sector, was left to me. In my opinion no other Allied troops had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome successfully the difficulties to be met in the Meuse-Argonne sector, and our plans and installations had been prepared for an expansion of operations in that direction. So the Meuse-Argonne front was chosen. The entire sector of 150 kilometers of front, extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, west to include the Argonne Forest, was accordingly placed under my command, including all French divisions then in that zone. The First American Army was to proceed with the St. Mihiel operation, after which the operation between the Meuse and the western edge of the Argonne Forest was to be prepared and launched not later than Sept. 25.

THE ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE BEGINS

As a result of these decisions the depth of the St. Mihiel operations was limited to the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regneville. The number of divisions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. Eighteen to nineteen divisions were to be in the front line. There were four French and fifteen American divisions available, six of which would be in reserve, while the two flank divisions of the front line were not to advance. Furthermore, two Army Corps headquarters with their corps troops, practically all the Army artillery and aviation, and the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisions, the first two destined to take a leading part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.

The salient had been held by the Germans since September, 1914. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the

Western front: namely, the Mézières-Sedan-Metz Railroad and the Briey Iron Basin; it threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main rail line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for eight kilometers to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woivre, including within the German lines the detached heights of Loupmont and Montsec which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had reinforced the positions by every artificial means during a period of four years.

On the night of Sept. 11 the troops of the First Army were deployed in position. On the southern face of the salient was the First Corps, Major-General Liggett commanding, with the 82nd, 90th, 5th, and 2nd Divisions in line, extending from the Moselle westward. On its left was the Fourth Corps, Major-General Joseph T. Dickman commanding, with the 89th, 42nd and 1st Divisions, the left of this corps being opposite Montsec. These two Army Corps were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the First Corps. The 1st Division on the left of the Fourth Corps was charged with the double mission of covering its own flank while advancing some twenty kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient, where it was to make contact with the troops of the Fifth Corps. On the western face of the salient lay the Fifth Corps, Major-General George H. Cameron commanding, with the 26th Division, 15th French Colonial Division, and the Fourth Division in line, from Mouilly west of Les Eparges and north to Watronville. Of these three divisions, the 26th alone was to make a deep advance directed southeast toward Vigneulles. The French Division was to make a short progression to the edge of the heights in order to cover the left of the 26th. The 4th Division was not to advance. In the center, between our Fourth and Fifth Army Corps, was the Second French Colonial Corps, Major-General E. J. Blondlat commanding, covering a front of forty kilometers with three small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the enemy from the tip of the salient.

The French Independent air force was at my disposal, which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our own air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements.

THE SALIENT WIPED OUT

At dawn on Sept. 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, and accompanied by small tanks, the infantry of the First and Fourth Corps advanced. The infantry of the Fifth Corps commenced its advance at 8 a. m. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight on Sept. 13 elements of the 1st and 26th Divisions made a junction near Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, eighteen kilometers northeast of St. Mihiel.

The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy, and all objectives were reached by the afternoon of Sept. 13. The enemy had apparently started to withdraw some of his troops from the tip of the salient on the eve of our attack, but had been unable to carry it through. We captured nearly 16,000 prison-

ers, 443 guns, and large stores of material and supplies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation was carried out enabled us to smother opposition to such an extent that we suffered less than 7,000 casualties during the actual period of the advance.

During the next two days the right of our line west of the Moselle River was advanced beyond the objectives laid down in the original orders. This completed the operation for the time being and the line was stabilized to be held by the smallest practicable force.

The material results of the victory achieved were very important. An American Army was



U. S. Signal Corps drawing

Bringing in a Wounded Comrade

an accomplished fact, and the enemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of our ability to organize a large American force and drive it successfully through his defenses. It gave our troops implicit confidence in their superiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the first time wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers, and open-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, proved to be the correct doctrine. Our divisions concluded the attack with such small losses and in such high spirits that without the usual rest they were immediately available for employment in heavy fighting in a new theatre of operations. The strength of the First Army in this battle totaled approximately 500,000 men, of whom about 70,000 were French.

MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATIONS

The definite decision for the Meuse-Argonne phase of the great Allied convergent attack was agreed to in my conference with Marshal

Foch and General Pétain on Sept. 2. It was planned to use all available forces of the First Army, including such divisions and troops as we might be able to withdraw from the St. Mihiel front. The Army was to break through the enemy's successive fortified zones to include the Kriemhilde-Stellung, or Hindenburg Line on the front Briailles-Romagne sous Montfaucon-Grand Pré, and thereafter, by developing pres-

until the American advance in 1918. The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground was a German defensive system of unusual depth and strength and a wide zone of utter devastation, itself a serious obstacle to offensive operations.

The strategical importance of this portion of the line was second to none on the Western front. All supplies and evacuations of the Ger-



Drawing by Hornby in Harper's Magazine

Doughboys at Work in a Bombed Village

The infantry is following up a barrage from our artillery in order to clean up machine-gun nests and snipers.

sure toward Mézières, was to insure the fall of the Hindenburg Line along the Aisne River in front of the Fourth French Army, which was to attack to the west of the Argonne Forest. A penetration of some twelve to fifteen kilometers was required to reach the Hindenburg Line on our front, and the enemy's defenses were virtually continuous throughout that depth.

The Meuse-Argonne front had been practically stabilized in September, 1914, and, except for minor fluctuations during the German attacks on Verdun in 1916 and the French counter-offensive in August, 1917, remained unchanged

man armies in northern France were dependent upon two great railway systems—one in the north, passing through Liège, while the other in the south, with lines coming from Luxembourg, Thionville, and Metz, had as its vital section the line Carignan-Sedan-Mézières. No other important lines were available to the enemy, as the mountainous masses of the Ardennes made the construction of east and west lines through that region impracticable. The Carignan-Sedan-Mézières line was essential to the Germans for the rapid strategical movement of troops. Should this southern system be cut by the

Allies before the enemy could withdraw his forces through the narrow neck between Mézières and the Dutch frontier, the ruin of his armies in France and Belgium would be complete.

THE ENEMY'S PIVOT

From the Meuse-Argonne front the perpendicular distance to the Carignan-Mézières railroad was 50 kilometers. This region formed the pivot of German operations in northern France, and the vital necessity of covering the great railroad line into Sedan resulted in the convergence on the Meuse-Argonne front of the successive German defensive positions. The effect of this convergence can be best understood by reference to the map. It will be seen, for example, that the distance between "No Man's Land" and the third German withdrawal position in the vicinity of the Meuse River was approximately 18 kilometers; the distance between the corresponding points near the tip of the great salient of the Western front was about 65 kilometers, and in the vicinity of Cambrai was over 30 kilometers. The effect of a penetration of 18 kilometers by the American Army would be equivalent to an advance of 65 kilometers farther west; furthermore, such an advance on our front was far more dangerous to the enemy than an advance elsewhere. The vital importance of this portion of his position was fully appreciated by the enemy, who had suffered tremendous losses in 1916 in attempting to improve it by the reduction of Verdun. As a consequence it had been elaborately fortified, and consisted of practically a continuous series of positions 20 kilometers or more in depth.

GERMANS HOLD THE HEIGHTS

In addition to the artificial defenses, the enemy was greatly aided by the natural features of the terrain. East of the Meuse the dominating heights not only protected his left, but gave him positions from which powerful artillery could deliver an oblique fire on the western bank. Batteries located in the elaborately fortified Argonne Forest covered his right flank, and could cross their fire with that of the guns on the east bank of the Meuse. Midway between the Meuse and the forest the heights of Montfaucon offered observation and formed a strong natural position which had been heavily fortified. The east and west ridges abutting on the Meuse and Aire River valleys afforded the enemy excellent machine-gun positions for the desperate defense which the importance of the position would require him to make. North of Montfaucon densely wooded and rugged heights constituted natural features favorable to defensive fighting.

When the First Army became engaged in the simultaneous preparation for two major operations, an interval of fourteen days separated the initiation of the two attacks. During this short period the movement of the immense number of troops and the amount of supplies, and confined entirely to the hours of darkness, was one of the most delicate and difficult problems of the war. The concentration included fifteen divisions, of which seven were involved in the pending St. Mihiel drive, three were in sector in the Vosges, three in the neighborhood of Soissons, one in a training area, and one near Bar-le-Duc. Practically all the artillery, aviation, and other auxiliaries to be employed in the new operations were committed to the St. Mihiel attack and, therefore, could not be moved until its success was assured. The concentration of all units not to be used at

St. Mihiel was commenced immediately, and on Sept. 13, the second day of St. Mihiel, reserve divisions and Army artillery units were withdrawn and placed in motion toward the Argonne front.

That part of the American sector from Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, while nominally under my control, did not actively become a part of my command until Sept. 22, on which date my headquarters was established at Souilly, southwest of Verdun. Of French troops, in addition to the Second French Colonial Corps, composed of three divisions, there was also the Seventeenth French Corps of three divisions holding the front north and east of Verdun.

At the moment of the opening of the Meuse-Argonne battle the enemy had ten divisions in line and ten in reserve on the front between Fresnes-en-Woevre and the Argonne Forest, inclusive. He had undoubtedly expected a continuation of our advance toward Metz. Successful ruses were carried out between the Meuse River and Luneville to deceive him as to our intentions, and French troops were maintained as a screen along our front until the night before the battle, so that the actual attack was a tactical surprise.

The operations in the Meuse-Argonne battle really form a continuous whole, but they extended over such a long period of continuous fighting that they will here be considered in three phases, the first from Sept. 26 to Oct. 3, the second from Oct. 4 to 31, and the third from Nov. 1 to 11.

THE BATTLE'S FIRST PHASE

On the night of Sept. 25 the nine divisions to lead in the attack were deployed between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Argonne Forest. On the right was the Third Corps, Major-General Bullard commanding, with the 33rd, 80th, and 4th Divisions in line; next came the Fifth Corps, Major-General Cameron commanding, with the 79th, 37th, and 91st Divisions; on the left was the First Corps, Major-General Liggett commanding, with the 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions. Each corps had one division in reserve and the Army held three divisions as a general reserve. About 2,700 guns, 189 small tanks, 142 manned by Americans, and 821 airplanes, 604 manned by Americans, were concentrated to support the attack of the infantry. We thus had a superiority in guns and aviation, and the enemy had no tanks.

The axis of the attack was the line Montfaucon-Romagne-Buzancy, the purpose being to make the deepest penetration in the center, which, with the Fourth French Army advancing west of the Argonne, would force the enemy to evacuate that forest without our having to deliver a heavy attack in that difficult region.

Following three hours of violent artillery fire of preparation the infantry advanced at 5.30 a. m. on Sept. 26, accompanied by tanks. During the first two days of the attack, before the enemy was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of defenses. Montfaucon was held tenaciously by the enemy and was not captured until noon of the second day.

By evening of the 28th a maximum advance of eleven kilometers had been achieved and we had captured Baulny, Epinonville, Septsarges, and Danneveux. The right had made a splendid advance into the woods south of Briulles-sur-Meuse, but the extreme left was meeting strong resistance in the Argonne. The attack continued without interruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw into first line

before Sept. 29. He developed a powerful machine-gun defense supported by heavy artillery fire, and made frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the 28th and 35th Divisions. These divisions had taken Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny, and Charpentry, and the line was within two kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged in a maneuver for the pinching out of a salient, but were necessarily committed, generally speaking, to a direct frontal attack against strong, hostile positions fully manned by a determined enemy.

By nightfall of the 29th the First Army line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Nantillois-Apremont—southwest across the Argonne. Many divisions, especially those in the center that were subjected to cross-fire of

artillery, had suffered heavily. The severe fighting, the nature of the terrain over which they attacked, and the fog and darkness sorely tried even our best divisions. On the night of the 29th the 37th and 79th Divisions were relieved by the 32nd and 3rd Divisions, respectively, and on the following night the 1st Division relieved the 35th Division.

The critical problem during the first few days of the battle was the restoration of communications over "No Man's Land." There were but four roads available across this deep zone, and the violent artillery fire of the previous period of the war had virtually destroyed them. The spongy soil and the lack of material increased the difficulty. But the splendid work of our engineers and pioneers soon made possi-



Brigadier-General U. G. McAlexander

He commanded the 38th Infantry at the Marne, where the regiment distinguished itself by its courageous defense.

ble the movement of the troops, artillery, and supplies most needed. By the afternoon of the 27th all the divisional artillery, except a few batteries of heavy guns, had effected a passage and was supporting the infantry action.

SECOND PHASE OF MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE

At 5:30 a. m. on Oct. 4 the general attack was renewed. The enemy divisions on the front from Fresnes-en-Woevre to the Argonne had increased from ten in the first line to sixteen, and included some of his best divisions. The fighting was desperate, and only small advances were realized, except by the 1st Division on the right of the First Corps. By evening of Oct. 5 the line was approximately Bois de la Cote Lemont-Bois du Pays-Gesnes-Hill 240-Fleville-Chehery, southwest through the Argonne.

It was especially desirable to drive the enemy from his commanding positions on the heights east of the Meuse, but it was even more important that we should force him to use his troops there and weaken his tenacious hold on positions in our immediate front. The further stabilization of the new St. Mihiel line permitted the withdrawal of certain divisions for the extension of the Meuse-Argonne operation to the east bank of the Meuse River.

On the 7th the First Corps, with the 82nd Division added, launched a strong attack northwest toward Cornay, to draw attention from the movement east of the Meuse and at the same time outflank the German position in the Argonne. The following day the Seventeenth French Corps, Major-General Claudel commanding, initiated its attack east of the Meuse against the exact point on which the German armies must pivot in order to withdraw from northern France. The troops encountered elaborate fortifications and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall had realized an advance of six kilometers to a line well within the Bois de Consenvoye, and including the villages of Beaumont and Haumont. Continuous fighting was maintained along our entire battle front, with especial success on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater part of the Argonne Forest was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front in order to make more rapid retirements farther west and withdraw his forces from northern France before the interruption of his railroad communications through Sedan.

REPLACEMENTS INSUFFICIENT

We were confronted at this time by an insufficiency of replacements to build up exhausted divisions. Early in October combat units required some 90,000 replacements, and not more than 45,000 would be available before Nov. 1 to fill the existing and prospective vacancies. We still had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the situation, American and Allied, especially as to our own resources in men for the next two months, convinced me that the attack of the First Army and of the Allied armies further west should be pushed to the limit. But if the First Army was to continue its aggressive tactics our divisions then with the French must be recalled, and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions.

In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Marshal Foch and General Pétain, on Oct. 10, the former expressed his appreciation of the fact that the First Army was striking the pivot of the German withdrawal, and also held the view that the Allied attack should continue. General Pétain agreed

that the American divisions with the French were essential to us if we were to maintain our battle against the German pivot. The French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks and, before those divisions with the French had been released, it became necessary for us to send the 37th and 91st Divisions from the First Army to assist the Sixth French Army in Flanders.

"MOST DESPERATE BATTLE OF OUR HISTORY"

At this time the First Army was holding a front of more than 120 kilometers; its strength exceeded 1,000,000 men; it was engaged in the most desperate battle of our history, and the burden of command was too heavy for a single commander and staff. Therefore, on Oct. 12, that portion of our front extending from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, to Fresnes-en-Woevre, southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second Army with Lieutenant-General Robert L. Bullard in command, under whom it began preparations for the extension of operations to the east in the direction of Briey and Metz. On Oct. 16 the command of the First Army was transferred to Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett, and my advance headquarters was established at Ligny-Barrois, from which the command of the group of American armies was exercised.

HINDENBURG LINE BROKEN

Local attacks of the First Army were continued in order particularly to adjust positions preparatory to a renewed general assault. The 1st and 5th Divisions were relieved by the 42nd and 80th Divisions, which were now fresh. An attack along the whole front was made on Oct. 14. The resistance encountered was stubborn, but the stronghold on Cote Dame Marie was captured and the Hindenburg Line was broken. Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon were taken and the line advanced 2 kilometers north of Sommerance. A maximum advance of 17 kilometers had been made since Sept. 26 and the enemy had been forced to throw into the fight a total of fifteen reserve divisions.

During the remainder of the month important local operations were carried out, which involved desperate fighting. The First Corps, Major-General Dickman commanding, advanced through Grand Pré; the Fifth Corps, Major-General Charles P. Summerall commanding, captured the Bois de Bantheville; the Third Corps, Major-General John L. Hines commanding, completed the occupation of Cunel Heights; and the Seventeenth French Corps drove the enemy from the main ridge south of La Grande Montagne. Particular heavy fighting occurred east of the Meuse on Oct. 18, and in the further penetration of the Kriemhilde-Stellung on Oct. 23 the 26th Division entering the battle at this time relieved the 18th French Division.

THE RESULTS, END OF OCTOBER

Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First Army by the end of October, we had met an increasing number of Germany's best divisions, rising from twenty in line and reserve on Sept. 26, to thirty-one on Oct. 31; the enemy's elaborately prepared positions, including the Hindenburg Line, in our front had been broken, the most impassable Argonne Forest was in our hands; an advance of twenty-one kilometers had been effected; 18,600 prisoners, 370 cannon, 1,000 machine guns, and a mass of material captured; and the great railway artery through Carignan to Sedan was now seriously threatened.

The demands of incessant battle which had been maintained day by day for more than a month had compelled our divisions to fight to the limit of their capacity. Combat troops were held in line and pushed to the attack until deemed incapable of further effort because of casualties or exhaustion; artillery once engaged was seldom withdrawn and many batteries fought until practically all the animals were casualties and the guns were towed out of line by motor trucks.

The American soldier had shown unrivaled fortitude in this continuous fighting during most inclement weather and under many disadvantages of position. Through experience, the Army had developed into a powerful and smooth-running machine, and there was a supreme confidence in our ability to carry through the task successfully.

While the high pressure of these dogged attacks was a great strain on our troops, it was calamitous to the enemy. His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, it became practically impossible to effect its relief. The enemy was forced to meet the constantly recurring crisis by breaking up tactical organizations and sending hurried detachments to widely separated portions of the field.

Every member of the American Expeditionary Forces, from the front line to the base ports, was straining every nerve. Magnificent efforts were exerted by the entire Services of Supply to meet the enormous demands made on it. Obstacles which seemed insurmountable were overcome daily in expediting the movements of replacements, ammunition and supplies to the front, and of sick and wounded to the rear. It was this spirit of determination animating every American soldier that made it impossible for the enemy to maintain the struggle until 1919.

MEUSE-ARGONNE, THIRD PHASE

The detailed plans for the operations of the Allied armies on the Western front changed from time to time during the course of this great battle, but the mission of the First American Army to cut the great Carignan-Sedan-Mézières Railroad remained unchanged. Marshal Foch coordinated the operations along the entire front, continuing persistently and unceasingly the attacks by all Allied armies; the Belgian army, with a French army and two American divisions, advancing eastward; the British armies and two American divisions, with the First French Army on their right, toward the region north of Givet; the First American Army and Fourth French Army toward Sedan and Mézières.

On the 21st my instructions were issued to the First Army to prepare thoroughly for a general attack on Oct. 28 that would be decisive, if possible. In order that the attack of the First Army and that of the Fourth French Army on its left should be simultaneous, our attack was delayed until Nov. 1. The immediate purpose of the First Army was to take Buzancy and the heights of Barricourt, to turn the forest north of Grand Pré, and to establish contact with the Fourth French Army near Boulton-aux-Bois. The army was directed to carry the heights of Barricourt by nightfall of the first day and then to exploit this success by advancing its left to Boulton-aux-Bois in preparation for the drive toward Sedan. By strenuous

effort all available artillery had been moved well forward to the heights previously occupied by the enemy, from which it could fully cover and support the initial advance of the infantry.

On this occasion, and for the first time, the army prepared for its attack under normal conditions. We held the front of attack and were not under the necessity of taking over a new front, with its manifold installations and services. Our own personnel handled the communications, dumps, telegraph lines, and water service; our divisions were either on the line or close in rear; the French artillery, aviation, and technical troops which had previously made up our deficiencies had been largely replaced by our own organizations, and our army, corps, and divisional staffs were by actual experience second to none.

FOE'S LAST DEFENSE

On the morning of Nov. 1 three Army Corps were in line between the Meuse River and the Bois de Bourgogne. On the right the Third Corps had the 5th and 90th Divisions; the Fifth Corps occupied the center of the line, with the 89th and 2nd Divisions, and was to be the wedge of the attack on the first day; and on the left the First Corps deployed the 80th, 77th and 78th Divisions.

Preceded by two hours of violent artillery preparation, the infantry advanced, closely followed by "accompanying guns." The artillery acquitted itself magnificently, the barrages being so well coordinated and so dense that the enemy was overwhelmed and quickly submerged by the rapid onslaught of the infantry. By nightfall the Fifth Corps, in the center, had realized an advance of almost nine kilometers, to the Bois de la Folie, and had completed the capture of the heights of Barricourt, while the Third Corps, on the right, had captured Aincreville and Andevanne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions, and had precipitated a retreat of the German forces about to be isolated in the forest north of Grand Pré. On the 2nd and 3rd we advanced rapidly against heavy fighting on the front of the right and center corps; to the left the troops of the First Corps hurried forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. Our heavy artillery was skillfully brought into position to fire upon the Carignan-Sedan Railroad and the junctions at Longuyon and Conflans. By the evening of the 4th our troops had reached La Neuville, opposite Stenay, and had swept through the great Forêt de Dieulet, reaching the outskirts of Beaumont, while on the left we were eight kilometers north of Boulton-aux-Bois.

The following day the advance continued toward Sedan with increasing swiftness. The Third Corps, turning eastward, crossed the Meuse in a brilliant operation by the 5th Division, driving the enemy from the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse and forcing a general withdrawal from the strong positions he had so long held on the hills north of Verdun.

APPEALS FOR ARMISTICE

By the 7th the right of the Third Corps had exploited its river crossing to a distance of ten kilometers east of the Meuse, completely ejecting the enemy from the wooded heights and driving him out into the swampy plain of the Woëvre; the Fifth and First Corps had reached the line of the Meuse River along their respective fronts and the left of the latter corps



Drawn by French government artist

The First Meeting of the German Delegates With Marshal Foch and Allied Associates in the Marshal's Railroad Car at Rethondes, France

(1) Marshal Foch; (2) British Admiral Wemyss; (3) An American delegate; (4) French General Maxime Weygand. The German delegates are (5) Mathias Erzberger; (6) General von Guendele; (7) General von Winterfeld; (8) Count von Oberndorff.

held the heights dominating Sedan, the strategic goal of the Meuse-Argonne operation, forty-one kilometers from our point of departure on Nov. 1. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications. Recognizing that nothing but a cessation of hostilities could save his armies from complete disaster, he appealed for an immediate armistice on Nov. 6.

Meanwhile general plans had been prepared for the further employment of American forces in an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle, to be directed toward Longwy by the First Army, while the Second Army was to assume the offensive toward the Briey Iron Basin. Orders directing the preparatory local operations involved in this enterprise were issued on Nov. 5.

Between the 7th and 10th of November the Third Corps continued its advance eastward to Remolville, while the Seventeenth French Corps, on its right, with the 79th, 26th, and 81st American Divisions, and two French divisions, drove the enemy from his final foothold on the heights east of the Meuse. At 9 p. m. on Nov. 9 appropriate orders were sent to the First and Second Armies in accordance with the following telegram from Marshal Foch to the commander of each of the Allied armies:

"The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attacks, retreats along the entire front.

"It is important to coördinate and expedite our movements.

"I appeal to the energy and the initiative of the Commanders-in-Chief and of their armies to make decisive the results obtained."

NOVEMBER 11, 1918

In consequence of the foregoing instructions, our Second Army pressed the enemy along its entire front. On the night of the 10th-11th and the morning of the 11th the Fifth Corps, in the First Army, forced a crossing of the Meuse east of Beaumont and gained the commanding heights within the re-entrant of the river, thus completing our control of the Meuse River line. At 6 a. m. on the 11th notification was received from Marshal Foch's headquarters that the armistice had been signed and that hostilities would cease at 11 a. m. Preparatory measures had already been taken to insure the prompt transmission to the troops of the announcement of an armistice. However, the advance east of Beaumont on the morning of the 11th had been so rapid and communication across the river was so difficult that there was some fighting on isolated portions of that front after 11 a. m.

GREAT ODDS OVERCOME

Between Sept. 26 and Nov. 11 twenty-two American and four French divisions, on the front extending from southeast of Verdun to the Argonne Forest, had engaged and decisively beaten forty-seven different German divisions, representing 25 per cent of the enemy's entire divisional strength on the Western front. Of these enemy divisions, twenty had been drawn from the French front and one from the British front. Of the twenty-two American divisions, twelve had at different times during this period been engaged on fronts other than our own. The First Army suffered a loss of about 117,000 in killed and wounded. It captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,000 machine guns, and large quantities of material.

The dispositions which the enemy made to meet the Meuse-Argonne offensive, both immediately before the opening of the attack and

during the battle, demonstrated the importance which he ascribes to this section of the front and the extreme measures he was forced to take in its defense. From the moment the American offensive began until the armistice, his defense was desperate and the flow of his divisions to our front was continuous.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND AMERICAN ARMY

Under the instructions issued by me on Nov. 5, for operations by the Second Army in the direction of the Briey Iron Basin, the advance was undertaken along the entire front of the Army and continued during the last three days of hostilities. In the face of the stiff resistance offered by the enemy, and with the limited number of troops at the disposal of the Second Army, the gains realized reflected great credit on the divisions concerned. On Nov. 6 Marshal Foch requested that six American divisions be held in readiness to assist in an attack which the French were preparing to launch in the direction of Château-Salins. The plan was agreed to, but with the provision that our troops should be employed under the direction of the commanding general of the Second Army.

This combined attack was to be launched on Nov. 14, and was to consist of twenty French divisions under General Mangin and the six American divisions under General Bullard. Of the divisions designated for this operation the 3rd, 4th, 29th, and 36th were in the Army reserve, and were starting their march eastward on the morning of Nov. 11, while the 28th and 35th were being withdrawn from line on the Second Army front.

AMERICAN ACTIVITIES ON OTHER FRONTS

During the first phase of the Meuse-Argonne battle, American divisions were participating in important attacks on other portions of the front. The Second Army Corps, Major-General Read commanding, with the 27th and 30th Divisions on the British front, was assigned the task in coöperation with the Australian Corps, of breaking the Hindenburg Line at Le Cateau, where the St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. In this attack, carried out on Sept. 29 and Oct. 1, the 30th Division speedily broke through the main line of defense and captured all of its objectives, while the 27th progressed until some of its elements reached Gouy. In this and later actions from Oct. 6 to 19, our Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced about twenty-four kilometers.

On Oct. 2-9 our 2nd and 36th Divisions assisted the Fourth French Army in its advance between Reims and the Argonne. The 2nd Division completed its advance on this front by the assault of the wooded heights of Mont Blanc, the key point of the German position, which was captured with consummate dash and skill. The division here repulsed violent counter-attacks, and then carried our lines into the village of St. Etienne, thus forcing the Germans to fall back before Reims and yield positions which they had held since September, 1914. On Oct. 10 the 36th Division relieved the 2nd, exploiting the latter's success, and in two days advanced, with the French, a distance of twenty-one kilometers, the enemy retiring behind the Aisne River.

In the middle of October, while we were heavily engaged in the Meuse-Argonne, Marshal Foch requested that two American divisions be sent immediately to assist the Sixth French Army in Belgium, where slow progress was being made. The 37th and 91st Divisions, the

latter being accompanied by the artillery of the 28th Division, were hurriedly despatched to the Belgian front. On Oct. 30, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, these divisions entered the line and attacked. By Nov. 3 the 37th Division had completed its mission by rapidly driving the enemy across the Escaut River and had firmly established itself on the east bank, while the 91st Division, in a spirited advance, captured Spitaals Bosschen, reached the Scheldt, and entered Audenarde.

AMERICAN TROOPS IN ACTION IN ITALY

The Italian government early made request for American troops, but the critical situation on the Western front made it necessary to con-

British government, through its ambassador at Washington, urged American participation in this undertaking. On July 23, 1918, the War Department directed the despatch of three battalions of infantry and three companies of engineers to join the Allied expedition. In compliance with these instructions the 339th Infantry, the 1st Battalion, 310th Engineers, 337th Field Hospital Company, and 337th Ambulance Company were sent through England, whence they sailed on Aug. 26.

The mission of these troops was limited to guarding the ports and as much of the surrounding country as might develop threatening conditions. The Allied force operated under British command, through whose orders the small American contingent was spread over a front



Courtesy of Red Cross Magazine

American Troops in Genoa

Yankee boys made "visits" to all countries of Europe. Here they are in sunny Italy.

centrate our efforts there. When the Secretary of War was in Italy during April, 1918, he was urged to send American troops to Italy to show America's interest in the Italian situation and to strengthen Italian morale. Similarly a request was made by the Italian prime minister at the Abbéville conference. It was finally decided to send one regiment to Italy with the necessary hospital and auxiliary service, and the 332nd Infantry was selected, reaching the Italian front in July, 1918. These troops participated in action against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 at the crossing of the Piave River and in the final pursuit of the Austrian army.

AMERICAN TROOPS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

It was the opinion of the Supreme War Council that Allied troops should be sent to cooperate with the Russians, either at Murmansk or Archangel against the Bolshevik forces, and the

of about 450 miles. From September, 1918, to May, 1919, a series of minor engagements with the Bolshevik forces occurred, in which eighty-two Americans were killed and seven died of wounds.

In April, 1919, two companies of American railroad troops were added to our contingent. The withdrawal of the American force commenced in the latter part of May, 1919, and on Aug. 25 there was left only a small detachment of Graves registration troops.

THE ALLIED ADVANCE INTO GERMANY

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, the Allies were to occupy all German territory west of the Rhine, with bridgeheads of thirty kilometer radius at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mayence. The zone assigned the American command was the bridgehead of Coblenz and the district of Treves. This territory was to be

occupied by an American Army, with its reserves held between the Moselle-Meuse rivers and the Luxemburg frontier.

The instructions of Marshal Foch, issued on Nov. 16, contemplated that two French infantry divisions and one French cavalry division would be added to the American forces that occupied the Coblenz bridgehead, and that one American division would be added to the French force occupying the Mayence bridgehead. As this arrangement presented possibilities of misunderstanding due to difference of views regarding the government of occupied territory, it was represented to the marshal that each nation should be given a well-defined territory of occupation, employing within such territory only the troops of the commander responsible for the particular zone. On Dec. 9 Marshal Foch accepted the principle of preserving the entity of command and troops, but reduced the American bridgehead by adding a portion of the eastern half to the French command at Mayence.

Various reasons made it undesirable to employ either the First or Second Army as the Army of Occupation. Plans had been made before the armistice to organize a third army, and on Nov. 14 this army, with Major-General Joseph T. Dickman as commander, was designated as the Army of Occupation. The Third and Fourth Army Corps staffs and troops, less artillery, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 32nd, and 42nd Divisions and the 66th Field Artillery Brigade were assigned to the Third Army. This force was later increased by the addition of the Seventh Corps, Major-General William M. Wright commanding, with the 5th, 89th, and 90th Divisions.

IN WAKE OF RETREAT

The advance toward German territory began on Nov. 17 at 5 a. m., six days after signing the armistice. All of the Allied forces from the North Sea to the Swiss border moved forward simultaneously in the wake of the retreating German armies. Upon arrival at the frontier a halt was made until Dec. 1, when the leading elements of all Allied armies crossed the line into Germany. The Third Army headquarters was established at Coblenz and an advance general headquarters located at Treves. Steps were immediately taken to organize the bridgehead for defenses and dispositions were made to meet a possible renewal of hostilities.

The advance to the Rhine required long, arduous marches, through cold and inclement weather, with no opportunity for troops to rest, refit, and refresh themselves after their participation in the final battle. The Army of Occupation bore itself splendidly and exhibited a fine state of discipline both during the advance and throughout the period of occupation.

The zone of march of our troops into Germany and the line of communications of the Third Army after reaching the Rhine lay through Luxemburg. After the passage of the Third Army, the occupation of Luxemburg, for the purpose of guarding our line of communications, was entrusted to the 5th and 33rd Divisions of the Second Army. The City of Luxemburg, garrisoned by French troops and designated as the headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, was excluded from our control.

Upon entering the Duchy of Luxemburg in the advance, a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy was announced. Therefore, when the French commander in the city of Luxemburg was given charge of all troops in the Duchy, in so far as concerned the "administration of the Grand Duchy of

Luxemburg," my instructions were that our troops would not be subject to his control. Later, at my request, and in order to avoid possible friction, Marshal Foch placed the entire Duchy in the American zone.

RETURN OF TROOPS TO THE UNITED STATES

On the day the armistice was signed the problem of the return of our troops to the United States was taken up with the War Department, and on Nov. 15 a policy recommended of sending home certain auxiliaries so that we could begin to utilize all available shipping without delay. On Dec. 21 the War Department announced by cable that it had been decided to begin immediately the return of our forces, and continue as rapidly as transportation would permit. To carry this out, a schedule for the constant flow of troops to the ports was established, having in mind our international obligations pending the signing of the treaty of peace.

While more intimately related to the functions of the Services of Supply than to operations, it is logical to introduce here a brief recital of the organizations created for the return of our troops to America. Prior to the armistice but 15,000 men had been returned home. Although the existing organization was built for the efficient and rapid handling of the incoming forces, the embarkation of this small number presented no difficulties. But the armistice suddenly and completely reversed the problem of the Services of Supply at the ports and the handling of troops. It became necessary immediately to reorganize the machinery of the ports, to construct large embarkation camps, and to create an extensive service for embarking the homeward-bound troops.

THE CAMP AT BREST

Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux became the principal embarkation ports, Marseilles and Le Havre being added later to utilize Italian and French liners. The construction of the embarkation camps during unseasonable winter weather was the most trying problem. These, with the billeting facilities available, gave accommodation for 55,000 at Brest, 44,000 at St. Nazaire, and 130,000 at Bordeaux. Unfortunately the largest ships had to be handled at Brest, where the least shelter was available.

To maintain a suitable reservoir of men for Brest and St. Nazaire, an embarkation center was organized around Le Mans, which eventually accommodated 230,000 men. Here the troops and their records were prepared for the return voyage and immediate demobilization. As the troops arrived at the base ports, the embarkation service was charged with feeding, reclothing, and equipping the hundreds of thousands who passed through, which required the maintenance of a form of hotel service on a scale not hitherto attempted.

On Nov. 16 all combat troops, except thirty divisions and a minimum of corps and army troops, were released for return to the United States. It was early evident that only limited use would be made of the American divisions, and that the retention of thirty divisions was not necessary. Marshal Foch considered it indispensable to maintain under arms a total, including Italians, of 120 to 140 divisions, and he proposed that we maintain thirty divisions in France until Feb. 1, twenty-five of which should be held in the zone of the armies, and that on March 1 we should have twenty divisions in the zone of the armies and five ready to embark. The plan for March 1 was satisfactory, but the

restrictions as to the divisions that should be in France on Feb 1 could not be accepted, as it would seriously interfere with the flow of troops homeward.

In a communication dated Dec. 24 the marshal set forth the minimum forces to be furnished by the several Allies, requesting the American Army to furnish twenty-two to twenty-five divisions of infantry. In the same note he estimated the force to be maintained after the signing of the preliminaries of peace at about thirty-two divisions, of which the American Army was to furnish six.

TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

In reply it was pointed out that our problem of repatriation of troops and their demobilization was quite different from that of France or Great Britain. On account of our long line of communications in France and the time consumed by the ocean voyage and travel in the United States, even with the maximum employment of our then available transportation, at least a year must elapse before we could complete our demobilization. Therefore it was proposed by me that the number of American combat divisions to be maintained in the zone of the armies should be reduced on April 1 to fifteen divisions and on May 1 to ten divisions, and that in the unexpected event that the preliminaries of peace should not be signed by May 1 we would continue to maintain ten divisions in the zone of the armistice until the date of signature.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief later revised his estimate, and, on Jan. 24, stated to the Supreme War Council that the German demobilization would permit the reduction of the Allied forces to 100 divisions, of which the Americans were requested to furnish fifteen. In reply, it was again pointed out that our problem was entirely one of transportation, and that such a promise was unnecessary, inasmuch as it would probably be the summer of 1919 before we could reduce our forces below the number asked. We were therefore able to keep our available ships filled, and by May 19 all combat divisions, except five still in the Army of Occupation, were under orders to proceed to ports of embarkation. This provided sufficient troops to utilize all troop transports to include July 15.

The President had informed me that it would be necessary for us to have at least one regiment in occupied Germany, and left the details to be discussed by me with Marshal Foch. My cable of July 1 summarizes the agreement reached:

"By direction of President, I have discussed with Marshal Foch question of forces to be left on the Rhine. Following agreed upon: The 4th and 5th Divisions will be sent to base ports immediately, the 2nd Division will commence moving to base ports on July 15, and the 3rd Division on Aug. 15. Date of relief of 1st Division will be decided later. Agreement contemplates that after compliance by Germany with military conditions to be completed within first three months after German ratification of treaty, American force will be reduced to one regiment of infantry and certain auxiliaries. Request President be informed of agreement."

As a result of a later conference with Marshal Foch, the 3rd Division was released on Aug. 3 and the 1st Division on Aug. 15.

THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

In February, 1918, the line of communications was reorganized under the name of the Services of Supply. At that time all staff ser-

vices and departments, except the Adjutant General's, the Inspector General's, and the Judge Advocate General's departments, were grouped for supply purposes under one coordinating head, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with a general staff paralleling, so far as necessary, the general staff at general headquarters.

The principal functions of the Services of Supply were the procurement, storage, and transportation of supplies. These activities were controlled in a general way by the Commanding General, Services of Supply, the maximum degree of independence being permitted to the several services. This great organization was charged with immense projects in connection with roads, docks, railroads, and buildings; the transportation of men, animals, and supplies by sea, rail, and inland waterways; the operation of telegraph and telephone systems; the control and transportation of replacements; the hospitalization necessary for an army of 2,000,000 men; the reclassification of numerous officers and men; the establishment of leave areas and of welfare and entertainment projects; the liquidation of our affairs in France; and the final embarkation of our troops for home.

The growth of the permanent port personnel, the location near the base ports of certain units for training, and other considerations led to the appointment of a territorial commander for the section around each port, who, while acting as the representative of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, was given the local authority of a district commander. For similar reasons an intermediate section commander and an advance section commander were appointed. Eventually there were nine base sections, including one in England, one in Italy, and one comprising Rotterdam and Antwerp; also one intermediate and one advance section.

The increasing participation of the American Expeditionary Forces in active operations necessitated the enlargement of the responsibilities and authority of the Commanding General, Services of Supply. In August, 1918, he was charged with complete responsibility for all supply matters in the Services of Supply, and was authorized to correspond by cable directly with the War Department on all matters of supply not involving questions of policy.

In the following discussion of the Services of Supply the subjects of coordination of supply at the front, ocean tonnage, and replacements are included for convenience, though they were largely or entirely under the direct control of General Staff sections at my headquarters.

COORDINATION OF SUPPLY

Our successful participation in the war required that all the different services immediately concerned with the supply of combat troops should work together as a well-regulated machine. In other words, there must be no duplication of effort, but each must perform its functions without interference with any other service. The fourth section of the General Staff was created to control impartially all these services, and, under broad lines of policy, to determine questions of transportation and supply in France and coordinate our supply services with those of the Allies.

This section did not work out technical details, but was charged with having a general knowledge of existing conditions as to supply, its transportation, and of construction affecting our operations or the efficiency of our troops. It frequently happened that several of the supply departments desired the same site for the



Drawn by Joseph Cummings Chase

Lieutenant-General R. L. Bullard

Commanded in succession 1st Division, First Army Corps, and Second Army.

location of installations, so that all plans for such facilities had to be decided in accordance with the best interests of the whole.

In front of the advance depots, railroad lines and shipments to troops had to be carefully controlled, because mobility demanded that combat units should not be burdened with a single day's stores above the authorized standard reserve. Furthermore, accumulations at the front were exposed to the danger of destruction or capture and might indicate our intentions. Each combat division required the equivalent of twenty-five French railway car loads of supplies for its daily consumption to be delivered at a point within reach of motor or horse-drawn transportation. The regular and prompt receipt of supplies by combatant troops is of first importance in its effect upon the morale of both officers and men. The officer whose mind is preoccupied by the question of food, clothing, or ammunition is not free to devote his energy to training his men or to fighting the enemy. It is necessary that paper work be reduced to an absolute minimum and that the delivery of supplies to organizations be placed on an automatic basis as far as possible.

The principle of flexibility had to be borne in mind in planning our supply system in order that our forces should be supplied, no matter what their number, or where they might be called upon to enter the line. This high degree of elasticity and adaptability was assured and maintained through the medium of the regulating station. It was the connecting link between the armies and the services in the rear, and regulated the railroad transportation which tied them together. The regulating officer at each station was a member of the Fourth Section of my General Staff, acting under instructions from his chief of section.

Upon the regulating officer fell the responsibility that a steady flow of supply was maintained. He must meet emergency shipments of ammunition or engineering material, sudden transfers of troops by rail, the hastening forward of replacements, or the unexpected evacuation of wounded. All the supply services naturally clamored to have their shipments rushed through. The regulating officer, acting under special or secret instructions, must declare priorities in the supply of things the Army needed most. Always informed of the conditions at the front, of the status of supplies, and of military plans and intentions, nothing could be shipped to the regulating station or in front of the advance depots except on his orders. The chiefs of supply services fulfilled their responsibilities when they delivered to the regulating officer the supplies called for by him, and he met his obligation when these supplies were delivered at the proper railheads at the time they were needed. The evacuation of the wounded was effected over the same railroad lines as those carrying supplies to the front; therefore, this control had also to be centralized in the regulating officer.

LOCATION IMPORTANT

The convenient location of the regulating stations was of prime importance. They had to be close enough to all points in their zones to permit trains leaving after dusk or during the night to arrive at their destinations by dawn. They must also be far enough to the rear to be reasonably safe from capture. Only two regulating stations were actually constructed by us in France, Is-sur-Tille and Liffol-le-Grand, as the existing French facilities were sufficient to meet our requirements beyond the reach of those stations.

As far as the regulating officer was concerned, supplies were divided into four main classes. The first class constituted food, forage and fuel, needed and consumed every day; the second, uniforms, shoes, blankets, and horseshoes, which wear out with reasonable regularity; the third, articles of equipment which require replacement at irregular intervals, such as rolling kitchens, rifles, and escort wagons; the fourth class covered articles, the flow of which depended upon tactical operations, such as ammunition and construction material. Articles in the first class were placed on an automatic basis, but formal requisition was eliminated as far as possible for all classes.

In order to meet many of the immediate needs of troops coming out of the line and to relieve to some extent the great strain on the railheads during active fighting, a system of army depots was organized. These depots were supplied by bulk shipment from the advance depots through the regulating stations during relatively quiet periods. They were under the control of the chiefs of the supply services of the armies and required practically no construction work, the supplies being stored in open places protected only by dunnage and camouflaged tarpaulins.

The Services of Supply can be likened to a great reservoir divided into three main parts—the base depots, the intermediate depots, and the advance depots. The management of this reservoir is in charge of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, who administers it with a free hand, controlled only by general policies outlined to him from time to time. Each of the supply and technical services functions independently in its own respective sphere; each has its share of storage space in the base depots, in the intermediate depots, and in the advance depots. Then comes the distribution system, and here the control passes to the chief of the Fourth Section of the General Staff, who exercises his powers through the regulating stations.

PURCHASING AGENCY

The consideration of requirements in food and material led to the adoption of an automatic supply system, but, with the exception of foodstuffs, there was an actual shortage, especially in the early part of the war, of many things, such as equipment pertaining to land transportation and equipment and material for combat. The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at the beginning was serious. Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage from the States reached about seven and one-half million tons to Dec. 31, 1918, which was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

The supply situation made it imperative that we utilize European resources as far as possible for the purchase of material and supplies. If our Services of Supply departments had entered the market of Europe as purchasers without regulation or coordination, they would have been thrown into competition with each other, as well as with buyers from the Allied armies and the civil populations. Such a system would have created an unnatural elevation of prices, and would have actually obstructed the procurement of supplies. To meet this problem from the standpoint of economical business management, directions were given in August, 1917, for the creation of a General Purchasing Board to coordinate and control our purchases both among our own services and among the

Allies as well. The supervision and direction of this agency was placed in the hands of an experienced business man, and every supply department in the American Expeditionary Forces was represented on the board. Agents were stationed in Switzerland, Spain, and Holland, besides the Allied countries. The character of supplies included practically the entire category of necessities, although the bulk of our purchases consisted of raw materials for construction, ordnance, air equipment, and animals. A total of about 10,000,000 tons was purchased abroad by this agency to Dec. 31, 1918, most of which was obtained in France.

terial necessities that were in common use in all the armies. The possibility of immense savings were fully demonstrated, but the principles had not become of general application before the armistice.

OCEAN TONNAGE

Following a study of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent to Washington in December, 1917, with a general statement of the shipping situation in France as understood by the Allied Maritime Council. In March, 1918, tonnage requirements for transport and maintenance of



Road Construction Behind the Lines

The functions of the purchasing agency were gradually extended until they included a wide field of activities. In addition to the coordination of purchases, the supply resources of our Allies were reconnoitered and intimate touch was secured with foreign agencies; a statistical bureau was created which classified and analyzed our requirements; quarterly forecasts of supplies were issued; civilian manual labor was procured and organized; a technical board undertook the coordination, development, and utilization of the electric power facilities in France; a bureau of reciprocal supplies visited the claims of foreign governments for raw materials from the United States; and a general printing plant was established. Some of these activities were later transferred to other services as the latter became ready to undertake their control.

The principles upon which the usefulness of this agency depended were extended to our Allies, and in the summer of 1918 the general purchasing agent became a member of the Inter-Allied Board of Supplies. This board undertook, with signal success, to coordinate the supply of the Allied armies in all those classes of ma-

900,000 men in France by June 30 were adopted as a basis upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation of tonnage.

In April the Allied Maritime Transport Council showed that requirements for 1918 greatly exceeded the available tonnage. Further revisions of the schedule were required by the Abbéville agreement in May, under which American infantry and machine-gun units were to be transported in British shipping and by the Versailles agreement in June.

In July a serious crisis developed, as the allotment for August made the American Expeditionary Forces by the Shipping Control Committee was only 575,000 dead-weight tons, afterward increased to 700,000, whereas 803,000 tons (not including animals) were actually needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping be diverted from trades, and that a larger percentage of new shipping be placed in transport service.

Early in 1918 a scheme had been proposed which would provide priority for essential supplies only, based upon monthly available tonnage in sight. Although it was the understanding that calls for shipping should be based

upon our actual needs, much irregularity was found in tonnage allotments.

REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL

Under the original organization project there were to be two divisions in each corps of six divisions which were to be used as reservoirs of replacements. One-half of the artillery and other auxiliaries of these two divisions were to be utilized as corps and army troops. They were to supply the first demands for replacements from their original strength, after which a minimum of 3,000 men per month for each army corps in France was to be forwarded to them from the United States. It was estimated that this would give a sufficient reservoir of personnel to maintain the fighting strength of combat units, provided the sick and wounded were promptly returned to their own units upon recovery.

The 32nd and 41st Divisions were the first to be designated as replacement and depot divisions of the First Army Corps, but the situation soon became such that the 32nd Division had to be employed as a combat division. For the same reason all succeeding divisions had to be trained for combat, until June 27, when the need for replacements made it necessary to designate the 83rd as a depot division.

1. By the middle of August we faced a serious shortage of replacements. Divisions had arrived in France below strength, and each division diverted from replacement to combat duty increased the number of divisions to be supplied and at the same time decreased the supply.

On Aug. 16 the War Department was cabled, as follows:

"Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent in preference to new divisions."

At this time it became necessary to transfer 2,000 men from each of three combat divisions (the 7th, 36th, and 81st) to the First Army, in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive.

By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive was initiated the replacement situation had become still more acute. The infantry and machine-gun units of the 84th and 86th Divisions, then in the vicinity of Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leaving only a cadre of two officers and twenty-five men for each company. To provide immediate replacements during the progress of the battles new replacement organizations were formed in the zone of operations; at first, as battalions, and later, as regional replacement depots.

2. On Oct. 3, a cable was sent the War Department, reading as follows:

"Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August, and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the replacement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the 84th and 86th Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due, including 55,000 requested for October, be shipped early in October. If necessary, some divisions in United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as replacements at once."

Altogether seven divisions had to be skeletonized, leaving only one man per company and one officer per regiment to care for the records. As a further measure to meet the situation, the

authorized strength of divisions was reduced in October by 4,000 men, thus lowering the strength of each infantry company to approximately 174 men. The thirty combat divisions in France at that time needed 103,513 infantry and machine-gun replacements, and only 66,490 were available.

Attention of the War Department was invited on Nov. 2 to the fact that a total of 140,000 replacements would be due by the end of November, and the cable closed by saying:

"To send over entire divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for is a wasteful method, and one that makes for inefficiency; but as replacements are not otherwise available, there is no other course open to us. New and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have had battle experience. The latter must be kept up numerically to the point of efficiency. . . ."

REMOUNTS

The shortage of animals was a serious problem throughout the war. In July, 1917, the French agreed to furnish our forces with 7,000 animals a month, and accordingly the War Department was requested to discontinue shipments. On Aug. 24, however, the French advised us that it would be impossible to furnish the number of animals originally stated, and Washington was again asked to supply animals, but none could be sent over until November, and then only a limited number.

Early in 1918, after personal intervention and much delay, the French government made requisition on the country, and we were able to obtain 50,000 animals. After many difficulties the purchasing board was successful in obtaining permission, in the summer of 1918, to export animals from Spain, but practically no animals were received until after the armistice.

Every effort was made to reduce animal requirements—by increased motorization of artillery and by requiring mounted officers and men to walk—but in spite of all these efforts the situation as to animals grew steadily worse. The shortage by November exceeded 106,000, or almost one-half of all our needs. To relieve the crisis in this regard, during the Meuse-Argonne battle, Marshal Foch requisitioned 13,000 animals from the French armies and placed them at my disposal.

RECLASSIFICATION

An important development in the Services of Supply was the reclassification system for officers and men. This involved not only the physical reclassification of those partially fit for duty, but also the reclassification of officers according to fitness for special duties. A number of officers were found unsuited to the duties on which employed. An effort was made to reassign these officers to the advantage of themselves and the Army. A total of 1,101 officers were reclassified in addition to the disabled, and 270 were sent before efficiency boards for elimination. Nine hundred and sixty-two wounded or otherwise disabled officers were reclassified, their services being utilized to release officers on duty with the Services of Supply who were able to serve with combat units.

CONSTRUCTION

Among the most notable achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces was the large programme of construction carried out by our

Engineer troops in the Services of Supply and elsewhere. The chief projects were port facilities, including docks, railroads, warehouses, hospitals, barracks, and stables. These were planned to provide ultimately for an army of 4,000,000, the construction being carried on coincident with the growth of the American Expeditionary Forces.

The port plans contemplated 160 new berths, including the necessary facilities for discharge of cargo, approximately one-half of which were completed at the time of the armistice. Construction of new standard-gauge railroad track amounted to 1,002 miles, consisting mainly of cut-offs, double tracking at congested points, and yards at ports and depots. Road construction and repair continued until our troops were withdrawn from the several areas, employing at times upward of 10,000 men, and often using 90,000 tons of stone per week.

Storage requirements necessitated large supply depots at the ports and in the intermediate and advance sections. Over 2,000,000 square feet of covered storage was secured from the French, but it was necessary to construct approximately 20,000,000 square feet additional. The base hospital centers at Mars and Mesves, each with 4,000-bed convalescent camps, are typical of the large scale upon which hospital accommodations were provided. The hospital city at Mars, of 700 buildings, covered a ground space of thirty-three acres and included the usual road, water, sewerage, and lighting facilities of a municipality.

Advantages of economy and increased mobility caused the adoption of the system of billeting troops. Billeting areas were chosen near the base ports, along the line of communications, and in the advanced zone, as strategical requirements dictated. The system was not altogether satisfactory, but with the number of troops to be accommodated no other plan was practicable. Demountable barracks were used for shelter to supplement lack of billets, 16,000 barracks of this type being erected, particularly at base ports where large camps were necessary. Stables at remount stations were built for 43,000 animals. Other construction included refrigerating plants, such as the one at Gievres with a capacity of 6,500 tons of meat and 500 tons of ice per day; and mechanical bakeries like that at Is-sur-Tille with a capacity of 800,000 pounds of bread per day. If the buildings constructed were consolidated, with the width of a standard barrack, they would reach from St. Nazaire across France to the Elbe River in Germany, a distance of 730 miles.

In connection with construction work, the Engineer Corps engaged in extensive forestry operations, producing 200,000,000 feet of lumber, 4,000,000 railroad ties, 300,000 cords of fuel wood, 35,000 pieces of piling, and large quantities of miscellaneous products.

TRANSPORTATION CORPS

The Transportation Corps as a separate organization was new to our Army. Its exact relation to the supply departments was conceived to be that of a system acting as a common carrier operating its own ship and rail terminals. The equipment and operation of port terminals stands out as a most remarkable achievement. The amount of tonnage handled at all French ports grew slowly, reaching about 17,000 tons daily at the end of July, 1918. An emergency then developed as a result of the critical military situation, and the capacity of our terminals was so efficiently increased

that, by Nov. 11, 45,000 tons were being handled daily.

The French railroad, both in management and material, had dangerously deteriorated during the war. As our system was superimposed upon that of the French, it was necessary to provide them with additional personnel and much material. Experienced American railroad men brought into our organization, in various practical capacities, the best talent in the country, who, in addition to the management of our own transportation, materially aided the French. The relation of our transportation corps to the French railroads and to our own supply departments presented many difficulties, but these were eventually overcome and a high state of efficiency established.

It was early decided, as expedient for our purposes, to use American rolling stock on the French railroads, and approximately 20,000 cars and 1,500 standard-gauge locomotives were brought from the United States and assembled by our railroad troops. We assisted the French by repairing with our own personnel 57,385 French cars and 1,947 French locomotives. The lack of rolling stock for allied use was at all times a serious handicap, so that the number of cars and locomotives built and repaired by us was no small part of our contribution to the Allied cause.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS

The Quartermaster Corps was able to provide a larger tonnage of supplies from the States than any of the great supply departments. The operations of this corps were so large and the activities so numerous that they can best be understood by a study of the report of the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

The Quartermaster Corps in France was called upon to meet conditions never before presented, and it was found advisable to give it relief. Transportation problems by sea transport and by rail were handled by separate corps organized for that purpose, and already described. Motor transport was also placed under an organization of its own. The usual routine supplies furnished by this department reached enormous proportions. Except for the delay early in 1918 in obtaining clothing and the inferior quality of some that was furnished, and an occasional shortage in forage, no army was ever better provided for. Special services created under the Quartermaster Corps included a remount service, which received, cared for, and supplied animals to troops; a veterinary service, working in conjunction with the remount organization; an effects section and baggage service; and a salvage service for the recovery and preparation for reissue of every possible article of personal equipment. Due to the activities of the salvage service, an estimated saving of \$85,000,000 was realized, tonnage and raw material were conserved, and what in former wars represented a distinct liability was turned into a valuable asset.

The graves registration service, also under the Quartermaster Corps, was charged with the acquisition and care of cemeteries, the identification and reburial of our dead, and the correspondence with relatives of the deceased. Central cemeteries were organized on the American battlefields, the largest being at Romagne-sous-Montfaucon and at Thiaucourt in the Woivre. All territory over which our troops fought was examined by this service, and, generally speaking, the remains of our dead were assembled in American cemeteries and the graves marked with a cross or six-pointed star and photographed. A few bodies

were buried where they fell or in neighboring French or British cemeteries. Wherever the soldier was buried his identification tag, giving his name and Army serial number, was fastened to the marker. A careful record was kept of the location of each grave.

SIGNAL CORPS

The Signal Corps supplied, installed, and operated the general service of telephone and telegraphic communications throughout the zone of Armies, and from there to the rear areas. At the front it handled radio, press, and intercept stations; provided a radio network in the zone of advance; and also managed the meteorological, pigeon, and general photographic services. Our communication system included a cable across the English Channel, the erection of 4,000 kilometers of telephone and telegraph lines on our own poles, and the successful operation of a system with 215,500 kilometers of lines.

The quantity and importance of gasoline engine transportation in this war necessitated the creation of a new service known as the Motor Transport Corps. It was responsible for setting up motor vehicles received from America, their distribution, repair, and maintenance. Within the zone of the Services of Supply, the Motor Transport Corps controlled the use of motor vehicles, and it gave technical supervision to their operation in the zone of the Armies. It was responsible for the training and instruction of chauffeurs and other technical personnel. Due to the shortage of shipments from America, a large number of trucks, automobiles, and spare parts had to be purchased in France.

RENTING, REQUISITION

A renting, requisition, and claims service was organized in March, 1918, to procure billeting areas, supervise the quartering of troops with an organization of zone and town majors, and to have charge of the renting, leasing, and requisitioning of all lands and buildings required by the American Expeditionary Forces. Under the provisions of an act of Congress, approved in April, 1918, the Claims Department was charged with the investigation, assessment, and settlement of all claims "of inhabitants of France or any other European country not an enemy or ally of an enemy" for injuries to persons or damages to property occasioned by our forces. The procedure followed was in accordance with the law and practice of the country in question. The efficient administration of this service had an excellent effect upon the people of the European countries concerned.

The various activities of the Services of Supply which, at its height on Nov. 11, 1918, reached a numerical strength in personnel of 668,312, including 23,772 civilian employees, can best be summed up by quoting the telegram sent by me to Major-General James G. Harbord, the Commanding General, Services of Supply, upon my relinquishing personal command of the First Army:

"I want the S. O. S. to know how much the First Army appreciated the prompt response made to every demand for men, equipment, supplies, and transportation necessary to carry out the recent operations. Heartly congratulations. The S. O. S. shares the success with it."

MUNITIONS

Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in

the modern sense. The task of the Ordnance Department in supplying artillery was especially difficult. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French government to supply us with the artillery equipment of 75's, 155 mm. howitzers, and 155 G. P. F. guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. The wisdom of this course was fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of American manufacture of the calibres mentioned on our front at the date of the armistice. The only guns of these types produced at home which reached France before the cessation of hostilities were 109 75 mm. guns. In addition, twenty-four 8-inch howitzers from the United States reached our front and were in use when the armistice was signed. Eight 14-inch naval guns of American manufacture were set up on railroad mounts, and most of these were successfully employed on the Meuse-Argonne front under the efficient direction of Admiral Plunkett of the Navy.

AVIATION

In aviation we were entirely dependent upon our allies, and here again the French government came to our aid until our own programme could be set under way. From time to time we obtained from the French such 'planes for training personnel as they could provide. Without going into a complete discussion of aviation material, it will be sufficient to state that it was with great difficulty that we obtained equipment even for training. As for up-to-date combat 'planes, the development at home was slow, and we had to rely upon the French, who provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing machines. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we received 1,379 'planes of the De Havilland type. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines on Aug. 7, 1918. As to our aviators, many of whom trained with our allies, it can be said that they had no superiors in daring and in fighting ability. During the battles of St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne our aviators excelled all others. They have left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page in the annals of our Army.

TANKS

In the matter of tanks we were compelled to rely upon both the French and the English. Here, however, we were less fortunate for the reason that our allies barely had sufficient tanks to meet their own requirements. While our Tank Corps had limited opportunity, its fine personnel responded gallantly on every possible occasion and showed courage of the highest order. We had one battalion of heavy tanks engaged on the English front. On our own front we had only the light tanks, and the number available to participate in the last great assault of Nov. 1 was reduced to sixteen as a result of the previous hard fighting in the Meuse-Argonne.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

The Chemical Warfare Service represented another entirely new departure in this war. It included many specialists from civil life. With personnel of a high order, it developed rapidly into one of our most efficient auxiliary services. While the early employment of gas was in the

form of clouds launched from special projectors, its use later on in the war was virtually by means of gas shells fired by the light artillery. One of the most important duties of the Chemical Warfare Service was to insure the equipment of our troops with a safe and comfortable mask and the instruction of the personnel in the use of this protector. Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.

ADMINISTRATION

The general health of our armies under conditions strange and adverse in many ways to our American experience and mode of life was marvelously good. The proportionate number of men incapacitated from other causes than battle casualties and injuries was low. Of all deaths in the American Expeditionary Forces (to Sept. 1, 1919) totaling 81,141, there were killed in action, 35,556; died of wounds received in battle, 15,130; other wounds and injuries, 5,669, and died of disease, 24,786. Therefore, but little over two-sevenths of the total loss of life in the American Expeditionary Forces was caused by disease.

Our armies suffered from the communicable diseases that usually affect troops. Only two diseases have caused temporarily excessive sick rates, epidemic diarrhoea and influenza, and of these, influenza only, due to the fatal complicating pneumonia, caused a serious rise in the death rate. Both prevailed in the armies of our allies and enemies and in the civilian population of Europe.

Venereal disease has been with us always, but the control was successful to a degree never before attained in our armies or in any other army. It has been truly remarkable when the environment in which our men lived is appreciated. The incidence of venereal disease varied between 30 and 60 per 1,000 per annum, averaging under 40. Up to September, 1919, all troops sent home were free from venereal disease. The low percentages were due largely to the fine character of men composing our armies.

Hospitalization represented one of the largest and most difficult of the medical problems in the American Expeditionary Forces. That the needs were always met and that there was always a surplus of several thousand beds, were the results of great effort and the use of all possible expedients to make the utmost of resources available. The maximum number of patients in hospital on any one day was 193,026, on Nov. 12, 1918.

Evacuation of the sick and wounded was another difficult problem, especially during the battle periods. The total number of men evacuated in one of the armies was 214,467, of whom 11,281 were sent in hospital trains to base ports. The number of sick and wounded sent to the United States up to Nov. 11, 1918, was 14,000. Since the armistice 103,028 patients have been sent to the United States.

The Army and the Medical Department was fortunate in obtaining the services of leading physicians, surgeons, and specialists in all branches of medicine from all parts of the United States, who brought the most skillful talent of the world to the relief of our sick and wounded. The Army Nurse Corps deserves more than passing comment. These women, working tirelessly and devotedly, shared the burden of the day to the fullest extent with the men, many of them submitting to all the dangers of the battle front.

RECORDS, PERSONNEL

New problems confronted the Adjutant General's Department in France. Our great distance from home necessitated records, data, and executive machinery to represent the War Department as well as our forces in France. Unusually close attention was paid to individual records. Never before have accuracy and completeness of reports been so strictly insisted upon. Expedients had to be adopted whereby the above requirements could be met without increasing the record and correspondence work of combat units. The organization had to be elastic to meet the demands of any force maintained in Europe.

A Statistical Division was organized to collect data regarding the special qualifications of all officers and to keep an up-to-date record of the location, duties, health, and status of every officer and soldier, nurse, field clerk, and civilian employee, as well as the location and strength of organizations. The Central Records Office at Bourges received reports from the battle front, evacuation camps, and base hospitals, convalescent leave areas, reclassification camps, and base ports, and prepared for transmission to the War Department reports of individual casualties. Each of the 299,599 casualties was considered as an individual case. A thorough investigation of the men classed as "missing in action" reduced the number from 14,000 to the signing of the armistice to 22 on Aug. 31, 1919.

In addition to printing and distributing all orders from General Headquarters, the Adjutant General's Department had charge of the delivery and collection of official mail, and finally of all mail. The Motor Despatch Service operated twenty courier routes, over 2,300 miles of road, for the quick despatch and delivery of official communications. After July 1, 1918, the Military Postal Express Service was organized to handle all mail, official and personal, and operated 169 fixed and mobile postoffices and a railway postoffice service.

While every effort was exerted to maintain a satisfactory mail service, frequent transfers of individuals, especially during the hurried skeletonizing of certain combat divisions, numerous errors in addresses, hasty handling, and readdressing of mail by regimental and company clerks in the zone of operations, and other conditions incident to the continuous movement of troops in battle, made the distribution of mail an exceedingly difficult problem.

INSPECTION, DISCIPLINE

The Inspector General's Department, acting as an independent agency not responsible for the matters under its observation, made inspections and special investigations for the purpose of keeping commanders informed of local conditions. The inspectors worked unceasingly to determine the manner in which orders were being carried out, in an effort to perfect discipline and team play.

The earnest belief of every member of the Expeditionary Forces in the justice of our cause was productive of a form of self-imposed discipline among our soldiers, which must be regarded as an unusual development of this war, a fact which materially aided us to organize and employ in an incredibly short space of time the extraordinary fighting machine developed in France.

Our troops generally were strongly imbued with an offensive spirit essential to success. The veteran divisions had acquired not only this

spirit, but the other elements of fine discipline. In highly trained divisions, commanders of all grades operate according to a definite system calculated to concentrate their efforts where the enemy is weakest. Straggling is practically eliminated; the infantry, skilful in fire action and the employment of cover, gains with a minimum of casualties; the battalion, with all of its accompanying weapons, works smoothly as a team in which the parts automatically assist each other; the artillery gives the infantry close and continuous support; and unforeseen situations are met by prompt and energetic action.

This war has only confirmed the lessons of the past. The less experienced divisions, while aggressive, were lacking in the ready skill of habit. They were capable of powerful blows, but their blows were apt to be awkward—teamwork was often not well understood. Flexible and resourceful divisions can not be created by a few maneuvers or by a few months' association of their elements. On the other hand, without the keen intelligence, the endurance, the willingness, and enthusiasm displayed in the training areas, as well as on the battlefield, the successful results we obtained so quickly would have been utterly impossible.

MILITARY JUSTICE

The commanders of armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades, and certain territorial districts were empowered to appoint general courts-martial. Each of these commanders had on his staff an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department, whose duty it was to render legal advice and to assist in the prompt trial and just punishment of those guilty of serious infractions of discipline.

Prior to the signing of the armistice, serious breaches of discipline were rare, considering the number of troops. This was due to the high sense of duty of the soldiers and their appreciation of the seriousness of the situation. In the period of relaxation following the cessation of hostilities, infractions of discipline were naturally more numerous, but not even then was the number of trials as great in proportion to the strength of the force as is usual in our service.

It was early realized that many of the peacetime methods of punishment were not the best for existing conditions. In the early part of 1918 it was decided that the award of dishonorable discharge of soldiers convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude would not be contemplated, except in the most serious cases. To remove these soldiers temporarily from their organizations, division commanders were authorized to form provisional temporary detachments to which such soldiers could be attached. These detachments were retained with their battalions so that offenders would not escape the dangers and hardships to which their comrades were subjected. Wherever their battalion was engaged, whether in front-line trenches or in back areas, these men were required to perform hard labor. Only in emergency were they permitted to engage in combat. Soldiers in these disciplinary battalions were made to understand that if they acquitted themselves well, they would be restored to full duty with their organizations.

All officers exercising disciplinary powers were imbued with the purpose of these instructions and carried them into effect. So that nearly all men convicted of military offenses in combat divisions remained with their organizations and continued to perform their duty as soldiers. Many redeemed themselves by render-

ing valiant service in action and were released from the further operation of their sentences.

To have the necessary deterrent effect upon the whole unit, courts-martial for serious offenses usually imposed sentences considerably heavier than would have been awarded in peace times. Except where the offender earned remission at the front, these sentences stood during hostilities. At the signing of the armistice, steps were at once taken to reduce outstanding sentences to the standards of peace time.

PROVOST MARSHAL

On July 20, 1917, a Provost Marshal General was appointed with station in Paris, and later the department was organized as an administrative service with the Provost Marshal General functioning under the first section, General Staff. The department was developed into four main sections—the Military Police Corps, which served with divisions, corps, and armies and in the sections of the Services of Supply; the prisoner of war escort companies; the criminal investigation department, and the circulation department. It was not until 1918 that the last mentioned department became well trained and efficient. On Oct. 15, 1918, the strength of the corps was increased to 1 per cent. of the strength of the American Expeditionary Forces, and Provost Marshals for armies, corps, and divisions were provided.

The Military Police of the American Expeditionary Forces developed into one of the most striking bodies of men in Europe. Wherever the American soldier went, there our Military Police were on duty. They controlled traffic in the battle zone, in all villages occupied by American troops, and in many cities through which our traffic flowed; they maintained order, so far as the American soldiers were concerned, throughout France and in portions of England, Italy, Belgium, and occupied Germany. Their smart appearance and military bearing and the intelligent manner in which they discharged their duties left an excellent impression of the typical American on all with whom they came in contact.

APPRECIATION

In this brief summary of the achievements of the American Expeditionary Forces it would be impossible to cite in detail the splendid ability, loyalty, and efficiency that characterized the service of both combatant and non-combatant individuals and organizations. The most striking quality of both officers and men was the resourceful energy and common sense employed under all circumstances in handling their problems.

The highest praise is due to the commanders of armies, corps, and divisions, and their subordinate leaders, who labored loyally and ably toward the accomplishment of our task, suppressing personal opinions and ambitions in the pursuit of the common aim; and to their staffs, who developed, with battle experience, into splendid teams without superiors in any army.

To my Chiefs of Staff—Major-General James G. Harbord, who was later placed in command of the Services of Supply, and Major-General James W. McAndrew—I am deeply indebted for highly efficient services in a post of great responsibility.

The important work of the staff at General Headquarters in organization and administration was characterized by exceptional ability and a fine spirit of coöperation. No chief ever had a more loyal and efficient body of assistants.

The officers and men of the Services of Supply fully realized the importance of their duties, and the operations of that vast business system were conducted in a manner which won for them the praise of all. They deserve their full share in the victory.

The American civilians in Europe, both in official and private life, were decidedly patriotic and loyal, and invariably lent encouragement and helpfulness to the armies abroad.

The various societies, especially their women, including those of the theatrical profession, and our Army nurses, played a most important part in brightening the lives of our troops and in giving aid and comfort to our sick and wounded.

The Navy in European waters, under command of Admiral Sims, at all times cordially aided the Army. To our sister service we owe the safe arrival of our armies and their supplies. It is most gratifying to record that there has never been such perfect understanding between these two branches of the service.

Our armies were conscious of the support and coöperation of all branches of the government. Behind them stood the entire American people, whose ardent patriotism and sympathy inspired our troops with a deep sense of obligation, of loyalty, and of devotion to the country's cause never equalled in our history.

Finally, the memory of the unflinching fortitude and heroism of the soldiers of the line fills me with greatest admiration. To them I again pay the supreme tribute. Their devotion, their valor, and their sacrifices will live in the hearts of their grateful countrymen.

In closing this report, Mr. Secretary, I desire to record my deep appreciation of the unqualified support accorded me throughout the war by the President and yourself. My task was simplified by your confidence and wise counsel. I am, Mr. Secretary, Very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, Commander-in-Chief,
American Expeditionary Forces.

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